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This is Lawrence Solum's legal theory weblog. Legal Theory Blog comments and reports on recent scholarship in jurisprudence, law and philosophy, law and economic theory, and theoretical work in substantive areas, such as constitutional law, cyberlaw, procedure, criminal law, intellectual property, torts, contracts, etc.

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Saturday, April 30, 2005
 
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Brennan and Democracy by Frank Michelman. I take special pleasure in this recommendation, both because Michelman was my contracts professor (along with Lea Brilmayer, creating a real "odd couple" experience) and because he is surely one of the most intelligent and thoughtful constitutional theorists of our time. Here is a blurb:
    In Brennan and Democracy, a leading thinker in U.S. constitutional law offers some powerful reflections on the idea of "constitutional democracy," a concept in which many have seen the makings of paradox. Here Frank Michelman explores the apparently conflicting commitments of a democratic governmental system where key aspects of such important social issues as affirmative action, campaign finance reform, and abortion rights are settled not by a legislative vote but by the decisions of unelected judges. Can we--or should we--embrace the values of democracy together with constitutionalism, judicial supervision, and the rule of law? To answer this question, Michelman calls into service the judicial career of Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, the country's model "activist" judge for the past forty years. Michelman draws on Brennan's record and writings to suggest how the Justice himself might have understood the judiciary's role in the simultaneous promotion of both democratic and constitutional government. The first chapter prompts us to reflect on how tough and delicate an act it is for the members of a society to attempt living together as a people devoted to self-government. The second chapter seeks to renew our appreciation for democratic liberal political ideals, and includes an extensive treatment of Brennan's judicial opinions, which places them in relation to opposing communitarian and libertarian positions. Michelman also draws on the views of two other prominent constitutional theorists, Robert Post and Ronald Dworkin, to build a provocative discussion of whether democracy is best conceived as a "procedural" or a "substantive" ideal.
Highly recommended!


 
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is The Art of Reading LOCHNER by Rebecca L. Brown. Here is the abstract:
    This essay argues that the Repudiation of Lochner v. New York is an event that has been cloaked in mystique and power, the very uncertainty of which has led to a kind of paralysis in the realization of constitutional aspiration. Yet because of its largely incorporeal nature, the meaning and implications of this important event have largely eluded focused critique and reevaluation. Those with a mind to question or rethink the Repudiation have focused their efforts primarily on revisionist accounts of Lochner itself. These are helpful in highlighting the possible meanings of the Repudiation, not descriptively, but normatively. They invite us to think about what we wish to consider ourselves to have repudiated with Lochner - a question that has, incredibly, not been adequately debated.
And here is a bit more from the article:
    Generally speaking the Repudiation is understood to have declared that what the Court in Lochner did was triply wrong: (A) it was incorrect as constitutional doctrine; (B) it was illegitimate as judicial behavior; and (C) it was fueled by inappropriate motivations. Although separable, the three prongs of this devil’s trident are not unrelated. The doctrinal error lay in recognizing a right to liberty of contract not specified in the text of the Constitution. The illegitimacy charge is the most complicated of the attacks on Lochner. Depending on the critic, the decision was illegitimate (not simply wrong) because the Court xceeded the proper scope of judicial authority by placing itself into the role of egislator or policy-maker,9 or because the content of the rights recognized under he Court’s due process formulations was too “meaningless and circular” to be pplied in a principled manner.10 Another version of the illegitimacy critique puts ctivism at the top of the list of sins, either alone or in combination with other eatures of Lochner, such as lack of firm textual basis or activism based on what ight be said to be legislative, rather than judicial, judgments. The critique from otivation attributes the errors of doctrine and legitimacy to the Court’s eactionary resistance to progressive “social legislation designed to relieve nequalities in the industrial marketplace.” 11 Perhaps the most damning of all, his charge brands the justices as unprincipled ideologues who turned their policy references into constitutional law.
And finally:
    In a representative democracy, where much power is placed in the hands of lawmakers answerable to many different constituencies, generality of law (an idea sounding in equality) is an essential safeguard for liberty. This explains why Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska survived the Repudiation, despite their otherwise discredited recognition of substantive content in due process, their own facts exemplifying better than any hypothetical how threats to equality are threats to liberty, and vice versa. It explains why judicial review limited to representation einforcement alone, an effort to use courts in the protection of equality but not iberty, is doomed to under-enforce constitutional justice without some injection of ubstantive obligations in the duty to represent. Lochner has provided a focal oint for a discussion of liberty and equality. Thus understood, the lliterative “Lochner,” long linked to legacies, lessons, laissez-faire, iberty, and labor law, has a new comrade, propitiously entitled Lawrence. lthough thirty years ago a leading scholar complained that “Lochner and Roe are twins,” the distinction of a strong family resemblance to Lochner belongs to Lawrence. This observation is cause, not for complaint, but for celebration that the wo strands of constitutional justice, liberty and equality, intertwined in Lochner and then rent asunder by decades of constitutional angst at the hands of the Repudiation, have been permitted to come together again in the law of the land.
Highly recommended!


Friday, April 29, 2005
 
Friday Calendar
    Derek Jinks, U. of Arizona School of Law, "Reciprocity and the Laws of War".
    University of Texas, School of Law: David Blight, Yale University, Department of History, "The Theft of Lincoln in Scholarship and in Public Memory".
    Vanderbilt Legal Theory Workshop: David Dana, Northwestern University Law School, "Adequacy of Representation after Stephenson".
    Northwestern University School of Law: Law and Positive Political Theory Conference: Legal Doctrine and Political Control, Day 1
      10:00–11:45am, Session 1
        • Charles Cameron and Lewis Kornhauser, “A Team Model of Appellate Law Creation” • Paul Rubin, Hugo Mialon, and Joel Schrag, “Judicial Hierarchies and the Rule-Individual Tradeoff.” • Tonja Jacobi and Emerson Tiller, “Legal Doctrine and Political Control.” Discussants: Eric Posner Rui de Figueiredo Mathew McCubbins
      1:15-3:00pm, Session 2
        • Lee Epstein, Charles Cameron, Andrew Martin, and Jeff Segal, “Strategic Defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court” • Tracey George and Jeffrey Berger, "From Defense to Offense: A Revised Strategic Account of Appellate Judging" • Joseph Smith, “Distributing Power by Deciding Cases: Explaining Supreme Court Deference to Administrative Action” Discussants: John de Figueiredo Christopher Zorn Max Schanzenbach
      3:30pm-4:45pm, Session 3
        • Eric Talley, “Equilibrium Expectations and Legal Doctrine” • Jide Nzelibe, “A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution” Discussants: Lewis Kornhauser John McGinnis


 
Zipursky on Punitive Damages Benjamin C. Zipursky (Fordham University School of Law) has posted A Theory of Punitive Damages (Texas Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    A contemporary theory of punitive damages must answer two questions: (1) what place, if any, do punitive damages have in the civil law of tort, given that they appear to involve an idea of criminal punishment? (2) why are punitive damages subject to special constitutional scrutiny, as in the Supreme Court's decision in BMW v. Gore, if they really are part of the civil law of tort? The article offers a theory that can answer both of these questions. Punitive damages have a double aspect, corresponding to two senses of "punitive." Insofar as they pertain to the state's goal of imposing a punishment upon a defendant who merits deterrence or retribution, they have a criminal aspect. Insofar as they pertain to the plaintiff's "right to be punitive," they have a civil aspect. Drawing upon the theory of civil recourse that the author has developed as a challenger to corrective justice theory, the article explains what a "right to be punitive" means. It then uses the recourse theory of punitive damages to support a rational reconstruction of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence of punitive damages. When a case can be understood as involving principally a plaintiff's right to be punitive, heightened constitutional scrutiny is not appropriate. However where, as in BMW v. Gore, the state is essentially imposing punishment, the excessiveness of a damages award is properly scrutinized under heightened constitutional standards.


 
Wuerth on Authorizations for the Use of Force Ingrid B. Wuerth (University of Cincinnati - College of Law) has posted Authorizations For the Use of Force, International Law, and The Charming Betsy Canon (Boston College Law Review, Vol. 42-6, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    International law has figured prominently in several on-going disputes around actions of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo, and here in the United States, but the precise relationship between international law and President's war powers has nonetheless gone largely unexplored. This Article seeks to clarify one important aspect of that relationship: the role of international law in determining the scope of Congress's general authorization for the use of force. Recent cases, including Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), have confirmed the importance of congressional authorization to the Court's construction of the President's war powers. International law can, in turn, play an important role in how courts interpret the scope of general authorizations for the use of force by Congress. The plurality opinion in Hamdi illustrates this point, but unfortunately relies on international norms without sufficient attention to their content or their relationship to the authorization provided by Congress. This article identifies and defends a better approach: courts should presume that general authorizations for the use of force do not empower the President to violate international law. Such a presumption is consistent with long-standing tools of statutory interpretation reflected in the so-called Charming Betsy canon, does a good job of maximizing the presumed preferences of Congress, advances separation of powers in a number of ways, and promotes several normative values that favor the use of international law as an interpretive tool.


 
Brandser on Victorian Censorship & Birth Control Kristin Brandser (University of Cincinnati - College of Law) has posted Law, Literature, and Libel: Victorian Censorship of 'Dirty Filty' Books on Birth Control (William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 10, p. 533, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article considers the increasing challenge of the fair allocation of scarce public health care resources by focusing on services for women and girls. It considers different ways of thinking about fairness in health care reform, the role of courts in promoting fairness, and the use of affirmative action measures to remedy health disparities. The health of individuals and populations is shown to be affected by clinical services, the organization and functioning of health systems, and underlying socio-economic determinants. Different theories of justice are addressed that affect assessments of fairness, considering availability, accessibility, acceptability of and accountability for services. The transition in judicial dispositions is traced, from deference to governmental resource allocation decisions to evidence-based scrutiny of governmental observance of constitutional and human rights legal obligations. The appropriate use of affirmative action measures to improve equality in health status is explored, given the increasingly unacceptable disparities in health among subgroups of women within countries.


 
Ahdieh on Norm Transformation Robert B. Ahdieh (Emory University School of Law) has posted The Role of Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, In Three Parts (Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 233, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Legal scholars, as well as economists, have focused limited attention on the role of coordinated groups of market participants - committees, clubs, associations, and the like - in social ordering generally and in the evolution of norms particularly. One might trace this neglect to some presumptive orientation to state actors (expressive law) and autonomous individuals (norm entrepreneurs) as the sole parties of interest in social change. Yet, alternative stories of social ordering and norm change might also be told. Dramatic recent changes in the contracting practices of the sovereign debt markets offer one such story. Using the latter by way of illustration, this essay explores the potential role of groups as mechanisms of norm transformation. In appropriate circumstances, it suggests, groups may offer an intermediate path of change between regulatory mandate and decentralized markets. Where a pattern of private behavior is at once inefficient but resistant to decentralized market change, groups may effectively stand in for the market - relying on private rather than public incentives to define outcomes, yet offering an infrastructure of coordination lacking in a pure market dynamic. Building on this conception, the essay offers a potential framework for the analysis of groups - as market substitutes in their internal dynamics, as market-mediating in their external interactions, and, most counter-intuitively, as contributing to norm change not exclusively through their strength, but also through their weakness.


 
Cook on Fairness in Health Care Reform Rebecca J. Cook (University of Toronto - Faculty of Law) has posted Exploring Fairness in Health Care Reform (Journal for Juridical Science Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 1-27, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article considers the increasing challenge of the fair allocation of scarce public health care resources by focusing on services for women and girls. It considers different ways of thinking about fairness in health care reform, the role of courts in promoting fairness, and the use of affirmative action measures to remedy health disparities. The health of individuals and populations is shown to be affected by clinical services, the organization and functioning of health systems, and underlying socio-economic determinants. Different theories of justice are addressed that affect assessments of fairness, considering availability, accessibility, acceptability of and accountability for services. The transition in judicial dispositions is traced, from deference to governmental resource allocation decisions to evidence-based scrutiny of governmental observance of constitutional and human rights legal obligations. The appropriate use of affirmative action measures to improve equality in health status is explored, given the increasingly unacceptable disparities in health among subgroups of women within countries.


