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This is Lawrence Solum's legal theory weblog. Legal Theory Blog comments and reports on recent scholarship in jurisprudence, law and philosophy, law and economic theory, and theoretical work in substantive areas, such as constitutional law, cyberlaw, procedure, criminal law, intellectual property, torts, contracts, etc.

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Wednesday, November 30, 2005
 
Scruton Interview Check out The Joy of Conservatism: An Interview with Roger Scruton (Part I) over at Right Reason. Here's a taste:
    The problem for conservatism is to reconcile the many and often conflicting demands that these various forms of life impose on us. The free-market ideologues take one instance of spontaneous order, and erect it into a prescription for all the others. They ask us to believe that the free exchange of commodities is the model for all social interaction. But many of our most important forms of life involve withdrawing what we value from the market: sexual morality is an obvious instance, city planning another. (America has failed abysmally in both those respects, of course.) Looked at from the anthropological point of view religion can be seen as an elaborate (and spontaneous) way in which communities remove what is most precious to them (i.e. all that concerns the creation and reproduction of community) from the erosion of the market. A cultural conservative, such as I am, supports that enterprise. I would put the point in terms that echo Burke and Chesterton: the free market provides the optimal solution to the competition among the living for scarce resources; but when applied to the goods in which the dead and the unborn have an interest (sex, for instance) it wastes what must be saved.


 
Markel on Executing the Innocent Check out Innocents Lost by Dan Markel on Slate. Here's a taste:
    The nontrivial risk of error and the irrevocable nature of the death penalty are only two reasons policy-makers sympathetic to the tropes of retributive justice should oppose the death penalty. As I've argued elsewhere and at greater length, retributivists are properly obsessed with accurately sorting the innocent from the guilty. It follows that the state committed to the virtues of impartial retributivism (rather than mere hotblooded revenge) should favor not only sobriety and restraint, but also modesty in punishment. The state should refuse to impose a punishment that prevents it from later acknowledging—and making amends for—its own wrongful acts to its own unintended victims.
Check it out!


 
Seidman on the Israeli Supreme Court, the Palestinian Uprising, and Administrative Review Guy I. Seidman (Interdisciplinary Center Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law) has posted Judicial Administrative Review in Times of Discontent: The Israel Supreme Court and the Palestinian Uprising (Israel Affairs, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Most democracies offer some form of judicial review of administrative action. In common law systems, such review is preformed by a national court system of general jurisdiction; in civil law systems, it is typically performed by a system of specialized administrative-law courts. Judicial willingness to actively review executive action and policy varies among different nature and across subject matters. It is typically especially limited in military matters, especially in times of War. Essentially all Western court systems pursue a low-key, highly deferential policy of review in military matters, limiting their intervention to extreme cases, and deciding well after the winds of war have subsided. Until recently this was of little practical significance. For over 50 years, since World War II ended, most of the West enjoyed a long period of peace and tranquility. But things have changed. Yet in recent years, a series of events has shaken Western complacency. Starting with the horrors of 9/11 in the United States, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and major terror attacks in Madrid and elsewhere, Western nations have become painfully aware of the need to adopt stricter security policies - which, in turn, meant a growing number of restrictions on basic human rights, and greater government oversight of private activities. Western nations have thus come to face the democratic dilemmas that we, in Israel, have known for too long, and have taken steps for which we, in Israel have been criticized for too long. The Israeli Supreme Court is often discussed in studies comparing court activism and judicial protection of human and civil rights. Where the Israeli experience seems of particular comparative interest is in the Court's response to the dilemmas facing the judiciary on finding a balance between respecting legitimate national security concerns and protecting valued civil and human rights - maintaining the values of democracy and the integrity of the legal and political system in times of war. I believe that in this, the Israeli Court achieved unique results. While somewhat deferential to the military, especially in times of ongoing military activities, the Court has coped well to a continuous state of emergency since 1948, and has, for the most part, been a clear and steady voice in curbing executive excess, especially when it infringed on individual liberties. This paper has four parts. Part II highlights the lesser known structural and jurisdictional background that enabled the Israeli Supreme Court to develop its public law jurisprudence. Part III uses leading cases of the Israeli Supreme Court to illustrate the complexly and diversity inherent to judicial review of the military in Israel, and the significant achievements of the Court from 1948 to the year 2000. Part IV focuses on the Supreme Court's judicial response to petitions relating to the Palestinian uprising of 2000 in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the most violent period in four decades of Israeli control over the territories. The concluding Part V attempts to summarize the paper and place all its parts in perspective, with an overall evaluation of the Court's performance in the tumultuous recent years.


 
Frischmann on Demsetzian Copyright Brett M. Frischmann (Loyola University of Chicago, Law School) has posted Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Copyright law provides an excellent case study with which to study and evaluate Harold Demsetz's theory of property rights. Regardless of how one feels about the relationship between property and intellectual property, it is hard to escape the fact that intellectual property rights have expanded and grown more property-like and more privatized in recent decades. There has been an undeniable Demsetzian trend in copyright law. In this article, I critique the Demsetzian trend in copyright law and challenge some of the fundamental premises upon which the normative arguments for continued privatization and propertization of intellectual resources rest. First, I focus on the perceived benefits of internalizing externalities. I argue that externalities do not necessarily distort incentives or, more generally, the market allocation of resources. For many externalities, there is no efficiency benefit to internalization (whether internalization is accomplished by Pigouvian taxes/subsidies or property rights). In the end, the benefits of internalization must be carefully assessed rather than assumed. The view that increasing the degree of internalization through private property rights inevitably leads to increased incentives to invest in creation or distribution is not well-established in either theory or practice. Second, I focus on the frequently invoked solution of efficient licensing and the "logic" that property rights should be extended "into every corner in which people derive enjoyment and value . . . [so that] signals of consumer preference [may] trigger and direct [producers'] investments" (Goldstein, 1994). I argue that there is a fundamental flaw in this logic that undermines the efficient licensing hypothesis. Social demand for individuals' access to and use of copyright protected works often exceeds private demand. Purchasers'/licensees' willingness to pay reflects only their private demand and does not take into account value that others might realize as a result of their use. As I explain, many uses of copyrighted works generate value for third-parties. Finally, drawing from the first two points, I argue that, from a Coasean perspective, both externalities and property rights have symmetrical and reciprocal potentials to distort the market allocation of resources. A priori and devoid of context, one cannot say that the potential distortions caused by a property right, externality, or incremental change in a property right have a net positive or negative effect on social welfare.


 
Curran on Comparative Law & Language Vivian Grosswald Curran (University of Pittsburgh - School of Law) has posted Comparative Law and Language (OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Reinhard Zimmermann and Mathias Reimann, eds., Oxford University Press, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Comparative law is law's cybernetics, or 'theory of messiness.' It attempts to steer through the messiness of the foreign by reordering it into the language of the familiar without betraying the original. It is needed urgently in contexts of unrecognized metamorphosis, and today metamorphoses are burgeoning in murky areas outside of law's traditional categories of either the national or the international. The less apparent, the less visibly foreign, the foreign is, the more comparative law has a task of translation involving the formation of a vocabulary to transmit new configurations that resist detection and articulation. This essay examines the centrality of translation to processes of language and meaning construction, and links translation to comparative law as a model for the study of similarity and difference, the universal and the particular. The debate in comparative law over the relative importance of similarity and difference among legal systems has its counterpart in linguistics in conflicting views about whether commonalities among languages are fundamental or marginal. These issues situate both language and comparative law between mutually contradictory aspirations of universalism and pluralism which have stalked the evolution of both fields. Despite appearances of the ascendancy of universalism in today's world, it is not difference and pluralism that are receding, but, rather, that former domains of pluralism and difference recede, while others emerge. Like language, inevitably imprecise and perpetually in flux, comparative law can not be frozen once and for all, to be captured for future application if only it is developed with sufficient acuity and insight. It shares what Isaiah Berlin attributed to philosophy and distinguished from the scientific: it does not carry within itself the method of its own solution, and therefore must be reinvented in each generation, destroying its own past rigidities and methods of decoding and transmitting, in order to construct a new modality of analysis, a new vocabulary better adapted to changed meaning. Comparative law shares with language the pitfalls of miscommunication and misunderstanding, as well as the potentials of learning to see, to communicate and to shed light in that elusive, inevitable, shifting and ever-reconfiguring space that, like language, it occupies between the same and the other.


Tuesday, November 29, 2005
 
Utset on Time-Inconsistent Misconduct Manuel A. Utset (University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law) has posted A Model of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case of Lawyer Misconduct (74 Fordham L. Rev. __ (2005) (forthcoming)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article develops a model of time-inconsistent misconduct to explain incremental misconduct by lawyers-i.e., repeated, marginal misconduct that over time can lead to a moral unraveling or disintegration. A person engages in time-inconsistent misconduct when: (1)she has determined that a particular type of misconduct has negative expected returns and made a long-term decision to abstain from such misconduct; (2)nonetheless, when provided with the opportunity, she reverses her long-term preference to abstain and engages in misconduct; and (3)the reversal is due to a preference for immediate gratification (and not to the acquisition of new information). A person will engage in such misconduct in each period in which the incremental gain from misconduct (i.e., the added incremental utility due to the immediacy of a reward or from avoiding an immediate cost) exceeds the incremental loss (i.e., the actual net expected loss from that one act of misconduct). For example, the prospect of receiving an immediate reward can lead a lawyer to repeatedly take prohibited or unethical actions, a phenomenon that I refer to as "nibbling opportunism". At the same time, the prospect of incurring an immediate cost can lead a lawyer to repeatedly procrastinate following through with a required action. Time-inconsistent misconduct harms both the third-party victims and the lawyer-i.e., each time that the lawyer engages in misconduct she incurs an incremental loss that from a long-term perspective she wanted to avoid, and which in the aggregate can be very large. Accounting for time-inconsistent misconduct is important, among other reasons, because the rules needed to deter such misconduct are different from those needed to deter the time-consistent misconduct assumed in standard models. The time-inconsistent misconduct model also generalizes to other types of misconduct, such as criminal misconduct and group misconduct.


 
Blumm, Dunning, and Reed on Public Trust Michael C. Blumm , Harrison Dunning and Scott W. Reed (Lewis & Clark Law School , University of California, Davis and Stanford Law School) have posted Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794 (Ecology Law Quarterly 461, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1997) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Under the influence of powerful irrigation and timber lobbies, the state of Idaho enacted a law in 1996 which renounced the application of the public trust doctrine to water rights and public land decisionmaking, in an effort to overturn several decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court. This article explains the genesis of that law, exposes its flaws, and questions its validity. In particular, we maintain that the rights that Idaho legislature attempted to terminate are in fact inalienable, sovereign rights that a state cannot renounce. We also argue that a state cannot, consistent with the federal law, terminate public rights in lands conveyed to the state under the equal footing doctrine. Finally, we contend that the Idaho statute violates the state constitution's declaration of the public character of water within the state. The article notes that its analysis may have use beyond the state of Idaho, as several other western states have constitutional provisions that could be interpreted to incorporate the public trust doctrine.


 
Call for Papers: Pramatism in Granada
    The Conference "III MEETING ON PRAGMATISM: AGENCY, INFERENCE, AND THE ORIGINS OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY" http://www.ugr.es/local/nef/Meeting/index.html will take palce in Granada, Spain, on April 19-21, 2006. Invited speakers include John McDowell, Robert Brandom (Pittsburgh, U.S.) and Mathieu Marion (Quebec, Canada). Submissions are welcomed until January 31, 2006. manuel de pinedo departamento de filosofía universidad de granada 18011 granada (spain) http://www.ugr.es/~pinedo/


Monday, November 28, 2005
 
Hasen on the Future of Election Law Election law guru Rick Hasen has posted No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article, prepared for a symposium on voting rights in the South Carolina Law Review, examines the future of election law in the Roberts Court. Even before the death of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and the announced retirement of Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, election law scholars had declared that the Supreme Court had reached "doctrinal interregnum." In the campaign finance arena, the Court's jurisprudence was becoming increasingly incoherent; voting rights law was said to be "at law with itself;" partisan gerrymandering claims in flux; and the question of Supreme Court oversight of the "nuts-and-bolts" of elections after Bush v. Gore a big mystery. With the change of two Justices on the Supreme Court, exit from doctrinal incoherence and uncertainty becomes possible. The replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist with new Chief Justice John Roberts and the replacement of Justice O'Connor with a new Justice appointed by President Bush could provide an opening for major changes in Supreme Court election law doctrine. This is especially true with Justice O'Connor's departure, because she has held the swing vote in key election law cases. What sort of changes should we expect from the Roberts Court? Making predictions is exceedingly difficult when the swing votes likely will be held by those who have not expressed (or not expressed recently) views on these subjects, and concern for respecting (even wrong-headed) precedent could prove a strong force. And Justices' views certainly may change over time. Still, I work under the assumption that a conservative president who had apparently committed himself to appointing Justices in the mold of Justices Thomas and Scalia is unlikely to appoint Justices who in fact move the Court to the left, and could well move the Court to the right in key election law cases. The result is that 5-10 years from now, the ground rules for American political competition could undergo a major change. Within the next decade, we could well see deregulation of campaign financing, a limiting of Congressional power to impose national solutions to problems of minority voting rights, and an upholding of state power to redistrict for partisan gain and impose increasingly draconian election administration tools enacted in the name of fraud prevention. The ability of states to manipulate election rules for partisan gain may present the greatest danger, as the Court exits from that corner of the political thicket. For those who look to courts for the promotion of political equality, the signs are not encouraging.
Highly recommended!


Sunday, November 27, 2005
 
Legal Theory Lexicon: Fact and Value
    Introduction Law students quickly learn that normative argument is an integral part of the law school experience. And sooner or later, they are likely to encounter what is called the fact/value distinction. Of course, the relationship between fact and value is a deep and complex philosophical topic. Even a survey of the basic topics would take us far afield into the heart of metaethics and across the field of normative moral philosophy. Nonetheless, we can take a quick look at three important ideas with which every legal theorist should have a basic familiarity.
    Hume on Deriving an Is from an Ought The locus classicus for the distinction between fact and value is David Hume's famous observation about the derivation of an "is" from an "ought." Here is the famous passage from Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, Section 1, Book III:
      I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar [poorly reasoned] systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.
    What is Hume up to? One might start with the idea that Hume's point is about the form of moral arguments. If all the premises are "is" propositions, then perhaps Hume is claiming that some sort of logical fallacy has been committed if the conclusion of the argument is an ought statement. Consider this example:
      Premise: Withdrawing from Iraq is a policy that would save human lives and improve the condition of the Iraqi people.
      Conclusion: Therefore, the United States ought to withdraw from Iraq.
    We might think that there is a missing premises, which would be of the form:
      Premise: The United States policy towards Iraq ought to aim at saving lives and improving the condition of the Iraqi people."
    But there is a problem with this interpretation of Hume's point. One can easily produce a version of the argument that contains only is premises, but that looks more or less valid. For example:
      Premise: Withdrawing from Iraq is a policy that would save human lives and improve the condition of the Iraqi people.
      Premise: The policy that would save lives and improve the condition of the Iraqi people is the most choice worthy policy.
      Conclusion: Therefore, the United States ought to withdraw from Iraq.
    I'm sure that you, gentle reader, have run ahead of me, and are at this very point objecting that the second premise includes a covert "ought" statement. And perhaps it does, but the point of the exericse is that Hume's point is not just about the formal qualities of moral arguments. For his point to get off the ground, it must have substantive metaethical punch--it must be grounded on some theory about what counts as a fact and what counts as a value.
    G.E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy The second classical source for the fact/value distinction is G.E. Moore's discussion of the so-called naturalistic fallacy and his open-question argument. The core idea of the naturalistic fallacy is that one cannot identify "goodness" with any natural property. That is, it would be a mistake to identify goodness with the natural property of pleasure or happiness or health. Why is it a fallacy? Moore thought that the fallacy could be brought out by the open-question argument. So suppose, someone says that withdrawing from Iraq would be good if and only if withdrawing from Iraq would produce more pleasure than any alternative course of action, and that this is so, because goodness just is the maximization of pleasure. Moore claims that it is nonetheless an open question whether this is so. "Is pleasure good?" is an open question, as is, "I concede that withdrawing from Iraq will produce the most pleasure, but nonetheless is is a good thing to do?" Moore's point was that if these questions are open in the sense that they are not nonsensical questions, then it cannot be the case that goodness is the maximization of pleasure. Moore claimed that for any natural property that might be used to define goodness, the open-question argument will still be available. Moore's conclusion was that goodness must be a non-natural basic property that is somehow directly perceived by some human faculty of moral intuition.
    The Entanglement of Fact and Value It is not uncommon for relatively sophisticated legal thinkers to accept that the fact/value distinction is a well-established truth of metaethics, but this would be a vast oversimplification. In fact, both the Humean and Moorean versions of the fact/value distinction are hugely controversial. One relatively simple demonstration of the difficulties that face any attempt to argue that facts and values belong to two mutually-exlusive realms can begin with what the distinction between thick and thin ethical terms. (Thin ethical terms would include "right" and "good," they are thin because they don't seem to carry any particular descriptive or factual content.) A good example of a thick ethical term might be "cruel." Actions can be described as cruel, and there is likely to be a good deal of intersubjective agreement on the question whether a particular action is cruel or not. Moreover, when asked why an action is cruel, the answer will certainly include a number of fact, e.g. the action caused pain, the pain was unnecessary to accomplishment of the actions purpose, and so forth. Cruel has a clear factual component. But cruel also involves moral values. So, for example, it would be quite odd to say, "His action was cruel, but it was nonetheless good." Such an assertion would naturally lead to the question: "So what was good about it that justified the cruelty." Of course, there are many possible answers to this challenge, but one of them is not: "Oh, there was nothing else that made it good; it was just a cruel action." Contrast this to, "His action was cruel, and therefore it was wrong." Imagine now the query: "Yes it was cruel, but what was wrong with that." And now the reply, "Huh? What was wrong with it was that it was cruel. Didn't you hear me?" Anyone who believes there is a sharp line that separates the realm of facts from the realm of values must produce an account of thick ethical terms, because such terms seem to straddle the line.
    Of course, there are many many thick ethical terms. For law students, the really interesting thing is that many legal concepts are closely related to (or are themselves) thick ethical terms. A good example is "murder." Whether or not an action is "murder" in the ordinary, nonlegal sense of that term is clearly a question that involves the entanglement of fact and value. "Was it murder?" leads to "Was someone killed?", "Was the killing in self defense?" and so on. If we conclude that an action was murder, then ordinarily we also conclude that the action is morally wrong--even thought in rare circumstances, murder might be morally justified. Murder is a concept in which law, fact, and value all seem to be entangled. As a law student, you might begin to look for fact/value distinctions and for the entanglement of fact and value. My guess is that you will see these ideas operating everywhere, but especially in torts and criminal law!
    If thick moral terms establish the entanglement of facts and values, that is only one step towards an adequate account of the fact-value distinction. For the purposes of law students with an interest in legal theory, awareness of the issues is probably sufficient. If you develop a deep interest in the foundations of normative jurisprudence, you will want to pursue these topics in much greater depth.
    Conclusion Arguments about what the law should be are normative; normative legal theory might be considered a particular branch of political and moral philosophy. So legal theorists need to be aware of the fact/value distinction. As a rule of thumb, be wary of arguments that seem to confuse facts and values or to derives oughts from ises. If you do decide to cross the line, then be aware of the criticisms that may come your way!


Saturday, November 26, 2005
 
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Arguing Marbury V. Madison, edited by Mark V. Tushnet. Here is a blurb:
    Marbury v. Madison, decided in 1803, is the foundation stone of the American doctrine of judicial review. Remarkably, the case was decided without the parties having presented an oral argument to the Supreme Court. This book begins with a unique transcript of an oral argument in the case, conducted before a bench of four distinguished federal judges. The transcript is followed by essays on Marbury’s intellectual background, its significance in U.S. constitutional history, and the way in which we might think of constitutional theory and judicial review in terms sensitive to the historical and political contexts in which the practice persists. Distinguished commentators question some of the claims made in the essays, and offer their own perspectives on Marbury’s importance.
The contributors include: David Strauss, Suzanna Sherry, Susan Low Bloch, Barry Friedman, Douglas Reed, Stephen Griffin, Vicki Jackson, Louis Seidman, and Mark Tushnet.


 
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is James Madison's Celebrated Report of 1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment by Kurt Lash. Here is the abstract:
    It has become commonplace to describe the Rehnquist Court as having staged a "Federalism Revolution." Although the current status of the Revolution is in dispute, historical treatment of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under Chief Justice Rehnquist no doubt will emphasize a resurgence of federalism and limited construction of federal power. Cases like Gregory v. Ashcroft, New York v. United States, United States v. Lopez, Printz v. United States, Alden v. Maine, and United States v. Morrison all share a common rule of interpretation: Narrow construction of federal power to interfere with matters believed best left under state control. The textual hook for this rule of strict construction has been the Tenth Amendment. The Court's reliance on the Tenth Amendment has been the source of unrelenting scholarly criticism, particularly because the amendment itself literally does nothing more than announce a mere "truism": Those powers not delegated are reserved. It says nothing about whether delegated powers are to be broadly or strictly construed. As I have written in two previous articles, Founders such as James Madison believed that the Ninth Amendment, not the Tenth, established a rule of strict construction. In this article, I address how it came to pass that the Tenth Amendment, and not the Ninth, became accepted as an independent rule of strict construction. Ironically, it was Madison himself who drafted the document that would establish the Tenth Amendment as the primary guarantor of constitutional federalism. Madison's 1800 "Report on the Virginia Resolutions" denounced the Alien and Sedition Acts as exceeding Congress's enumerated powers and thus intruded upon the retained rights of the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment. His Report became a canonical document in the 19th century states' rights movement and transformed the Tenth Amendment into a symbolic declaration of limited federal power.
Download it while its hot!


Friday, November 25, 2005
 
Friday Calendar
    St Anne's College, Oxford: Ed Flippen, "US Electricity Deregulation after California, Enron and the Worst Blackout in US History"
    Oxford Centre for Competition Law & Policy: Edward Flippen, US Electric Deregulation after California, Enron, and the Worst Blackout in US History


 
Ristroph on Proportionality as Limit on Government Power Alice Ristroph (University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law) has posted Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government (Duke Law Journal, Vol. 55, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article examines proportionality as a constitutional limitation on the power to punish. In the criminal context, proportionality is often mischaracterized as a specifically penological theory-an ideal linked to specific accounts of the purpose of punishment. In fact, a constitutional proportionality requirement is better understood as an external limitation on the state's penal power that is independent of the goals of punishment. Proportionality limitations on the penal power arise not from the purposes of punishment, but from the fact that punishing is not the only purpose that the state must pursue. Other considerations, especially the protection of individual interests in liberty and equality, restrict the pursuit of penological goals. Principles of proportionality put the limits into any theory of limited government, and proportionality in the sentencing context is just one instance of these limitations on state power. This understanding of proportionality gives reason to doubt the assertion that determinations of proportionality are necessarily best left to legislatures. In doctrinal contexts other than criminal sentencing, proportionality is frequently used as a mechanism of judicial review to prevent legislative encroachments on individual rights and other exercises of excessive power. In the criminal sentencing context, we should recognize a constitutional proportionality requirement as a limit on penal power.


 
Nicolas on the Number of Justices on the Supreme Court Peter Nicolas (University of Washington School of Law) has posted Nine, of Course: A Dialogue on Congressional Power to Set by Statute the Number of Justices on the Supreme Court (New York University Journal of Law & Liberty, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In this article, I hypothesize that 28 U.S.C. Section 1, which sets the number of justices on the United States Supreme Court at nine, is not a constitutionally valid exercise of congressional power. Rather, I theorize, under the design of the Constitution, the number of justices on the Supreme Court at any given time will vary depending on the number of justices the President chooses to nominate and how many of those, if any, members of the Senate opt to confirm. In the manuscript, I consider and reject potential sources of congressional power to enact the statute, including the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I and the Regulations Clause of Article III. I then consider how the constitutionality of the statute would be determined, including who would have standing to bring a challenge. Finally, I examine the consequences of my hypothesis.


 
Piomelli on Collaborative Lawyering Ascanio Piomelli (University of California, Hastings College of the Law) has posted The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This Article reinterprets collaborative lawyering - and its call for progressive lawyers to collaborate with clients and communities to jointly pursue social change - as part of a participatory democratic tradition of active self-government by engaged citizens. Rejecting conventional views that collaborative lawyering primarily grows out of postmodernist social theory, the Article details this lawyering's deep affinity with John Dewey's modern recasting of Athenian and Jeffersonian ideas and with the early 1960s' practice of Ella Baker, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and New Left activists. It argues that a democratic lens reveals the distinctive values underlying collaborative lawyers' commitment to ordinary citizens' robust participation in collective efforts to reshape society - values that are at odds with competing visions of democracy and lawyering that place expert professionals at the center of such efforts.


 
French on the Problem of the Future Susan Fletcher French (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) has posted Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This short article explores the similarities between perpetual private trusts and conservation servitudes granted in perpetuity, the adequacy of existing doctrines to handle future changes in circumstances, the deference due to donor intent, and concludes that legal changes will be needed to give private trust beneficiaries more power to determine how trust assets will be used and to protect the public interests in conservation servitudes and the continuing utility of the land subject to them.