 
Brown on Dworking & Constitutional Theory Rebecca L. Brown (Vanderbilt Law School) has posted How Constitutional Theory Found Its Soul: The Contributions of Ronald Dworkin (EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE, Oxford University Press, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Like rain falling to a parched earth, Ronald Dworkin's early work lighted upon a field of constitutional thought desiccated by embarrassment over Brown v. Board of Education. From a distance of a half century, it is difficult to appreciate the profound chagrin that had arisen from what now seems a simple judicial declaration of equality. Yet the decision had hurled the world of constitutional theory into decades of existential angst, leading it, temporarily, to lose a grasp on its soul. This essay explores some ways in which Dworkin's frank discussion of rights as well as his thick notion of equality helped restore optimism and aspiration to the constitutional project when it was in dire need of uplifting. It also traces effects of Dworkin's work in some of the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court.


 
Conference Announcement: Nature in the Kingdom of Ends
    NATURE IN THE KINGDOM OF ENDS Where are we taking nature? Were is nature taking us? A Conference in Selfoss, Iceland, June 11th and 12th 2005 Respecting others for what they are rather than treating them simply as instruments is one of the fundamentals of human morality. The philosopher Immanuel Kant expressed this in the following words: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means”. And sometimes Kant says that rational beings are citizens in the kingdom of ends. But why only rational beings? The title “Nature in the Kingdom of Ends” indicates that nature should also belong to the kingdom of ends, that it is deserving of respect and that one should never treat it simply as a means but always also as an end. The object of the conference is to consider the place of nature in the contemporary world and its appearances in different aspects of human life. When we ask about sources of values, we are asking questions about the basic frames which we set for our lives; the surroundings in which we live, the projects that we undertake, and the goals we set ourselves. Here we find the roots of ethics and art. Ecological crises, climatic changes, and natural catastrophes have made us increasingly aware of the place of man, as a living creature, in a fragile natural environment which constrains human life in various ways. But, at the same time, nature has appeared as a source of values opening up new ways for creative and meaningful life. This status of nature is reflected in new trends in art and ethics. Culture – art – nature Complex relations between art and nature are one of the characteristics of contemporary art. The distinction between art and nature has become increasingly blurred at the same time as the ancient dichotomy of culture and nature has become controversial. It is the inner space, the interstices between disciplines, the challenging discourse between the triple, culture – art – nature, that has become a locus, a place for creative richness, that has generated some of the most exciting artworks created during the last decades. Ethics Ideas about the proper object of moral philosophy underwent radical changes in the last decades of the 20th century. Philosophers began discussing nature as an independent source of moral values, rather than a mere stage for moral life which, in the end, derives its value from relations between humans. Nature and modernity The new circumstances of art and ethics have forced us to recognize the dual nature of humans as natural and cultural creatures. We are forced to look at humans as a unified whole with these two sides, which often conflict.


 
Conference Announcement: What Is Autonomy?
    What is Autonomy? Venue: Academy of Fine Arts, Kolkata Date: 29-30 July 2005 Conference Statement
      In the first decade of the twentieth century where we live in, autonomy has become one of the major concerns of our social and political existence. Right to autonomous life is now a political, cultural, and social call of both individual and the groups - a rare conformity that points to the critical importance of the problematic of autonomy in the agenda of critical thinking. As is currently understood, the notion of autonomy, both as something that belongs to human beings and human nature, and as something that is the source or basis of morality, that is, duty, is bound up inextricably with the philosophy of our time. The term began to be applied primarily or even exclusively in a political context, to “civic communities” possessing independent legislative and self-governing authority. Then the term was taken up again in the context of individual rational persons that is in the context of their individual rights and existences, for their individual modes of behaviour. In the background of the upsurge of anti-colonial movements the term gained new perspectives and meanings, which would now imply not only new rights, but also new responsibilities (autonomy of whom, for whom, in respect to what?). It became the emblem of group rights, in particular minority rights. In time the idea of autonomy became not only the standard of rights or responsibilities, but also an issue of governmentality - something that denotes transaction, government, negotiation, and relating to others on the basis of set rules. So we have now the questions: If autonomy has been emblematic of rights, does it take into account the gendered nature of the term? Can we trace the birth of the autonomous subject? What are the relevant constitutional and juridical thoughts shaping the universe of autonomy? Why is autonomy, an idea that holds universal attraction for mass politics, related to so much violence? Is autonomy one more regulated term, or is the concept autonomous, so that we can speak of autonomy of the autonomies? And, is private property, to go the fundamentals, a problematic for autonomy? What is autonomy without access to resources? On the other hand, if forms of ownership of resources determine autonomy, what is left of autonomy as a norm? If we relate the concept of autonomy to the more familiar notions of freedom or self-determination, we can locate in this case the questions of responsibility and the conditions of freedom. Autonomy generally is held as a valued condition for persons in liberal cultures. We uphold autonomous agents as the exemplar of persons who, by their judgment and action, authenticate the social and political principles and policies that advance their interests. But the sceptic may ask if we are not being “blinded” by the ideal of autonomy, and therefore the question, what happens if we value autonomy too much? In autonomous action the agent herself directs and governs the action. But what does it mean for the agent herself to direct and to govern? In the context of the emerging demands for group autonomy, the further question to be probed is if this is not now the occasion to investigate and re-envision the concept of democracy with the norm, principles, and various forms of autonomy and more importantly in a way, where the standards of minimal justice become the foundation for a new democratic outlook inscribed by practices of autonomy perched on understanding of each other. Accommodation becomes the form of responsibility for the agency that wills autonomy. In the history of thought reason has co-opted our conception of autonomy. Given this history, it can be argued that the task is now to set autonomy free. But the question is how? Surely, the problem is in the way the self defines the claims for autonomy, the way in which it relegates the issue of justice and understanding from considerations of autonomy. Law becomes in such conditions the most assured site of autonomy, and the juridical arrangement handed down from the top becomes the only possible form of autonomy. The paradox is then: if we are governed by reason in what we choose and how we choose, that means that we subject ourselves to reason in this business of what and how we choose; we are not in that case autonomous. Yet, if we say that we are not governed by reason but by desires and passions, then in that case we are not governing ourselves in what we choose, and we are not therefore autonomous. The way out of the closure has to be sought in historical understanding of the way in which the two principles of autonomy and accommodation have worked in political life, and the way in which standards of justice have negotiated the relation between autonomy and accommodation. We require both historical and analytical understanding of the issue for such a critical enterprise. We require moreover deeper and rigorous understanding of the geo-political and ethno-political grounds on which the call for autonomy is now articulated and which modulate the self’s understanding of the norm. Similarly the need is to inquire into the ethical grounds on which the call for autonomy is given and practices of autonomy continue. The purpose of the conference is to inquire into conditions and dimensions of autonomy, their historical nature, and their political significance in terms of enriching democracy.
    The conference will be held in Kolkata, India, on 29-30 July 2005. Structured around panel discussions, the conference will deal with six themes, which will form the panel sub-themes: The Birth of the Autonomous Subject (Panel Convenor: Samir K. Das – samir@mcrg.ac.in) Autonomy as an Idea for Mass Politics (Panel Convenor: Sanjoy Barbora – xonzoi@hotmail.com) Laws of Autonomy (Panel Convenor: (Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury – sabyasachi@mcrg.ac.in) Feminism as a Resource for Autonomy (Panel Convenor: Paula Banerjee – paula@mcrg.ac.in) Autonomy of the Autonomies (Panel Convenor: Sanjay Chaturvedi – sanjay_1999_99_99@yahoo.com) Access, Ownership and Resources – Private Property as A Problem of Autonomy (Panel Convenor: Arun Kumar Patnaik - akpatnaik@satyam.net.in) Various experiences on movements for autonomy will be discussed in the context of the sub-themes. The conference is part of a research and dialogue programme on autonomy, which CRG has been conducting with the support of the Ford Foundation. Interested paper contributors may contact the panel convenors. Inquiries are welcome and all other inquiries can be addressed at mcrg@mcrg.ac.in Registration charge for the conference is Rs. 100/ per person. Copies of the papers will be available on payment of photocopying charge and on the CRG website. Panels will be finalised by 30 April 2005, and papers will have to be submitted by 30 June 2005. The conference will not have general travel support fund. But it will provide full accommodation for the participants during their stay for the conference. In case of partial or exceptional travel support inquiries can be addressed to panel convenors or at mcrg@mcrg.ac.in The Conference on “What is Autonomy?” will be the first in a series of annual conferences that CRG will hold on critical thinking in India. Organising Committee: Members: Samir Kumar Das, Paula Banerjee, Sanjay Barbora, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Arun Kumar Patnaik, and Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury, Convenor: Ranabir Samaddar Director: Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group FE 390, Sector 3, Salt Lake City, Kolkata 700106, India Ph: 91-33-23370408 Fax: 91-33-23371523 Email: ranabir@mcrg.ac.in / mcrg@mcrg.ac.in


Thursday, April 28, 2005
 
Cox on Partisan Gerrymandering Adam Cox (University of Chicago Law School) has posted Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Courts and scholars have long struggled over whether and how to police partisan gerrymandering. For all the disagreement about how to resolve these questions, however, there has been one consistent point of concurrence - that courts should treat congressional gerrymanders and state legislative gerrymanders identically. Constitutional jurisprudence and legal scholarship have always assumed that these two types of gerrymanders pose the same problems and are subject to the same solutions. Last Term in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court entrenched this assumption in constitutional doctrine. This Article demonstrates that, contrary to the conventional view, congressional and state legislative gerrymanders raise distinct conceptual, normative, and constitutional questions. State legislative gerrymanders differ from congressional gerrymanders in a crucial way: a state legislative gerrymander affects the composition of the entire legislative assembly, while a congressional gerrymander affects the composition of only a small part of the legislature. This difference is significant because the standard contemporary accounts about why partisan gerrymanders are harmful describe harms that turn on the structure of representation in the legislative assembly as a whole - not on the consequences of redistricting for a small subset of the legislature. Such legislature-wide harms can be identified by a court reviewing a state legislative gerrymander, because the court assesses the redistricting plan that affects the composition of the entire legislature. But a court reviewing a single state's federal congressional gerrymander cannot identify such harms. The Article argues that the Justices' efforts in Vieth to directly identify the existence of harms caused by Pennsylvania's alleged congressional gerrymander were therefore misguided. If courts are to police congressional partisan gerrymanders, they instead need to develop strategies for state-level intervention that reduce the risk of congress-wide injuries.
I just finished reading this very interesting piece--which raises some very interesting questions about the nature of the harm caused by partisan gerrymandering. Highly recommended!


 
Tax Symposium Over at TaxProf Blog, Paul Caron reports:
    The most recent issue of the Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence (Vol. 18, No. 1, 2005) contains a wonderful collection of tax articles by a dazzling array of American and international tax scholars assembled by Guest Editor Edward J. McCaffery (USC).
Go to TaxProf blog for the papers & abstracts.