 
Symposium Announcement: International Law & the State of the Constitution at Columbia
    International Law and the State of the Constitution New York City, February 24-25, 2006 25th Annual Federalist Society Student Symposium Columbia Law School is honored to be hosting this year's symposium on its 25th anniversary. We join a tradition of symposia dedicated to exploring the most pressing and important issues in law and public policy. We have chosen the topic of international law, broadly defined, for this year's symposium, and we are certain it will provide a fantastic set of panels and debates. International law has dominated the Supreme Court's docket in recent terms in two distinct, but related, forms. The first involves issues that are inherently international in nature—for example the power of the Executive, and protections offered by the Constitution in the war on terror—where the Court has always struggled with its role in the international realm. The second involves the increasing frequency with which the Court involves international law in its decisions in ways it historically has not. The use of foreign sources in the interpretation of the Constitution is the most pressing concern voiced by conservative jurists, and continues to provoke controversy when it is employed to defend reversal of settled U.S. law. This year's symposium will address the various applications of both of these concerns. We have invited the most accomplished professors and jurists from a variety of points on the ideological spectrum to deliver insight into these important questions. We hope you will join us in New York City on Friday and Saturday, February 24-25, 2006. The speakers include
      Judge Frank Easterbrook, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Dennis Jacobs, 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William H. Pryor, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge A. Raymond Randolph, DC Circuit Court of Appeals Dean Alex Aleinikoff, Georgetown University Law Center Professor Akhil Amar, Yale Law School Professor Curtis Bradley, Duke University School of Law Professor Steven Calabresi, Northwestern University Law School Professor Lori Damrosch, Columbia Law School Professor Martin Flaherty, Fordham Law School Professor Thomas Franck, New York University Law School Professor Vicki Jackson, Georgetown University Law Center Professor John McGinnis, Northwestern University Law School Professor Thomas W. Merrill, Columbia Law School Professor Gerald Neuman, Columbia Law School Professor Catherine Powell, Fordham Law School Professor Jeremy Rabkin, Cornell University Professor Michael Ramsey, University of San Diego Law School Professor Jeremy Waldron, Columbia Law School Professor Ruth Wedgewood, Johns Hopkins University Professor John Yoo, Boalt Hall (UC Berkeley) School of Law


Thursday, November 24, 2005
 
Thursday Calendar
    Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Josep Lluís Martí Marmol, The Epistemic Conception of Deliberative Democracy Defended
    Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Thomas Skouteris, 'The New Tribunalism': Liberal Sensibilities in the Age of Adjudication
    Oxford Financial Law Discussion Group: Professor Niamh Moloney, "The Hedge Fund Challenge as a Test Case for EC Securities Regulation"
    University College, London, Centre for Law and the Environment and the Journal of Environmental Law: The Hon. Sir Francis Jacobs, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Environment: What Role for the Court in a Global Drama?’
    University College, London, Current Legal Problems Lecture: Professor Jeremy Phillips (UCL), ‘How to Win at Monopoly: Applying Game Theory to the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights’


 
Thanksgiving This Thanksgiving, I would like to thank the many teachers and mentors who have enabled and enriched my life as teacher, scholar, and thinker.
    Thanks to Mr. Chevalier of Repetto School in Monterey Park, my home room teacher in seventh grade--the first of many teachers who made learning an adventure rather than a chore.
    Thanks to Congressman Brad Sherman, my best friend in 8th grade, who convinced me to join the Mark Keppel High School Debate Team.
    Thanks to Jewel Bridges, my high school debate coach, who really had no idea what to do with me.
    Thanks to Marilyn Young, who played a recording of Larry Tribe in the final round of the college national debate championships. At age 14, when I learned that Tribe was then a young professor at Harvard Law School, I decided that I wanted to be a law professor--a lucky if somewhat improbable dream.
    Thanks to Mr. Katz, my high school American History teacher, who had 16 and 17 year olds reading classic articles from history and political science about constitutional history. I took it for granted.
    Thanks to Geoff Goodman, Dennis Winston, and King Schofield, to John DeBross, John Wallen, and Lee Garrison, to Donn Parson, David Zarefsky, James Unger, and Lee Polk, to Jay Hurst and David Kent, and many many others on the "national circuit." I learned so much.
    Thanks to Rogers Albritton--the best teacher I've ever had.
    Thanks to Warren Quinn, Gregory Kavka, and Jean Hampton. Warren, Greg, and Jean were extraordinary philosophers, associated with the UCLA philosophy department in the late 70s and early 80s. All three are now gone, long before their times. Each of them encouraged me when I needed encouragement.
    Thanks to Philippa Foot--I use something I learned from Philippa almost every day of my professional life.
    Thanks to John Rawls, who was generous beyond all reason. He set the standard to which I aspire.
    Thanks to Frank Michelman and Lea Brilmayer. First year contracts: Lea taught the first semester; Frank taught the second. Perhaps some of my readers will be able to guess that there was quite a contrast. Ex ante versus ex post, anyone?
    Thanks to Andy Kaufman, Charles Nesson, Charles Fried, Roberto Unger, Lloyd Weinreb, Louis Kaplow, Arthur Miller, and David Westfall. Most especially, thanks to Steve Marzen, from whom I learned the law.
    And to Archibald Cox--who single-nandedly provided a window into what was best about legal education in another era.
Best wishes for a joyous Thanksgiving! And thank you for reading!


 
Shiffrin on Bollinger on Academic Freedom Check out Steve Shiffrin's Bollinger, Academic Freedom, and Tolerance on Left2Right. Here's a taste:
    According to Bollinger, the goal of university education is to produce tolerant and non-authoritarian citizens, citizens who have “the imaginative range and the mental courage to take in, to explore, the full complexity of the subject. To set aside one's pre-existing beliefs, to hold simultaneously in one's mind multiple angles of seeing things, to actually allow yourself seemingly to believe another view as you consider it. . . .” It strikes me that this perspective on academic freedom is overly narrow. We can all agree that professor have responsibilities. They must teach within the confines of the subject they are teaching. They must respect students whose views are different than those of the professor. In many courses they should be expected to explore, so far as possible, “the full range of the complexity of the subject.” (Bollinger, I believe is not so naïve as to believe that the full range can really be explored in every course. What he means to counter is one-sided or partisan teaching). But, in requiring this of every course, Bollinger goes too far. Is it wrong for a teacher in a seminar on law and economics to explore the subject without having a unit on challenges to law and economics?
Read the whole post!


Wednesday, November 23, 2005
 
Wednesday Calendar
    Heythop Philosophy Society (London): John Skorupski (St Andrews), Welfare and Morality
    Philosophy of Education (London): Mitja Sardoc (IOE), Liberal Civic Education Re-examined
    Northwestern Law & Economics: Kathy Spier, Professor of Law and Professor of Management and Strategy, Northwestern University, "Strategic Judgment Proofing"
    University Collgege, London, International Law Association: Dr Matthew Craven, SOAS; Catriona Drew, SOAS; Dr Susan Marks, Cambridge University; Dr Gerry Simpson, LSE, ‘The Empire Strikes Back? Colonialism, empire, self-determination and international law’


 
Lash on Madison's Tenth Amendment Kurt Lash (Loyola, Los Angeles) has posted James Madison's Celebrated Report of 1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment (forthcoming George Washington Law Review) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    It has become commonplace to describe the Rehnquist Court as having staged a "Federalism Revolution." Although the current status of the Revolution is in dispute, historical treatment of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under Chief Justice Rehnquist no doubt will emphasize a resurgence of federalism and limited construction of federal power. Cases like Gregory v. Ashcroft, New York v. United States, United States v. Lopez, Printz v. United States, Alden v. Maine, and United States v. Morrison all share a common rule of interpretation: Narrow construction of federal power to interfere with matters believed best left under state control. The textual hook for this rule of strict construction has been the Tenth Amendment. The Court's reliance on the Tenth Amendment has been the source of unrelenting scholarly criticism, particularly because the amendment itself literally does nothing more than announce a mere "truism": Those powers not delegated are reserved. It says nothing about whether delegated powers are to be broadly or strictly construed. As I have written in two previous articles, Founders such as James Madison believed that the Ninth Amendment, not the Tenth, established a rule of strict construction. In this article, I address how it came to pass that the Tenth Amendment, and not the Ninth, became accepted as an independent rule of strict construction. Ironically, it was Madison himself who drafted the document that would establish the Tenth Amendment as the primary guarantor of constitutional federalism. Madison's 1800 "Report on the Virginia Resolutions" denounced the Alien and Sedition Acts as exceeding Congress's enumerated powers and thus intruded upon the retained rights of the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment. His Report became a canonical document in the 19th century states' rights movement and transformed the Tenth Amendment into a symbolic declaration of limited federal power.
Highly recommended.


 
Lazarus on Deliberative Democracy & Environmental Law Richard James Lazarus (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law (Georgetown Law Journal, Vol 94, No. 2, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In recent years, the formal environmental lawmaking dimension of Congress has become effectively moribund. Earlier Congresses were, by contrast, celebrated for enacting sweeping, demanding environmental laws and for passing significant and increasingly detailed amendments in response to subsequent developments in executive branch agencies, federal courts, and the states. Now, Congress passes almost no coherent, comprehensive environmental legislation and displays no ability to deliberate openly and systematically in response to changing circumstances and new information. Instead, when Congress does now exercise its lawmaking authorities to influence environmental protection policy, it does so primarily through the appropriations process: the sphere of its responsibility that, ironically, has proven to be the least conducive to the kind of deliberative democracy that justifies legislative supremacy in environmental lawmaking. This article describes the ascent and descent of Congress in environmental law, discusses the troublesome implications for environmental law of the increasing dominance of the appropriations process in congressional lawmaking, identifies the major causes of these developments, and concludes by offering some possibilities for congressional reform.


 
Call for Papers: "Making Ethics Visible"
    Call for Proposals The 2nd Midwest Environmental Ethics Conference: "Making Ethics Visible" St. Paul, Minnesota May 6, 2006 Conference Sponsors: --Department of Philosophy, University of St. Thomas --Program on Agricultural, Food, and Environmental Ethics, University of Minnesota --Minnesota Department of Natural Resources --Minnesota Association for Environmental Education Featured Speakers: --J. Baird Callicott, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Texas --Andrew Light, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Washington --Peter Bell, Chair, Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities The organizing committee for the 2nd Midwest Environmental Ethics Conference invites proposals from academic philosophers, natural resource professionals, environmental education practitioners, and interested community members for papers, panels, roundtables, workshops, and other presentations that address the role of environmental ethics in community decision-making. The committee specifically invites proposals that address the conference theme -- "Making Ethics Visible" -- by answering the following question: "how can your academic discipline, professional expertise, or personal insight contribute to making ethical practices, principles, and/or assumptions visible in community decision-making about the environment?" Proposals that address the environment of the Midwest and/or environmental education are especially encouraged. Presenters may also wish to address one or more of the following related questions: --what ethical practices, principles, and assumptions are involved in community decision-making about the environment? how are theoretical issues in environmental ethics related to actual communities, issues, and decision-making processes? --who constitutes the "community" in community decision-making? who gets to make the decisions, and how is this decided? who is affected by these decisions, and what role do these parties have in the decision-making process? are the values promoted in environmental decisions shared by the affected communities? --how does community decision-making function at different temporal and spatial scales? what role can future generations play? what role can people in distant lands play? what is the relationship between local, regional, and global communities? what is the relationship between communities of interest and communities of place? --how are ethical conflicts resolved? which methods of conflict resolution have proven most effective, and why? --what role can environmental educators play in community decision- making? how should environmental ethics be incorporated into environmental education? how do environmental ethics and the ethics of education interact in the delivery of environmental education? Morning keynote addresses by J. Baird Callicott and Andrew Light will be followed by a panel discussion with Peter Bell and other policy- makers that will model how to make ethics visible in community decision-making, using the issue of suburban sprawl as a case study. Following lunch, four hour-long concurrent sessions will promote an interdisciplinary dialogue between academics, professionals, environmental educators, and community members. A variety of session proposals will be considered -- including papers, panels, roundtables, discussions, and workshops -- but all presentations will be limited to 30 minutes, so that 30 minutes of audience discussion and participation can follow. Conference organizers will chair the concurrent sessions and will review all proposals prior to acceptance. Send one-page proposals by 6 January 2006 to: Heidi Giebel Department of Philosophy, #JRC 241 University of St. Thomas St. Paul, MN 55105 Email: hmgiebel@stthomas.edu Phone: 651-962-5367 Please include the title of your proposed presentation, your institutional affiliation (if any), and your contact information. Requests for audio-visual equipment must accompany the proposal. Electronic submissions are encouraged. Registration materials will be made available on or around 15 February 2006. We will also have a web site linked to http:// www.stthomas.edu/phil/ and http://www.agricola.umn.edu/ethics/


 
Program Announcement: PhD in Information, Communication, and the Social Sciences
    Doctor of Philosophy in Information, Communication, and the Social Sciences The Oxford Internet Institute (OII) is now accepting applications from candidates worldwide who want to study the Internet and its social impact full-time at a doctoral level from October 2006. We aim to admit four to six students a year, starting in 2006-07. The first closing date for fully completed applications is the 20th of January 2006 for admission in October 2006. We are a department of Oxford University, chartered to pioneer the multidisciplinary study of the evolution and social implications of the Internet and related information and communication technologies. The OII informs and grounds its research in fruitful collaboration with policy makers, technologists, businesspeople, teachers, scholars and civil society more widely. We seek to understand the most relevant social puzzles, problems, and opportunities associated with the Internet as it transforms the fundamentals of work, politics, education, entertainment, and social collaboration and conflict. Candidates must demonstrate the talent, creativity, and enthusiasm necessary to perform outstanding research that will make a difference—to ask original, concrete questions and adopt incisive methodologies for exploring them, in order to help positively shape the development of digital networked space and those whose lives are affected by it. The OII’s four key areas of research provide the focal points for studies within the DPhil in Information, Communication, and the Social Sciences: Technology and institutional innovation. This area includes productivity in the private and public sphere; the management, functioning and delivery of government services and processes; and e-democracy and e-government developments. Backgrounds in sociology, management, government, and political science would help to explore issues such as: In what ways is the Internet transforming politics, government and organizational performance? How do governments use information technology to improve public service delivery and enhance democratic processes—or to strengthen autocratic regimes? What social and organizational factors constrain and drive developments in e-government and e-democracy? Science, learning and networks. Here the focus is on the use of ICTs within academic and research communities, especially on innovations in education and the social, legal and ethical shaping of what is becoming known as e-Science. Backgrounds in education, computer science, ethics, and law would be particularly appropriate for examining questions like: In what ways is the Internet being used to transform science, learning, and education? What new legal, ethical, and institutional issues are being raised by advanced Internet and Grid technologies? Will advanced developments in e-Science define the next breakthrough in ICTs? e-Society. The application of ICTs in many aspects of everyday life is the heart of this theme, such as in personal interactions and activities in the household and workplace in a mobile, networked society. Backgrounds in sociology, media and cultural studies, economics, political science and other relevant social sciences are welcomed to gain fresh insights into questions like: Who uses and who does not use the Internet and what difference does this make? Is the Internet a technology of freedom or control, enhancing social and personal freedom or eroding privacy and civil liberties? How can the Internet’s impact be accurately and meaningfully measured and explained? What social factors are shaping ICTs and their broad societal implications? Shaping, governing and regulating the Internet and related ICTs. This focal point investigates frameworks that liberate or constrain the range of choices that can be made about the use, design and development of ICTs, including the architecture of the Internet and how it is governed. Backgrounds in law, computer science, technology policy, and media studies would be especially relevant to issues such as: How far should, and can, citizen behaviour in cyberspace be regulated and controlled? Who does, and who should, govern the Internet? What shifts between public and private gatekeepers are underway, or could emerge in the future? What options are there for what the Internet could look like in the next 10–20 years, and which of these futures are most desirable and attainable? For further information, see http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/teaching/


Tuesday, November 22, 2005
 
Tuesday Calendar
    Georgetown Law: Vicki Jackson, Habeas Corpus
    NYU Colloquium in Law, Economics & Politics: Richard Pildes (New York University School of Law) with Daryl Levinson (Harvard Law School), "Separation of Parties, Not Powers"
    Oxford Human Rights Discussion Group: Kate Hofmeyr and Tarunabh Khaitan, Judicial Enforcement of Positive Rights in India and South Africa: A Comparative Perspective
    Oxford EC Law Discussion Group: Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Idea of a European Constitution
    Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Henry Carr, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Claims & Shapes: New Boundaries in IP Law


 
Tauber on the Bill of Rights in the Territories Alan Tauber (University of South Carolina) has posted The Empire Forgotten: The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    "The Empire Forgotten: The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories" examines the history of the Insular Cases, a series of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century, dealing with the extension of the Bill of Rights to recently acquired territories of the United States. It begins with an examination of the history of territorial acquisition by the United States, starting with the Northwest Territories and continuing up through the Treaty of Paris at the end of the Spanish-American War. Through this historical examination, the paper traces the various laws and treaties made by Congress, and how the Treaty of Paris, unlike prior treaties, lacked a provision guaranteeing rights to citizens of the newly acquired territories. It was this lack that lead to the decisions by the United States Supreme Court, holding that the full Bill of Rights, specifically the right to a jury trial, did not apply to these newly acquired "insular" territories. Part III of the paper begins with an examination of the Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, the first application of the Bill of Rights to United States territory not yet a state. It notes that in that case, Chief Justice Taney held that the Bill of Rights, and specifically the right to a jury trial, applied in U.S. territories. It then moves on to an examination of the "Uniform Duties Clause Cases," in which the Court first addressed the Government's relationship to the insular territories, and ruled that they were not part of "the United States" as that term was used in the Constitution. It then moves on to examine the Insular Cases themselves, and the creation of the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine, which holds that the Constitution only applies fully to territories that Congress has incorporated into the United States. Since Congress has not incorporated the insular territories, the Court held that the right to a jury trial did not apply. It traces the evolution of the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine from its first articulation in Justice White's concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell through its eventual adoption by the full Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico (sic). The paper then examines the distinction between procedural and fundamental rights, only the latter of which have been incorporated. It notes that the Court held that the right to a jury trial is procedural, rather than fundamental, and therefore citizens of the insular territories could not claim this right. The paper moves on to a discussion of the racist language and assumptions underlying the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine before moving on to an examination of several solutions to the problem of this unequal application of the Bill of Rights. Four possible solutions are suggested, and the benefits and detriments of each are explored before the paper finally concludes that the best action to solve for this unequal application of the Bill of Rights is for Congress to fully incorporate the Insular Territories.


 
Professional Suicide? Updated and Moved to the Top of the Blog Check out Attack of the Career-Killing Blogs by Robert S. Boynton on Slate. A taste:
    "Here goes nothing. I shouldn't be doing this. I'll be going up for tenure soon," reads the first post of the blog that University of Chicago political scientist Daniel Drezner started in September 2002. Sure enough, this past October, Drezner was denied tenure. And although his department claimed that blogging hadn't been a factor in the decision, junior academics across the blogosphere were traumatized.
Update: Here is Drezner's reply. A short excerpt:
    I'm pretty sure that the contribution of blogs to academic output can be measured using pre-existing standards -- with one exception and one caveat. The exception is that maybe the whole of an academic blog is greater than the sum of its parts. Precisely because a blog can contribute to public discourse, scholarly research, and teaching pedagogy at the same time, it encourages a greater mkix of ideas and information than would otherwise be possible. Whether this is true I will leave for the commenters.


 
Tussey on File Sharing Deborah S. Tussey (Oklahoma City University School of Law) has posted Music at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Systems Perspective on File Sharing (Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Peer-to-peer file sharing arose in the context of a system for production and distribution of music recordings. This article applies complexity theory and systems analysis to that system. It describes the music system as a complex system displaying universal characteristics of such systems, including nonlinearity, emergence, and unpredictability. P2P is an emergent phenomenon, which has fed back into the system and produced emergent responses, notably the iTunes business model and moderate digital rights management. These responses suggest that the music system is successfully adapting to the digital environment and has positioned itself "at the edge of chaos" where complex systems are most sustainable. Nonetheless, numerous proposals for legislative responses to file sharing are on the table. This article suggests several guidelines for successful regulation of complex systems such as the music system and applies those guidelines to current copyright reform proposals. I conclude that such proposals are premature and suggest that the current regulatory structure be left essentially intact for several years to allow the system reasonable time to adapt. During that period, Congress should monitor system conditions to ensure open competition and utilize independent observers to perform a thorough system analysis which could guide legislative intervention if it later proves necessary.


 
Bateup on Constitutional Dialogue Christine Bateup (New York University - School of Law) has posted The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue (71 Brooklyn Law Review, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In recent years, the metaphor of "dialogue" has become increasingly ubiquitous within constitutional theory - both in the United States and globally - as a way of describing the nature of interactions between courts and non-judicial actors in the area of constitutional decision-making, particularly in relation to the interpretation of rights. This Article provides a critical account of theories of constitutional dialogue in order to determine which of these theories hold the greatest normative promise. Theories of dialogue face two hurdles to normative success. First, they must accomplish their goal of resolving the democratic objection to judicial review. Second, and legitimacy aside, they must be able to provide an attractive normative vision of the role of judicial review in democratic constitutionalism. This Article maintains that while theories of constitutional dialogue do make important contributions to our understanding of judicial review, most fail to provide satisfying normative visions of dialogue on these dual levels of analysis. This Article concludes that the greatest potential for achieving a normatively satisfying understanding of constitutional dialogue emerges when the contributions of equilibrium and partnership theories of dialogue are synthesized. Equilibrium theories focus on the judiciary's capacity to facilitate society-wide debate, while partnership theories draw attention to more distinct "judicial" and "legislative" functions that the different branches of government respectively perform. The dynamic fusion of these models not only makes the greatest contributions to our understanding of modern constitutionalism and the practice of judicial review, but also offers the greatest potential for designing improved dialogic constitutional systems in the future.


 
Lazarus on Natural Laws, Human Nature, and Environmental Law Richard James Lazarus (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Environmental Law (Virginia Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article explores the roles that human nature, the laws of nature, and the nature of the nation's lawmaking institutions have all played in the emergence and evolution of domestic environmental law and how the interrelated difficulties presented by each are reflected in the kinds of legal issues that surround environmental lawmaking. The article also discusses how these same difficulties impede environmental lawmaking by obscuring from lawmakers, judges, and the general population what is truly important about environmental law. Part I considers the ways in which the need for environmental law derives from the tendency of human nature to cause adverse environmental consequences and the ways in which the laws of nature make it more difficult to prevent those consequences absent the imposition of external legal rules. Part II describes how our nation's lawmaking institutions are similarly challenged by the laws of nature. This includes a discussion of how the kinds of laws necessary to bridge the gap between human nature and the laws of nature are systematically difficult for our lawmaking institutions to develop in the first instance and to maintain over time. Part III takes a closer look at one of the nation's most important legal institutions - the United States Supreme Court - and briefly discusses both its past shortcomings in environmental lawmaking and its potential in the future.


 
Epstein & Segal on the Dynamics of Supreme Court Ideology The Washington Post has a nifty op/ed, Changing Room The Court's Dynamics Have a Way of Altering a Justice's Approach to the Law by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal
    Samuel Alito, in all likelihood, will be a conservative justice and will reach decisions in accord with that label. But there's a "but" -- actually several, all recent or current justices: David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor, to name five justices for whom, to greater or lesser extent, ideological labels proved misleading. The "but" offers important insights into why some nominees, once they become justices, sometimes don't behave as predicted and how the court's dynamics can affect their views. In the case of Souter, initial judgments about how he might vote were downright wrong. The clear expectation, based largely on his lower court record, was that Souter would be a rather consistent conservative voter -- even more to the right than Reagan appointees Kennedy and O'Connor, at the time of their nominations. Souter, of course, is a rather consistent voter -- on the court's liberal wing.
Epstein & Segal are among the best political scientists who study judicial attitudes. Check it out!


Monday, November 21, 2005
 
Monday Calendar
    Boston College Law: Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
    Columbia Legal Theory Workshop: Abner Greene of Fordham Law School, Excerpts from "Against Obligation:A Theory of Permeable Sovereignty"
    Columbia Law & Economics: Louis Kaplow, Harvard Law School, "Taxation of Families"
    Georgetown Environmental Research Workshop: Professor J.B. Ruhl, Florida State University School of Law, "The Effects of Wetlands Mitigation Banking On Humans--A Case Study of Ecosystem Services Policy Failure"
    Aristotelian Society, London: Antony Duff, Answering for Crime. If you are interested in criminal law theory, don't miss a chance to hear Duff!
    Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Dr Matthew Gibney, Security, Citizenship and the Law: regulating boundaries: Beyond the bounds of responsibility : Western States and measures to prevent the entry of refugees
    UCLA Law: Dennis Ventry, Visiting Scholar in Taxation, UCLA School of Law, Program in Business Law & Policy, For Richer, For Poorer: How Tax Policymakers have Protected and Punished American Families, 1913-2005
    University of Texas Law: Albert Yoon, Northwestern University, "Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East"


 
Call for Papers: BSET 2006
    CALL FOR PAPERS The BRITISH SOCIETY for ETHICAL THEORY 2006 CONFERENCE University of Southampton, UK 10-12 July 2006 Invited Speakers:
      Roger Crisp (Oxford University) Mark Timmons (University of Arizona)
    Papers are invited for the annual conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, to be held at the University of Southampton. The subject area is open within metaethics and normative ethics. Papers on topics in applied ethics or the history of ethics may also be considered provided they are also of wider theoretical interest. Papers, which should be unpublished at the time of submission, should be in English, no longer than 6500 words, readable in at most 45 minutes and in a form suitable for blind review. Please send your submission electronically, and include an abstract, as well as your full name, address and academic affiliation. Those who submitted papers for our previous conferences - successfully or otherwise - are welcome to submit again (though not of course the same papers!). Please tell us if you are a postgraduate student: submissions from postgraduates are encouraged as our aim is that some such should be represented at the conference. Selected conference papers will be published in the journal "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice". Please make clear in any covering letter whether you want your paper considered for publication here as well as for the conference programme. The deadline for submissions is 6th December, 2005. Papers and accompanying particulars should be emailed to Dr. Elinor Mason: Elinor.Mason@ed.ac.uk Note that ONLY electronic submissions will be accepted. Further particulars regarding registration will be available in due course from: BSET homepage: www.bset.org


Sunday, November 20, 2005
 
Legal Theory Calendar
    Monday, November 21
      Boston College Law: Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
      Columbia Legal Theory Workshop: Abner Greene of Fordham Law School, Excerpts from "Against Obligation:A Theory of Permeable Sovereignty"
      Columbia Law & Economics: Louis Kaplow, Harvard Law School, "Taxation of Families"
      Georgetown Environmental Research Workshop: Professor J.B. Ruhl, Florida State University School of Law, "The Effects of Wetlands Mitigation Banking On Humans--A Case Study of Ecosystem Services Policy Failure"
      Aristotelian Society, London: Antony Duff, Answering for Crime. If you are interested in criminal law theory, don't miss a chance to hear Duff!
      Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Dr Matthew Gibney, Security, Citizenship and the Law: regulating boundaries: Beyond the bounds of responsibility : Western States and measures to prevent the entry of refugees
      UCLA Law: Dennis Ventry, Visiting Scholar in Taxation, UCLA School of Law, Program in Business Law & Policy, For Richer, For Poorer: How Tax Policymakers have Protected and Punished American Families, 1913-2005
      University of Texas Law: Albert Yoon, Northwestern University, "Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East"
    Tuesday, November 22
      Georgetown Law: Vicki Jackson, Habeas Corpus
      NYU Colloquium in Law, Economics & Politics: Richard Pildes (New York University School of Law) with Daryl Levinson (Harvard Law School), "Separation of Parties, Not Powers"
      Oxford Human Rights Discussion Group: Kate Hofmeyr and Tarunabh Khaitan, Judicial Enforcement of Positive Rights in India and South Africa: A Comparative Perspective
      Oxford EC Law Discussion Group: Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Idea of a European Constitution
      Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Henry Carr, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Claims & Shapes: New Boundaries in IP Law
    Wednesday, November 23
      Heythop Philosophy Society (London): John Skorupski (St Andrews), Welfare and Morality
      Philosophy of Education (London): Mitja Sardoc (IOE), Liberal Civic Education Re-examined
      Northwestern Law & Economics: Kathy Spier, Professor of Law and Professor of Management and Strategy, Northwestern University, "Strategic Judgment Proofing"
      University Collgege, London, International Law Association: Dr Matthew Craven, SOAS; Catriona Drew, SOAS; Dr Susan Marks, Cambridge University; Dr Gerry Simpson, LSE, ‘The Empire Strikes Back? Colonialism, empire, self-determination and international law’
    Thursday, November 24
      Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Josep Lluís Martí Marmol, The Epistemic Conception of Deliberative Democracy Defended
      Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Thomas Skouteris, 'The New Tribunalism': Liberal Sensibilities in the Age of Adjudication
      Oxford Financial Law Discussion Group: Professor Niamh Moloney, "The Hedge Fund Challenge as a Test Case for EC Securities Regulation"
      University College, London, Centre for Law and the Environment and the Journal of Environmental Law: The Hon. Sir Francis Jacobs, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Environment: What Role for the Court in a Global Drama?’
      University College, London, Current Legal Problems Lecture: Professor Jeremy Phillips (UCL), ‘How to Win at Monopoly: Applying Game Theory to the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights’
    Friday, November 25
      St Anne's College, Oxford: Ed Flippen, "US Electricity Deregulation after California, Enron and the Worst Blackout in US History"
      Oxford Centre for Competition Law & Policy: Edward Flippen, US Electric Deregulation after California, Enron, and the Worst Blackout in US History


 
Legal Theory Lexicon: Conduct Rules and Decision Rules
    Substantive rules of law (such as the rules of torts, contract, and property) are usually assumed to be addressed to two audiences. As conduct rules, the substantive law is addressed to everyone (citizens, officials, and noncitizens). Thus, property law tells us who has dominion over which resources. If this land is mine, then the law communicates the message that I can use my land and exclude others from its use. These very same legal rules also serve as decision rules, they tell courts how to resolve disputes. We usually assume that the content of the conduct rules are the decision rules are identical, but this need not be the case. Professor Meir Dan-Cohen of U.C. Berkeley proposed a very famous thought experiment. He asked us to imagine acoustic separation between ordinary citizens, who would only "hear" the conduct rules, and officials (such as judges), to whom the decision rules would be addressed. This leads naturally to the following thought: should decision rules and conduct rules have the same content or should they differ. And if they differ, how could the law prevent acoustic leakage, e.g. prevent ordinary citizens from learning about the content of the decision rules?
    Example? Here's a pretty clear example. Suppose that we have a conduct rule that says, "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." This might be a good conduct rule, because we want citizens to inform themselves about the content of the law, and we certainly don't want citizens deliberately insulating themselves from knowledge of the law in order to create a defense if they charged with its violation. But at the same time, we might prefer that ignorance of the law would serve as an excuse, at least some of the time, when it comes to actually convicting and punishing defendants. Punishment is expensive and injurious, and sometimes no really good purpose will be served by punishing someone who is reasonably ignorant of the law's content.
    But how can we excuse ignorance of the law without altering the conduct rule? One way to accomplish this goal would involve some obfuscation by judges. Opinions might state boldly: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse," while simultaneously excusing ignorant defendants on the ground that "knowledge of the legal status of the intentional content is part of the mental state that is an element of the crime." The first formulation is easily accessible to ordinary folks; the second is couched in language that may be opaque except to those trained in the law.
As a second year law student, I was given Meir-Dan Cohen's Decision Rules and Conduct rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harvard Law Review 625 (1984) to evaluate for publication in the Review. I still remember vividly the meeting of the articles office in which I advocated publication of the article. One editor took the position that the article should be published if it would have the same influence on legal theory as Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913), has produced. Rather a tough standard, don't you think? Professor Dan-Cohen's article is a classic of contemporary legal theory. You won't regret reading it!


Saturday, November 19, 2005
 
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Sandra Day O'Connor : How the First Woman on the Supreme Court Became Its Most Influential Justice by Joan Biskupic. Here's a blurb:
    In the late 1980s, as the Supreme Court justices were discussing a case, Antonin Scalia ranted against affirmative action. Sandra Day O'Connor, the first and then still the only woman on the High Court, replied, "Why, Nino, how do you think I got my job?" This is one of the few revelatory moments in Biskupic's bio of the retiring O'Connor as sharp-tongued, humorous and utterly realistic. It's also, as Biskupic shows in a close study of O'Connor's jurisprudence, a bit misleading: for most of her career on the Court, the conservative O'Connor voted against affirmative action. With access to justices' once private papers, longtime court observer Biskupic, now with USA Today, sheds light on the internal workings on the Court, but not much on the internal workings of the very private O'Connor's mind and heart. Biskupic does show the justice gaining confidence and force on the Court, particularly after her fight against breast cancer in 1988. As O'Connor faces retirement, Biskupic clarifies her judicial legacy, sometimes seeing the glass as half full, sometimes as half empty: praising her lack of ideology but also noting a lack of vision in a justice who often "step[s] to the brink, and then back[s] away"—a mixed legacy that will be debated for years to come.


 
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude by Lior Strahilevitz. Here is the abstract:
    This article addresses a central question in property theory: In a world where an owner can exercise the right to exclude third parties from his resource in any of several ways, what causes him to adopt a particular exclusionary strategy? Orthodox property scholarship has focused a great deal of attention on those exclusion rights that arise under trespass law. This paper suggests that much can be gained from thinking about exclusion with a bigger tent approach, one that is sensitive to the ways in which non-trespass-based exclusion rights substitute for in rem, trespass-based rights. Non-trespass-based exclusion rights include exclusionary vibes, which are communicative signals that make undesirable third parties feel unwelcome, as well as exclusionary amenities, which impose a disproportionate tax on the undesirable by bundling permission to use a resource with an obligation to pay for a separate, polarizing resource. It turns out that information asymmetries often drive owners' decisions about what exclusion strategies to adopt. Where third parties seeking to use property possess private information about their own preferences, behaviors, and intentions, and the owner cannot discover this private information at a low cost, the owner is likely to delegate the exclusion function to the would-be entrants by employing non-trespass based exclusion strategies. By contrast, where there is little private information involved, or private information can be discovered by the owner at a low cost, the owner is more likely to employ trespass-based exclusion rights. This relationship between information asymmetries and the choice of exclusion strategies suggests new possibilities for creative government intervention in those settings where particular exclusion strategies conflict with public policy interests. It is well understood that the government can impose outright prohibitions, proscribing some forms of exclusion and permitting other forms. This is the strategy the government has adopted in the housing discrimination arena. Alternatively, the government can adopt subtler but equally effective strategies that regulate access to private information as a means of altering owners' incentives to exclude. Megan's Law is the most prominent and far-reaching example of the subtle approach, although many aspects of information privacy law affect owners' incentives in much the same way. In short, by rendering private information public or public information private, the state can alter, sometimes radically, the mix of exclusion strategies that resource owners employ.
Download it while its hot!


Friday, November 18, 2005
 
Leiter on Hiring Tactics Read Brian Leiter's post A New Hiring Tactic: Reader Reaction Sought. Here is ataste:
    [T]here has been much talk about a new recruitment tactic by Northwestern, described to me by colleagues at Illinois and Texas as follows: Northwestern offers to fly back a "hot" candidate prior to the "meat market" on the condition that if Northwestern makes the candidate an offer, the candidate commits to accept that offer against any others, except for two or three super elite schools on a pre-agreed list (e.g., Yale or Stanford).
There are already some good comments, including this one from Adam Winkler:
    Only a risk averse candidate would take this offer. NW is doing this to target candidates that otherwise will be expected to be offered jobs at better schools. The candidates will know that they are being considered by numerous other better schools, thus why would they turn away those possibilities for NW? Perhaps a bird in the hand is better than two in the bush, but we're likely talking about 8-10 in the bush. Also, NW has the additional problem of being relatively unattractive to candidates due to its tenure record, constant defection of junior faculty, and the informal Ph.D. requirement for tenure -- the latter imposed even on candidates with nothing more than a J.D. If memory serves, NW has lost candidates in recent years to schools considerably lower in the prestige rankings -- e.g., David Walker going to Boston University instead. I would not be at all surprised if NW lost its chance to get candidates through this process.


 
Friday Calendar


 
Lipshaw on "Rational Frogs" Jeff Lipshaw has posted a draft of Reason, Self-Deception and Rational Frogs: Reconciling Comprehension and Responsibility in Law and Business Ethics on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This is my attempt to dig deeply into the descriptive and normative aspect of the study and teaching of business law and ethics. The possibility of conflation of the descriptive and normative is reflected in no discipline as much as law. The coincidence of legal positivism (a view I largely endorse) and the adoption of a social science approach has, it seems to me, not only created some bad social science, but has left a significant void in the way legal academics (and perhaps lawyers) look at ethical duties and responsibilities, particularly in business. I want to explore the significance of that conflation in a context familiar to a substantial number of graduates of American law schools: ethics. I am particularly concerned with two topics that go to the heart of what business lawyers do: (a) justifying harm to others, and (b) resolving inter-firm or inter-personal conflicts, where there may be wide variances in legitimately-held professional and personal values. Hence, this is an epistemological search for a satisfying secular business ethic. Although it appears to me this will approach book length, I have finished (at least, I hope, to the point of a moderately professional standard) a preface, an introductory Chapter 1 that at least outlines the entire argument, and Chapter 2, which is the bulk of the theory that will be applied in later chapters. At this point, I am willing to make it public for purposes of scholarly reaction.


 
McGowan on Open Source Check out There's no such thing as free software (And it's a good thing, too) by David McGowan on First Monday. Here's a taste:
    At the end of the day, F/OSS development is about smart people using generally applicable legal tools to help them arrange their affairs as they please. Partisan rhetoric—on both sides--can tend to obscure that fact, but that is a reason to ignore the rhetoric rather than to suspect the tools. Simplicity is elegant in law as well as elsewhere, and it is the simplicity and straightforwardness of the approach that we should celebrate. Give people rights in their work, let them use those rights to realize their vision, let creativity flourish, and let the chips fall where they may. It is not really freedom, but it is really cool. So next time someone says “free as in freedom,” or talks about speech and beer, remember: There is no such thing as free software, and it's a good thing, too.


 
Lazarus on Property Rights in the Supreme Court Richard James Lazarus (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement within the U.S. Supreme Court on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article takes the measure of Justice Scalia's ability to produce significant opinions for the Court, by focusing on the Court's property rights cases during the past several decades. Much of the analysis relies on the Official Papers of Justice Harry Blackmun, which provide a virtual treasure trove of information revealing the Court's deliberative process when Blackmun was on the Court from 1971 to 1994. The article concludes that Justice Scalia may have appeared an effective champion of pro-property rights rhetoric to those outside the Court, but he has been much less effective within the Court in furthering that agenda. He not only repeatedly failed in his efforts to build a workable majority coalition on the Court, but he instead pushed away potential allies. The upshot was, in the first instance, precedent heavy on strong rhetoric yet light on staying power. In combination with other causes, the ultimate result was a splintering of those Justices, which included more than a simple majority, intuitively sympathetic to property rights claims and the reconstruction of a new majority more often led by Justice John Paul Stevens that returned the law to where it had been prior to Justice Scalia's joining the Court.


 
Blumm & Ritchie on Ownership of Wildlife Michael C. Blumm and Lucus Ritchie (Lewis & Clark Law School and Lewis & Clark College - Law School) have posted The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife (Environmental Law, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The law of capture, a central feature in Anglo-American property law, has deep historical roots, running at least to Rome, where capturers could create private property in res nullius resources like wildlife (ferae naturae) if they did so consistent with Roman law (imperium). When transfered to English common law, capture doctrine was laden with pervasive restrictions imposed by royal prerogatives, as the English king was said to own wildlife that had been unowned in Rome. Thus, royal forests and hunting franchises imposed substantial limits on wildlife capture. In early America, the lack of royal prerogatives seemed for a time to sanction a free-wheeling rule of wildlife capture unknown in England. For example, the English rule allowing landowners to exclude capturers was largely discarded, at least with respect to unfenced lands. But as the overharvesting consequences of expansive capture rules became apparent, American courts rediscovered and "republicanized" the royal prerogatives into the concept of state ownership of wildlife. This 19th century development was grounded on both sovereign power and public ownership principles, or "sovereign ownership," a concept endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1896. Although during the 20th century the Supreme Court repeatedly limited the state ownership of wildlife where it conflicted with federal law–and finally overturned the case that endorsed the doctrine in 1979–today nearly every state claims ownership of wildlife. This article examines this phenomenon and explains both the limits and utility of the state ownership doctrine in the 21st century. We claim that although modern notions of the police power justify expansive state regulation of wildlife, the state ownership doctrine retains vitality because it may bolster or enlarge police power regulation by 1) imposing affirmative duties to protect wildlife, 2) empowering states to collect damage for damages to wildlife, and 3) offering an affirmative defense against landowner claims of constitutional takings due habitat protections.


 
Jacobi on Medicaid John Jacobi (Seton Hall School of Law) has posted Dangerous Times for Medicaid on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Medicaid has become a cornerstone of our health finance system. It covers over 50 million Americans. Many are otherwise uninsurable because of their poverty and/or their disabilities. Others rely on Medicaid because the deteriorating employment-based insurance system increasingly fails to cover low income workers and their families. Medicaid’s costs are rising in large part due increased enrollment, and not increasing per-person costs. This paper examines proposed short and long term cost-cutting "reforms" to Medicaid, including those that would shift programmatic power from the federal to the state level, and "ownership society" measures that would reduce or abolish Medicaid's assurance of coverage of a defined array of medically necessary services. This paper argues that some (although not all) of the proposed reforms would lessen our commitment to care for the poor and disabled, in some cases pushing vulnerable people out of public coverage. It argues that the state of private coverage is such that these ejected beneficiaries would become uninsured. Ironically, the Medicaid reforms would, in addition to weakening Medicaid, also weaken the safety net for the uninsured. Some of the long term structural reforms threaten to push Medicaid beneficiaries out of the program to a reduced safety net.


 
Conference Announcement: "Too Pure an Air" at Glouster
    CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT AND CALL FOR PAPERS "Too Pure an Air": Law and the Quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality Gloucester, England June 18-20, 2006 Sponsored by Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, University of Gloucestershire, Central Gloucester Initiative, Gloucester City Council Two hundred and fifty years ago, in 1756, William Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield, took office as Chief Justice of England. Soon after, he presided over a case involving the slave, James Somerset, who had been brought by his master from Virginia to England. Arguing that his simple presence on English soil made him free, Somerset's counsel maintained that the air of England was "too pure for slaves to breathe." Lord Mansfield agreed. In language that came to dominate all subsequent controversies on the subject, Mansfield held that slavery was not part of the common law of England - that slavery was "so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law" - and that therefore "the black must be discharged." We are pleased to announce that a Conference on "Too Pure an Air": Law and the Quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality will be held in Gloucester, England, June 18-20, 2006, to celebrate Lord Mansfield's famous decision in Somerset v. Stewart and its impact. The conference specifically aims to discuss the role the law has played in both fostering freedom and equality, and in furthering oppression and exploitation. In our modern world, lawyers are accustomed to see law as a force to redress such issues as individual freedom, social and political inequalities, and injustice. But the precise connection between the work of lawyers and pursuit of these goals is hard to pin down. Did slavery eventually disappear in English territory because the judges were holding against it? Or did slavery die of other causes, with lawyers essentially tidying up the details? In our own time, were decisions like Brown v. Board of Education a spur to change, or a fairly tardy reflection that changes had already been occurring in the larger society? What is the role that culture plays in fostering a free and egalitarian society? In Somerset, what was it about England and its culture that made its air "too pure for slaves to breathe?" This conference will explore the issues of how law and its practitioners affect issues of freedom, equality, and justice. We invite your participation in the conference. Examples of the types of sessions we expect to organize include:
      * Somerset v. Stewart, Its Influences and Impacts * Slavery and the Law * Race, Racism, and the Law * Criminal Justice * Reparations * Colonialism * The Intersection between Liberty and Equality * Women's Rights * Sexual Orientation and the Law
    Papers dealing with these and related issues are welcome. We invite scholars in law, history, political science, geography, sociology, economics, and other disciplines to organize panels, to submit proposals for individual paper presentations, and/or to indicate their interests in serving as panel moderators. Papers from the Conference will be published by the Texas Wesleyan Law Review in a special symposium issue. This is the third annual conference held by Texas Wesleyan University School of Law and the University of Gloucestershire. Last year's highly successful conference, "The Power of Stories: Intersections of Law, Culture, and Literature," followed the equally engaging conference celebrating the 150th anniversary of Hadley v. Baxendale. Proposal Submissions Proposals must contain the following information:
      Name, Address, Phone, Fax, and e-mail Title of Paper A statement of up to 300 words explaining what you would like to present.
    For full panel proposals, please submit the above information for each participant. If you would be willing to serve as a moderator, please indicate that on your proposal. Deadline for submission of proposals is February 6, 2006. Please submit proposals via e-mail to Professor Reginald Oh and Professor Jason Gillmer at roh@law.txwes.edu . Those submitting can expect to receive a response by March 1, 2006. About Gloucester
      Historic Gloucester (Roman Glevum) is one of the ancient centers of English power and commerce. From its founding as a fort protecting Roman Britain from Welsh raids across the Severn River, it has played a unique role in the history of the island. Under the Saxons it became a major ecclesiastical center, with portions of its magnificent Cathedral dating back to a foundation by Kyneburga, sister of King Osric of Hwicce, in 678-79, and a financial center with its own mint. The city became the third in England to get its own charter, which it did from Henry II in 1185. The city's prominent Tudor architecture testifies to its growth and importance under Elizabeth I. It was a Parliamentary hotbed in the Civil War, and the successful defense of the city against a Royalist siege was one of the turning points of that conflict. It became one of the earliest industrial parts of Britain, with a pin industry still reflected in the unique horse-posts that still adorn its cobbled streets. The area around Gloucester is a microcosm of England. While aristocrats and members of the haute ton relaxed at nearby Cheltenham and Bath, tall ships at the Gloucester docks were unloading grain from Canada and the Black Sea that simultaneously forced unemployed peasants into the cities and made possible cheap food for the workers at the great new Midland mills. From nearby Bristol the swarms of ships-as many as 2,000-made the great triangular circuit, trade goods to the Gold or Ivory Coasts to barter for slaves, thence to the West Indies or New Orleans to sell the slaves for tobacco, rum, and sugar. The Gloucester area is full of historic, literary, and legal interest. On the docks is the mill whose broken shaft led to Hadley v. Baxendale, and nearby Sudeley Castle (the model for Blandings Castle in the P.G. Wodehouse novels) was the headquarters of Prince Rupert of Paradine v. Jane fame. The splendid Cathedral not only features the biggest stained-glass window in England and the tomb of Edward II-foully murdered by his wife and her lover-but serves as the Hogwarts School of Magic in the Harry Potter films. Its organist wrote the tune that would become The Star-Spangled Banner. At the New Inn (where visitors can still book rooms or put down a pint or two), Lady Jane Grey got the news that she had been named Queen of England. Down the street is the original tailor shop that inspired Beatrix Potter's The Tailor of Gloucester. The city is the home of one of the "little ships" of Dunkirk, the Queen Boadicea II; the National Waterways Museum; the City Museum, where visitors can see the old Roman walls and a large collection of Roman artifacts and coins from the site; and Blackfriars Priory, the oldest scriptorum in Britain, where monks copied and illuminated manuscripts by hand. Nearby are the famous and beautiful Cotswolds and, across the river, the Forest of Dean and the green hills of Wales. Although activities for the 2006 Conference have not yet been set, they will be designed to showcase and explore the history and beauty of the Gloucester region. We expect that on-site childcare will be available during the special events, and that tours of the Gloucester area will be available for family members and traveling companions of attendees.
    Organizing Committee Reginald Oh, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; Jason Gillmer, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; Stephen Alton, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; Pamela Bridgewater, American University Washington College of Law; David Caudill, Villanova University School of Law; Adrienne Davis, University of North Carolina School of Law; Richard Dennery, Central Gloucester Initiative; Penelope Pether, Villanova University School of Law; Frank Snyder, Notre Dame School of Law; Diane Wragg, University of Gloucestershire, Law For more information about the conference, see www.gloucesterconference.com


 
Book Announcement: Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar by Forster
    Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar Michael N. Forster To read the entire book description or a sample chapter, please visit: http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7747.html What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--and he does so with great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions. "Nuanced and convincingly supported, Forster's work reaches conclusions of great intrinsic interest."--Paul Horwich, University College, London and City University of New York Paper | $16.95 / £10.95 | ISBN: 0-691-12391-8 Cloth | 2004 | $45.00 / £29.95 | ISBN: 0-691-11366-1


Thursday, November 17, 2005
 
Book Announcement: Thurman Arnold by Waller
    Thurman Arnold: A Biography Spencer Weber Waller ISBN 0814793924 288 pages Cloth Publication date: 12/1/2005 $40.00 "Waller's biography captures the energy, creativity, sense of humor and commitment of this original legal scholar and the nation's greatest anti-trust lawyer, who had the guts to battle the McCarthy scourge of the 1950s. Every law student should read this book about a genuine legal hero. It will give them a sense of lawyering as a noble profession." —Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University In this first biography of Thurman Arnold (1891-1961), Spencer Weber Waller traces Arnold's life from his birth in Laramie, Wyoming, and explores how his western upbringing later influenced his distinctive views about law and power. After studying at Princeton and Harvard Law School, Arnold practiced law in Chicago, served in World War I, and eventually returned to Laramie, where he was a prominent practitioner, mayor, and state senator in the 1920s. As the rise of national corporations began to destroy the local businesses that were the core of his legal practice, Arnold turned to the academy, most notably at Yale Law School, where he became one of the leading spokesmen for the legal realism movement. Arnold attracted the attention of Franklin Roosevelt, who appointed him to head the Antitrust Division during the New Deal. He went on to establish Arnold, Fortas & Porter in Washington, D.C., which defended hundreds of clients accused of Communist sympathies during the McCarthy era. Arnold was one of the few individuals who shaped twentieth-century American law in so many of its facets, and Waller honors his life and legacy with a book that is both vividly narrated and extensively researched. Spencer Weber Waller is professor of law and director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago.


 
Thursday Calendar
    University of Illinois Legal History: Willy Forbath (University of Texas), "The Morality of Borders: Race, Liberalism, and National Identity in the Law and Politics of European Immigration, 1882-1924"
    Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: John Stanton-Ife, Harm and Autonomy
    NYU Colloquium in Legal, Political and Social Philosophy: Liam Murphy, Morality and the Concept of Law Link fixed!
    Boston University Law: Daniela Caruso, "Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization".
    Florida State Law: Tracy Higgins, Fordham University Law School.
    Georgetown Intellectual Property: Brett Frischmann, Loyola Chicago, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law
    Loyola University Chicago, Intellectual Infrastructure and Intellectual Property.
    University of London School of Advanced Study: David Owens (School of Advanced Study), Duress, Deception and the Validity of a Promise
    Loyola Los School, Los Angeles: Peter Blanck, "The Future of the Americans with Disabilities Act"
    Ohio State Law: Milton C. Regan Jr. (Georgetown), "Eat What You Kill*
    Oxford Trinity College Law Society: Hugh Laddie, "The Common Law - a system under stress"
    University College, London, Law Faculty: Professor Bruno de Witte (European University Institute), ‘Promotion and Erosion of Cultural Diversity by European Union Law ’
    University of Michigan Law & Economics: James Hines, Jr., Michigan Business School, Value-Added Taxes and International Trades: The Evidence
    Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Jürgen Habermas, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University (Philosophy).
    Brooklyn Law School: Eric M. Zolt (UCLA), Inequality and Taxation: Evidence from the Americas
    University of North Dakota Law, Northern Plains Indian Law Center Speakers Series: Kirsten Matoy Carlson (Michigan), “Does Constitutional Change Matter? Canada’s Recognition of Aboriginal Title.”


 
Patterson on the Methodology Debate in Jurisprudence Dennis Patterson (Rutgers) has posted Notes on the Methodology Debate in Contemporary Jurisprudence: Why Sociologists Might Be Interested on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The current Methodology Debate in jurisprudence centers around the question whether conceptual analysis is still a viable methodology for legal theory. This article considers the impact of Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction for both the Methodology Debate in legal philosophy and the implications of the debate for sociologists of law.
Highly recommended!