 
Thursday Calendar
    Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Jennifer Nedelsky, University of Toronto (Law), "Legislative Judgment And The Enlarged Mentality: Taking Religious Perspectives":
      Hannah Arendt outlined a preliminary theory of judgment in her lectures at the New school and in various essays. But she did not live to write the volume she had planned on judgment as the final volume to her work on thinking and willing1. In my earlier work, I have built upon her theory of judgment, primarily by looking at its implications for judgment in the judicial context2. Here, I return to her own primary interest, political judgment. In this essay, I look at the importance of judgment for two of the central functions of the legislature in a constitutional state: the legislature as a locus of collective deliberation about the common good and the legislature as a participant in the ongoing, dynamic, and contested definition of core constitutional values. These functions are, in turn, linked to a third issue: the link between the ordinary practices of citizens and what we can hope for from a legislature.
      The central concept in Arendt’s theory, which she borrowed from Kant, is the enlarged mentality. Briefly put, what distinguishes judgment from both subjective preference and provable truth claims, is that judgment involves reflection on the question at hand from the standpoint or perspective of others. Judgment as such remains subjective, it cannot compel the assent of others as truth claims can. But it can claim validity with respect to other judging subjects. It is the use of the enlarged mentality, the consideration of others’ perspectives, that makes this validity possible. It is this exercise that distinguishes mere private opinion from valid judgment.
    Fordham University School of Law: Sean J. Griffith, Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law (2004-05), "Good Faith Business Judgment: a Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence":
      This Article develops a theory of rhetoric in corporate law jurisprudence. It begins by examining a recent innovation in Delaware case-law: the emerging principle of “good faith.” Good faith is an old notion in law generally, but it offers to bring significant change to corporate law, including realignment of the business judgment rule and a shift in the traditional balance between the authority of boards and the accountability of boards to courts. The Article argues, however, that good faith functions as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard. That is, it operates as a speech-act, a performance, as opposed to a careful method of analysis. To explain the sudden appearance of good faith, this Article articulates a model of corporate law rhetoric. Courts invent rhetorical devices to loosen corporate law doctrine and increase judicial review of board decision-making in response to scandals and other extra-legal pressures operating upon the judiciary. These pressures stem largely from the twin threats of corporate migration and federal preemption, both of which imperil the primacy of the Delaware judiciary as a corporate law-maker. In periods of crisis and scandal, the judiciary employs rhetorical devices to reduce these pressures, typically with the effect of increasing board accountability, only to return, once the pressure recedes, to a position of board deference. After finding several examples of this pattern in corporate law history, this Article argues, ultimately, that regular movement back and forth along the authority/ accountability spectrum is an essential feature of corporate law jurisprudence and that understanding the rhetorical devices that permit this movement is necessary to complete any account of what corporate law is and how it works.
    Georgetown Workshop on Transnational Legal Issues: Marc Spindelman, "Homosexuality’s Horizon"
    University of Texas, School of Law: David Blight, Yale University, Department of History, "Healing or Justice: Has Civil War Memory Divided or Unified America?"


 
Ribstein Asks "Why Corporations?" Larry E. Ribstein (University of Illinois College of Law) has posted Why Corporations? (Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 1, p. 183, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article suggests that reform of the governance of publicly held firms might appropriately include a move from the corporate to the partnership form. The corporate form is susceptible to regulation, rigidly centralized and not readily adaptable to firms' varying circumstances. These features are unsuitable for new economy firms that rely on markets and networks rather than integration. Partnership's greater flexibility and freedom from government interference arguably make it a better choice than corporation for many publicly held firms. Thus, the persistence of incorporation may owe more to politics and regulation than to efficiency. The rigidity of the corporate form makes it easier to regulate and therefore provides more rent-seeking opportunities for politicians and interest groups than if parties could freely choose their business form. Taxation of corporate distributions reduces owners' incentives to take control of corporate earnings through partnership-type firms. Also, by protecting managers' power, preserving the corporate form co-opts the interest group that is best able to lobby for change. However, new corporate tax rules, increased federal regulation of corporate governance and the changing nature of U.S. business may give firms new incentives to use the partnership form. Lawyers may be the agents of change, as they have been in promoting partnership-based business forms for closely held firms.


 
Sunstein on Irreversible & Catastrophic Harms Cass R. Sunstein (University of Chicago Law School) has posted Irreversible and Catastrophic (Cornell Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    As many treaties and statutes emphasize, some risks are distinctive in the sense that they are potentially irreversible or catastrophic; for such risks, it is sensible to take extra precautions. When a harm is irreversible, and when regulators lack information about its magnitude and likelihood, they should purchase an option to prevent the harm at a later date - the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. This principle brings standard option theory to bear on environmental law and risk regulation. And when catastrophic outcomes are possible, it makes sense to take special precautions against the worst-case scenarios - the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle. This principle is based on two foundations: an appreciation of people's failure to appreciate the expected value of truly catastrophic losses; and an understanding of the distinction between risk and uncertainty. The Irreversible Harm precautionary Principle must, however, be applied with a recognition that irreversible harms are sometimes on all sides of social problems, and that such harms may be caused by regulation itself. The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle must be applied with an understanding that in some cases, eliminating the worst-case scenario causes far more serious problems than it solves. The normative arguments are illustrated throughout with reference to the problem of global warming; other applications include injunctions in environmental cases, genetic modification of food, protection of endangered species, and terrorism.


 
Posner on Political Trials Eric A. Posner (University of Chicago Law School) has posted Political Trials in Domestic and International Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Due process protections and other constitutional restrictions normally ensure that citizens cannot be tried and punished for political dissent, but these same restrictions interfere with criminal convictions of terrorists and others who pose a non-immediate but real threat to public safety. To counter these threats, governments may use various subterfuges to avoid constitutional protections, often with the complicity of judges, but when they do so, they risk losing the confidence of the public, which may believe that the government targets legitimate political opponents. This paper argues that that the amount of process enjoyed by defendants in criminal trials reflects a balancing of these two factors: their dangerousness, on the one hand, and the risk to legitimate political competition, on the other hand. Political trials are those in which the defendant’s opposition to the existing government or the constitutional order is the main issue. The paper discusses various ways in which governments and judges adjust process protections, so that a public threat can be countered while the risks to political competition are minimized. International trials are also discussed within this framework.


 
Brown on Reading Lochner Rebecca L. Brown (Vanderbilt Law School) has posted The Art of Reading LOCHNER (NYU Journal of Law & Liberty, Summer 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This essay argues that the Repudiation of Lochner v. New York is an event that has been cloaked in mystique and power, the very uncertainty of which has led to a kind of paralysis in the realization of constitutional aspiration. Yet because of its largely incorporeal nature, the meaning and implications of this important event have largely eluded focused critique and reevaluation. Those with a mind to question or rethink the Repudiation have focused their efforts primarily on revisionist accounts of Lochner itself. These are helpful in highlighting the possible meanings of the Repudiation, not descriptively, but normatively. They invite us to think about what we wish to consider ourselves to have repudiated with Lochner - a question that has, incredibly, not been adequately debated.


 
Competition Announcement: The Mental & the Normative
    THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION 2005 - £1500 The Mental and the Normative The Philosophical Quarterly invites submissions for its 200 international prize essay competition, the topic of which is 'The Mental and the Normative'. A longstanding problem in meta-ethics has been to understand the relation between non-normative judgements about straightforwardly factual matter and normative judgements relating to how we ought morally to act. A similar problem arises outside the sphere of ethics, though it has not received anything like the same attention. It is hard to deny that we are subject to requirements of reason. There is the familiar idea that we ought to avoid inconsistent beliefs, and it seems plausible that we are subject to a requirement relating to taking the means necessary to carry out our intentions. If these requirements are expressed in terms of what we ought to do - in normative terms - how should such ought-statements be conceived, and what grounds or makes sense of them? Are they grounded in intrinsic features of believing or intending - perhaps in constitutive aims of believing or intending? If so, what does this tell us about our mental life? If not, how else are they to be understood? Essays should not be longer than 8,000 words. They should be typed in double spacing and conform to the usual stylistic requirements (see inside back cover). Three copies of each essay are required and these will not be returned. All entries will be regarded as submissions for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly, and both winning and non-winning entries judged to be of sufficient quality will be published. The closing date for submissions is 1st November 2005. All submissions should be headed 'The Mental and the Normative Prize Essay Competition' (with the author's name and address given in a covering letter, but NOT in the essay itself) and sent to: The Executive Editor, The Philosophical Quarterly, University of St Andrews, KY16 9AL


Wednesday, April 27, 2005
 
Wednesday Calendar
    No events for today.


 
Brown Confesses to Flaws Rebecca L. Brown (Vanderbilt Law School) has posted Confessions of a Flawed Liberal (Rebecca L. Brown, THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MEANING OF LIBERALISM/CONSERVATISM, The Good Society, June/July 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This essay, a contribution to a discussion group, briefly explores different conceptions of liberalism that might explain apparent inconsistencies between classic liberal positions and current constitutional views of liberal theorists.


 
Gillette & Scott on International Sales Law Clayton P. Gillette and Robert E. Scott (New York University Law School and University of Virginia School of Law) have posted The Political Economy of International Sales Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, or CISG, has been adopted by more than 60 countries in an effort to harmonize the law that applies to international sales contracts. In this paper, we argue that the effort to create uniform international sales law ("ISL") fails to supply contracting parties with the default terms they prefer, thus violating the normative criterion that justifies the law-making process for commercial actors in the first instance. Our argument rests on three claims. First, we contend that the process by which uniform ISL is drafted will dictate the form that many provisions take. Second, we contend that the legal form dictated by the drafting process has significant substantive consequences, particularly for the policy objectives of uniform ISL. That leads to our third claim. We predict that in order to achieve uniform ISL that is widely adopted, those involved in the drafting process will systematically promulgate many vague standards that contracting parties would not choose for themselves. These defaults cannot be justified as the inevitable cost of achieving an optimal level of uniformity. If the products of a uniform ISL are default terms that parties do not want, then the underlying justification for the law-making function - reduction of contracting costs - vanishes. We find significant correspondence between our predictions about the drafting of uniform international sales law and the CISG. The CISG was drafted by parties whose objectives did not necessarily coincide with those of the commercial actors whose conduct the treaty was intended to regulate. The result is a variety of vague standards and compromises that appear inconsistent with commercial interests. We also illustrate the ways in which the CISG avoided potential correctives to these problems. We conclude by suggesting that commercial actors involved in international sales would prefer to choose governing law from among legal regimes that compete to supply parties with more desirable substantive terms.


 
Bell & Parchomovsky on Property & Federalism Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky (Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law and University of Pennsylvania Law School) have posted Of Property and Federalism on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This Essay proposes a mechanism for expanding competition in state property law, while sketching out the limitations necessary to protect third parties. The fact that property law is produced by the states creates a unique opportunity for experimentation with such property and property-related topics as same-sex marriages, community property, adverse possession and easements. The Essay begins by demonstrating the salutary effects of federalism on the evolution of property law. Specifically, it shows that competition among states has created a dynamic property system in which new property institutions replace obsolete ones. The Essay then contemplates the possibility of increasing innovation and individual choice in property law by inducing state competition over property regimes. Drawing on the scholarly literature examining state competition for corporate law and competition over the provision of local public goods, the Essay constructs an open property system that creates an adequate incentive for the states to offer new property regimes and allows individuals to adopt them without relocating to the offering state. This Essay also has important implications for the burgeoning literature on the numerus clausus principle, under which the list of legally permissible property regimes is closed. The Essay argues that in a federalist system, it is socially desirable to expand the list of property forms to include certain out-of-state forms.