 
Goldberg on Tiered Equal Protection Review Suzanne B. Goldberg (Columbia University - Columbia Law School) has posted Equality Without Tiers (Southern California Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 481, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Equality Without Tiers offers a comprehensive analysis of tiered equal protection review and argues that the current framework has outlived its utility and functions in many respects as a barrier to equality. As an alternative to the current ossified test, the article develops and tests a single standard of review aimed to provide a more finely calibrated response to the complexities of discrimination in the 21st century. To support this argument, the article focuses first on tensions in the current tiered framework for equal protection review, pointing to, among others, the Court's variously "weak" and "strong" approaches to rational basis review and the largely acontextual approach to affirmative action. Then, after identifying "class legislation" as the key focus of equal protection analysis, the article distills a single standard from the Court's extant equal protection jurisprudence. With this standard in place, I argue, both theoretically and through application of the standard to the several equal protection cases decided during the past three decades, that a single standard can enable sufficiently careful review to capture prejudice-infested classifications while not becoming excessively rigid. Against this background, the article concludes that the tiers may be understood best as a transitional analytic tool to assist courts in identifying impermissible bias in once-natural classifications. At the same time, I argue that the analysis prompted by the tiers is unduly simplistic and that serious scholarly consideration should be given to the possibilities for equal protection review opened up by a single review standard.
Highly recommended!


 
King on Bargained Punishment and Judicial Oversight Nancy J. King (Vanderbilt University School of Law) has posted Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment (58 Stanford Law Review 293 (2005)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article examines parties' ability to circumvent consistency in sentencing by bargaining around the rules that structure sentences within statutory ranges in federal criminal cases. Without careful control by judges, sentencing bargaining carries risks for structured-sentencings systems that may outweigh gains in efficiency. After a discussion of weaknesses in the ability of judges to oversee the factual accuracy of sentencing agreements, the article advances several options that would strengthen that supervisory role, promoting greater accuracy, transparency, and consistency in federal sentencing.


 
Beckham on Substantial Non-infringing Uses James Brian Beckham (John Marshall Law School) has posted RIAA Survive Substantial Non-infringing Uses? (Virginia Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This Note discusses peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing cases as they relate to rights in digital media. The recent problems involving P2P stem from the Supreme Court Sony-Betamax case of 1984. This piece takes issue with the scope of the Sony decision and several other notable cases in this context, and discusses the proper standard to be applied in cases involving charges of contributory copyright infringement. The Seventh Circuit gives Sony a plausible reading by balancing the intent of software distributors and the harms to rights holders - an approach mandated by the Court in Sony, and soon to be revisited in Grokster. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit glosses over the import of the Sony decision by ignoring intent and, more importantly, by disregarding the feasibility of balancing the parties’ respective interests with the potential harms to the parties. This Note suggests that courts faced with the defense of substantial non-infringing uses should employ a fact-intensive approach utilizing the balancing of interests mandate given by the Court in Sony, or in the alternative, that legislative action may be necessary. The discussion concludes with some final remarks about the direction of the doctrine, and offers some possible solutions for content owners to stave off unauthorized distribution of protected works.


 
Lazarus on Salzman on Rose Richard James Lazarus (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Crystals and Mud in Nature (Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, Vol. 17, No. 3, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This commentary is being published in a forthcoming symposium issue on "The Properties of Carol Rose" by the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities. It is a commentary on a paper presented by Professor James Salzman Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water. The commentary addresses three related topics (1) what I liked best about Professor Salzman's article; (2) how the article's narrow focus on one use (drinking) of one resource (water) undermines some of the article's conclusions by understating water's complexity; and (3) why the article made me think about dirt, and ultimately about mud, and the juxtaposition of water and dirt in natural resources law.


 
Wells on the Ownership of Local Churches Catharine P. Wells (Boston College - Law School) has posted Who Owns the Local Church? A Pressing Issue for Dioceses in Bankruptcy (Seton Hall Legislative Journal, Symposium Issue: Bankruptcy in the Religious Non-Profit Context, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The recent bankruptcies of Catholic Dioceses are unprecedented. For the first time, Bankruptcy Courts must deal with the difficult question of who owns the parish church. In this paper, I will explore two possible sources of confusion about this question. The first is the non- commercial, charitable nature of the Church. The second is its organizational complexity. Resolving the confusion requires a familiarity with various different sources of law including charities law, bankruptcy law, trust law, and Canon Law. In this paper I address this issue by: 1. discussing why the equities and policies that govern charitable bankruptcies are different from those that govern commercial bankruptcies; 2. laying out a road map for determining ownership issues that indicates what sub-questions must be answered and in what order; and 3. discussing the role that each of the different sources of law plays in answering these questions. My conclusion is that, in most circumstances, individual parishes do have a significant ownership stake in assets that are given or dedicated for their use.


 
Conference Announcement: "Cultural Environmentalism" at Stanford
    Cultural Environmentalism at 10 A Center for Internet and Society Symposium Stanford Law School March 11-12, 2006 http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/conferences/cultural/ Ten years ago, Duke Law Professor Jamie Boyle suggested that the history of the environmental movement offered powerful theoretical and practical lessons to those who sought to recognize the importance of the public domain, and to expose the harms caused by a relentlessly maximalist program of intellectual property expansion. On March 11-12, 2006, Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society will host a symposium to explore the development and expansion of the metaphor of "cultural environmentalism" over the course of ten busy years for intellectual property law. We've invited four scholars to present original papers on the topic, and a dozen intellectual property experts to comment and expand on their works. Molly Van Houweling explores voluntary manipulation of intellectual property rights as a tool for cultural environmentalism. Susan Crawford extends Boyle's analysis to the age of networks. Rebecca Tushnet, looks at the ways in which the law's impulse to generalize complicates the project of cultural environmentalism, and Madhavi Sunder looks at how the metaphor affects traditional knowledge. Professor Boyle will also offer some remarks, as will Stanford Law School's Professor Lawrence Lessig. Comments on the papers by: Terry Fisher, Harvard Law School, Jack Balkin, Yale Law School, Arti Rai, Duke Law School, Pam Samuelson, UC Berkeley School of Law: Boalt Hall, Neil Netanel, UCLA Law School, Julie Cohen, Georgetown University Law Center, Jesica Litman, Wayne University, Mark Lemley, Stanford Law School, Peggy Radin, Stanford Law School, Yochai Benkler, Yale Law School, Siva Vaidhyanathan, NYU School of Law


 
Conference Announcement: The Rehnquist Court & the First Amendment at Washington University
    Washington University School of Law and the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy Announce: Program:
      9:00 a.m. Introductory Remarks Dean Daniel L. Keating, Washington University School of Law Neil M. Richards, Washington University School of Law 9:15 - 11:00 Technology & Speech:
        Speakers: Jack M. Balkin, Yale Law School Jonathan Zittrain, Oxford University (via videoconference) Mark P. McKenna, St. Louis University School of Law John Palfrey, Harvard Law School Commentator: Thomas B. Nachbar, University of Virginia School of Law Moderator: Jennifer E. Rothman, Washington University School of Law
      11:15-12:30 Property & Speech:
        Speakers: Robert A. Sedler, Wayne State University School of Law Timothy Zick, St. John's University School of Law Commentator: Shelley Ross Saxer, Pepperdine University School of Law Moderator: Daniel R. Mandelker, Washington University School of Law
      2:00-3:15 Free Speech Methodologies:
        Speakers: Lee Epstein, Washington University School of Law Jeffrey A. Segal, S.U.N.Y. Stony Brook University David E. Bernstein, George Mason University School of Law Martin H. Redish, Northwestern University School of Law Moderator: Neil M. Richards, Washington University School of Law
      3:30 - 5:00 Religion and the First Amendment:
        Speakers: Garrett Epps, University of Oregon School of Law Jay D. Wexler, Boston University School of Law Abner S. Greene, Fordham University School of Law Commentators: Eric R. Claeys, St. Louis University School of Law Thomas C. Berg, University of St. Thomas School of Law Moderator: Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, Washington University School of Law
    The papers presented at the Conference will be published in Volume 21 of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, forthcoming in summer 2006. The Conference is open to the public. For more information contact Heather Buethe at hgmackie@wulaw.wustl.edu


Wednesday, November 16, 2005
 
New YLJ The October 2005 issue of the Yale Law Journal can be accessed here. The contents include Fixing Freezeouts by Guhan Subramanian and Of Property and Federalism by Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky.


 
More MobBlog on Cohen's The Place of the User in Copyright Law The conversation about Julie E. Cohen's article continues at MobBlog. Check out new posts from William Patry, Fred von Lohman (and here), Jim Speta, and Joseph Liu.


 
Posner's Foreword to the Harvard Law Review Supreme Court Issue I've just started to look at it, but this is obviously a must download. Here's the link: http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/119/Nov05/PosnerFTX.pdf. Download it while it's hot!


 
Wednesday Calendar
    Institute of Philosophy Conference and Seminar Series (London): Terrence Horgan (Arizona), Cognitivist Expressivism.
    Northwestern Law & Economics: Henry Smith, Professor of Law, Yale University, "Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow"
    University College London, Mellon Foundation: Lasse Thomassen (Limerick), The Inclusion of the Other? Habermas on Tolerance
    University College London, School of Public Policy: Matthew Cramer (Cambridge), Dimensions of Objectivity in Law
    NYU Legal History: Richard Primus, Visiting Professor, NYU School of Law, "The Riddle of Hiram Revels: Retroactivity and the Civil War"
    Ohio State Center for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies: Conference, Building Democracy Through Online Citizen Deliberation.
    Oxford Centre for Criminology: Didier Bigo, European Liberty and Security: What is at stake?
    University of Georgia Law: Olufunmilayo B. Arewa (Case Western Reserve University), "Piracy," Borrowing and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks: History, Hierarchies and Conceptions of Culture
    University of Toronto Tax & Law and Economics Series: Edward J. McCaffery University of Southern California, Starving the Beast: The Psychology of Budget Deficits
    University of Toronto Globalization, Law & Justice Workshop Series: Harry Arthurs, Osgoode Hall Law School, The Role of Global Law Firms in Constructing or Obstructing a Transnational Regime of Labour Law


 
Sachs on the Law Merchant & Cyberspace Stephen E. Sachs has posted From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval 'Law Merchant' on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Modern advocates of corporate self-regulation have drawn unlikely inspiration from the Middle Ages. On the traditional view of history, medieval merchants who wandered from fair to fair were not governed by domestic laws, but by their own lex mercatoria, or law merchant. This law, which uniformly regulated commerce across Europe, was supposedly produced by an autonomous merchant class, interpreted in private courts, and enforced through private sanctions rather than state coercion. Contemporary writers have treated global corporations as descendants of these itinerant traders, urging them to replace conflicting national laws with a law of their own creation. The standard history has been accepted by legal scholars across the ideological spectrum, by economists and political scientists, and by those drafting new regimes to govern Internet commerce. This Article argues that the traditional view is deeply flawed. Returning to the original sources - especially the court rolls of the fair of St. Ives, the most extensive surviving records of the period - it demonstrates that merchants in medieval England were substantially subject to local control. Commercial customs and substantive laws varied significantly across towns and fairs, and did not constitute a coherent legal order. The traditional interpretation has been retained, not for its accuracy, but for ideological reasons and for its long and self-reinforcing pedigree. This Article takes no position on the merits of shielding multinational actors from domestic law; it merely denies that the Middle Ages provide a model for such policies.


 
Dodge on Customary International Law as Part of Domestic Law William S. Dodge (University of California - Hastings College of the Law) has posted The Story of The Paquete Habana: Customary International Law as Part of Our Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The Paquete Habana is famous for its statement that "international law is part of our law", for what it says about consulting the works of scholars and the evolving nature of international law, and for its suggestion that customary international law might be superseded as a rule of decision by a "controlling executive act". As one chapter in the forthcoming book International Law Stories, this paper tells the story of The Paquete Habana. Most of the statements for which The Paquete Habana is famous simply repeat principles that date to the eighteenth century. But the underlying conception of international law had changed during the nineteenth century from a foundation in natural law to a positivism based on state practice and consent. While The Paquete Habana reflected that transition, it also stands for continuity and for accommodation of the original understanding of customary international law as part of the domestic legal system. The Paquete Habana's dictum about a "controlling executive act", however, was new and inconsistent with the nineteenth century understanding of the roles of the President and Congress. This paper suggests that it resulted from Justice Gray's attempt to strengthen his opinion by demonstrating that the executive branch had not intended to violate customary international law in this case.


 
Berg on Natural Law & Christian Realism Thomas Berg (University of St. Thomas, St. Paul/Minneapolis, MN - School of Law) has posted John Courtney Murray and Reinhold Niebuhr: Natural Law and Christian Realism (Journal of Catholic Social Thought, Vol. 3, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    During the two decades after World War II, two Christian theologians of public life appeared on the cover of Time magazine: Reinhold Niebuhr in 1948 and John Courtney Murray in 1960. As their appearances suggest, during this time Murray the Catholic and Niebuhr the Protestant were America's most prominent Christian theologians concerning the relationship between religion, morality, and politics. Niebuhr inspired not only two generations of Christian clergy and activists, but also numerous secular statesmen and thinkers who admired his hard-nosed policy and cultural analyses, and some of whom dubbed themselves Atheists for Niebuhr. Murray, of course, set forth the most prominent account of how faithful Catholics could affirm the American political system and laid the intellectual groundwork for the Church to embrace equal religious freedom as a moral ideal at Vatican II. Murray and Niebuhr each engaged in polemics directed at the other's writings or school of thought. Niebuhr criticized the Catholic natural-law tradition for rigidity and for elevating contingent features of pre-modern societies into the supposedly universal standards of human reason. Murray, in defending the universal propositions of natural law, blasted Niebuhr's Christian realism as a theory that sees things as so complicated that moral judgment bcomes practically impossible. The thesis of this paper, though, is that Murray and Niebuhr, natural law and Christian realism, are not as far apart as they seemed, for the reasons following. (Indeed, the philosophically deepest aspects of the American founding reflect elements both of natural-law reasoning (as Murray emphasized) and realist concerns to structure institutions so as to counter the inevitable tendencies to self-aggrandizement (as Niebuhr emphasized).) First, Niebuhr was more of a natural-law theorist than he admitted. Although Christian realism emphasizes how moral-political assertions are typically tainted by partiality and self-aggrandizement, Niebuhr himself set forth a universal theory about the perennial dynamics of human nature, and he affirmed the universal validity of certain moral-political concepts sich as equality. Second, although Niebuhr criticized natural-law theory for elevating historically contingent propositions to universal status, recent natural-law approaches have given much greater attention to historical contingencies and differences in the application of general principles. I show how Murray exhibited this historical consciousness and often relied on arguments of prudence and pragmatics that a Christian realist should appreciate. Third, although Niebuhr's appreciation for ambiguity and tension made him reluctant to rely on absolute rules in political matters, later Christian realists affirmed the need for rules precisely to limit the human propensities for self-aggrandizement. Natural law and Christian realism both assert that moral-political principles and institutions should rest on assessments of human nature and what will promote human flourishing in the light of that nature. Both recognize real, objectively valid moral-political principles - grounded ultimately in God the creator - but both can recognize also that these universal principles tend to be general in nature and that applying them to concrete contexts will produce varying specific rules. There remain many differences between natural-law and Christian-realist approaches, but often the differences complement each other, so that a full vision of Christian political ethics can benefit from both approaches. A combination of natural law and Christian realism suggests that a moral-political principle or institution is most solid when its justification rests on both the possibilities of human nature and on its negative tendencies. For example, the most powerful case for democracy, in Niebuhr's words, is that man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, and man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary. I close the paper with a brief discussion of why the common project that Murray and Niebuhr shared remains of value in America today. Among other things, both Murray and Niebuhr articulated their arguments in terms that others could access and evaluate without having already adopted the premises of the Christian faith. Although I do not believe there is any general legal or moral obligation to present political arguments in such terms, nevertheless in a society characterized by religious disagreement, such arguments are more likely to be effective in political debate and lead to productive deliberation about political choices.


 
Vasquez on Obligations of Corporations under Inernational Law Carlos Manuel Vazquez (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 43, p. 927, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    International law today addresses the conduct of private corporations in a variety of areas. With very few exceptions, however, international law regulates corporate conduct indirectly - that is, by requiring states to enact and enforce regulations applicable to corporations and other non-state actors. Only a small number of international legal norms - primarily those relating to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and forced labor - apply directly to non-state actors. Scholars have argued forcefully that international law should move in the direction of directly imposing obligations on corporations. These arguments overlook important aspects of the problem. If international legal norms were extended to corporations and backed by effective enforcement mechanisms, states would lose control over compliance with the norms. If not accompanied by an effective enforcement mechanism, the norms would probably be widely disregarded. The first option is likely to be strongly resisted by states; the second option would do little for the interests sought to be protected and would be bad for international law.


 
Vandenbergh on Individuals as Polluters Michael P. Vandenbergh (Vanderbilt University - School of Law) has posted The Individual as Polluter (Environmental Law Reporter, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Individuals are the largest source of dioxin emissions, contribute almost one-third of all ozone precursor emissions, and are a far larger source of several other air toxics than all large industrial sources combined. Thus, after more than 30 years of regulation largely directed at industry, individual behavior has emerged as a leading source of pollution. Professor Michael P. Vandenbergh argues that treating individual behavior as a discrete source of pollution can lead to the development of viable, innovative regulatory instruments that have the prospect of achieving pollution reductions at a relatively low cost. The creation of an individual toxic release inventory, for example, is one such tool. Drawing on the work of norms scholars and leading social psychologists, Professor Vandenbergh argues that environmental norm activation theory can identify the information that is most likely to induce changes to environmental behavior and can help policymakers develop new tools for inducing such change.


 
Danay on Free Expression & P2P Robert Jacob Danay (Government of Canada - Justice Canada) has posted Copyright vs. Free Expression: The Case of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing of Music in the United Kingdom (International Journal of Communications Law and Policy, Vol. 10, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This paper explores the extent to which the peer-to-peer (p2p) file-sharing of music is a form of communication protected from the restrictions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (U.K.) (CDPA) by the guarantee of free expression enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and incorporated into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.) (HRA). The paper first examines the protection offered to freedom of expression through the existing copyright scheme. It is asserted that due to a lack of context-sensitivity, mechanisms such as the idea-expression dichotomy must not be relied upon to deny the existence of prima facie breaches of Article 10(1) of the ECHR. Rather, such breaches must be acknowledged and justified (if possible) as being "necessary in a democratic society" under Article 10(2) of the ECHR. Next, the extent to which p2p music file-sharing represents an infringement under the terms of the CDPA (exclusive of any effect of the ECHR) is examined. It is concluded that such sharing does amount to an infringement under the Act and is not subject to any of the enumerated defences. The final part of the paper explores the extent to which the statutory restriction on file-sharing of music may be permitted under Article 10 of the ECHR. It is suggested that, for a number of reasons, the CDPA's restriction on free expression may not be "necessary in a democratic society" under Article 10(2) of the ECHR. As a result, should this statutory restriction be impugned in a U.K. courtroom in the context of p2p music file-sharing, such a court may be under an obligation to exculpate infringing parties under the "public interest" defence or to make a declaration of incompatibility under the HRA.


 
Stinneford on Subsidiarity & Federalism John F. Stinneford (University of St. Thomas School of Law) has posted Subsidiarity, Federalism and Federal Prosecution of Street Crime (Journal of Catholic Social Thought, Vol. 2, p. 495, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In recent decades, Congress has expanded the reach of federal criminal law to the point where it substantially overlaps with state law. Many defendants who commit essentially local "street" crimes, such as arson, carjacking, or illegal firearms possession, now violate both state and federal law. Defendants who are prosecuted in the federal system typically face greater procedural disadvantages, higher conviction rates and longer sentences than those prosecuted for the same conduct in state court. But neither the Department of Justice nor the federal judiciary has articulated uniform standards for determining which cases belong in federal court and which do not. Rather, this issue has been left largely to the discretion of individual United States Attorneys. The essay that follows will argue that the best source for a standard to govern prosecutorial discretion in this area is the principle of subsidiarity: the principle that higher order institutions (such as the federal government) should avoid taking over the functions or disrupting the internal life of lower order institutions (such as state and local government), but should provide assistance to such institutions where necessary. This principle would permit federal intervention in criminal matters traditionally handled by the states only where the federal government enjoys an inherent advantage by virtue of its nature as a national government. Cases could not be moved from state to federal court simply to avoid procedural or evidentiary problems under state law, to avoid local juries, or to obtain a longer sentence than is available under state law. Inclusion of such a standard in the federal prosecutorial guidelines is consistent with basic principles of federalism, and will eliminate the most egregious disparities resulting from the overlap of state and federal criminal law.


Tuesday, November 15, 2005
 
MobBlog on Cohen's The Place of the User in Copyright Law Over at the Picker MobBlog, several IP scholars are discussing The Place of the User in Copyright Law by Julie E. Cohen of the Georgetown Law Center. Here is the abstract of Cohen's very interesting article:
    The past decade has witnessed an upsurge of interest, on the part of both copyright owners and copyright scholars, in users of copyrighted works. Copyright doctrine, however, is characterized by the absence of the user. This absence produces a domino effect that ripples through the structure of copyright law, shaping both its unquestioned rules and its thorniest dilemmas. The essay traces the effects of the user's absence, and argues that a theory of the user is needed to restore doctrinal and theoretical balance. Specifically, it is commonly understood that users play two important roles within the copyright system: users receive copyrighted works, and some users become authors. Both roles further the copyright system's larger project to promote the progress of knowledge. But copyright law and policy have shown little interest in understanding the processes by which these roles are performed, nor in inquiring what users need to perform their roles in a way that optimizes the performance of the copyright system as a whole. The models of the user offered by copyright scholars have not helped as much as they could in answering these questions. In broad brush, scholarly efforts to cast the user have produced three fully fledged candidates, each more unrealistic than the last: the economic user, the "postmodern" user, and the romantic user. As the essay shows, none of these characters provides a satisfying account of the user's role within the copyright system. This essay introduces a new character, the situated user, who engages cultural goods found within the context of her culture through a variety of activities ranging from consumption to creative play, and whose activities are the vehicle through which copyright's collective project is advanced.
Check out MobBlog posts by Julie Cohen (and here), Lydia Loren (and here), Bill Patry (and here), Randy Picker, and Brett Frischmann. My contribution is here.


 
Tuesday Calendar
    University of Illinois Law: Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School.
    George Mason Law: Josh Wright, George Mason, Measuring the Impact of Slotting Allowances on Consumer Welfare.
    Georgetown Law: Carrie Menkel Meadow, Georgetown, "What's Fair in Love and War? A Study of Professional Variations in Ethics"
    University of Colorado Law, The 32nd Annual Austin N. Scott Jr. Memorial Lecture: Phil Weiser, Telecom’s Brave New World.
    Lewis & Clark Law: Richard Brooks, Associate Professor of Law, Yale Race and Uncertainty.
    Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Alison Brimelow, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Is the IP System Working? Some Observations
    University College, London, Law Faculty: Colm O'Cinneide (UCL), ‘Poverty and Human Rights: The Law as Tool of Social Change’
    University of Chicago Law & Economics: Paul Mahoney, Virginia Law School (with Jianping Mei, Stern School of Business, NYU), Mandatory versus Contractual Disclosure: Evidence from the 1930s
    Vanderbilt Law: Bob Rasmussen, Vanderbilt Law School, "Empirically Bankrupt"


 
Rosenbury on Endings Marriages Laura Rosenbury (Washington University, St. Louis) has posted Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Default rules governing property distribution at divorce and death are often identified as one of the primary benefits of marriage. This Article examines these default rules in all fifty states, exposing the ways property distribution differs depending on whether the marriage ends by divorce or death. The result is often counter-intuitive: in most states, a spouse is likely to receive more property if her marriage ends by divorce than if the marriage lasts until "death do us part." This difference can be explained in part by the choices of feminist activists over the past thirty-five years: feminists played a large role in the reform of divorce law but have largely ignored inheritance law. This Article begins to fill the void by exploring what current inheritance laws reflect about the states' conceptions of marriage and the roles of spouses within marriage. In doing so, the Article questions whether inheritance law should be reformed to conform with divorce law or whether women would benefit more from a re-examination of the partnership theory of marriage that informs current divorce law.


 
Hasen on Congressional Power & Felon Disenfranchisement Richard L. Hasen (Loyola Law School (Los Angeles)) has posted The Uncertain Congressional Power to Ban State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article, prepared for a voting rights symposium to appear in the Howard Law Journal, considers congressional power to ban state felon disenfranchisement laws. Although courts in other countries have held that the practice of denying the right to vote to felons (or ex-felons) violates constitutional guarantees, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the practice usually does not violate the U.S. Constitution. Current controversy in lower federal courts swirls over whether section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may bar certain state felon disenfranchisement laws. This article looks beyond that controversy to the constitutional question: If Congress passed a clear law barring the state practice of disenfranchising felons (or ex-felons), would the Supreme Court uphold such a law as a permissible exercise of Congressional power to enforce the 14th or 15th amendments? The most promising, but still quite uncertain, basis for congressional power is that a felon disenfranchisement ban enforces equal protection guarantees against race discrimination under the 14th amendment and enforces the right to vote free of race discrimination under the 15th amendment. In particular, the federal government could argue that it is intentional past (and potentially present) race discrimination in this country that leads to cycles of poverty in minority communities, and that such poverty makes it more likely that members of these communities will be arrested. In addition, the government could argue that state discrimination in the administration of the criminal justice system makes it more likely that minorities will be convicted of felonies and therefore disenfranchised. The article concludes that in light of the Supreme Court's new federalism jurisprudence it is uncertain whether the Supreme Court would uphold such a law on this basis as a permissible exercise of congressional power, leaving state legislatures as the prime locus for changes to felon disenfranchisement laws.


 
Vasquez on Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain Carlos Manuel Vazquez (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Sosa v Alvarez-Machain and Human Rights Claims Against Corporations under the Alien Tort Statute on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Contrary to the claims of some observers, the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain does not sound the death knell for the use of the Alien Tort Statute to maintain human rights claims against private corporations in the U.S. courts. The decision clarifies the nature of claims under the Alien Tort Statue to some extent, and places some limits on the theories available in actions against private corporations, but for the most part such suits remain as viable after Sosa as they were before. That is not to say, however, that victims of corporate human rights violations in developing countries should hold out much hope that their lot will be bettered through Alien Tort Statute litigation in the United States. Even before Sosa, such suits had a chance of producing results favorable to foreign plaintiffs only with respect to a very narrow category of human rights violations. This paper first briefly describes the evolution of Alien Tort Statute from the time it was reinvigorated in Filartiga v Pena-Irala to the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa. It then discusses the implications of Sosa for human rights claims against private corporation sand assesses the potential significance of federal human rights litigation as a mechanism for addressing the problems of those whose human rights are adversely affected by US corporations operating abroad.


 
Port on Trademark Dilution in Japan Kenneth L. Port (William Mitchell College of Law) has posted Trademark Dilution in Japan on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Trademark dilution jurisprudence in Japan is in a state of confusion. In an otherwise highly rational, highly developed system, this scattered jurisprudence is unexpected. It may be that Japanese courts, much like American courts, are reticent to recognize the full scope of the dilution right or it may be that the cause of action is still too new. The confused status of Japanese trademark dilution law, however, is indicative of a judiciary that is at odds with the legislature. This scattered jurisprudence is not scattered because of a lack of technical skill by the judiciary. It is likely scattered for greater reasons: to rein in a right the judiciary sees as inconsistent with the purposes of trademark protection in Japan. This article directly addresses the paucity of trademark dilution cases in Japan. This article concludes that first, to be sure, there are probably more cases than get reported (although that number is probably negligible). Second, the statute is even more vague than most Japanese legislation and does not even use the word dilution. Japanese courts do not or cannot distinguish between fundamental elements of the cause of action. Third, the defensive trademark system, underutilized as it is, provides an alternative to dilution protection. Finally, the theoretical understanding of trademark law renders dilution claim superfluous. In the aggregate, the result is a system that is very unsure of the dilution cause of action. This lack of certainty may prevent some entities from recognizing and pursuing their rights under the statute. To be sure, the confused state of Japanese dilution protection clearly indicates that Japanese courts do not understand the cause of action or are reticent to apply it as it is written. Given the high degree of technical skill of Japanese judges, it is not likely that they are simply making serious errors when applying dilution law to any given set of facts.


 
Nottage on Form and Substance (Comparatively) and Unfair Contracts Luke R. Nottage (University of Sydney - Faculty of Law) has posted Form and Substance in US, English, New Zealand and Japanese Law: A Framework for Better Comparisons of Developments in the Law of Unfair Contracts (Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 26, pp. 247-292, 1996) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Recently there has been talk of change in the law of contract in the United States, England, New Zealand and Japan. Often this is linked to broader trends of internationalisation. This article builds on the form-substance framework proposed by Atiyah and Summers, focusing on the fine print doctrine, the duty of good faith, and the law of unconscionability and undue influence. It argues that developments in these areas of contract law, which control unfair contracts, tend to be consistent with the overall orientation of each national legal system. This suggests that counter-systemic developments in each legal system's contract law will be met by more resistance than expected. Further, those overall orientations are not necessarily convergent, and this is likely to affect the impact of international developments in contract law on each legal system.


 
Conference Announcement: Punishment at Newcastle
    'Punishment' conference Research Beehive, Old Library Building, University of Newcastle Friday and Saturday, 2nd-3rd December 2005 Conference website: http://www.ncl.ac.uk/niassh/punishment/index.htm OVERVIEW
      This conference aims to bring together some of the leading philosophers with new scholars to discuss and debate issues in the philosophy of punishment from across a number of approaches. Papers will be published in a special issue of the new Journal of Moral Philosophy, published by Sage (website: http://mpj.sagepub.com) appearing in November 2006. The conference is supported by the Newcastle Institute for the Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities; the Newcastle Political Philosophy Group; and the University of Newcastle.
    PROGRAMME
      Friday, 2nd December 2005 ---- Beehive room 2.29 (9.30-17.00)
        1.00 - 1.30 Conference Registration 1.30 - 3.00 Michael Clark (University of Nottingham) "Retribution and Organic Unities" 3.00 - 3.30 Tea/coffee 3.30 - 5.00 Christopher Bennett (University of Sheffield) "Punishment as State Denunciation of Crime" 5.00 - 5.30 Break 5.30 - 7.00 Matt Matravers (University of York) "Doing Retributive Justice in Conditions of Distributive Injustice"
      Saturday, 3rd December 2005 ---- Beehive room 2.29 (9.30-17.00)
        9.30 - 11.00 Richard L. Lippke (James Madison University) "Imprisonable Offenses" 11.00 - 11.30 Coffee/tea 11.30 - 1.00 Leo Zaibert (University of Wisconsin) "The Fitting, the Deserving, and the Beautiful" 1.00 - 2.00 Lunch 2.00 - 3.30 Geoffrey Scarre (University of Durham) "Punishment and Reputation"
    Speakers will have 25-30 minutes to present. Commentators will then have about 10 minutes to offer comments, followed by a brief 2-3 minute right of response by speakers before opening the floor for 45 minutes of discussion. Commentators include Thom Brooks (University of Newcastle), Antony Duff(University of Stirling), Gerhard Overland (University of Oslo), and Jens Timmermann (University of St Andrews). REGISTRATION
      Want a registration form? Email me (t.brooks@ncl.ac.uk) and I can send you one as an attachment. Registration forms with payment must be sent by *15th November 2005* to:
        Dr Thom Brooks Department of Politics University of Newcastle Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU United Kingdom
      These forms also have information about accommodation. Delegates are recommended to select accommodation in Jesmond or City Centre areas, preferably along Osbourne Road.
    *Papers to be delivered at the conference will be made available to all conference delegates prior to the meeting.* DIRECTIONS


 
Call for Papers: Ethical Aspects of Risk
    Announcement and Call for Papers Conference Ethical Aspects of Risk 14-16 June 2006 Philosophy Department, Delft University of Technology Keynote speakers:
      Ruth Chadwick University of Lancaster Carl Cranor University of California Riverside Douglas MacLean University of North Carolina Paul Slovic Decision Research, Oregon
    Technology has advanced human well being in a myriad of respects, such as energy, communication and abilities to travel. Still, every technology also has negative side-effects, such as risks from accidents and pollution. A standard way to judge the acceptability of a specific technology is cost-benefit analysis. However, next to the balance between the benefits and risks of a technology the following considerations seem to be important: the distribution of costs and benefits, whether a risk is voluntarily taken, whether there are available alternatives etc. How to judge whether a risk is acceptable is a pressing ethical question that deserves thorough investigation. There is a vast amount of sociological and psychological research on acceptable risks, but surprisingly, there is only very little research from moral philosophy on risks. This conference aims to fill this gap by bringing together moral philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and engineers to reflect on the ethical issues concerning ‘acceptable risk’. The following questions will be the focus of the conference:
      - What are morally legitimate considerations in judging the acceptability of risks? Is cost-benefit analysis the best way or do we need additional considerations? - What role should emotions play in judging the acceptability of risks? Are they irrational and distorting or are they a necessary precondition for practically rational judgments? - What role should the public play in judging the acceptability of risks (e.g. informed consent procedures analogous to medical ethics)? - Is the precautionary principle a fruitful tool in dealing with risks?
    Call for papers: abstracts due by December 1st 2005 Submit a 750 word abstract with information about academic affiliation to ethicsrisks@tbm.tudelft.nl Visit the conference website at http://www.ethicsrisk.tbm.tudelft.nl/ For inquiries, contact the organization committee through ethicsrisk@tbm.tudelft.nl Organization: Sabine Roeser and Lotte Asveld Conference management: Henneke Piekhaar


Monday, November 14, 2005
 
Monday Calendar
    Columbia Legal Theory Workshop: David Sklansky of University of California at Berkeley, "Democratic Policing Inside and Out"
    Boston College Law: William H. Simon, Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School & William W. and Gertrude H. Saunders Professor of Law, Stanford University School of Law.
    George Washington IP Speakers Series: Peter P. Swire, Ohio State University, “Security Market: Competitive and Security Incentives for Disclosure of Data”
    Georgetown Environmental Research Workshop: Jody Freeman, Harvard Law School, "Modular Environmental Regulation".
    London School of Economics: Doug MacLean (Chapel Hill), Must Environmental Ethics be Anthropocentric?
    NYU Law: Rochelle Dreyfuss
    Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Barbara Hudson, Security, Citizenship and the Law: regulating boundaries: Justice, community and "risky citizenship" : principles of justice for divided society
    UCLA Law: Professor Yuen Huo, UCLA, Department of Psychology, Authority Relations in the Context of Diversity: A Social Psychological Perspective
    University of Alabama Law: Kent Greenfield, Boston College School of Law, Military Recruiting, Law Schools, and the First Amendment
    University of Minnesota Public Law: Don Herzog, University of Michigan Law School, The Kerr Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights.
    University of Texas Law: Siva Vaidhyanathan, "The Googlization of Everything"
    Vanderbilt Law & Business Workshop: Steve Choi, New York University School of Law, "The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals"


 
Hasday on Intimacy and Economic Exchange Jill Elaine Hasday (Minnesota) has psoted Intimacy and Economic Exchange (forthcoming 119 Harv. L. Rev. Dec. 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The current legal debate about the regulation of economic exchange between intimates mistakenly assumes that the law does not countenance such exchange to any notable extent. This assumption is so widely held that it unites otherwise disparate anticommodification and pro-market scholars. Both groups agree that the law maintains a strict boundary between economic exchange and intimacy, and disagree only on whether to applaud or criticize that boundary. Both overlook or underemphasize the degree to which the law already permits economic exchange within intimate relationships. The current debate's focus on whether the law should enforce economic exchanges between intimates misses at least three critical questions: how the law already regulates such exchanges, for what purposes, and with what consequences. One of the primary ways that the law constitutes an intimate relation as intimate - recognizes its dignity and distinguishes it from other relationships - is by regulating how economic resources are exchanged within the relationship. But efforts to denote the sanctity of intimate relationships through the regulation of economic exchange appear to systematically perpetuate and exacerbate distributive inequality for women and the poor. These distributive consequences suggest a need to reexamine and reform how the legal system establishes the specialness of an intimate relationship. This Article begins that project.


 
Strahilevitz on Rights to Exclude Lior Strahilevitz (University of Chicago Law School) has posted Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude (Michigan Law Review, Vol. 104, August 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article addresses a central question in property theory: In a world where an owner can exercise the right to exclude third parties from his resource in any of several ways, what causes him to adopt a particular exclusionary strategy? Orthodox property scholarship has focused a great deal of attention on those exclusion rights that arise under trespass law. This paper suggests that much can be gained from thinking about exclusion with a bigger tent approach, one that is sensitive to the ways in which non-trespass-based exclusion rights substitute for in rem, trespass-based rights. Non-trespass-based exclusion rights include exclusionary vibes, which are communicative signals that make undesirable third parties feel unwelcome, as well as exclusionary amenities, which impose a disproportionate tax on the undesirable by bundling permission to use a resource with an obligation to pay for a separate, polarizing resource. It turns out that information asymmetries often drive owners' decisions about what exclusion strategies to adopt. Where third parties seeking to use property possess private information about their own preferences, behaviors, and intentions, and the owner cannot discover this private information at a low cost, the owner is likely to delegate the exclusion function to the would-be entrants by employing non-trespass based exclusion strategies. By contrast, where there is little private information involved, or private information can be discovered by the owner at a low cost, the owner is more likely to employ trespass-based exclusion rights. This relationship between information asymmetries and the choice of exclusion strategies suggests new possibilities for creative government intervention in those settings where particular exclusion strategies conflict with public policy interests. It is well understood that the government can impose outright prohibitions, proscribing some forms of exclusion and permitting other forms. This is the strategy the government has adopted in the housing discrimination arena. Alternatively, the government can adopt subtler but equally effective strategies that regulate access to private information as a means of altering owners' incentives to exclude. Megan's Law is the most prominent and far-reaching example of the subtle approach, although many aspects of information privacy law affect owners' incentives in much the same way. In short, by rendering private information public or public information private, the state can alter, sometimes radically, the mix of exclusion strategies that resource owners employ.


 
Andand on Dutch Auction IPOs Anita I. Anand (Yale Law School) has posted Is the Dutch Auction IPO a Good Idea? (Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The Google IPO raised the question of whether Dutch auctions are preferable to the traditional bookbuilding method of financing. Some argue that Dutch auctions make public offerings more efficient in terms of price discovery by leaving less money on the table. They further argue that Dutch auctions are more fair, since underwriters do not allocate securities to preferred clients, thereby allowing for a more equitable allocation among institutional and retail investors. I suggest that the Dutch auction is not necessarily more fair and may in fact lead to less efficient capital markets. I argue that reform of the current system is unnecessary because of capital market composition and, in particular, the means by which a majority of retail shareholders invest in securities.


 
Cotropia on Patent Claim Interpretation Christopher Anthony Cotropia (Tulane University School of Law) has posted Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms (William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 47, October 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The optimal scope of patent protection is an issue with which patent system observers have struggled for decades. Various patent doctrines have been recognized as tools for creating specific patent scopes and, as a result, implementing specific patent theories. One area of patent law that has not been addressed in the discussion on patent scope and theories is patent claim interpretation. This omission is particularly noteworthy because of the substantive role patent claims and the interpretation thereof play in the patent system, namely the framing of questions of patent infringement and validity. This Article will explore the not-yet-discussed relationship between claim interpretation methodology and patent scope. The discussion will focus on how changes in interpretation methodology affect patent scope, an aspect of methodologies that the Article identifies as their "claim scope paradigm." Introducing the claim scope paradigm concept is mainly beneficial for two reasons. First, identifying the claim scope paradigm allows different interpretation methodologies to be evaluated as to their impact on the substantive function of patent claims. A claim scope paradigm criterion represents a significant and worthwhile departure from the current standard of certainty used by courts and commentators. Second, recognizing claim scope paradigms facilitates the use of claim interpretation methodology as a patent policy lever. Interpretation methodologies can be highly effective levers, having the ability to inject patent policy at the most basic level of the patent process.


 
Tuerkheimer on Violence Against Pregnant Women Deborah Tuerkheimer (University of Southern Maine - School of Law) has posted Conceptualizing Violence against Pregnant Women (Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 81) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Violence against pregnant women has been largely overlooked by social and legal discourses. Violence often begins or escalates during pregnancy, yet the criminal law as currently constituted fails to provide a remedy commensurate with the victim's injury. The pregnant battered woman thus lies outside the reach of law's protection. This Article explores the nature of pregnancy battering - violence inflicted on a pregnant woman by her intimate - and the limitations of the criminal law's response to it. I begin by introducing to legal scholarship current scientific research on the prevalence, dynamics, and consequences of violence during pregnancy. I then turn to the failure of conventional legal structures to redress pregnancy battering, asserting that criminal law decontextualizes violence and disregards the victim's pregnancy, resulting in an unduly restrictive definition of her injury. In recent years, a new paradigm that purports to redress violence against pregnant woman has ascended. Embodied in the recently enacted federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (UVV), this approach identifies the fetus as the victim of violence. To evaluate the merits of this model, I consider how the construct of fetal personhood has historically served as a vehicle for state control over the lives of women. I claim that what is distinct - and particularly pernicious -- about the UVV and analogous state statutes is that the pregnant woman, who was historically subject to paternalistic regulations enforcing idealized notions of motherhood, is now vanished altogether. Feminist theory, which might be expected to provide a framework that addresses criminal law's inadequacies in this area, itself offers an incomplete understanding of pregnancy. In order to challenge law's flawed definition of pregnancy battering, a richer, more complex story must be told. By integrating two strands of feminist scholarship that have developed largely in opposition to one another, my aim is to conceptualize pregnancy in a manner that animates an affirmative vision for criminal law functioning in this realm. Articulating how pregnant victims of domestic violence suffer allows for the possibility of meaningful criminal law remediation. To this end, I propose a new statutory approach that brings the woman - as fully constituted by her pregnancy - into legal focus.


Sunday, November 13, 2005
 
Legal Theory Calendar
    Monday, November 14
      Columbia Legal Theory Workshop: David Sklansky of University of California at Berkeley, "Democratic Policing Inside and Out"
      Boston College Law: William H. Simon, Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School & William W. and Gertrude H. Saunders Professor of Law, Stanford University School of Law.
      George Washington IP Speakers Series: Peter P. Swire, Ohio State University, “Security Market: Competitive and Security Incentives for Disclosure of Data”
      Georgetown Environmental Research Workshop: Jody Freeman, Harvard Law School, "Modular Environmental Regulation".
      London School of Economics: Doug MacLean (Chapel Hill), Must Environmental Ethics be Anthropocentric?
      NYU Law: Rochelle Dreyfuss
      Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Barbara Hudson, Security, Citizenship and the Law: regulating boundaries: Justice, community and "risky citizenship" : principles of justice for divided society
      UCLA Law: Professor Yuen Huo, UCLA, Department of Psychology, Authority Relations in the Context of Diversity: A Social Psychological Perspective
      University of Alabama Law: Kent Greenfield, Boston College School of Law, Military Recruiting, Law Schools, and the First Amendment
      University of Minnesota Public Law: Don Herzog, University of Michigan Law School, The Kerr Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights.
      University of Texas Law: Siva Vaidhyanathan, "The Googlization of Everything"
      Vanderbilt Law & Business Workshop: Steve Choi, New York University School of Law, "The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals"
    Tuesday, November 15
      University of Illinois Law: Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School.
      George Mason Law: Josh Wright, George Mason, Measuring the Impact of Slotting Allowances on Consumer Welfare.
      Georgetown Law: Carrie Menkel Meadow, Georgetown, "What's Fair in Love and War? A Study of Professional Variations in Ethics"
      University of Colorado Law, The 32nd Annual Austin N. Scott Jr. Memorial Lecture: Phil Weiser, Telecom’s Brave New World.
      Lewis & Clark Law: Richard Brooks, Associate Professor of Law, Yale Race and Uncertainty.
      Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Alison Brimelow, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Is the IP System Working? Some Observations
      University College, London, Law Faculty: Colm O'Cinneide (UCL), ‘Poverty and Human Rights: The Law as Tool of Social Change’
      University of Chicago Law & Economics: Paul Mahoney, Virginia Law School (with Jianping Mei, Stern School of Business, NYU), Mandatory versus Contractual Disclosure: Evidence from the 1930s
      Vanderbilt Law: Bob Rasmussen, Vanderbilt Law School, "Empirically Bankrupt"
    Wednesday, November 16
      Institute of Philosophy Conference and Seminar Series (London): Terrence Horgan (Arizona), Cognitivist Expressivism.
      Northwestern Law & Economics: Henry Smith, Professor of Law, Yale University, "Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow"
      University College London, Mellon Foundation: Lasse Thomassen (Limerick), The Inclusion of the Other? Habermas on Tolerance
      University College London, School of Public Policy: Matthew Cramer (Cambridge), Dimensions of Objectivity in Law
      NYU Legal History: Richard Primus, Visiting Professor, NYU School of Law, "The Riddle of Hiram Revels: Retroactivity and the Civil War"
      Ohio State Center for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies: Conference, Building Democracy Through Online Citizen Deliberation.
      Oxford Centre for Criminology: Didier Bigo, European Liberty and Security: What is at stake?
      University of Georgia Law: Olufunmilayo B. Arewa (Case Western Reserve University), "Piracy," Borrowing and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks: History, Hierarchies and Conceptions of Culture
      University of Toronto Tax & Law and Economics Series: Edward J. McCaffery University of Southern California, Starving the Beast: The Psychology of Budget Deficits
      University of Toronto Globalization, Law & Justice Workshop Series: Harry Arthurs, Osgoode Hall Law School, The Role of Global Law Firms in Constructing or Obstructing a Transnational Regime of Labour Law
    Thursday, November 17
      University of Illinois Legal History: Willy Forbath (University of Texas), "The Morality of Borders: Race, Liberalism, and National Identity in the Law and Politics of European Immigration, 1882-1924"
      Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: John Stanton-Ife, Harm and Autonomy
      NYU Colloquium in Legal, Political and Social Philosophy: Liam Murphy, Morality and the Concept of Law Link fixed!
      Boston University Law: Daniela Caruso, "Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization".
      Florida State Law: Tracy Higgins, Fordham University Law School.
      Georgetown Intellectual Property: Brett Frischmann, Loyola Chicago, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law
      Loyola University Chicago, Intellectual Infrastructure and Intellectual Property.
      University of London School of Advanced Study: David Owens (School of Advanced Study), Duress, Deception and the Validity of a Promise
      Loyola Los School, Los Angeles: Peter Blanck, "The Future of the Americans with Disabilities Act"
      Ohio State Law: Milton C. Regan Jr. (Georgetown), "Eat What You Kill*
      Oxford Trinity College Law Society: Hugh Laddie, "The Common Law - a system under stress"
      University College, London, Law Faculty: Professor Bruno de Witte (European University Institute), ‘Promotion and Erosion of Cultural Diversity by European Union Law ’
      University of Michigan Law & Economics: James Hines, Jr., Michigan Business School, Value-Added Taxes and International Trades: The Evidence
      Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Jürgen Habermas, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University (Philosophy).
      Brooklyn Law School: Eric M. Zolt (UCLA), Inequality and Taxation: Evidence from the Americas
      University of North Dakota Law, Northern Plains Indian Law Center Speakers Series: Kirsten Matoy Carlson (Michigan), “Does Constitutional Change Matter? Canada’s Recognition of Aboriginal Title.”
    Friday, November 18
      Georgetown International Human Rights Colloquium: Lori Fisler Damrosch, Columbia University School of Law, "Reflections on Medellin"
      Washington University: Conference on the Rehnquist Court & the First Amendment
      Fordlam Law: EXPLORING THE LIMITS: Recent Challenges to the Scope of IP Law.
      UCLA Law: David M. Driesen, Angela R. Cooney Professor, Syracuse University College of Law, "Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?"
      Columbia Law School: Conference, Shareholder Democracy: Its Promises and Perils.
      University of Georgia Law: Jedediah S. Purdy (Duke University), The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation
      University of Texas Law: Seth Chandler, University of Houston, "The Network Structure of the Law"
      Villanova Law: Marc Galanter, University of Wisconsin Law School