 
Sklansky on Police and Democracy David A. Sklansky (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) has posted Police and Democracy (Michigan Law Review, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This Article explores the connections between ideas about American democracy and ideas about the police. I argue that criminal procedure jurisprudence and scholarship on the police over the past half-century have roughly tracked, in a delayed fashion, developments in democratic theory over the same period. The most important of these developments were, first, the emergence during the 1950s of the pluralist theory of democracy, an unusually rich and resonant account that emphasized the roles of elites, interest groups, and competition in sustaining American democracy; and second, beginning in the 1960s, the gradual shift away from this theory and toward accounts of democracy emphasizing popular participation, community, and deliberation. Democratic pluralism had helps make sense of several interrelated hallmarks of criminal procedure and police studies in the Warren and Burger Court eras: the focus on the group psychology of the police; the concern with police discretion and the reliance on judicial oversight; the emphasis on personal dignity; the attraction to second wave police professionalism; the embrace of modernity; the centrality of consensus; and the disregard of institutional structure. The subsequent shift away from pluralism finds reflection in several themes in contemporary criminal procedure: the enthusiasm for community participation; the premium placed on transparency; the distrust of elites and expertise; the preoccupation with legitimacy; and the retreat from modernity. Other features of criminal procedure jurisprudence and scholarship today - the continued treatment of the police as a breed apart, the persistent de-emphasis of institutional structure, and the relative inattention to issues of equality - reflect important points of continuity between pluralism and the theories that supplanted it. Our ideas about policing could benefit from a more rounded understanding of democracy - an understanding sensitive to those aspects of democracy that have to do less with collective self-rule than with traditions of resistance to illegitimate hierarchy, and mindful of the core insights of democratic pluralism, 1960s-style participatory democracy, and eighteenth-century political economy. I investigate, in a tentative fashion, how such an understanding of democracy might affect our thinking about five important issues in contemporary law enforcement: community policing, racial profiling, police privatization, police personnel practices, and public disclosure of law enforcement practices.


 
Driesen on the Neutrality of Cost-Benefit Analysis David M. Driesen (Syracuse University - College of Law) has posted Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral? (University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 77, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) owes much of its appeal to its image as a neutral principle for deciding upon the appropriate stringency of environmental, health, and safety regulation. This article examines whether CBA is neutral in effect, i.e. whether it sometimes makes regulations more stringent or regularly leads to weaker health, safety and environmental protection. It also addresses the question of whether CBA offers either an objective value-neutral method or procedural neutrality. This Article shows that CBA has almost always proven anti-environmental in practice and that, in many ways, it is anti-environmental in theory. It examines the practice of the Bush Administration using a representative data set and shows that Office of Management and Budget review produced numerous anti-environmental, health, and safety changes and no pro-protection changes in the rules in the data set. It also reviews "prompt letters," which CBA proponents cite as examples of CBA producing more regulation, rather than less. These letters have never prompted any fresh regulatory action and rarely have any basis in CBA. Finally, this article shows that the anecdotal information relied upon to show that CBA sometimes has strengthened rules prior to the Bush Administration provides little or no support for the view that CBA has a neutral effect. The most common legal formulation of a cost-benefit test, that the costs should not exceed the benefits of regulation, acts a one-way ratchet, demanding that some regulations become less stringent, but never demanding greater protection of health, safety, or the environment. Nevertheless, one can discern some reasons why some analysts look at CBA as neutral in the apparent even-handedness of the optimality criterion, which has more influence in the academy than in practice. Even this criterion, however, does not act neutrally relative to all existing alternative criteria. Furthermore, the value choices in choosing methods for quantifying benefits make objective value neutral CBA a theoretical impossibility.


Tuesday, April 26, 2005
 
2005 Entry Level Hiring, Interim Report Updated as of April 28, 7:20 a.m. PDST
116 schools have reported so far.
Based on the most recent information I've received, there are still a few schools that will make decisions in the next two weeks or so. Unless I hear of schools that plan to take even longer, I will close the books around the middle of May. Please note, I still need additional information about an outstanding rumour about Syracuse (see end of this post). Finally, if you know of a law school that will not make any entry-level hires that is not listed, please drop me an email: lsolum@sandiego.edu.
The fine print: For my purposes, someone hired from a non-tenure-track position (e.g. a VAP) to a tenure-track position counts as an entry level hire. Hires to temporary positions or to non-tenure-track positions are not included. I am standardizing the terminology for certain disciplines; for example, government, politics, political theory, and political science are all listed as "political science." I am tracking hires made during the 2004-05 academic year--so a hire made in Fall 2004 will be listed, even if the candidate starts in Spring 2005 & a hire made in Spring 2004 will not be listed, even if the candidate starts in Fall 2005.
The most complete version of the data reported here is in an excel spreadsheet. Although I update the various statistics (e.g. number of placements per school) on a regular basis, I do not check this against the spreadsheet every time I add a name. Some reports are confidential--and for this reason, the statistics do not yet match the list, although the two will eventually be in sync.
In the JD/LLB placement tournament, the current leaders are:
    Harvard 35 Yale 21 Columbia 11 NYU 10 Chicago 8 Michigan 6 Stanford 6 Berkeley 5 UCLA 5 Virginia 5 Duke 4 Tel Aviv 4 Georgetown 3 Penn 3 Texas 3 Cornell 2 George Washington 2 Kansas 2 Minnesota 2 Northwestern 2
73 of the 153 candidates on whom I have confirmed data have (or will soon get) advanced degrees beyond the first degree in law (JD in the U.S.; LLB or other elsewhere). 30 of these are PhDs or DPhils. Of those, 9 are in Political Science (including politics and government), 4 are in Philosophy, 3 each are in History and Economics, and 1 each are from Classics, English, Environmental Studies, International Relations, Law, Molecular Biology, Policy Analysis, and Social Policy. There are also five candidates with SJD, bringing the total number of advanced doctorates to 34 (there is one candidate with both an SJD & a PhD). The numbers are based on my complete data set, which includes some candidates whose placement is not yet public. Here are the reports & rumours to date:
    Akron
      Sarah Cravens, JD Washington & Lee, Mphil Cambridge (Classics)
      Richard Lavoie, JD Cornell, LLM NYU (Tax)
      Stefan Padfield, JD Kansas
    Alabama
      Michael Pardo, JD Northwestern
    American University
      Lynda Dodd, JD Yale, PhD Princeton (Political Science)
    Arizona
      Darian Ibrahim, JD Cornell
      Barak Orbach, LLB Tel Aviv, SJD Harvard
    Arkansas-Little Rock
      New: Sharon Reece, JD Hofstra, LLM NYU
      New: Robert Steinbuch, Columbia, MA Penn (Political Science)
    Barry University
      D. Aaron Lacy, JD Florida, LLM American
    Berkeley
      New: Ken Bamberger, JD Harvard
      Newest: Erin Murphy, JD Harvard
    Brooklyn
      Chris Serkin, JD Michigan
    Cardozo
      Rick Bierschbach, JD Michigan
      Eric Pan, JD Harvard, MSc Edinburgh (European and International Politics)
      Julie Suk, JD Yale, DPhil Oxford (political science-politics)
    Catholic
      New: Heather Elliott, JD Berkeley, MPhil Yale (Political Science)
    Chapman
      Newest: Ernesto Hernandez, JD George Washington, LLM Georgetown
      Newest: Henry Noyes, JD Indiana-Bloomington
      Newest: Lawrence Rosenthal, JD Harvard
    Charleston
      John Simkins, JD Duke, LLM Duke (International & Comparative)
    Chicago
      New: Jacob Gersen, JD Chicago, PhD Chicago (Political Science)
      Todd Henderson, JD Chicago
      New: Tom Miles, JD Harvard, PhD Chicago (Economics)
    Chicago-Kent
      New: Bernadette Atuahene, JD Yale, MPP Harvard
    Cincinnati
      New: No entry level hires
    Colorado
      Miranda Perry, JD Chicago, LLM NYU (Tax) Laura Spitz, JD British Columbia, LLM Cornell
    Columbia
      New: Elizabeth Emens, JD Yale, PhD Cambridge (English)
    Cornell
      New: No entry level hiring
    Denver
      Michael Mireles, JD McGeorge, LLM George Washington (Intellectual Property)
      Viva Moffat, JD Virginia, MA Virginia (History)
    Drake
      Ellen Yee, JD Minnesota
    Emory
      Newest: No entry level hiring
    Florida
      Andrea Matwyshyn, JD Northwestern, PhD Northwestern (Social Policy)
      Lee-ford Tritt, JD NYU, LLM NYU (Tax)
    Florida International
      Hannibal Travis, JD Harvard
    Florida State
      Dan Markel, JD Harvard, MPhil Cambridge (Political Science)
    Fordham
      Youngjae Lee, JD Harvard
      John Pfaff, JD Chicago, PhD (candidate)Chicago (Economics)
    George Washington
      Roger Fairfax, JD Harvard, MA University of London (History)
    Georgetown
      New: Greg Klass, JD Yale, PhD New School (Philosophy)
    Georgia
      Bobby Bartlett, JD Harvard
      John Neiman, JD Harvard
      Jason Solomon, JD Columbia
    Golden Gate
      New: Eric Christiansen, JD NYU, MA Chicago (Religious Studies)
    Hastings
      Ethan Leib, JD Yale, PhD Yale (Political Science)
    Harvard
      New: Adriaan Lanni, JD Yale, PhD Michigan (Classics)
      New: Jed Shugerman, JD Yale, PhD (Candidate) Yale (History)
    Hofstra
      Bennett Capers, JD Columbia.
    Howard
      Aderson Francois, JD NYU
    Illinois
      Ekow Yankah, JD Columbia, BCL Oxford
    Iowa
      Katherine Porter, JD Harvard
    Indiana, Bloomington
      Joshua Fairfiled, JD Chicago
    Indiana, Indianapolis
      Newest: No entry level hiring
    Kansas
      Andrew Torrance, JD, Harvard, PhD Harvard (Biology)
    Kentucky
      Newest: Nicole Huberfeld, JD Seton Hall
    Lewis & Clark
      Juliet Stumpf, JD Georgetown
    Louisiana State University
      New: LeeAnn Lockridge, JD Duke
    Loyola-Chicago
      John Bronsteen, JD Yale
    Loyola-LA
      Lee Petherbridge, JD Penn, PhD, Baylor (Molecular Biology)
      Kimberly West-Faulcon, JD Yale
    Marquette
      No entry level hires
    Maryland
      Kelly Casey, JD Georgia
    Miami
      Stephen Vladeck, JD Yale
    Michigan
      Gil Seinfeld, JD Harvard
    Michigan State
      No entry-level hires
    Minnesota
      Allan Erbsen, JD Harvard
      William McGeveran, JD NYU
    Missouri-Columbia
      Newest: Rigel Oliveri, JD Stanford
    Mississippi College
      Michael McCann, JD Virginia, LLM (Candidate) Harvard
    Nebraska
      New: Susan Franck, JD Minnesota, LLM University of London
    Nevada
      Michael Guttentag, JD Yale, PhD (candidate)RAND (Policy Analysis)
    New England
      Victor Hansen, JD Lewis & Clark, LLM JAG School (Military Law)
    New York Law School
      Newest: No entry level hiring
    New York University
      New: Oren Bar-Gill, LLB Tel Aviv, PhD Tel Aviv (Economics), SJD Harvard
    North Carolina
      Newest: No entry level hiring
    North Dakota
      Kirsten Dauphinais, JD Columbia
      Wenona Singel, JD Harvard
      Douglas Smith, JD Texas
    Northern Illinois
      Newest: No entry level hires
    Notre Dame
      Alejandro Camacho, JD Harvard
      Lloyd Mayer, JD Yale
      O. Carter Snead, JD Georgetown
    Ohio State
      Michelle Alexander, JD Stanford
    Oklahoma City
      Marc Blitz, JD Chicago, PhD Chicago (Political Science)
      Newest: Carla Spivack, JD NYU, PhD (candidate) Boston College (English).
    Penn
      Bill Burke-White, JD Harvard, PhD Cambridge (International Relations)
    Quinnipiac
      Jeffrey A. Meyer, JD Yale
    Pepperdine
      No entry level hires
    Richmond
      Shari Motro, JD NYU
    Roger Williams
      Jared Goldstein, JD Michigan
      Timothy Kuhner, JD Duke, LLM Duke
    Rutgers-Camden
      Arthur Laby, JD Boston University
      Damon Smith, J.D. Harvard, MUP Illinois Urbana/Champaign (Urban Planning)
    Rutgers-Newawrk
      Anna Gelpern, JD Harvard, MSc London School of Economics (Anthropology)
    Samford
      Alyssa DiRusso, JD Texas
    St. John's
      Nelson Tebbe, JD Yale, MA Chicago (Religious Studies)
    St. Louis University
      Eric Miller, BL Edinburgh, DPhil (candidate) Oxford (Law)
      Kerry Ryan, JD Tulane, LLM Florida (Tax)
      Ann Scarlett, JD Kansas
    St Thomas (Miami)
      John Kang, JD UCLA, PhD (ABD) Michigan (Political Science)
    Santa Clara
      Angelo Ancheta, JD UCLA, MPA Harvard
      Lia Epperson, JD Stanford
    Seattle
      New: Joaquin Avila, JD Harvard
      New: Russell Powell, JD Virginia, MA Loyola-Chicago (Philosophy)
    Seton Hall
      No entry level hiring
    South Carolina
      Jacqueline Fox, JD Georgetown, LLM Georgetown
      Thomas Crocker, JD Yale, Ph.D. Vanderbilt (Philosophy)
    South Texas
      Geoffrey Corn, JD George Washington, LLM JAG School
      New: Adam Gershowitz, JD Virginia
    Southern Methodist
      Joshua Tate, JD Yale, PhD (candidate) Yale (History)
    Southwestern
      Byron Stier, JD Harvard
      Sung Hui Kim, JD Harvard
    Stanford
      New: No entry level hiring
    Suffolk
      Patrick Shin, JD Harvard, PhD (candidate) Harvard (Philosophy)
    Syracuse
      Rakesh Anand, JD Yale
      Jeremy Blumenthal, JD Penn, PhD Harvard (Psychology)
      Nina Kohn, JD Harvard
      Kevin Maillard, JD Penn, PhD Michigan (Political Science)
      Jenny Roberts, JD NYU
    Temple
      N. Jeremi Duru, JD Harvard, MPP Harvard
      Andrea Monroe, JD Michigan, LLM NYU (Tax)
    Tennessee
      New: Iris Goodwin, JD NYU
      Jennifer Hendricks, JD Harvard
      Mae Quinn, JD Texas, LLM Georgetown (Advocacy)
    Texas
      Emily Kadens, JD Chicago, PhD Princeton (History)
      Jens Dammann, DrJur Frankfurt, SJD Yale
    Texas Tech
      Michael Hatfield, JD, NYU, MA Texas A&M (Philosophy)
    Thomas Jefferson Law School
      Ben Templin, JD Berkeley
      Kaimipono Wenger (J.D., Columbia)
    Toledo
      Newest: No entry level hires
    Touro
      Newest: Fabio Arcila Jr., JD Berkeley
    Tulane
      Kristin Avery, JD Columbia
      Gabriel Feldman, JD Duke
      New: Tania Tetlow, JD Harvard
    University of San Diego
      New: Orly Lobel, LLB Tel Aviv, SJD Harvard
      Lesley McAllister, JD Stanford, PhD Berkeley (Environmental Studies)
    University of San Francisco
      Maya Manian, JD Harvard
    University of Mississippi
      New: No entry level hiring
    UC Davis
      No entry level hiring
    UCLA
      Newest: No entry level hiring
    USC
      New: Kareem Crayton, JD Stanford, PhD Stanford (Political Science)
      James Spindler, Harvard JD
    Utah
      New: Hilary Green, JD Yale
      Alice Ristroph, JD Harvard, PhD Harvard (Political Science)
    Vanderbilt
      Newest: No entry level hires
    Vermont
      Faith Rivers, JD Harvard
    Villanova
      New: Robert MIller, JD Yale, PhD Columbia (Philosophy)
    Virginia
      Kerry Abrams, JD Stanford
      Michal Barzuza, LLB Tel Aviv, SJD Harvard
      New: Michael Doran, JD Yale
      Brandon Garrett, JD Columbia
      Newest: Chris Sprigman, JD Chicago
    Wake Forest
      New: No entry level hiring
    Washburn
      William Merkel, JD Columbia, D. Phil (Candidate) Oxford (field?)
      Peter Reilly, JD Harvard, LLM Georgetown
    Washington & Lee
      David Zaring, JD Harvard
    Washington University
      New: Jennifer Rothman, JD UCLA, MFA USC (Film & Television)
    Wayne State
      Noah Hall, JD Michigan
      Jocelyn Benson, JD Harvard
    Western New England
      Barbara Noah, JD Harvard
      Jill Anderson, JD Columbia
    Western State-Fullerton
      Newest: Mitchell Keiter, JD UCLA
    Widener-Harrisburg
      New: Jill Family, JD Rutgers-Camden
    William & Mary
      Laura A. Heymann, JD Berkeley
    Whittier
      Seval Yildirim, JD NYU, LLM NYU
    Willamette
      Paul Diller, JD Michigan
    Wisconsin
      Allison Christians, JD Columbia, LLM NYU (Tax)
    Yale
      New: No entry level hiring
    Rumours?
      And can anyone verify the following: Syracuse
        Juscelino F. Colares (Ph.D./M.A. Political Economy, Tennessee-Knoxville; J.D. Cornell)