 
Legal Theory Lexicon: Virtue Ethics
    Introduction The Legal Theory Lexicon already includes posts on Deontology and Utilitarianism--representing two important families of ethical theory. This week, the Lexicon provides an introduction to virtue ethics. As always, the Lexicon provides a quick and dirty summary with an eye to law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in legal theory. Together, these three posts provide a rough and ready introduction to the three most prominent approaches to normative ethics.
    What is virtue ethics? Obviously, virtue ethics has something to do with virtue, which in this context is closely related in meaning to the English word "excellence," the Latin "virtu," and the Greek, "arete." Sometimes "virtue ethics" is also called "aretaic moral theory," using the adjective form of the Greek word for virtue.
    In moral philosophy, the virtues are the human excellences. Here is the definition offered by the distinguished moral philosopher, Rosalind Hursthouse:
      Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as "Do unto others as you would be done by" and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.
    It might be illuminating to compare virtue ethics to deontology and utilitarianism via the following simplified formulas:
    • Utilitarianism: An action is right if and only if the action will produce the best consequences as compared to the alternative actions that could be undertaken by the agent.
    • Deontology: An action is right if and only if the action is either (a) required by a moral duty, or (b) allowed by a moral permission, and not (c) forbidden by a moral prohibition.
    • Virtue Ethics: An action is right if and only if the action is one which a virtuous moral agent would characteristically perform under the circumstances.
    Formulas are tricky, and I haven't tried to get these formulations exactly right. Instead, my aim was to paint broadly to give a sense of the basic structure of these three approaches to moral theory. Whereas, utilitarianism makes consequences (or states of affairs) the central idea of moral theory and deontology focuses on moral rules, virtue ethics focuses on character and human excellence.
    Modern Moral Philosophy Historically, virtue ethics finds its roots in ancient Greek philosophy, particularly in the work of Plato and Aristotle, but the contemporary revival of virtue ethics can, in a sense, be traced to G.E.M. Anscombe's article, Modern Moral Philosophy published in the journal Philosophy in 1958. Anscombe's famous article noted the well-known deficiencies and problems associated with utilitarianism and deontology and suggested that a return to Aristotle's moral philosophy might provide a fruitful alternative. This marks the beginning of what might be called the aretaic turn in moral philosophy--initiating both a return to Aristotle's theory of the virtues and the development new varieties of virtue theory.
    The Virtues What are the virtues? One good way to answer this question is to examine Aristotle's account of human excellence. For Aristotle, the virtues are acquired dispositional qualities; they are potentialities or powers which are states of character or of mind. Aristotle characterizes the virtues as intellectual or moral, and his views can be sketched by examining these two categories.
    The moral virtues are states of character concerned with choice; examples include courage, temperance and justice. Aristotle thought that virtues such as courage related to human emotion in a particular way. In the case of courage, there is a morally neutral human emotion--fear. The disposition to excessive fear (fear that is disproportionate to the situation) is the vice of timidity. The disposition to insufficient fear is the vice of recklessness. Courage is the disposition to feel fear that is proportionate to the actual threat or danger. Hence the virtue of mean is a mean between two opposed vices, timidity and recklessness. Moral virtues, says Aristotle, are acquired as a result of habit; one must act courageously in order to become courageous.
    The intellectual virtues are practical and theoretical wisdom. Practical wisdom or phronesis is excellence in deliberation: the person of practical reason is able to choose good ends and the means to achieve those ends. Practical wisdom operates in realm of praxis: action in particular situations. Theoretical wisdom or sophia, on the other hand, operates in the realm of theoria; abstract thinking, science and theory. The intellectual virtues are initially developed by teaching and mature through experience.
    A fully virtuous agent, then, would be someone who possesses the full complement of the moral and intellectual virtues. This may be rare, as most humans lack some of the virtues and possess others in an imperfect form.
    Virtue Ethics and Human Good What are the implications of virtue ethics for human ends and actions? Here is a very simple (and simplified) answer. Virtue ethics counsels us to cultivate virtue--to acquire the human excellences insofar as that is possible. Virtuous agents will then aim at the right goals in life, because their intellectual and emotional makeup naturally points them towards a just and flourishing life. Thus, a fully virtuous human will characteristically act in the right way for the right reasons. And what about those who lack full virtue? Many humans, however, lack fully virtuous characters. What counsel does virtue ethics offer those who lack the full complement of human excellence? The answer to this question can be developed in at least two ways. First, we might ask ourselves, "How would a virtuous human act in these circumstances?" This is, of course, part of ordinary human deliberation. When faced with a difficult choice situation, sometimes we think of someone whose character we admire, and ask, "How would she (or he) deal with this?" Second, we might ask ourselves, "What do the virtues counsel in this situation?" That is, we can take our understanding of the human excellences, and ask questions like, "What action would be courageous?" or "What action would accord with the virtue of justice?"
    Particularism and Phronesis Contemporary virtue ethics is distinctive in part, because it denies something that both deontology and utilitarianism seem to affirm--that there is a decision procedure for ethics. Utilitarianism claims that there is a very simple rule (which if correctly applied) yields the morally correct action for each situation: act so as to produce the best consequences. Deontology has a similar claim: to do the right thing, simply consult the moral rules, and perform that action which is required or if no action is required, choose from among those that are permissible. Virtue ethics characteristically denies that there is any mechanical rule that generates the morally correct action. Why not? One answer to that question lies in Aristotle's idea of the phronimos, the person who possesses the virtue of practical wisdom. The phronimos has the ability to respond to the complexities of particular situations, to see what is morally salient, and to choose an action that will work given the circumstances.
    Behind the virtue of phronesis or practical wisdom is an assumption about the complexity of life. Virtue ethics characteristically argues that life is more complicated than our theories and rules. It would be impossible, the virtue ethicist might argue, to write a code of rules for moral conduct. No matter how complicated the rules, situations would inevitably arise that were not covered or in which the rules produced a perverse and unintended result. Acting morally requires more than a knowledge of moral principles; it requires a sensitivity to particular situations. One way of putting this is use the metaphor of moral vision, the ability to size up a real-world choice situation, perceiving the morally relevant circumstances.
    Virtue Politics and Virtue Jurisprudence What are the implications of virtue ethics for the questions that legal theorists ask? One starting point for an answer might be the development of "virtue politics," i.e. a political theory that builds on the foundations of virtue ethics. A virtue politics might begin with the idea that the goal of the state should be the establishment of the conditions for the development of human excellence. Thus, the aim of the legislator might be described as the establishment of a political and legal framework within which individual citizens can realize their full potential for human excellence. A virtue politics might also consider the implications of virtue theory for the design of political institutions. For example, institutions might both seek to counteract the fact that both citizens and office holders will frequently be less than fully virtuous and also to establish conditions under which legislators, executives, and judges are selected at least in part for their possession of the virtues.
    What about the implications of virtue ethics for legal theory? We might call an aretaic approach to legal theory "virtue jurisprudence." Among the topics that aretaic legal theory might explore is a virtue-centered theory of judging, which describes the particular excellences required by judges. A virtue-centered theory of judging offers an account of the characteristics or excellences that make for a good judge. These include: (1) judicial temperance, (2) judicial courage, (3) judicial temperament, (4) judicial intelligence, (5) judicial wisdom, and (6) justice. We might say that a virtuous judge is a judge who fully possesses the judicial virtues. Although every theory of judging can incorporate some account of judicial virtue, a virtue-centered theory of judging makes the distinctive claim that the judicial virtues are central, i.e. that they have basic explanatory and normative significance.
    In particular, a virtue-centered theory of judging would contend that a correct legal decision is a decision that would characteristically be made by a virtuous judge in the circumstances relevant to the decision. Thus, the central normative thesis of a virtue-centered theory of judging is that judges ought to be virtuous and to make virtuous decisions. Judges who lack the virtues should aim to make lawful or legally correct decisions, although they may not be able to do this reliably given that they lack the virtues. Judges who lack the judicial virtues ought to develop them. Judges ought to be selected on the basis of their possession of (or potential for the acquisition of) the judicial virtues.
    One of the judicial virtues is "judicial wisdom," the judicial form of the phronesis. If the world is too complex for a complete code of moral rules, then what about the law. Aristotle suggested that justice according to law would inevitably fall short in at least some particular cases, because the legislature must speak in relatively general and abstract language which sometimes will produce unintended consequences that are contrary to the purposes of the law. Here is Aristotle's discussion from Chapter 10 of Book V of the Nicomochean Ethics:
      What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not what is legally just: it is a rectification of legal justice. The explanation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law takes account of the majority of cases, though not unaware that in this way errors are made. And the law is nonetheless right; because the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the case; for the raw material of human behavior is essentially of this kind.
    Thus, the particularism that characterizes virtue ethics may translate into a concern with equity in virtue jurisprudence.
    Conclusion While utilitarianism and deontology are well-known to legal theory, virtue ethics is only beginning to have an influence on contemporary jurisprudence. Most contemporary American legal theorists were trained before virtue ethics reached its full flower in the 1980s and 1990s, and many law professors who have broad theoretical interests are only vaguely aware of the substantial impact that virtue ethics has had on contemporary moral philosophy. Nonetheless, a theoretically inclined law student can bring virtue ethics to bear on a variety of legal problems. One good example concerns the use of the "reasonable person" standard in tort law. It is interesting that tort law frames the standard of care in negligence cases with reference to the concept of an agent (the reasonable person)--and does not use the "reasonable action" or "reasonable consequences" as the fundamental idea.
    If thinking about the reasonable person in tort law is a good place to begin, virtue ethics can be applied to a variety of legal problems. Here is one suggestion. Sometimes, you will find that a strict application of the rules leads to a result that is manifestly unfair and unintended. Ask yourself: "Is this a case where a virtuous judge might choose to depart from the rule on equitable grounds?" And here is another suggestion: Whenever you find yourself dissatisfied with consequentialist or deontological approaches to the moral problems that law addresses, ask yourself, "What would virtue ethics say here?" What character traits or virtues are relevant to this problem? When you start to list the relevant virtues, you will be on your way to a virtue-theoretic analysis of the legal problem!
    Bibliography
      Anscombe, G.E.M., 1958, "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy 33:1-19.
      Crisp, Roger (ed.), 1996, How Should One Live? Oxford: Clarendon Press.
      Crisp, Roger and Michael Slote (eds.), 1997, Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
      Foot, Philippa, 1978, Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Blackwell.
      Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1999, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The single best one-volume statement of virtue ethics.
      Solum, Lawrence B. Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 Metaphilosophy 178 (2003).
      Statman, D. (ed.), 1997, Virtue Ethics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Links


Saturday, November 12, 2005
 
Legal Theory Bookworm This week, the Legal Theory Bookworm recommends The Medical Malpractice Myth by Tom Baker. Here is a description:
    In January 2005, President Bush declared the medical malpractice liability system "out of control." The president's speech was merely an echo of what doctors and politicians (mostly Republicans) have been saying for years—that medical malpractice premiums are skyrocketing due to an explosion in malpractice litigation. Along comes Baker, director of the Insurance Law Center at the University of Connecticut School of Law, to puncture "the medical malpractice myth" with a talent for reasoned argument and incisiveness. He counters that the real problem is "too much medical malpractice, not too much litigation," and that the cost of malpractice is lost lives and the "pain and suffering of tens of thousands of people every year"—most of whom do not sue. Baker argues that the rise in medical premiums has more to do with economic cycles and the competitive nature of the insurance industry than runaway juries. Finally, Baker offers an alternative in the form of evidence-based medical liability reform that seeks to decrease the incidence of malpractice and also protect doctors from rising premium costs. Having worked with insurance companies, law firms and doctors, Baker brings experience and perspective to his book, which is sure to be important and controversial in future debates.


 
Download of the Week Mark Graber of the University of Maryland is one of the superstars at the intersection of political science and law. His work within what is sometimes called the "new institutionalism" has been enormously influential. So I am especially pleased to recommend The Jacksonian Makings of the Taney Court as the Download of the Week. Here is the abstract:
    Many twentieth century commentators regard the willingness of Taney Court majorities to declare laws unconstitutional as proof that the justices on that tribunal adjured Jacksonian partisanship upon taking the bench. Old Republicans during the 1820s fulminated against judicial review of state legislation and sought to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1787, but they were apparently frustrated by a Taney Court which continued imposing contract clause and dormant commerce clause limits on state power. This paper demonstrates that Jacksonians in office supported judicial power. Jacksonian animus was more directed at McCulloch v. Maryland than either Marbury v. Madison or Fletcher v. Pack. Jacksonians wanted a stronger federal judiciary that would limit national power to regulate economic life and prevent northern states from assisting fugitive slaves. The more interesting question about the Taney Court is why they never overruled McCulloch, given that the judicial majority was on record as opposing that decision, then why then never limited Marbury.
Download it while its hot!


Friday, November 11, 2005
 
AALS FRC Today, I'm at the AALS FRC (the "meat market") in Washington DC, interviewing candidates for entry-level academic jobs at the University of Illinois College of Law. If you are going through this process, I wish you the best of luck!


 
Friday Calendar


 
Ben-Shahar & Mikos on Measures of Recovery in Private Law Omri Ben-Shahar and Robert A. Mikos (University of Michigan Law School and University of California, Davis - School of Law) have posted The (Legal) Value of Chance: Distorted Measures of Recovery in Private Law (American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 7 No. 2) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Parties who make investments that generate externalities may sometimes recover from the beneficiaries, even in the absence of contract. Previous scholarship has shown that granting recovery, based on either the cost of reasonable investment or the benefit conferred, can provide optimal incentives to invest. This article demonstrates that the law often awards recovery that is neither purely cost-based nor purely benefit-based and instead equals either the greater or lesser of the two measures. These hybrid approaches to recovery distort compensation and incentives. The article demonstrates the surprising prevalence of these practices and explores informational and institutional reasons why they emerge.


 
Hill on the Economics od Identity Claire A. Hill (University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law) has posted What the New Economics of Identity has to Say to Legal Scholarship on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In a paper published in 2000, George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton "introduce[d] identity- a person's sense of self- into economic analysis." Identity fits into the utility function: people seek identity benefits; they seek to avoid identity costs. Identity payoffs thus affect what people will do, interacting with other motivations for action. In this paper, I argue that law and economics' policy prescriptions can be enriched by taking identity into account. What counts as an identity? The category is potentially broad and amorphous: being African-American is an identity, as is being civic minded, as is being a jock or nerd. The common feature is the possibility of identity payoffs that strongly influence action. For instance, a person with a strong gourmand identity may incur significant identity payoffs if he receives a diagnosis of diabetes and has to restrict his diet accordingly. What generalizations can be made about identities so disparate? I consider at this juncture two stylized types of cases: one where the law is importantly involved in identity creation, and the other, where law is dealing more with identities that can be regarded as pre-existing. I discuss various examples in disparate contexts, including corporate law and criminal law. The paper also argues that taking identity into account doesn't just mean considering identity-as-payoff. As psychologists and sociologists have amply documented, identity is also a perceptual lens through which people perceive the world. Taking identity-as-perceptual-lens into account will be far more difficult than taking identity-as-payoff into account; it is necessary, though, to further the broader goal of making law and economics more realistic.


 
Regan on Teaching Enron Milton C. Regan, Jr. (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Teaching Enron (Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74, December 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The word "Enron" has become shorthand to refer to corporate wrongdoing in the first years of the twenty-first century. Aside from the dizzying heights from which it fell, Enron was notable for the intricacy of the misbehavior in which it engaged. The company created elaborate organizational structures, often with multiple layers of control, that were intended to use legal form to disguise economic substance. Such manipulation of form obviously required the services of many lawyers. Transactional lawyers in particular have expertise in fashioning elaborate permutations of form that the law will honor, even if the result is not entirely congruent with underlying economic substance. It's reasonable therefore to assume that lawyers' fingerprints were on Enron's arrangements perhaps more than in any other recent corporate scandal. Much of the commentary on Enron's attorneys has focused on whether these lawyers violated ethical rules or other legal provisions, and on how the law governing attorney conduct might be strengthened to prevent future transgressions. This commentary generally has been thoughtful and valuable as far as it goes. The application of legal rules, however, is triggered by the existence of certain facts - and the perception that these facts exist is the result of a complicated process. This suggests that we may gain particularly rich insights into the complexity of ethical judgment by trying to understand circumstances as lawyers themselves may have seen them. Proposed transactions don't come labeled as problematic and intricate legal structures rarely are obviously fraudulent. Those characterizations are conclusions that are the product of a complex process of perception that organizes information in particular ways based on factors such as situational cues and personal predilections. Behaving ethically requires cultivating powers of perception that are sensitive to and recognize events that carry ethical significance. Gaining an appreciation of the circumstances in which a given set of lawyers operated can be difficult, because it requires access to details about the texture of practice that often are unavailable. In the case of Enron, however, the Bankruptcy Court appointed an Examiner to review many of Enron's transactions. Of particular interest, the Examiner's final report contains an Appendix that discusses possible causes of action that Enron might have against its inside and outside legal counsel, along with potential defenses to these claims. The Examiner's reports constitute one of the most detailed accounts available of the activities of transactional lawyers as they worked on matters that later were deemed fraudulent, in some cases criminally so. This article discusses several transactions that the Examiner scrutinized. These represent only a portion of the transactions that the Examiner analyzed, but constitute a large number of the transactions with respect to which he focused on the conduct of attorneys. My aim is not to evaluate these attorneys' possible liability. Rather, my goal is to try to imagine the world as these lawyers may have seen it at the time the events unfolded. What influences shaped their perception of what was occurring? To what situational cues were they sensitive or blind, and why? How might they have interpreted information that in retrospect seems incriminating? What precisely does it mean, in other words, to say that Enron's lawyers "blessed," "signed off" on, or "approved" the company's transactions? Are these conclusions consistent with how the flow of events unfolded? Addressing these questions ideally will shed light on broader issues. When are circumstances likely to suggest that an ethical question has arisen? What kinds of factors enhance or obscure the ability to recognize this? What rationalizations tend to be available in what circumstances which provide reassurance that nothing is amiss? The article suggests that transactional lawyers may face a distinctive ethical challenge because their stock in trade is the creative manipulation of legal form. Law's tolerance of some divergence between legal form and economic substance helps create a background assumption that such divergence is normal and not problematic. At some point the divergence becomes wide enough that the law will treat it as fraud. The working assumption that divergence is normal, however, means that it may take something striking for a transactional lawyer to conclude that this point has been reached. When we add the common tendency to engage in self-serving rationalization to the picture, the perceptual problem becomes even more challenging. My hope is that engaging in a close analysis of the work of Enron's lawyers on specific transactions will suggest how Enron might be used as a case study that makes lawyers and law students more sensitive to the process of exercising judgment in ambiguous situations in which wrongdoing is not apparent on its face.


 
Nottage on Civil Procedure Reform in Japan Luke R. Nottage (University of Sydney - Faculty of Law) has posted Civil Procedure Reforms in Japan: The Latest Round (Ritsumeikan University Law Review, Vol. 22, pp. 81-86, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article outlines key features of the latest reforms to Japan's Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 2003 with effect from 2004. Even more so than the 1996 amendments, these reforms are directed at speeding up civil proceedings, as part of the government's whole-scale reforms to civil (and criminal) justice initiated in 2001. The increased burdens placed on lawyers may also reflect their declining relative influence in Japan's law reform processes.


Thursday, November 10, 2005
 
Thursday Calendar
    Ohio State: Conference, The Madness in the Shadows of Modern Life: Judicial Security and Politics in the 21st Century
    Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: John Gardner, Simply in VIrtue of Being Human: the Whos and Whys of Human Rights
    University of Pennsylvania Law: Conference, The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary. Starts today.
    Boston University Law: John Donohue (Yale).
    Fordham Law: John C. P. Goldberg, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School, and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, "The Gallery of Wrongs".
    NYU Colloquium in Law, Philosophy & Political Theory: David Dyzenhaus, The Legitimacy of the Rule of Law.
    Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Prof Patricia Birnie, Exploiting the ambiguities of Article 65 of the Law of the Sea Convention: current practice of the International Whaling Convention
    Stanford Law & Economics: Mark Cohen (Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University), "Imperfect Competition in Auto Lending: Subjective Markup, Racial Disparity, and Class Action Litigation"
    University of Michigan Law & Economics: Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard (Olin Lecturer) The Political Economy of Investor Protection.
    University of Minnesota Public Law Series: Rick Pildes, New York University Law School, Separation of Parties, Not Powers
    Vanderbilt Law: Richard Craswell, Stanford Law School, "Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere"
    Yale Law, Economics & Organizations Workshop: Professor Kevin Davis, New York University, Law, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Biolerplate.


 
Sunstein on the Precautionary Principle & the Availability Heuristic Cass R. Sunstein (University of Chicago Law School) has posted The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Climate Change on SSRN. Here is the abatract:
    Because risks are on all sides of social situations, it is not possible to be "precautionary" in general. The availability heuristic ensures that some risks stand out as particularly salient, whatever their actual magnitude. Taken together with intuitive cost-benefit balancing, the availability heuristic helps to explain differences across groups, cultures, and even nations in the assessment of precautions to reduce the risks associated with climate change. There are complex links among availability, social processes for the spreading of information, and predispositions. If the United States is to take a stronger stand against climate change, it is likely to be a result of available incidents that seem to show that climate change produces serious and tangible harm.
I always read Sunstein!


 
Vasquez on the FSIA Carlos Manuel Vazquez (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Altmann v. Austria and the Retroactivity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, pp. 207-22, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) generally applies to claims based on events that occurred before the Statute's enactment. To decide the retroactivity question, the Court had occasion to consider the essential nature of foreign sovereign immunity: it is merely a procedural immunity providing foreign states with present protection from the inconvenience and indignity of a lawsuit, or is it something more than that? The Court's examination of this question was brief and unsatisfying. Its analysis would have been enriched by a recognition that foreign sovereign immunity is regulated not just by federal statute, but also by principles of customary international law that the federal statute sought, in large part, to codify. Among the authorities the Court did consider, it found support for the proposition that foreign sovereign immunity is a procedural immunity and also for the proposition that foreign sovereign immunity is an immunity from substantive liability. Viewing these authorities as contradictory, the Court concluded that the retroactivity issue had to be resolved on other grounds. This brief article maintains that the relevant authorities are not contradictory. They are consistent with the conclusion that foreign states enjoy both a procedural and a substantive immunity, a possibility that the Court appears to have overlooked.


 
Trujillo on the State Action Antitrust Examption Elizabeth Trujillo (Florida State University College of Law) has posted State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides with Deregulation: Rehabilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The state action antitrust exemption, also known as the state action immunity doctrine, is used by antitrust defendants to shield themselves against antitrust liability in instances where their anticompetitive conduct, if not under the aegis of state policy, would have been deemed a violation of federal antitrust law. Under the Midcal test, a court may grant state action immunity to a defendant if it is proven that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is pursuant to a "clearly-articulated" state policy and has been "actively supervised" by the state. This paper evaluates the role, function, and definition of the state action exemption in the context of transforming regulated energy markets into competitive ones. In examining the manner in which lower courts have applied the state action antitrust exemption, this paper concludes that a broad application of the state action would hinder state efforts to open up the electrical markets for competing new entrants. The challenge for policymakers in establishing "pro-competition" policies is in implementing them within old regulatory structures originally intended to delegate authority to regulatory entities such as utilities which have traditionally dominated the electrical market. In effect, broad application of state action would interfere with any competitive efforts because it would continue to preserve old regulatory structures and protect traditionally dominant suppliers in the market. Careful analysis of major state action cases helps illuminate the problem and reveals a window into the possible solution. In applying the Midcal test, courts have used the foreseeability standard first established in the landmark Supreme Court case, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, inconsistently. This paper suggests that this "Hallian" foreseeability standard, if tied to the "clearly-articulated" state policy prong of the Midcal test, could help courts narrow the application state action. Ultimately, state action represents a federalism issue and it raises jurisdictional paradoxes. On the one hand, it stands for a state's right to regulate domestic public policy; on the other, it exempts a defendant from federal antitrust liability if the Midcal test is satisfied. Finally, delegated authority to regulatory agencies allows for another means of jurisdictional scrutiny - that of the declaratory rulings from the state commissions.


 
Winick & Wexler on Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Clinical Education Bruce Winick and David B. Wexler (University of Miami School of Law and University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law) have posted The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Recent years have seen the emergence of the therapeutic jurisprudence/preventive law model of lawyering. This model contemplates lawyers practicing with an ethic of care and heightened interpersonal skills, who seek to prevent legal difficulties for their clients through sensitive counseling, advance planning, creative problem solving, careful drafting, and the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques. In recent years, this emerging model has begun to penetrate legal education. It has much to offer clinical legal education, in particular. This model can be seen as a reconceptualization of an approach to skills training that previously has been used in clinical legal education. But the model, by explicitly valuing the psychological well-being of the client, by calling for enhanced interpersonal skills, through creative application of behavioral science research to the legal context, and by emphasizing the prevention of legal problems, adds a new dimension to clinical law teaching. The model, by bringing insights from psychology and social work into our understanding of the role of counsel, also brings a much needed interdisciplinary perspective to clinical legal education. Moreover, although much of clinical legal education has focused on litigation skills, this model includes law office counseling skills in a variety of non-litigation contexts. This presentation describes the TJ/preventive law model, and demonstrates its value in the clinical legal education and skills training context. It illustrates the value of the model by offering some suggestions on how it can be used to restructure criminal law clinics. After offering some general considerations, it then provides two illustrations of how the model can be used to transform criminal practice - one drawn from criminal sentencing, and the other from juvenile parole revocation. These illustrations are also used to introduce a new tripartite analytical framework for how lawyers can creatively use behavioral science theory and research in their lawyering. The criminal law clinic traditionally has focused on representation of the defendant at trial, including pretrial suppression motion practice. As such, it has been a good vehicle for teaching interviewing, trial preparation, and litigation skills. Bringing therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ") to the criminal law clinic would broaden the role that clinical law students would play, in the process teaching them skills in addition to litigation. Because TJ focuses on ways of enhancing the client's psychological wellbeing, an important component of the clinic would be to focus on the client's potential for rehabilitation. Increasingly, representing clients in plea bargaining, diversion, and sentencing involves the creation of rehabilitative options and alternatives to incarceration. Helping the client to understand the value of entering into rehabilitation presents exciting opportunities for law students to learn and practice the subtleties of interviewing and counseling. Moreover, it presents an opportunity to engage in interdisciplinary work and to work with professionals from other fields - social workers, psychologists, and clinicians and paraprofessionals working in substance abuse and other types of offender rehabilitation programs. Presenting rehabilitative options provides an important context for the teaching of negotiation and advocacy skills, as well as heightened interpersonal skills. TJ brings much to the table concerning the development and improvement of these needed skills. A TJ criminal clinic also provides an opportunity for the student to practice that advocacy skills that are needed to persuade prosecutors and judges to accept rehabilitative alternatives to incarceration. It is time to expand our concept of the criminal law clinic in this direction, and to train a new generation of criminal lawyers to represent their clients more effectively and to play a major role in their rehabilitation.


 
Denning & Cherry on the Five Stages of Submission Grief Brannon Denning & Miriam Cherry (Cumberland School of Law & Cumberland School of Law) have posted The Five Stages of Law Review Submission on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    "The Five Stages of Law Review Submissions," is a humorous look at the law review submissions process from the author's perspective. My colleague Miriam Cherry and I suggest that the process of submitting to law reviews tracks Elisabeth Kubler-Ross's "five stages of grief."


Wednesday, November 09, 2005
 
Wednesday Calendar
    NYU Legal History: William E. Nelson, Weinfeld Professor of Law, "Government by Judiciary: The Growth of Judicial Power in Colonial Pennsylvania"
    University College, London, Faculty of Law: Professor James Crawford SC (Cambridge University), ‘Failed States or Failed Ideas of the State?’
    University of Alabama Law: Ruth Rubio-Marin, NYU Law Global Faculty/Universidad de Sevilla.
    University of Georgia Law: David A. Brennen (Mercer University).


 
Cross on the Strategic Political Effects of Procedure Frank B. Cross (University of Texas at Austin - Department of Management Science & Information Systems ) has posted Legal Process, Legal Realism and the Strategic Political Effects of Procedural Rules on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    While decisions on procedural requirements in litigation might be considered the most purely legal decisions made by courts, realists have contended that even procedures are tools of ideological decisionmaking. Realists argue that the apparently neutral procedural requirements are created or applied precisely for their ideological implications. There are several forms of realism, though, that have not been distinguished. In absolute realism, each judge can justify his or her preferred outcome in the case, while a more sophisticated realism accepts that lower court judges' decisions are restrained by legal doctrines created for the very purpose of manipulating their ideological outcomes. In this study, the effects of certain procedures are tested via a large database of circuit court decisions, using threshold requirements such as jurisdiction and standing. The direct effect of the threshold procedures by dismissing actions is a consistently conservative one, as projected by the realists, and the procedures serve as a legal doctrine that produces systematically conservative consequences. The quantitative empirical results demonstrate that procedural threshold requirements have a profoundly conservative effect on judicial outcomes, especially in federal statutory cases. A study of the precedential effect of these decisions shows that it is self-multiplying, such that decisions on procedural threshold issues have considerable precedential impact on later court rulings.
Highly recommended!


 
Pardy on the Holy Grail of Environmental Law Bruce Pardy (Queen's University - Faculty of Law) has posted In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem (McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Vol. 1, p. 29, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    There is widespread resistance to the use of generally applicable rules in environmental law. Such rules are thought impossible; and if not impossible, then certainly undesirable. This consensus is one of the main obstacles to progress in ecosystem protection, as it prevents environmental law from becoming a rigorous, coherent, predictable discipline, and from being able to stem the tide of ecological deterioration. Modern environmental law consists of nebulous, discretionary concepts and lists of narrow prohibitions for specific situations. Neither is based upon an abstract definition of sustainability in ecological terms. Consequently, the size of the human footprint upon ecosystems continues to grow. If environmental matters were to be governed by a single, generally applicable rule, what would it say? In this article, the author develops a rule that defines an environmental bottom line and respects established legal norms. The first step identifies an ecological limit for society as a whole. The second articulates a rule that proscribes individual behaviour, such that the combined impact of all individual actions would be within the limit identified in the first step.


 
Medwed on Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence Daniel S. Medwed (University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law) has posted The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence (Boston University Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 125, 2004). Here is the abstract:
    This Article analyzes the institutional and political factors deterring prosecutors from accepting the possible legitimacy of post-conviction innocence claims and formulating creative responses to them. Specifically, the institutional culture of most prosecutors' offices treasures convictions; an attorney's conviction rate may serve as a barometer of that person's stature within the organization and a key factor in determining that person's chances for internal advancement. This professional incentive for prosecutors to obtain and maintain convictions may be bolstered by profound psychological and personal bases for believing in the soundness of the verdicts and pragmatic reasons for discounting the possibility that there may be some creditable claims within the heap of post-conviction filings. Likewise, there are a series of political incentives for prosecutors to resist post-conviction innocence claims, even potentially meritorious ones, with zeal. Candidates vying for the office of chief prosecutor typically campaign on a general tough-on-crime platform, strewn with references to their overall win-loss record and reminders about specific successes in high-profile cases. Appearing "soft" on criminals, such as by accepting the possible validity of a prisoner's innocence claim, detracts from that tough-on-crime rhetoric and is largely anathema to prosecutors. The major exceptions to this general rule are when political considerations suggest that openness to the innocence claim may be advantageous, which is of little consolation to the prisoner whose claim happens to surface at a time when the political stars are not so perfectly aligned. This Article concludes by mentioning a series of potential reforms designed to help rehabilitate the ideal that prosecutors are obliged to do justice in the post-conviction arena.


 
Hsu on New Source Review Shi-Ling Hsu (University of British Columbia - Faculty of Law) has posted The Real Problem with New Source Review on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Even as the Bush Administration relentlessly erodes the Clean Air Act's New Source Review program, the Department of Justice continues to litigate New Source Review cases and obtain favorable settlements. The Department of Justice has had surprising success arguing that various plant modifications are major modifications that must be accompanied by the installation of state-of-the-art pollution control equipment, even as its mandate begins to disappear. It is important, however, even as the backlog of New Source Review cases begin to thin out, to stop and reflect on some important lessons from the costly legal battles that have characterized New Source Review litigation. This is especially true since neither the Bush Administration nor its critics grasp what is truly flawed with New Source Review. The problems with New Source Review are two-fold: (i) that it is part and parcel of the larger mistake of grandfathering, and (ii) is that it is defined mostly in terms of the installation of pollution control equipment. Both of these aspects of New Source Review retard the turnover of polluting capital, locking in obsolete old facilities such as eighty-year-old coal-fired power plants, and giving them economic reasons to live well past their original intended retirement date. These are the real problems with New Source Review, and there is no solution except abandonment of the whole concept of grandfathering, along with New Source Review. This article proposes a revisitation of Pigouvian taxes or cap-and-trade emissions trading programs as the predominant way of curbing air pollution. The same amount of pollution reduction can be achieved by these market mechanisms, and in a manner that does not encourage the overcapitalization of polluting industries, as command-and-control regulation does. By requiring the installation of expensive pollution control equipment, New Source Review as a command-and-control scheme simply gives polluters a reason to prolong the life of their existing capital. Pigouvian taxes and cap-and-trade programs can, if designed correctly, be just as stringent in terms of pollution reduction, and still free polluters to turn over older, more polluting capital. These also market mechanisms shift a number of informational regulatory burdens away from the EPA, and perhaps more importantly, recruit the entrepreneurial side of polluting industries into the pollution reduction mission.


 
Book Announcement: Chasing the Wind by Morag-Levine
    Chasing the Wind Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State Noga Morag-Levine To read the entire book description please visit: http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7649.html The Federal Clean Air Act of 1970 is widely seen as a revolutionary legal response to the failures of the earlier common law regime. Chasing the Wind challenges this view. Through historical analysis of the evolution of Anglo-American air pollution law and contemporary case studies, Noga Morag-Levine highlights striking continuities in the regulatory principles underpinning both the Clean Air Act regime and its nuisance-based predecessor. "In this impressive review of the history of air pollution control law, Noga Morag-Levine traces the roots of current tensions between common law and precautionary approaches to regulation.... Chasing the Wind combines a remarkable blend of legal history, comparative law, and political theory that is presented with unfailing clarity and balance. . . . ."--Robert V. Percival, Law and Politics Book Review Paper | $19.95 / £12.95 | ISBN: 0-691-12381-0 Cloth |2003 | $45.00 / £29.95 | ISBN: 0-691-09481-0


Tuesday, November 08, 2005
 
Tuesday Calendar


 
Dickinson on Privatization of Foreign Affairs Laura Dickinson (University of Connecticut - School of Law) has posted Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law (William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 135, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Although the privatization of governmental functions has long since become a fixture of the American political landscape and has engendered a rich scholarly debate among domestic administrative law scholars, far less attention has been paid to the simultaneous privatization of what might be called the foreign affairs functions of government. Yet privatization is as significant in the international realm as it is domestically. The United States and other countries now regularly rely on private parties to provide all forms of foreign aid, to perform once sacrosanct diplomatic tasks such as peace negotiations, and even to undertake a wide variety of military endeavors. Moreover, because most formal international law instruments apply only to governmental actors, we face the specter (as with domestic U.S. constitutional law) of private contractors falling through the cracks of the international legal regime and evading accountability altogether. Despite the magnitude of these developments, however, international law scholars have not yet focused sufficiently on privatization as a comprehensive trend in the international arena, let alone considered its implications. This Article seeks to fill that gap in the literature while arguing, perhaps counter-intuitively, that privatization in the international sphere need not actually result in reduced accountability. Indeed, the opposite may sometimes be the case because, unlike in the domestic context, legal accountability is actually very difficult to achieve under international law with respect to either state or private actors. Such a failure of accountability under international law is, of course, a cause for concern. Yet it means that there may actually be more avenues of accountability over private contractors than are available with regard to state actors. This is because the very fact of privatization - with its hybrid public-private character - may open up alternative avenues of accountability beyond the formal instruments of international law. Drawing on the extensive domestic administrative law literature on privatization, I argue that international law scholars must consider these alternative avenues of accountability: democratic accountability, contractual accountability, and internal institutional accountability. Applying this expanded framework to both the privatization of military activities and foreign aid, I seek to open a dialogue between international law scholars and domestic administrative law scholars concerning the implications of privatization. In addition, the framework I articulate may allow us to more easily distinguish those circumstances in which privatization may be benign from those in which the risk of impunity is too high.


 
Graber on the Makings of the Taney Court Mark Graber (University of Maryland - School of Law) has posted The Jacksonian Makings of the Taney Court on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Many twentieth century commentators regard the willingness of Taney Court majorities to declare laws unconstitutional as proof that the justices on that tribunal adjured Jacksonian partisanship upon taking the bench. Old Republicans during the 1820s fulminated against judicial review of state legislation and sought to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1787, but they were apparently frustrated by a Taney Court which continued imposing contract clause and dormant commerce clause limits on state power. This paper demonstrates that Jacksonians in office supported judicial power. Jacksonian animus was more directed at McCulloch v. Maryland than either Marbury v. Madison or Fletcher v. Pack. Jacksonians wanted a stronger federal judiciary that would limit national power to regulate economic life and prevent northern states from assisting fugitive slaves. The more interesting question about the Taney Court is why they never overruled McCulloch, given that the judicial majority was on record as opposing that decision, then why then never limited Marbury.


 
Sperling on Living Wills and Pregnancy Daniel Sperling (University of Toronto - Faculty of Law) has posted Do Pregnant Women have (Living) Will? (Journal of Health Care Law & Policy, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 331-342, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Living wills are documents that instruct health care providers about particular kinds of medical care that an individual would or would not want to have if rendered incompetent. Under the American legal system, living wills of pregnant women are not legally binding or enjoy a much weaker effect than those of other women, not to mention those of other men. In Canada, however, the law is silent on this matter. From this silence one can infer either that the legislators were not fully aware of the possibility that incompetency may also occur during pregnancy or that Canada considered the American model and decided not to follow it. By analyzing the American and English legal opinions on pregnancy clauses in living will legislation, this article calls for the adoption of an original Canadian approach deviating from the American model, thereby giving full legal effect to the living will of an incompetent pregnant woman.


 
Joo on Corporate Hierarchy & Racial Justice Thomas Wuil Joo (University of California at Davis Law School) has posted Corporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice (forthcoming, 79 St. John's L. Rev. --- (2005)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Although traditional corporate governance theory viewed corporate directors and executives as agents accountable to shareholders, commentators today tend to agree, as a descriptive matter, that those "agents" enjoy wide discretion to govern the corporation free from shareholder input. There is normative disagreement, however, over whether the law should increase shareholder participation in corporate decisionmaking. This was illustrated recently by the debate over the SEC's failed proposal to expand shareholders’ power to nominate director candidates. The normative debate is typically framed in terms of shareholder value. This essay, prepared for a symposium on race, gender, and corporate law, applies a different normative standard: whether increased shareholder power would make corporations more responsive to issues of racial justice and social responsibility generally. I suspect it would not. Increasing shareholder power will strengthen the voice of justice-minded shareholder activists, but it will also empower those shareholders who are concerned primarily with profits. This is even more likely to be true in the context of shareholder voting for two reasons. First, social justice concerns, particularly those involving racial minorities, typically do not enjoy majority support in the political arena. Second, most shareholders are rationally apathetic toward corporate elections. Third, shareholders, as dispersed and anonymous participants in governance, are not held accountable for corporate policy. Thus shareholders will be strongly tempted to vote in their narrow self-interest. Directors and executives currently enjoy the discretion to consider social justice in making corporate policy. That power imposes moral obligations and makes the public view them as accountable for social effects of corporate actions. Increased shareholder power, however, may generate explicit, legally enforceable shareholder demands for higher profits rather than social justice. That would remove directors' discretion and trump their moral obligations. The point here is not that the existing, management-centered corporate governance system is an ideal method of making corporations responsive to racial justice issues. Indeed, dependence on management discretion is probably the worst possible method - except for all the others.


 
Book Announcement: Borrowing Constitutional Designs by Skach
    Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic by Cindy Skach To read the entire book description or the introduction, please visit: http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/8094.html Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century--Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic--Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy. cloth | $29.95 / £18.95 | ISBN: 0-691-12345-4


Monday, November 07, 2005
 
Madison on Residency Matching for Physicians Kristin M. Madison (University of Pennsylvania - School of Law) has posted The Residency Match: Competitive Restraints in an Imperfect World (Houston Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 759, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In 2002 physicians filed a lawsuit alleging that "the match," the more than fifty-year-old system by which medical students and other applicants are assigned to medical residency programs, violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. Last year, without hearings on the issue, Congress found that the match was "highly efficient" and "pro-competitive" and granted a retroactive antitrust exemption for its operation. These seemingly incompatible views invite further analysis of the merits of the residency match from the perspective of public policy. This Article considers the arguments of match advocates and critics, evaluating both theoretical models and empirical evidence of the effects of the match on resident compensation. It rejects the assertion that matching mechanisms are necessarily inefficient, and instead describes factors that should be considered in an assessment of efficiency. The Article concludes that given the role of the residency match in remedying market imperfections, the congressional grant of an exemption was justified. It also suggests, however, that further action may be required to ensure that the matching process obtains the maximum possible social benefit.


 
Orenstein on Rule 403 Aviva Orenstein (Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington)has posted Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (Cornell Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 1487, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In a significant break with traditional evidence rules and policies, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 (concerning rape and child abuse, respectively) allow jurors to use the accused’s prior sexual misconduct as evidence of character and propensity. Courts have rejected due process challenges to the new rules, holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 serves as a check on any fairness concerns. However, courts' application of Rule 403 in cases involving these sexual propensity rules is troubling. Relying on the legislative history of the new rules and announcing a "presumption of admissibility," courts have forsaken the traditional operation of Rule 403. Thus, while touting Rule 403 as the guarantor of due process, these courts have limited - and, in some cases, abandoned - their essential role as gatekeepers. The article rejects what it dubs "403-lite," an uncritical, acontextual and rote application of the Rule 403 standard. It proposes new ways for courts to apply Rule 403 in the context of Rules 413 and 414, permitting them to follow the new and dubious course charted by Congress without abandoning the basic guarantees of fairness or derogating the vital discretionary powers of the trial judge to determine admissibility on a case-by-case basis. Courts can limit the dangers these rules present by carefully monitoring the emotional aspects of the evidence, the methods of proof and the time spent on such uncharged offenses, all with an eye to diminishing jury confusion and distraction. Rules 413 and 414 raise significant issues concerning the integrity and power of the courts. In legislating new rules of evidence, Congress cannot pre-balance prejudice and probative value in individual cases. By retaining the crucial judicial functions of weighing evidence and exercising discretion, courts can achieve a balance between the Congressional mandate to admit particular evidence and the judicial role of ensuring a fair trial.


 
Monday Calendar
    Columbia Law & Economics: John C. Coates, IV, Harvard Law School, "An Empirical Reassessment of MBO Bids: Techniques, Outcomes and Corporate Law"
    Cardozo School of Law: Conference, A Comparative Examination of Hate Speech Protection. Continues today.
    Florida State Law: Alexandra Klass, William Mitchell College of Law (Markell) Rediscovering the Common Law in the Age of the Federal Regulatory State .
    Georgetown Environmental Research Workshop: Professor Robert Glicksman, University of Kansas School of Law, "Chief Justice Rehnquist's Impact on Environmental, NaturalResources, and Takings Law"
    Aristotelian Society (London): Ralph Wedgwood, How we Know what Ought to Be
    NYU Law: Barry Friedman.
    Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Professor Lucia ZednerSecurity, Citizenship and the Law: regulating boundaries: Securing liberty in the face of terror: reflections from criminal justice.
    Oxford Human Rights Discussion Group: Graham Gee, Under-Theorization of Judicial Independence and its Impact for the Adjudication of Human Rights Claims
    UCLA Law: Troy Paredes, UCLA School of Law, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The Regulatory Philosophy, Regulatory Style, and Mission of the SEC
    University of Alabama Law: Philip Oliver, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
    University of Texas Law: Teresa Sullivan & Jay Westbrook, "Twenty-First Century Bankruptcy: Two Decades of Evidence About Consumer Debt and The Stigma of Bankruptcy"
    Vanderbilt Law & Business Series: Ralph Walkling, Drexel University, LeBow College of Business, "Share Repurchase, Executive Options and Wealth Changes to Stockholders and Bondholders"


 
Conference Announcements: Values in Public Life at Heythrop
    Values in Public Life First conference 26 Nov. 2005: Values in Public Life: their Sources, Meanings, Expressions. Speakers:
      Dr Timothy Chappell (Dundee): 'Understanding Human Goods', Dr Margaret Atkins (Blackfriars, Oxford): 'Making Sense of Common Goods', Dr Patrick Riordan SJ (Heythrop): 'Solidarity in Fulfilment - A Vision for Politics?'.
    Second conference 25 Feb. 2006: Values in the Economy Third conference 20 May 2006: Values in the Culture Cost: 25 Pounds per conference (?60 for all three), includes lunch and refreshments Further information on website: www.heythrop.ac.uk/HIREPL/ under Events, or contact: m.tourlamain@heythrop.ac.uk


 
Superprecedent & the Commerce Clause Check out Using Superprecedent to Save the Commerce Clause by Ben Barros over at Property Prof Blog. Here's a taste:
    Here's where the idea of superprecedent might come in to save the day. Why don't advocates for a meaningful reading of the Commerce Clause say, "okay, the cases upholding the Civil Rights laws (including the FHA) are superprecedent. Can we have an honest debate about the limited scope of federal power now?" Indeed, the cases upholding the Civil Rights laws seem to be a very settled and uncontroversial part of the Constitutional landscape (at least as far as public reliance goes), and therefore would seem to have a stronger claim to superprecedent status than Roe v. Wade. (I think, by the way, that because public reliance is an important part of the idea of superprecedent, the scope of superprecedent status has to be somewhat fact specific. So no arguing for giving superprecedent status to the vacuous Wickard v. Filburn unless you're talking about regulating the sale of wheat).


Sunday, November 06, 2005
 
Legal Theory Calendar
    Sunday, November 6
      Cardozo School of Law: Conference, A Comparative Examination of Hate Speech Protection. Starts today.
    Monday, November 7
      Columbia Law & Economics: John C. Coates, IV, Harvard Law School, "An Empirical Reassessment of MBO Bids: Techniques, Outcomes and Corporate Law"
      Cardozo School of Law: Conference, A Comparative Examination of Hate Speech Protection. Continues today.
      Florida State Law: Alexandra Klass, William Mitchell College of Law (Markell) Rediscovering the Common Law in the Age of the Federal Regulatory State .
      Georgetown Environmental Research Workshop: Professor Robert Glicksman, University of Kansas School of Law, "Chief Justice Rehnquist's Impact on Environmental, NaturalResources, and Takings Law"
      Aristotelian Society (London): Ralph Wedgwood, How we Know what Ought to Be
      NYU Law: Barry Friedman.
      Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Professor Lucia ZednerSecurity, Citizenship and the Law: regulating boundaries: Securing liberty in the face of terror: reflections from criminal justice.
      Oxford Human Rights Discussion Group: Graham Gee, Under-Theorization of Judicial Independence and its Impact for the Adjudication of Human Rights Claims
      UCLA Law: Troy Paredes, UCLA School of Law, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The Regulatory Philosophy, Regulatory Style, and Mission of the SEC
      University of Alabama Law: Philip Oliver, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
      University of Texas Law: Teresa Sullivan & Jay Westbrook, "Twenty-First Century Bankruptcy: Two Decades of Evidence About Consumer Debt and The Stigma of Bankruptcy"
      Vanderbilt Law & Business Series: Ralph Walkling, Drexel University, LeBow College of Business, "Share Repurchase, Executive Options and Wealth Changes to Stockholders and Bondholders"
    Tuesday, November 8 Wednesday, November 9
      NYU Legal History: William E. Nelson, Weinfeld Professor of Law, "Government by Judiciary: The Growth of Judicial Power in Colonial Pennsylvania"
      University College, London, Faculty of Law: Professor James Crawford SC (Cambridge University), ‘Failed States or Failed Ideas of the State?’
      University of Alabama Law: Ruth Rubio-Marin, NYU Law Global Faculty/Universidad de Sevilla.
      University of Georgia Law: David A. Brennen (Mercer University).
    Thursday, November 10
      Ohio State: Conference, The Madness in the Shadows of Modern Life: Judicial Security and Politics in the 21st Century
      Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: John Gardner, Simply in VIrtue of Being Human: the Whos and Whys of Human Rights
      University of Pennsylvania Law: Conference, The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary. Starts today.
      Boston University Law: John Donohue (Yale).
      Fordham Law: John C. P. Goldberg, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School, and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, "The Gallery of Wrongs".
      NYU Colloquium in Law, Philosophy & Political Theory: David Dyzenhaus, The Legitimacy of the Rule of Law.
      Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Prof Patricia Birnie, Exploiting the ambiguities of Article 65 of the Law of the Sea Convention: current practice of the International Whaling Convention
      Stanford Law & Economics: Mark Cohen (Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University), "Imperfect Competition in Auto Lending: Subjective Markup, Racial Disparity, and Class Action Litigation"
      University of Michigan Law & Economics: Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard (Olin Lecturer) The Political Economy of Investor Protection.
      University of Minnesota Public Law Series: Rick Pildes, New York University Law School, Separation of Parties, Not Powers
      Vanderbilt Law: Richard Craswell, Stanford Law School, "Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere"
      Yale Law, Economics & Organizations Workshop: Professor Kevin Davis, New York University, Law, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Biolerplate.
    Friday, November 11


 
Legal Theory Lexicon 011: Second Best
    Introduction The post provides a very basic introduction to the idea of "second bes." The term "second best" originated in a famous 1956 article by Lipsey and Lancaster (see bibliography), and it was originally used as a technical economic concept. Despite its technical origins, the idea behind the second best is very general: sometimes the ideal solution to a problem (or "optimal policy option") is infeasible. The best should not be the enemy of the good; so, when the first-best policy option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider second-best solutions. In this post, we will take a hard look at the idea of the second best, beginning with a statement of the intuitive idea and then looking at the more formal idea of the second best in its original economic context.
    As always, the Lexicon is aimed at law students, especially first-year law students, with an interest in legal theory.
    The Intuitive Idea The intuition behind the idea of the second best is simple. We would like to have the best possible legal system. But sometimes the best legal policies are not in the cards; that is, the best policy may be impractical. Why? In legal theory, one common reason that we cannot adopt the best policy is politics. Given the political forces that operate, the best campaign finance system may be pie in the sky. So we ask the question, of those systems that might be politically feasible, which is the "second best"?
    Although I've introduced the intuitive idea by talking about "political feasibility," the idea of the second best is more general than that. First-best solutions may be unavailable because of a variety of constraints, of which politics is only one. The intuitive idea of the second best is a bit broader and less technical than the way economists define "second best," so let's turn to that now.
    The Second Best in Economics Let's move from the intuitive idea of the second best to the origins of that idea in economic theory. The very general idea of the economic theory of the second best can be expressed as follows:
      Assume a system with multiple variables. Take the most desirable state the whole system could assume and the associated values that all of the variables must assume to produce this state: call this condition, the first-best state of the system and call the associated values of the variables, the first-best values. Now assume that one variable will not (or cannot) assume the value necessary for the first-best state of the whole system: call this the constrained variable. Holding the constrained variable constant, consider the most desirable state the whole system could then assume and the associated values that all the nonconstrained variables must assume to produce this state: call this the second-best state of the system. There are systems in which achieving the second-best state will require that at least one variable other than the constrained variable must assume a value other than the first-best value: call these value(s) the second-best value(s).
    And here is the way that Lipsey and Lancaster formulated the idea:
      [I]f there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian conditions, though still attainable, are in general, not desirable.
    (If "Paretian" is unfamiliar to you, either ignore that term or click here.) Lipsey and Lancaster are making a normative (but technical( argument. They assert that if one variable is constrained and cannot assume its first-best value, then "in general" other variables should not assume their first-best values. The "in general" qualification is important. Lipsey and Steiner didn't and couldn't show that it is always (or necessarily) the case that constraint of one variable affects the most desirable value for other variables. Rather, their proof shows that this is possible. In the real world, whether nonconstrained variable should depart from their first-best variables depends entirely on the facts. In fact, if a policymaker lacks certain information about the second-best variables, it may turn out that the real world policy that will produce the best result is to try to move the constrained variable as close as possible to its optimal state, leaving the second-best variables in their first-best states. The possibility was called the "third best" by Ng (see bibliography below).
    One or two additional points are necessary to complete the technical story.
      First, the definition that I just gave assumes that only one variable is constrained. But there is no reason to limit the theory of the second best in this way, more than one variable may be constrained. In fact, in theory every variable could be constrained: in this limiting case, the second-best state would be the only possible state of the system.
      Second, the second best is usually understood as relative to a constrained variable. We could use the phrase "second best" to refer to the second-best state the system could assume if all the variables were unconstrained, but this is not the way that Lipsey and Lancaster used that phrase.
      Third, there is an important difference between the way economists understand "second best" and the way the same phrase is understood by noneconomists. What was interesting and powerful about Lipsey and Lancaster's proof is that it produced the counterintuitive result that sometimes when one variable is constrained, the best policy choice will involve moving other variables away from their first-best values.
    Although technically, the definition of second best need not be limited to that special situation, that is the interesting result, and the use of the theory of the second best in economics may be limited to the special case. Outside of economics, however, the phrase "second best" tends to be used in a much looser sense. The important thing is not the terminology, but the ideas. To be clear, however, it is useful to explain what you mean by second best!
    The Second Best and Nonideal Theory The idea of the second best that is used by economists is analogous to a distinction made famous by the political philosopher, John Rawls. Rawls distinguished between two ways of approaching political philosophy, ideal and nonideal theory. In ideal theory, we assume compliance with the normative requirements of our theory. Rawls used the phrase "well-ordered society" to refer to the situation that obtains in ideal theory. In a society that is well ordered by Rawls's principles of justice, citizens actually would be guaranteed a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties and the basic structure would actually work to the advantage of the least well off group in society. In nonideal theory, we relax the assumption that the society is well ordered by the principles of justice. Can you make that very abstract description more concrete? Yes, here is a really good example. In a society that is well-ordered by Rawls's principles of justice, we might assume that if there are local governmental units, they will comply with the restraints imposed by the freedom of speech. But in the real world, local governments might be more susceptible to political pressure to suppress unpopular speech than would be the central government (i.e. the national government in Washington, D.C., in the case of the United States). So, in the real world of nonideal theory, we might be very considered with constraining the jurisdiction and powers of local governments; whereas, this issue may not even arise in the case of ideal theory.
    Pinpointing the Constrained Variable The notion of the second best and the related idea of nonideal theory get tossed around quite a lot in legal theory, but sometimes these terms are used carelessly or without precision. Whenever you hear or read the term "second best," ask yourself the question, "Which variable is constrained, and why is it constrained?" Because the "second best" is second best relative to a constrained variable, use of the concept of the second best doesn't mean anything unless and until the constrained variable is specified. Moreover, it is sometimes very important to know why the constrained variable is constrained. This is because it is easy to construct an argument for a second-best policy option that uses a double standard with respect to whether variables should be considered to be constrained. Here is a simple example:
      Suppose our problem is racial justice with respect to the distribution of income and resources. Someone might make the case for reparations (a one time payment of a compensatory amount to descendents of the former slaves) on the ground that reparations are the second-best solution. The first-best solution would be a just economic order in which market mechanisms operate in a nondiscriminatory fashion to allocate income and wealth according to just criteria. (For this purpose, we don't need to specify what the just criteria are.) But the first-best solution is unavailable, because a just economic order is politically infeasible. Therefore, we ought to support reparations, which is the second-best policy.
    So far, so good. But notice that there is a hidden assumption in this argument. The argument assumes that reparations are politically feasible. If this assumption is incorrect (which it may well be as an empirical matter), then it follows that the argument for reparations as the preferred second-best solution is fallacious. Of course, one can deploy double standards with respect to which variables are constrained (or which options are infeasible) so long as the double standard is made clear. But when the double standard is concealed and the argument is made in the context of policy evaluation, then we have either an innocent mistake or an attempt at manipulation.
    The Feasible Choice Set Another way of approaching the general problem revealed by the theory of the second best is via the notion of the feasible choice set. Take all of the possible legal policy options with respect to a particular legal problem. Then lay out a set of well-defined criteria for feasibility. Apply the criteria to the set, sorting the options into the feasible choice set and the infeasible choice set. Practical policy discussion will usually be limited to the options within the feasible choice set, but legal theory is not limited to the practical. Frequently we can learn something important by considering options that are outside the feasible choice set. For example, a rule of strict liability might turn out to be the optimal rule of tort law. It could also turn out that strict liability regimes are politically infeasible--perhaps because the fault-based social norms are very strongly held. But that fact should not preclude legal theorists from examining the merits of strict liability regimes. Not only may such an examination be of intrinsic interest, but the insights gleaned from such an examination may well assist in the evaluation of the options that are within the feasible choice set.
    The Bottom Line The notion of the second best, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, and the idea of the feasible choice set, are all essential tools for a legal theorist. As a first year student, you are likely to encounter these ideas in classroom discussion or in law review articles assigned as ancillary reading. The trick to mastering these concepts and using them effectively is to identify the constrained variable (or the nonideal conditions). Once you've done that, you can move to the next step, which is the question, "What criteria are used to identify the constrained variables?" And if you can answer that question, you are now in a position to respond in an intelligent and sophisticated way to applications of the theory of the second best!
    Bibliography & Links


Saturday, November 05, 2005
 
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends What Roe V. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Most Controversial Decision edited by Jack M. Balkin. Here's a blurb:
    In January 1973, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade struck down most of the country’s abortion laws, and held for the first time that women had a constitutional right to safe and legal abortions. Three decades later, Roe v. Wade remains one of the Supreme Court’s most controversial decisions, and political struggles over abortion rights still divide American politics. In What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said, eleven distinguished constitutional scholars rewrite the opinions in this landmark case in light of thirty years of experience but making use only of sources available at the time of the original decision. Taking positions both for and against the constitutional right to abortion, the contributors offer novel and illuminating arguments that get to the heart of this fascinating case. In addition, Jack Balkin gives a detailed introduction to Roe v. Wade, chronicling the history of the Roe litigation, the constitutional and political clashes that followed it, and the state of abortion rights in the U.S. today. Contributing their versions of Roe are: Anita Allen, Akhil Amar, Jack M. Balkin, Teresa Stanton Collett, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Jeffrey Rosen, Jed Rubenfeld, Reva Siegel, Cass Sunstein, Mark Tushnet, and Robin West.