 
Feibelman on the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy Adam Feibelman (University of North Carolina) has posted Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Bankruptcy scholars generally agree that consumer bankruptcy functions, at least in part, as a form of social insurance. It does so by allowing individuals to discharge unsecured debts that they incur and cannot pay as a result of the occurrence of one or more particular events or circumstances. Available data suggest that the consumer bankruptcy system primarily insures individuals against the effects of unemployment, illness, disability, and marital dissolution. But other regimes - unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, Medicare, spousal support laws, etc. - insure individuals against these circumstances as well. To the extent that legal scholars have considered the relationship between bankruptcy and these other programs, they have tended to assume that bankruptcy filings reflect failures of other social insurance programs, "gaps" in the social safety net. It is reasonable to believe, however, that an optimal social insurance system would allocate significant functions to bankruptcy. This Article frames basic questions that must be resolved in determining the optimal role of bankruptcy within the American social insurance system. By way of illustration, it compares the wage insurance functions of bankruptcy and unemployment insurance with respect to administrative costs, co-insurance costs, moral hazard, and effects on labor and credit markets. It also considers potential policy implications of such a comparison. These include changing the scope of benefits and/or eligibility under non-bankruptcy programs and altering the exemption rules that operate in bankruptcy. Resolving such normative questions about the relationship between bankruptcy and other social insurance programs is an essential step in evaluating the significance of current bankruptcy rates and the desirability of recent bankruptcy reforms.
I just finished this very interesting piece which deals with fundamental questions about the function of consumer bankruptcy law. Recommended.


 
Tuesday Calendar
    Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Tony Coady, Morality and Private Warriors.
    Georgetown Law School: Marks (Greenwald Fellow).
    University of Illinois College of Law: Todd Allee, Dept. of Political Science, UIUC.
    Lewis & Clark Law School: Craig Johnston.
    Oxford Taxation Law: Professor Malcolm Gammie QC, A European Corporation Tax.
    Vanderbilt University School of Law: Stefanie Lindquist, Vanderbilt Political Science Department and Law School.


 
Articles for Sale on Amazon.com Paul Caron has a post on the very recent phenomenon of Amazon.com posting law review articles for sale. (Also, see Orin Kerr and Larry Ribstein.) I'm not sure this phenomenon is really very interesting--because I doubt there will be many sales. Will anyone pay $5.95 plus shipping for this?
Update: See also this post by Stuart Levine.


 
Hasen on the Nuclear Option Election-law superblogger Rick Hasen has a Roll Call editorial titled "Hate the Filibuster? You Might Want to Nuke the Entire Senate". Here is a taste:
    Democrats in the Senate have used the power of the filibuster to block from office the 10 most ideologically extreme of President Bush’s nominees for federal judgeships, while approving a vast majority of his nominees. In response, some Republicans have threatened to change the filibuster rules in the name of “majority rule,” and Democrats have countered by saying they will grind the chamber’s business to a halt if the GOP eliminates the filibuster on judicial nominations. Some Democrats have argued that Republican appeals to majority rule are hypocritical: If Republicans really subscribed to majority rule principles, the argument goes, they would support a constitutional amendment to abolish the Senate itself. Actually, we should take the question of abolishing the Senate more seriously — not because it proves Republican hypocrisy, but because it helps us to understand the value of the filibuster. It turns out that the reason Americans would likely oppose abolishing the Senate — because it allows an intense minority to have its opinion taken into account — applies equally to the filibuster.
The question whether we should have a Senate is a good one--especially since the abolition of the selection of Senators by state legislatures. But I think Hasen has fundamentally misconceived the point of the debate about the filibuster of judicial nominees in the Senate--which is, at bottom, about the norms of the Senate itself. No one doubts that a Senator may delay consideration of a nominee for judicial office (or executive office) by use of the filibuster. When the filibuster serves the deliberative role of forcing further debate and deliberation, it is in the spirit of the Senate rules and the function of the Senate as the "cooling saucer." The issue concerns the use of the filibuster to prevent the Senate from giving advice and consent at all--a contravention of the constitutional duty of the senate to provide advice to the President. When a filibuster is continued to the end of a term, it effectively avoids that responsibility acting as a de facto but not de jure supermajority rule for confirmation. The history is complicated, but there is a powerful argument that the use of the filibuster in this way contravenes the norms of the Senate. Of course, both Republicans and Democrats have used other tools to defeat and delay nominations--for example, Republicans bottled up many of Clinton's nominations in Committee. In my opinion, that action contravened the Senate's constitutional duty, but it was clearly permitted by the norms of the Senate itself. It is the extension of the filibuster through the end of a term that is at issue, and the issue is whether this action violates Senate norms and hence is properly the object of the so-called "nuclear option"--the use of the Byrd technique to cut off debate via a ruling from the chair. This is not a debate about how our legislature should be designed as a matter of ideal theory. Read Hasen's excellent piece!
And on the same topic, the Senate Republican Policy Committee has released a new policy paper, The Constitutional Option: The Senate's Power to Make Procedural Rules by Majority Vote.
Update: And I also recommend this post and this post by Paul Horwitz over at PrawfsBlog.
And Hasen responds here.


 
Bar-Gill on Pricing Legal Options Oren Bar-Gill (New York University - School of Law) has posted Pricing Legal Options: A Behavioral Perspective on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Many legal rules can be interpreted as creating options. Option pricing is thus important for understanding the ex ante effects of these rules. And, recognizing that individuals, whose behavior the law aims to influence, are imperfectly rational, a behavioral option pricing model is a potentially helpful tool for legal policy. This paper develops such a model and applies it to a series of legal problems in tort law, contract law, corporate law and criminal law.