 
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is "The Right to Judicial Review" by Yuval Eylon and Alon Harel. Here is the abstract:
    Judicial review (JR) is typically justified on consequentalist grounds, namely that it is conducive to the efficacious protection of rights. This paper disputes this popular justification and argues instead that JR is based on a "right to an explanation" – explanation targeted at the person whose rights are infringed. The explanation must justify, and, in appropriate cases, lead to a reconsideration of any infringement of rights in light of the particular claims and circumstances of the victims of the infringement. This right-based justification implies that JR is justified even if it is found to be ultimately detrimental to the efficacious protection of rights. Finally, it is argued that the right to an explanation is a participatory right and consequently that JR does not conflict with the right to equal democratic participation.


Friday, November 04, 2005
 
Alito Central On the University of Michigan Law Library site: here. And the Library of Congress offers this site.


 
Friday Calendar
    Georgetown Intenational Human Rights Colloquium: Laura Dickinson, University of Connecticut School of Law, "Democracy and Trust"
    University of Mississippi Law: The Americans with Disabilities Act at 15: Past, Present, and Future. Participants include Peter Blanck, Kaaryn Gustafson, Ann Hubbard, Miranda McGowan, Camile Nelson, Michael Stein, and Michael Waterstone.
    Boston College Law: Adam J. Hirsch, William and Catherine VanDercreek Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law, Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
    Thomas Jefferson Law: Patent Law Symposium.
    Ohio State Legal History: Scott D. Gerber, Ohio State, The Origins of an Independent Judiciary: A Study in Early American Constitutional Development, 1606-1787
    UCLA Law: Kirk Stark, UCLA School of Law.
    University of Pennsylvania Philosophy: Michele Moody-Adams, Cornell University, Arguing with the Past.
    University of Texas Law: Samuel Issacharoff, NYU School of Law, "Backdoor Federalization: Grappling with the Risk to the Rest of the Country"
    William Mitchell Law: Juvenile Justice Symposium


 
Denno on Post-Freudian Criminal Law Deborah W. Denno (Fordham University School of Law) has posted Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World (University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 601-774, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Freudian psychoanalytic theory has greatly influenced the modern definition of criminal culpability. Indeed, much of the language of key criminal statutes, cases, and psychiatric testimony is framed by psychoanalytic concepts. This impact is particularly evident in the Model Penal Code’s mens rea provisions and defenses, which were developed in the 1950s and 1960s, a time of Freudian reign in the United States. For contemporary criminal law, however, this degree of psychoanalytic presence is troublesome. Freudian theory is difficult to apply to group conflicts and legal situations, and the theory emphasizes unconscious (rather than conscious) thoughts. The rising new science of consciousness and conscious will provides continuity with Freudian theory. Yet, in contrast to Freudian principles, this new science offers criminal law a means of enlightening existing mens rea doctrine with advanced discoveries that more easily comport with human behavior and evidentiary standards. The results of this author's unprecedented statewide study of criminal jury instructions also suggest that courts are wrong to distort or reduce the significance of mens rea in the ways juries interpret criminal cases. This article concludes that current consciousness research provides a sound vehicle for criminal law doctrine to return the law's focus to the defendant's mental state, thereby retaining the moral insights, but not the muddle, that Freudian theory originally contributed.


 
Rowe on Universities the Experimental Use Patent Exception Elizabeth A. Rowe (University of Florida - Fredric G. Levin College of Law) has posted The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment? on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    To the extent university research has become more of a business than a philosophical enterprise, this article analyses whether it is fair to treat universities' patent infringement differently from their industry counterparts. The experimental use exception to patent infringement permits the use of another's patented device when such use is for philosophical inquiry, curiosity, or amusement. A relatively recent Federal Circuit opinion, Madey v. Duke University, has spurred much displeasure with the doctrine. Madey holds that a research university is not immunized under the experimental use exception when its researchers engage in research using patented inventions. The case has created an outcry because over the years universities appear to have assumed, albeit incorrectly, that their research was protected under the doctrine and thus their scientists need not seek permission from patent owners before using patented devices. Virtually all commentators since Madey have criticized the ruling and its effect on the experimental use exception. This article enters the discussion to offer a different and opposing viewpoint. It rejects the view that universities deserve special treatment, and it takes the position that a narrow experimental use exception is consistent with existing law, consistent with sound public policy, and appropriate for the current nature of university research. Furthermore, unlike most other commentators, it proposes that the Madey opinion will not cause the death of all research and innovation. The article examines several pragmatic considerations, as well as the United States Supreme Court's ruling this summer in Merck KgaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., in support of that position. It concludes with a recommendation as to when it might be appropriate for Congress to consider any expansion of the experimental use exception.


 
Binder on the Act of God Defense Denis Binder (Chapman University - School of Law) has posted Act of God? or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort Law (Review of Litigation, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Hurricane Kartrina and similar natural disasters raise significant legal issues. Potentially liable parties quickly invoke the common law Act of God doctrine as a limitation on liability. However, the defense is severely restricted in its application. For example, the common law held it was inapplicable when an Act of God coalesced with an Act of Man, in other words human negligence, to cause injury. This article analyzes the traditional Act of God defense while positing that most large scale natural disasters entail human errors, such as in design, construction, operations, maintenance, inspection, regulation, or preparation or response to an emergency. The legal result is the same whether the Act of God is viewed as a defense, duty issue, or intervening causation issue. Two follow up articles, in a trilogy dealing with the legal issues involved with natural risks and societal responses to emergencies, are The Duty to Disclose Gelologic Hazards in Real Estate Transactions, 1 Chapman Law Review 13 (1998) and Emergency Action Plans: A Legal and Practical Blueprint Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail, 63 U. Pitt. Law Review 791 (2002).


 
Perry on Ranking Law Reviews Ronen Perry (University of Haifa - Faculty of Law) has posted The Relative Value of American Law Reviews: A Critical Appraisal of Ranking Methods (Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Ranking law reviews is not a novel initiative. Data regarding the relative value of legal periodicals was first published in 1930, in an article primarily concerned with the overall contribution of legal periodicals to the development of positive law. Since then many attempts have been made to rank American law reviews by various criteria. This Article, however, focuses not on actual rankings but on ranking theory and methodology. It offers an introductory discussion of the goals of law review rating, and the essential attributes of reliable and beneficial ranking methods, followed by a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the advantages and shortcomings of the various methods that can be used to assess the relative value of American law reviews.


 
Sjostrom on Internet IPOs William K. Sjostrom Jr. (Northern Kentucky University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law) has posted Going Public Thorugh and Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible Alternative for Small Companies (Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, p. 529, 2001) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The Internet has made it possible for a small company to bypass Wall Street and market its stock directly to the public by posting its offering document on the Web. This type of offering has been termed an Internet direct public offering (DPO). The first Internet DPO was launched by a beer microbrewery in 1995. Since then, Internet DPOs have received a lot of attention from the media, and numerous small companies have pursued them. However, data demonstrates that less than 40% of Internet DPOs result in the companies raising any money. The Article examines the advisability of Internet DPOs under existing law as a financing option for small companies in light of this poor success rate. It explores the various federal and state regulatory issues raised by and the advantages and disadvantages associated with going public through an Internet DPO. The Article concludes that, except in limited circumstances, small companies should view Internet DPOs only as a financing option of last resort. In addition to analyzing DPOs under existing law, the Article proposes regulatory changes that would further the public policy objective of facilitating access to capital by small companies without compromising the competing public policy objective of protecting investors from the risks associated with investing in small companies.


 
Wildman on Social Justice Centers Stephanie M. Wildman (Santa Clara University School of Law) has posted Democracy and Social Justice: Founding Centers for Social Justice in Law Schools (Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 55, p. 252,2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Protecting democracy by combating inequality is the task of social justice lawyers. The practice of democracy mandates inclusion of the diverse populations of this nation into the social order. Social justice lawyers seek to give material meaning to democratic ideals in the daily lives of individuals and communities that are marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented. Currently, not enough lawyers serve the disenfranchised and not enough lawyers emerge from disenfranchised communities. Hence, the disenfranchised continue to be denied access to legal resources, to the detriment of democracy. Legal educators must begin to think about how to institutionalize consciousness about social justice as part of the canon of legal education and to promote the idea that a professional is one dedicated to public service and the provision of justice. The creation of centers and institutes in social justice law can help accomplish this goal. This article discusses the institutional values necessary for building a successful center, emphasizing communication and inclusion. It also addresses key components of a successful social justice program, including a curriculum that coordinates theory with practice in the traditional classroom and clinical settings; faculty scholarship and related social justice practice; involvement of students, student groups, and staff; an intellectual climate that promotes extracurricular events and work with other centers of specialization within the law school and university; and alumni/community relations and fundraising. The article makes suggestions for how to implement each element.


Thursday, November 03, 2005
 
Thursday Calendar
    Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Richard Ekins, Balliol College, Oxford, Legislative Intent and Group Action.
    University of Michigan Law & Economics: Jesse Fried, UC-Berkeley, The Vulnerability of Common Shareholders in VC-Backed Firms
    University of Minnesota Public Law Workshop: Regina Austin, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Article: Law-Genre Documentaries and Visual Legal Advocacy
    Brooklyn Law School: Kimberly Yuracko, Northwestern University School of Law, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation
    Boston University Law: David Lyons, "Rights and Recognition"
    Fordham University Law: Rachel Moran, Robert D. & Leslie-Kay Raven Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Bacon-Kilkenny Distinguished Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law, Fall 2005), "Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education"
    Florida State University Law: Paul Rubin, Emory University School of Law.
    American University, The First Annual Distinguished Lecture on Intellectual Property: Pamela Samuelson, UC Berkeley, “Copyright and Consumer Protection”
    London Institute of Philosophy Conference and Seminar Series: Lizzie Fricker (Oxford), Testimony and Epistemic Authority
    British Institute of Human Rights, London: Michael Drolet (Oxford), Foundations and Anti-Foundations: Quentin Skinner and Jacques Derrida on Power and the State
    NYU Colloquium in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory: Elizabeth Harman - Reading # 9 - November 3rd, 2005 Elizabeth Harman, The Mistake in "I'll Be Glad I Did It" Reasoning: The Significance of Future Desires & Sacred Mountains and Beloved Fetuses: Can Loving or Worshipping Something Give It Moral Status?
    Loyola Law School, Los Angeles: John T. Parry, Visiting Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, "The Shape of Modern Torture: Extraordinary Rendition and Ghost Detainees"
    Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Dr Rosalie Balkin, Diplomatic conference on the revision of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Treaties
    Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law: Professor Javier Lete Achirica, The Regulation of Unfair Contract Terms in Spanish Law.
    Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies & Public Interest Law Programme: Daniel Machover and Kate Maynard, The recent attempt by Metropolitan Police to arrest the Israeli General, Doron Almog, at Heathrow Airport for grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949, in the Occupied Territories of West Bank and Gaza
    University College London, Faculty of Law: Dr Jorge Fedtke (UCL), ‘Identity Cards and Data Protection: Security Interests and Individual Freedom in Times of Crisis’
    University of Pennsylvania Philosophy: Michele Moody-Adams, Cornell University, What's So Special About Academic Freedom?
    Vanderbilt Law: Christopher Yoo, Vanderbilt Law School, "Copyright and the Theory of Impure Public Goods"
    Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Peyton Young, Johns Hopkins University (Economics), The Power of Norms


Wednesday, November 02, 2005
 
Wednesday Calendar
    University of Chicago, Law & Economics: Eric Talley, USC Law School, Optimal LIability for Terrorism
    University College, London, Mellon Foundation: Andrea Baumeister (Stirling), Diversity and Unity: The Problem with Constitutional Patriotism
    Philosophy of Education, London: Graham Haydon, On the Duty of Educating Respect: a response to Robin Barrow's 'On the Duty of Not Causing Offence'
    Northwestern Law & Economics: Randy Kroszner, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
    NYU Legal History: Gerard Magliocca, Associate Professor of Law , Indiana University School of of Law, Indianapolis, "One Turn of the Wheel: Andrew Jackson and the Modern Constitution."
    Oxford Centre for Criminology: Susanne Karstedt, Al Quaida is not a Network but an Ideology: Global Social Movements and Local Terror
    Villanova University Law: Marc Galanter, University of Wisconsin Law School.


 
Priest on Music Piracy Eric Priest (Harvard Law School) has posted The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China (Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 21, June 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Piracy is the single greatest threat to copyright owners in the US and globally, and China stands at the heart of the international piracy epidemic, producing nearly two-thirds of the goods on the $512 billion worldwide counterfeit market. Chinese piracy costs the US music and film industries billions of dollars in losses each year, and the Chinese domestic music and film industries have been decimated at the hands of pirates. Any solution to the international piracy problem must begin with a solution to the problem in China. However, the road to such a solution has become far more difficult with the rapid growth of the Internet in China, and consequently, the rapid growth of Internet piracy there. This paper contemplates what the future holds for the protection of audiovisual works in China. It is meant to provide cultural and historical context to the copyright piracy epidemic in China, and, with that context in mind, realistically assess three policy directions from which the Chinese government might choose going forward as it seeks to defeat piracy in the Internet age and develop vibrant domestic music and film industries. The three policy directions examined are: (1) cracking down on piracy; (2) staying the present course; and (3) establishing an online alternative compensation system that would allow users to download unlimited music and movies from the Internet while ensuring copyright owners are fairly compensated for their works. I argue that the third option could provide the optimal balance between the objectives of Chinese consumers (more entertainment at a lower price), copyright owners (fair compensation), and the Chinese government (cultural enrichment and reduction of Internet and physical piracy). Information used in this paper was obtained from numerous interviews I conducted in Shanghai and Beijing during December 2004 and January 2005. All of those interviewed are connected with copyright in China, either in the administrative, legal, or entertainment fields. Interviewees included government officials, intellectual property lawyers, an appellate court judge specializing in intellectual property cases, law professors, music producers, a television producer, a publicist, an agent, songwriters, and music industry executives.


 
Parry on Modern Torture John T. Parry (University of Pittsburgh School of Law) has posted The Shape of Modern Torture: Extraordinary Rendition and Ghost Detainees (Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, p. 516, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    My goal in this essay is to combine two ways of thinking about torture and related forms of coercive treatment and interrogation. The first way is a legal analysis of some of the issues surrounding torture, with particular reference to the practice of extraordinary rendition (the use of force rather than legal process to take suspected "terrorists" from one country to another for purposes of detention and interrogation) and the existence of so-called "ghost detainees" (people who are secretly held and interrogated by the U.S or its allies in undisclosed locations and who are outside the protections of domestic or international law in any practical sense). Although some of my arguments and conclusions on these issues may be surprising or at least debatable, they will be set largely within a familiar context of legal argument and analysis. The second is an effort to think more conceptually or theoretically, albeit sketchily, about what torture is and how it operates within and as a part of modern societies. By "modern," I mean simply societies governed as centralized, often democratic nation states and the social and psychological dynamics associated with them – such things as "bureaucracies and corporations, the nuclear family with its bourgeois mores, human and social sciences and the institutions that support them." Although we often think of these things positively, as reflecting the progress of enlightenment values, the experience of modernity also generates concerns about the ways in which these structures can "ingrain destructive patterns of thinking and acting" that result in a level of dehumanization or subjection of people that is different in degree and kind from what is arguably inherent in the relationship between individual and society. My point in undertaking this second type of analysis is to get a broader perspective on the reasons that torture and its close equivalents are practiced by countries such as the U.S., and at the ways in which they are practiced - including the ways in which law makes room for these practices. As I hope will become clear in this essay, one of the most important aspects of modern torture is the creation of doubt as to whether torture has happened at all. Extraordinary rendition and the creation of ghost detainees serve this function well.


 
Two by Steinitz Maya Steinitz (New York University) has two new papers on SSRN:
    The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and a Jurisprudence of the Deviant (International Law FORUM du droit international, Vol. 7, p. 129, 2005):
      This short article is a synopsis of a doctoral thesis entitled Law as Communication: A Concept of International Law. Embedded in the legal theory of philosopher Joseph Raz - who argued that "whatever else the law is, it either claims legitimate authority, is held to possess it, or both" - this analysis of international law's claim of legitimate authority is based on an ethnographic study of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former- Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The analysis of international law's claim of legitimate authority, which uses semiotics and performance-studies perspective, is then used as a basis for an examination of issues in analytic legal philosophy: the relationship between the phenomenology of law and its concept and the social-psychological dimensions of methodologies used and advocated for by legal philosophers.
    'The Milosovic Trial - Live!': An Iconomic Analysis of International Law's Claim of Legitimate Authority (Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, pp. 103-123, 2005):
      It has been argued that international law has recently "come of age", that it is a fully-fledged legal system like any other. It has also been argued that in order for a normative system to qualify as "law" it must, at the least, claim to possess legitimate authority and to be supreme to other normative systems. This article examines one highly visible development in international law - the criminal war trials - from a sociological perspective, trying to discern whether and how international law claims legitimate authority and supremacy. Specifically, it focuses on a deeply symbolic example of international criminal adjudication: the Milosevic trial. The article offers a sociological reading of the symbolism of the interpersonal dynamics of the Milosevic trial and concludes that what is in fact attempted, and perhaps achieved, through internationalizing the transitional-justice trials is the internationalization of the transition process itself. The subject of the transition from an illiberal and illegitimate regime to a liberal and legitimate one is not in fact the former-Yugoslavia, but the 'international community' itself. The rule of law that the ICTY seeks to vindicate is not only law as such, and not necessarily the law of the former-Yugoslavia, but the rule of international law.


 
Blumn on Clean Water & the EPA Michael C. Blumm (Lewis and Clark Law School) has posted Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water (Environmental Law, Vol. 33, p. 79, 2003) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The meaning of complex statutes like the Clean Water Act is heavily influenced by interpretations of implementing agencies like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This article recounts three significant cases in which EPA chose to discount the Clean Water Act's objective of preserving and restoring the integrity of the nation's waters in favor of political or administrative convenience. The result was that EPA helped to make the statute ineffective against the chief source of water pollution: runoff from nonpoint sources (polluted runoff). This article claims that all three cases involved statutory gaps or ambiguities which an EPA that took seriously the statutory objective would have interpreted differently, and that these interpretations would have been sustained by the courts. The article suggests that, pending a change of heart by the agency, there are several opportunities for litigants to challenge EPA's roads not taken.


 
Call for Proposals: Race and Political Development at Oregon
    Race and US Political Development CALL FOR PROPOSALS As the subfield of American Political Development (APD) has matured, political scientists and other scholars have initiated critical interrogations of the role of racial politics in US political development. These interrogations raise important questions about how the nation has grappled with its historical legacy of racialized development. The framing and answering of these questions will shape the future trajectory of APD as a field of inquiry, but can also provide crucial insights into the persistence and meaning of race as a salient political category. On May 11 and 12, 2006, the College of Arts and Sciences and the Political Science Department of the University of Oregon are co-hosting a national conference that will critically interrogate the role of racial politics in US political development. Top established and emerging scholars will gather in Eugene for a day and a half to present their work and discuss their thinking around these topics. The conference organizers, Joe Lowndes and Julie Novkov, are soliciting papers on this subject from legal, institutional, historical and cultural perspectives with the aim of collecting them in an edited volume. Topics include (but are not limited to) labor, migration, political orders, parties, social movements, region, political identity, class, gender and sexuality. We are particularly interested in exploring how studies of race can enrich understandings of political development in the United States and vice versa. If you are interested in participating in the conference and the edited volume project, please submit a 1-2 page summary of your proposal for a potential chapter to Joe Lowndes and Julie Novkov. We prefer e-mail submissions (Joe at jlowndes@uoregon.edu and Julie at novkov@uoregon.edu) but will accept mailed submissions as well. Please direct hard copies to Julie Novkov, Department of Political Science, 1284 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1284. Proposals should include your name, institution and position, address, telephone, and e-mail address in addition to the proposed title and summary of your proposal. To ensure full consideration, please get your proposal to us by Friday December 2, 2005. A preliminary version of a website about the conference and edited volume may be found at http://uoregon.edu/~novkov/raceapd. We look forward to hearing from you, and welcome any questions you may have about the conference or the edited volume.


Tuesday, November 01, 2005
 
Tuesday Calendar
    Georgetown Law: Jonathan Marks, "9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?: What Counts in Counterterrorism"
    Lewis & Clark Law: Susan Mandiberg, Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Were Doomed to Failure.
    Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Dr Greenhalgh & Dr Mark Rogers, Trade Marks & Performance in Services
    USC : Direct Democracy on the Brink: The California Special Election. This looks like a fabulous event! Be sure to click through for the lineup of speakers!


 
Rankings! New rankings from Brian Leiter at the new website http://www.leiterrankings.com/. The website reports the July 2005 faculty rankings, listing the Top 30 law school faculties as measured by mean and median per capita scholarly impact(citations):
    Rank School Score 1 Chicago 100 2 Yale 77 3 Harvard 68 4 Stanford 61 5 Berkeley 50 6 NYU 45 7 Columbia 43 8 Georgetown 37 9 Duke 31 9 Texas 31 11 Cornell 29 12 Northwestern 28 13 Michigan 27 13 Virginia 27 15 UCLA 26 16 George Washington 24 17 Colorado 23 18 Boston University 22 18 Emory 22 18 Illinois 22 21 Penn 20 21 Vanderbilt 20 23 George Mason 19 23 Arizona 19 23 Hastings 19 23 Minnesota 19 23 San Diego 19 28 Arizona State 18 28 Ohio State 18 28 Iowa 18 28 Brooklyn 17 28 Pittsburgh 17 28 USC 17 28 Chicago-Kent 16 28 Washington University-St. Louis 16 28 Cardozo 15 28 Fordham 15 28 North Carolina 14 28 William & Mary 11
And here is some of the methodolgy:
    This is a ranking of the top 30 law faculties based on a standard "objective" measure of scholarly impact: per capita citations to faculty scholarship. We looked only at the top quarter of each faculty, largely for logistical reasons--it made the study more manageable--but partly because the scholarly standing of a school depends more on its best faculty, than its average. Impact was measured using Westlaw's JRL database rather than TP-ALL, since the latter includes on-line versions of treatises (for example, Wright & Miller on Federal Practice & Procedure) and thus would artificially inflate the counts for schools at which these treatise authors teach.
And Leiter also has rankings based on student quality, here.