 
Conference Announcement: Metaphysics of Value
    The Metaphysics of Value Centre for Metaphysics and Mind School of Philosophy University of Leeds Saturday 14th May, 2005 A one-day workshop with Jay Wallace, Ralph Wedgwood, Jimmy Lenman and Ulrike Heuer. Registration (includes coffee, tea and lunch): £10 standard and £5 for students For further enquiries or to register contact Andrew McGonigal, School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, LS2 9JT or notify him via e-mail at: a.mcgonigal@leeds.ac.uk


Monday, April 25, 2005
 
Monday Calendar
    Columbia Law & Economics: John J. Donohue, Yale Law School, "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws" (authored with David H. Autor and Stewart J. Schwab):
      This paper provides empirical estimates of the effects on employment and wages of wrongful-discharge protections adopted by state courts across the United States during the last three decades. We find robust evidence that one wrongful-discharge doctrine, the implied-contract exception, reduced state employment rates by 0.8 to 1.6 percent. The initial impact is largest for female, younger, and less-educated workers - those who change jobs frequently - while the longer-term effect is greater for older and more-educated workers - those most likely to litigate. By contrast, we find no robust employment or wage effects of two other widely recognized wrongful-discharge laws: the public-policy and good-faith exceptions.
    UCLA Law School: Randall Thomas, Vanderbilt Law School, "Reassessing the Lead Plaintiff Provision: Is the Experiment Paying Off?"
    University of Texas School of Law: Michael Heise, Cornell, "Judge, Juries, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses" (with Ted Eisenberg)":
      We analyze thousands of trials from a substantial fraction of the nation’s most populous counties. Evidence across ten years and three major datasets suggests that: (1) juries and judges award punitive damages in approximately the same ratio to compensatory damages, (2) the level of punitive damages awards has not increased, and (3) juries’ and judges’ tendencies to award punitive damages differ in bodily injury and no-bodily injury cases. Jury trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in financial injury cases. Judge trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in bodily injury cases.


 
Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky on IP & the Boundaries of the Firm Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky (New York University - School of Law and University of Pennsylvania Law School) have posted Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries of the Firm on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Arrow's disclosure paradox implies that information that is not afforded legal protection cannot be bought or sold on the market. This paper emphasizes the important relationship between the paradox of disclosure and the boundaries of the firm question. Only legally protected inventions, i.e., patented inventions, may be traded; pre-patent stages of the innovation process may not. Consequently, by force of law, rather than by the guidance of economic principle, pre-patent innovation must be carried out within the boundaries of a single firm.


 
Yu on on the Information Ecosystem Peter K. Yu (Michigan State University College of Law) has posted Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem (Michigan State Law Review, Vol. 2005, pp.1-20, Spring 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This short essay proceeds in two parts. The first part examines the controversy surrounding the use of the term intellectual property. It discusses the common criticisms of the term's usage, including those articulated by Richard Stallman. It also challenges the myth that intellectual property did not acquire any property attributes until the establishment of the World Intellectual Property Organization. The essay suggests that the term may remain in common usage despite its uneasy analogy to real property, and a more nuanced understanding of property law may alleviate some of the problems caused by using the term. The second part focuses on the need for a new conceptual framework to reframe the intellectual property debate. This part articulates three reasons why the information ecosystem would provide such a framework. First, it reminds policymakers and commentators of the problems of the current bipolar intellectual property debate. Second, it highlights the different components of the intellectual property system and the interactions among these components. Third, it underscores the need to take a holistic perspective and consider intellectual property laws and policies as one of the many components of a larger information ecosystem.


 
Richamn on Salerno Daniel C. Richman (Fordham University School of Law) has posted The Story of United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES, Carol Steiker, ed., Foundation Press Law Stories Series, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Is it constitutional for the government to lock up people without waiting to convict them at trial? If it is, what are the limits on the government's power to lock up anyone it deems dangerous? These are issues raised by preventive detention provisions in bail statutes, and addressed in United States v. Salerno. The controversy about these bail statutes, once so hotly contested, has died down. But the broader questions about the government's power to detain suspected criminals without giving them the benefit of full criminal process remain unresolved, and have taken on a new urgency as the nation confronts the threat of more terrorist attacks. This essay, intended as a chapter in the Criminal Procedure Stories volume, explores the story of Salerno and of the doctrinal analysis that emerged from it.


Sunday, April 24, 2005
 
Legal Theory Calendar
    Monday, April 25
      Columbia Law & Economics: John J. Donohue, Yale Law School, "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws" (authored with David H. Autor and Stewart J. Schwab):
        This paper provides empirical estimates of the effects on employment and wages of wrongful-discharge protections adopted by state courts across the United States during the last three decades. We find robust evidence that one wrongful-discharge doctrine, the implied-contract exception, reduced state employment rates by 0.8 to 1.6 percent. The initial impact is largest for female, younger, and less-educated workers - those who change jobs frequently - while the longer-term effect is greater for older and more-educated workers - those most likely to litigate. By contrast, we find no robust employment or wage effects of two other widely recognized wrongful-discharge laws: the public-policy and good-faith exceptions.
      UCLA Law School: Randall Thomas, Vanderbilt Law School, "Reassessing the Lead Plaintiff Provision: Is the Experiment Paying Off?"
      University of Texas School of Law: Michael Heise, Cornell, "Judge, Juries, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses" (with Ted Eisenberg)":
        We analyze thousands of trials from a substantial fraction of the nation’s most populous counties. Evidence across ten years and three major datasets suggests that: (1) juries and judges award punitive damages in approximately the same ratio to compensatory damages, (2) the level of punitive damages awards has not increased, and (3) juries’ and judges’ tendencies to award punitive damages differ in bodily injury and no-bodily injury cases. Jury trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in financial injury cases. Judge trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in bodily injury cases.
    Tuesday, April 26
      Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Tony Coady, Morality and Private Warriors.
      Georgetown Law School: Marks (Greenwald Fellow).
      University of Illinois College of Law: Todd Allee, Dept. of Political Science, UIUC.
      Lewis & Clark Law School: Craig Johnston.
      Oxford Taxation Law: Professor Malcolm Gammie QC, A European Corporation Tax.
      Vanderbilt University School of Law: Stefanie Lindquist, Vanderbilt Political Science Department and Law School.
    Wednesday, April 27
    Thursday, April 28
      Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Jennifer Nedelsky, University of Toronto (Law), "Legislative Judgment And The Enlarged Mentality: Taking Religious Perspectives":
        Hannah Arendt outlined a preliminary theory of judgment in her lectures at the New school and in various essays. But she did not live to write the volume she had planned on judgment as the final volume to her work on thinking and willing1. In my earlier work, I have built upon her theory of judgment, primarily by looking at its implications for judgment in the judicial context2. Here, I return to her own primary interest, political judgment. In this essay, I look at the importance of judgment for two of the central functions of the legislature in a constitutional state: the legislature as a locus of collective deliberation about the common good and the legislature as a participant in the ongoing, dynamic, and contested definition of core constitutional values. These functions are, in turn, linked to a third issue: the link between the ordinary practices of citizens and what we can hope for from a legislature.
        The central concept in Arendt’s theory, which she borrowed from Kant, is the enlarged mentality. Briefly put, what distinguishes judgment from both subjective preference and provable truth claims, is that judgment involves reflection on the question at hand from the standpoint or perspective of others. Judgment as such remains subjective, it cannot compel the assent of others as truth claims can. But it can claim validity with respect to other judging subjects. It is the use of the enlarged mentality, the consideration of others’ perspectives, that makes this validity possible. It is this exercise that distinguishes mere private opinion from valid judgment.
      Fordham University School of Law: Sean J. Griffith, Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law (2004-05), "Good Faith Business Judgment: a Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence":
        This Article develops a theory of rhetoric in corporate law jurisprudence. It begins by examining a recent innovation in Delaware case-law: the emerging principle of “good faith.” Good faith is an old notion in law generally, but it offers to bring significant change to corporate law, including realignment of the business judgment rule and a shift in the traditional balance between the authority of boards and the accountability of boards to courts. The Article argues, however, that good faith functions as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard. That is, it operates as a speech-act, a performance, as opposed to a careful method of analysis. To explain the sudden appearance of good faith, this Article articulates a model of corporate law rhetoric. Courts invent rhetorical devices to loosen corporate law doctrine and increase judicial review of board decision-making in response to scandals and other extra-legal pressures operating upon the judiciary. These pressures stem largely from the twin threats of corporate migration and federal preemption, both of which imperil the primacy of the Delaware judiciary as a corporate law-maker. In periods of crisis and scandal, the judiciary employs rhetorical devices to reduce these pressures, typically with the effect of increasing board accountability, only to return, once the pressure recedes, to a position of board deference. After finding several examples of this pattern in corporate law history, this Article argues, ultimately, that regular movement back and forth along the authority/ accountability spectrum is an essential feature of corporate law jurisprudence and that understanding the rhetorical devices that permit this movement is necessary to complete any account of what corporate law is and how it works.
      Georgetown Workshop on Transnational Legal Issues: Marc Spindelman, "Homosexuality’s Horizon"
      University of Texas, School of Law: David Blight, Yale University, Department of History, "Healing or Justice: Has Civil War Memory Divided or Unified America?"
    Friday, April 29
      Derek Jinks, U. of Arizona School of Law, "Reciprocity and the Laws of War".
      University of Texas, School of Law: David Blight, Yale University, Department of History, "The Theft of Lincoln in Scholarship and in Public Memory".
      Vanderbilt Legal Theory Workshop: David Dana, Northwestern University Law School, "Adequacy of Representation after Stephenson".
      Northwestern University School of Law: Law and Positive Political Theory Conference: Legal Doctrine and Political Control, Day 1
        10:00–11:45am, Session 1
          • Charles Cameron and Lewis Kornhauser, “A Team Model of Appellate Law Creation” • Paul Rubin, Hugo Mialon, and Joel Schrag, “Judicial Hierarchies and the Rule-Individual Tradeoff.” • Tonja Jacobi and Emerson Tiller, “Legal Doctrine and Political Control.” Discussants: Eric Posner Rui de Figueiredo Mathew McCubbins
        1:15-3:00pm, Session 2
          • Lee Epstein, Charles Cameron, Andrew Martin, and Jeff Segal, “Strategic Defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court” • Tracey George and Jeffrey Berger, "From Defense to Offense: A Revised Strategic Account of Appellate Judging" • Joseph Smith, “Distributing Power by Deciding Cases: Explaining Supreme Court Deference to Administrative Action” Discussants: John de Figueiredo Christopher Zorn Max Schanzenbach
        3:30pm-4:45pm, Session 3
          • Eric Talley, “Equilibrium Expectations and Legal Doctrine” • Jide Nzelibe, “A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution” Discussants: Lewis Kornhauser John McGinnis
    Saturday, April 30
      Northwestern University School of Law: Law and Positive Political Theory Conference: Legal Doctrine and Political Control, Day 2
        9am-10:15am, Session 4
          • Mathew McCubbins, Daniel Rodriguez, Cheryl Boudreau and Arthur Lupia “Communication and Interpretation” • Pablo Spiller, Matias Iaryczower and Mariano Tommasi “Judicial Lobbying” Discussants: Matthew Spitzer Andrew Martin
        10:45-11:30am, Session 5
          •Roundtable Discussion: The Future of Law and Positive Political Theory (Daniel Rodriguez)


 
Legal Theory Lexicon: The Internal Point of View
    Introduction How can we look at a legal system? H.L.A. Hart famously deployed the distinction between external and internal perspectives on a legal system in his famous book, The Concept of Law. This post provides a very brief introduction to this distinction for law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in legal theory.
    Internal and External What is the difference between internal and external perspectives on the law? Obviously, we are dealing with a metaphor here. The idea is that one can look at the law from the inside or from the outside. Even if you have never encountered this distinction before, the intuitive idea of the metaphor is fairly clear. The internal point of view is the perspective of participants in the system--those who accept the authority of law. Thus, the internal point of view is paradigmatically the point of view of legal officials (such a judges). The external point of view is the perspective of outsiders. Thus, the external point of view is paradigmatically the point of view of a sociologist or anthropologist from a different culture, who observes the legal system.
    Here are some examples:
      --Doctrinal theories (e.g. a theory of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution) are usually stated from the internal point of view. This is the kind of theory that law students usually encounter early in their legal education.
      --Causal theories (e.g. a public-choice theory that explains why a particular area of law has come to be the way it is) are usually stated from the external point of view. In first-year law school courses, causal theories are usually stated in a very compact, even off-hand form. There may be a brief classroom discussion of the causal forces that shaped a particular legal doctrine, but it is fairly rare actually to read social science literature on topics like this.
    The General Significance of the Internal Point of View The idea of the internal point of view plays a particular role in H.L.A. Hart's theory of law, but this post is about a related but distinct topic--the more general role that the internal/external distinction plays in legal theory. Newbie legal theorists need to know this distinction in order to avoid a very serious mistake in theory development. That mistake is to slide between the internal and external point of view. This mistake is actually quite easy to make. The theorist is working within the internal point of view--describing a particular legal doctrine from the point of view of lawyers and judges who work within the constraints of the doctrine. Then, the theorist slides into an explanation as to how the law came to be the way it is--describing the operation of political or economic pressures--and then slides back to the doctrinal level--drawing the conclusion that the law should be interpreted differently in light of the causal explanation. Arguments like this can be made to work, but unless the relationship between the causal explanation and the doctrinal consequence is explained carefully, this kind of move can easily involve a category mistake. Causal explanations (of how the law has come to be the way it is) are usually irrelevant from the internal point of view.
    Rules and the Internal Point of View The internal point of view may have additional significance to legal theorists. One can argue that legal rules cannot be described from a purely external point of view. Huh? Imagine that you are an anthropologist from Mars, observing an earthly legal system. You would be able to note various regularities in behavior, but so long as you stuck to the purely external point of view, you would not be able to say anything about the content of the laws. In order to do that, you would need to ask the question "What is the meaning of the these legal texts and actions?" And to say anything about meaning, you would need to assume (at least hypothetically) something like the internal point of view. You would need to ask the question, "What does these behaviors are markings mean to those who are inside the practice of law?"
    If this argument is correct, then important consequences follow. Legal theorists are interested in legal theory. If the internal point of view is a necessary prerequisite for understanding the legal significance of the behavior of legal actors, then it would seem to follow that all legal theory requires that the theorist be able to assume the internal point of view at the stage where the theorist describes the legal phenomenon that are the object of study.
    Let me give an example of this rather abstract point. Suppose you want to develop a causal theory of tort law. You want to argue that there is an economic explanation of the emergence of negligence (as opposed to strict liability) as the primary standard of care in tort. The details of the theory don't matter, but let's assume you believe that inefficient legal standards create incentives for litigation and that a quasi-evolutionary process leads to the selection of efficient standards. And of course, you would need to argue that negligence is efficient. This theory is primarily stated from the external point of view, but it also relies on the legal meaning of the distinction between "negligence" and "strict liability"--concepts that can only be understood from the legal point of view.
    The central idea here is that the external point of view can describe the behavior of legal actors, but the internal point of view is required to understand the meaning of legal actions.
    Conclusion The distinction between the internal and external point of views is one of the basic ideas in legal theory. When you first begin to construct theories about the law, you should ask yourself, "Am I looking at this area of the law from the internal point of view or am I taking a perspective that is external to the law?" For more on theory construction, you might also want to look at an earlier post in the Legal Theory Lexicon series: Legal Theory Lexicon 016: Positive and Normative Legal Theories


Saturday, April 23, 2005
 
The Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited and the earlier The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model by Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth. This work is absolutely essential--especially for constitutional theorists trained in law who are unfamiliar with this important work. Here is a blurb:
    Authored by two leading scholars of the Supreme Court and its policy making, this study systematically presents and validates the use of the attitudinal model to explain and predict Supreme Court decision making. In the process, it critiques the two major alternative models of Supreme Court decision making and their major variants--the legal and rational choice. Using the U.S. Supreme Court Data Base, the justices' private papers, and other sources of information, the book analyzes the appointment process, certiorari, the decision on the merits, opinion assignments, and the formation of opinion coalitions.


 
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is A New Understanding of Tax (Michigan Law Review, 2005). Here is the abstract:
    The traditional understanding of broad-based tax systems contrasts an income tax with all forms of a consumption tax. The income tax, alone, includes the yield to capital in its base; consumption taxes do not. Simple financial analysis demonstrates the equivalence of the two most common classes of consumption taxation - prepaid, or wage-based, and postpaid, or sales taxes - under certain assumptions, most importantly including constant tax and interest rates between the periods in the model. Advocates of redistributive taxes insist on both progressive rates and an income base, in large part to tax the yield to capital; opponents clamor for flat-rate consumption taxes, often invoking Mill's celebrated argument against the income tax's "double taxation" of savings to support their case. Once progressivity is presumed, however - as its enduring popular appeal suggests it ought be - the traditional understanding is flawed. Asking a different timing question, "when, in a taxpayer's flow of funds, ought progressive taxes be imposed?," casts tax systems in a new light. The present tax system emerges as an onerous wage-based one. A progressive cash-flow consumption tax, in contrast, emerges as the best - most consistent and principled - tax on the yield to capital, under just the conditions in which it is fair and appropriate to tax such yield. This gives a further reason to support a progressive cash-flow consumption tax, sounding in reasons familiar to income tax supporters. A consistent, progressive cash-flow consumption tax will lower the burden of taxation when capital transactions (borrowing, saving, and investing) are used to smooth labor earnings within or between lifetimes (or taxpayers), and will increase the burden of taxation when capital transactions are used to enhance labor earnings within or between lifetimes (or taxpayers). Critical reflection based on a near century of experience reveals such a tax to give form to attractive normative ideals. The new understanding helps to show that the traditional and most common arguments for consumption taxation are not compelling. The best, most appealing case for a consumption tax does not rest on "horizontal equity" models, nor on claims about the economic, consequentialist importance of savings on an individual or an aggregate social level. Rather it is claims of fairness, in a social contractarian sense in the manner of John Rawls and other liberal theorists, that argue for a properly designed consumption tax - in part precisely because of the way such a tax sometimes but not always burdens capital and its yield, and in greater part because such a tax points the way towards greater, more meaningful progressivity in tax. The new understanding of tax yields important insights into pressingly practical matters of tax policy and design, and opens up an important window to critique contemporary trends in tax reform. The battle in tax policy should not be over income versus consumption taxation - as it has been for centuries - but rather over what kind of consumption tax to choose. Failure to address this question head-on has led tax policy to move, seemingly inexorably, towards the wrong choice, with the fate of progressive, redistributive taxation hanging in the balance.
Download it while it's hot! May I also recommend The Future of Copyright (by your blogger) as well as The Rise and Fall of Textualism by Jonathan Molot and Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies by Don Dripps.


Friday, April 22, 2005
 
Solum on the Future of Copyright Lawrence Solum (your blogger) has posted The Future of Copyright on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Sometimes technological change is so profound that it rocks the foundations of an entire body of law. Peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing systems - Napster, Gnutella, KaZaA, Grokster, and Freenet3 - are mere symptoms of a set of technological innovations that have set in motion an ongoing process of fundamental changes in the nature of copyright law. The video tape recorder begat the Sony "substantial noninfringing use" defense. The digital cassette recorder begat the Audio Home Recording Act. The internet begat the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.6 Napster begat Napster. We see the law morph right in front of our eyes, but its ultimate form is still obscure. As a consequence, the future of copyright is up for grabs. We live in a magical, exhilarating, and frightening time: Many alternative copyfutures8 shimmer on the horizon, sometimes coming into sharper focus and sometimes fading away. In this heady atmosphere, the idea slingers are at work. Richard Posner and William Landes have proposed indefinitely renewable copyrights. Neil Netanel, William Fisher, and others propose to legalize P2P filesharing and replace the lost revenues with a tax on hardware and internet service. Joseph Liu suggests that the scope of fair use should grow with time. Mark Lemley is debunking ex post justifications for intellectual property. No surprise, the academics do not have a monopoly on idea slinging. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) have gone on the offensive, proposing legislation like the "Induce Act," targeted at shutting down P2P filesharing services that allow third parties to share copyrighted content. No copywarrior is more prominent and influential than Larry Lessig. Lessig was the brilliant architect of Eric Eldred's failed challenge to the CTEA's retroactive twenty-year extension of copyright terms - effectively a twenty-year moratorium on new works entering the public domain. In Free Culture, Lessig has remade himself as a "norm entrepreneur" - a public figure with the towering ambition of reshaping "copynorms" - the fundamental set of social norms that shape perceptions of the morality of filesharing and the legitimacy of legislation that shrinks the public domain. This essay examines the ideas in Free Culture in the context of current controversies over the future of copyright.
As always, comments are very welcome. Hope you enjoy!


 
Friday Calendar
    University of San Diego School of Law: Sai Prakash.
    University of Texas School of Law: Adrienne Davis, University of North Carolina (Visiting professor at UT Law), "Manumission, Miscegenation & Marriage: The Sexual Economy of American Slavery".


 
Levin on the Nomos and Narrative of Matushita Nickolai Levin has posted The Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Around twenty-one years ago, Robert Cover left an indelible mark on legal scholarship with his epic tale of world formation and development, Nomos and Narrative. He posited the idea that our culture consists of a multitude of insular communities (nomoi), each of whose experiences is guided by those texts and events (narratives) that give its legal precepts normative meaning, thereby connecting each community's vision of reality to its ideal. Occasions arose, however, where different community's visions of the ideal could not be contained within each community alone and thus came into conflict. Resolution required reconciliation of those narratives that provided each nomos with normative meaning. This entailed respecting the insularity of each nomos as much as possible but, where need be, recognizing that one vision was normatively better than another and redeeming the lesser from its fall from grace. Cover's work specifically concerned the battle between civil rights norms and religious liberty ones in the early 1980s. But Cover's central idea - the relationship between nomos and narrative - need not be limited to the specific struggle that confronted him. In fact, his work aids understanding of one of the most important (and confusing) issues in antitrust: when to limit the range of permissible inferences from circumstantial evidence at the summary judgment stage. Studying the history of how the antitrust summary judgment standard developed, this Article discusses how antitrust has its own nomoi (substantive sub-worlds) and redemptive narrative (consumer welfare) interacting with one another and how, in one nomos - oligopoly parallel pricing cases - some circuit courts have arguably erred by overapplying deterrence concerns that originated as part of the consumer welfare narrative.
This brings me back to my third year in law school, when Cover's Nomos and Narrative was the foreword to the Supreme Court issue. I have a distinct memory of groups of editors reciting a particular passage, which, as I recall, mentioned "sherds of meaning" or something similar.


 
Stone on International Environmental Ethics & Law Christopher D. Stone (University of Southern California - Law School) has posted Ethics in International Environmental Law (Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The actual influence of didactic ethics on public policy is controversial, and perhaps particularly so in regard to multilateral fora. But efforts to mend the global environment invite ethical analysis in three ways. First, there are issues of human obligations to the non-human environment (“environmental ethics proper). Second there are issues of ethics among nations in respect of the environment (inter-national ethics). Third, there are issues of ethics among generations in respect of the environment (inter-generational ethics). The first - environmental ethics proper - can be illustrated by the question, has humankind an obligation not to kill whales? (Have whales rights?) The second is illustrated by the question, if the harvesting of a certain number of whales is moral, have indigenous peoples a higher priority on them than commercial fishermen from industrialized countries? (Are there principles of fair distribution among nations?) The third can be illustrated by the question, have present generations an obligation to remote future generations to preserve whales? (Are there obligations of sustainable development?) The author reviews and critically assesses these and related issues that have been recurring in international environmental governance bodies and literature.


 
Rose on Science and Environmental Law Carol M. Rose (Yale Law School) has posted Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science Can Do to Help (Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 9, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In this Article, the author assesses the role of science in a maturing modern environmental law. She describes this maturation process, beginning in the early 1970s with a first wave of "behavior-based" (BB) regulations. These regulations constrained the actions of resource-users, but generally they abandoned the very difficult task of linking the required constraints directly to an impact on environmental quality. BB regulations served a useful purpose in cutting back large pollution sources, but by the 1980s they came under increasing criticism for their lack of flexibility, including their inattentiveness to costs, to actual impact on quality, and to small and diffuse sources that could be cumulatively more damaging than large or easily-controlled ones. In an attempt to remedy these problems, a now-maturing environmental law has turned increasingly but as yet incompletely to quality-based (QB) approaches. The QB regulations, which include market-based efforts, attempt to connect regulatory requirements to actual improvements in environmental quality. The newer QB approaches, however, entail much greater reliance on measurement of the relationship between resource uses and quality changes. This pattern in turn puts new demands on scientific knowledge, especially for ways to measure or model (a) small and scattered sources and their impacts (b) marginal or cumulative effects of differing amounts of the same kinds of resource uses, and c) synergistic effects among different kinds of resource uses, particularly in connection with system-wide approaches. More generally, policymakers need the scientific community to be tolerant of the ways in which policy decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, scientific study can be important to environmental policy simply by enhancing interest in the environmental questions.


 
Weinstein on Judicial Limits on Legislative Power Ian Weinstein (Fordham University - School of Law) has posted The Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur: U.S. v. Booker and The Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to Define Crimes on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article offers a historically grounded account of the twists and turns in the Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence from the end of World War II to the Court's stunning rejection of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The doctrinal shifts that have roiled this area of the law can best be understood as the Court's effort to respond to the changing political and social landscape of crime in America. In the mid 1970's, legislative activity in the criminal law was largely focused on Model Penal Code influenced recodification. In that era, the Supreme Court took power from an ascendant judiciary and gave it to legislators who did not seem disposed to exercise their authority too broadly. By the late 1990’s the tide had shifted and the Court turned sentencing doctrine on its head to take power over criminal law from legislative bodies inclined to push the limits of their power and transfer it back to a newly cautious judiciary. This article explores how that shift in power was informed by changing social and political conditions and was accomplished through doctrines regulating the Sixth Amendment right to trial.


 
Burk on Federalism in Cyberspace Dan L. Burk (University of Minnesota Law School) has posted Federalism in Cyberspace Revisited (WHO RULES THE NET? ESSAYS ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND JURISDICTION 119, Adam Theier & Wayne Crews, eds., 2003) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Transborder flow of digitized goods and services has become a major feature in the debate over Internet regulation. Some commentators have argued that the architecture of the Internet changes everything; others have replied that it changes nothing. This updated article addresses federalism issues raised by on-line interjurisdictional competition, arguing that despite the suggestions of the “unexceptionalist” school of commentary, Internet regulation remains anything but “business as usual.” Analysis of interstate competition in law as a product is appropriate in determining the proper scope of state regulation of on-line activity. Two lines of constitutional cases define the parameters of proper interstate regulatory competition: those dealing with personal jurisdiction, and those dealing with the dormant commerce clause. Inherent in the Supreme Court's Due Process holdings is the principle that interstate diversity in law products is desireable and central to a federal system. The minimum contacts test of International Shoe and subsequent cases preserves the individual's right to vote with his feet in selecting among the law products offered by the several states. Competition for law as a product can only be maintained if states are prevented from externalizing the costs of their local regulations. The Supreme Court holdings regarding the dormant commerce clause indicate that this constitutional doctrine serves to prevent states from exporting their law products to other jurisdictions by attempting to control wholly extraterritorial activity. Although the Internet may in some cases facilitate externalization of state regulatory costs, centralized regulation by the federal government, rather than overreaching by the states, is the proper solution to such externalities.


Thursday, April 21, 2005
 
Law Review If you are thinking about the decision whether to write on to law review, surf here and follow the links.


 
Waldron Debates Yoo Over at Ex Post, a report on the debate between Jeremy Waldron and John Yoo on torture.


 
Thursday Calendar
    UC Berkeley, Kadish Center: Rogers Smith, Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, PROVIDENTIALISM, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE ETHICS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE:
      It is already clear that, like Ronald Reagan before him, President George W. Bush will be viewed as a far more historically significant figure than most observers anticipated when he first ran for the White House. For me he has a far less historic but nonetheless special significance. He came to power as I was writing Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (2003). Both his rhetoric and his policies have provided amazingly apt illustrations of that book’s empirical claims about how political leaders advance “stories of peoplehood” to win support for their vision of their political community’s proper identity and aims. But they also have provided profoundly disquieting challenges to the book’s normative argument, that we should welcome a democratic politics in which clashing “comprehensive views,” including religious views, are openly espoused. Since he ran for Governor of Texas and especially from his First Inaugural Address to the present, George W. Bush has advanced a religious understanding of American peoplehood quite explicitly, and since September 11, 2001 he has especially done so in the context of American foreign policy—in ways that I, like many observers, find deeply disturbing. The quandary this paper addresses, then, is this: if we recognize the importance of “stories of peoplehood” to the creation and maintenance of successful and morally defensible political societies, and if we acknowledge that religious stories can rightfully play a significant part in those processes, can we still find grounds to criticize the ways and means President Bush is deploying religious stories of peoplehood, especially in regard to U.S. foreign policy? This quandary is, I believe, a common one among Bush’s critics. Many who have been troubled by the President’s providentialist rhetoric have been reluctant to criticize it severely, fearing conservative charges that they are simply hostile to the expression of religious perspectives in public life. I argue that, despite their undoubted sincerity, President Bush’s religious statements can rightly be deemed ethically dubious contributions to political discourse. They are not dubious because they are religious, or because they are a type of “comprehensive view,” or even because they fail to provide reasons all can in principle accept. They fail on their own substantive terms, as religious arguments advanced in the service of democracy. Bush’s providentialist accounts claim theological certainty while remaining largely devoid of specific appeals to any identifiable religious authorities. They also repeatedly imply, though never quite claim, divine mandates for controversial specific policies, particularly in the periods when legitimation for those policies seems most crucial. And even as they profess to promote democracy, they are structured not only to discourage but to de-legitimate democratic criticism and dissent, all to a much greater degree than the discourses of Bush’s recent presidential predecessors, including Ronald Reagan. This kind of providentialist discourse bears the hallmarks of a “story of peoplehood” that is being used politically to gain an aura of ethical legitimacy for policies that are otherwise unlikely to be seen as in accord with the nation’s dominant moral traditions.
    Fordham University School of Law: Caroline M. Gentile, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham, "Investment Funds and Investment Fees".
      The purpose of this essay . . . is to begin to undertake this analysis and to identify the most promising methods of developing effective reform proposals. Part I provides a brief overview of mutual funds and hedge funds, describing first the similarities in the relationships between the investors in the funds and the investment advisers of the funds and then turning to the differences in organizational structures, regulatory restrictions, and investment strategies. Part II analyzes the fees charged to investors, noting first the types of fees and then describing the difficulties arising from each of the fees. Part III briefly outlines current reform proposals for addressing these problems and then sketches and alternative framework for developing reform proposals.
    Stanford Law & Economics: Bruce Hay (Harvard Law School) & Kathryn Spier (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University), "Manufacturer Liability for Harm Caused by Consumers to Others":
      Should the manufacturer of a product be held legally responsible when a consumer, while using the product, harms someone else? We show that if consumers have deep pockets then manufacturer liability is not desirable. If homogeneous consumers have limited assets, then the best rule is "residual-manufacturer liability" where the manufacturer pays the shortfall in damages not paid by the consumer. Residual manufacturer liability distorts the market quantity when consumers’ willingness to pay is correlated with their propensity to cause harm. It distorts product safety when consumers differ in their wealth levels. In both cases, consumer-only liability may be preferred.
    Yale Law Economics & Organizations Workshop: Professor K. Daron Acemoglu, MIT/Economics, Unbundling Institutions:
      This paper evaluates the importance of property rights institutions, which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and contracting institutions, which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history, and document strong first-stage relationships between property rights institutions and the determinants of European colonization strategy (settler mortality and population density before colonization), and between contracting institutions and the identity of the colonizing power. Using this instrumental variables approach, we ?nd that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic growth, investment, and ?nancial development. Contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of ?nancial intermediation. A possible explanation for this pattern is that individuals often ?nd ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse e¤ects of weak contracting institutions, but ?nd it harder to mitigate the risk of expropriation in this way.
    University of Texas Constitutional & Legal Theory Colloquium: Rick Hills, University of Michigan, "Two Concepts of ‘The Economic’ in Constitutional Law: The Underlying Unity of Due Process and Federalism Jurisprudence".
    Florida State University, College of Law: Lars Trägårdh, Columbia University, The Juridification of Politics in the United States and Europe: Historica Roots, Contemporary Debates and Future Prospects.
    Boston University School of Law: Allan Macurdy.
    Georgetown Workshop on Transnational Legal Issues: Lama Abu-Odeh, "The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Teaching Islamic Law in the United States".
    Vanderbilt University Legal Theory Workshop: Dan Farber, University of California - Berkeley Law School, "'Judgment Calls', Or, Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test?".


 
McCaffery's New Understanding of Tax Edward J. McCaffery (University of Southern California - Law School) has posted A New Understanding of Tax (Michigan Law Review, 2005). Here is the abstract:
    The traditional understanding of broad-based tax systems contrasts an income tax with all forms of a consumption tax. The income tax, alone, includes the yield to capital in its base; consumption taxes do not. Simple financial analysis demonstrates the equivalence of the two most common classes of consumption taxation - prepaid, or wage-based, and postpaid, or sales taxes - under certain assumptions, most importantly including constant tax and interest rates between the periods in the model. Advocates of redistributive taxes insist on both progressive rates and an income base, in large part to tax the yield to capital; opponents clamor for flat-rate consumption taxes, often invoking Mill's celebrated argument against the income tax's "double taxation" of savings to support their case. Once progressivity is presumed, however - as its enduring popular appeal suggests it ought be - the traditional understanding is flawed. Asking a different timing question, "when, in a taxpayer's flow of funds, ought progressive taxes be imposed?," casts tax systems in a new light. The present tax system emerges as an onerous wage-based one. A progressive cash-flow consumption tax, in contrast, emerges as the best - most consistent and principled - tax on the yield to capital, under just the conditions in which it is fair and appropriate to tax such yield. This gives a further reason to support a progressive cash-flow consumption tax, sounding in reasons familiar to income tax supporters. A consistent, progressive cash-flow consumption tax will lower the burden of taxation when capital transactions (borrowing, saving, and investing) are used to smooth labor earnings within or between lifetimes (or taxpayers), and will increase the burden of taxation when capital transactions are used to enhance labor earnings within or between lifetimes (or taxpayers). Critical reflection based on a near century of experience reveals such a tax to give form to attractive normative ideals. The new understanding helps to show that the traditional and most common arguments for consumption taxation are not compelling. The best, most appealing case for a consumption tax does not rest on "horizontal equity" models, nor on claims about the economic, consequentialist importance of savings on an individual or an aggregate social level. Rather it is claims of fairness, in a social contractarian sense in the manner of John Rawls and other liberal theorists, that argue for a properly designed consumption tax - in part precisely because of the way such a tax sometimes but not always burdens capital and its yield, and in greater part because such a tax points the way towards greater, more meaningful progressivity in tax. The new understanding of tax yields important insights into pressingly practical matters of tax policy and design, and opens up an important window to critique contemporary trends in tax reform. The battle in tax policy should not be over income versus consumption taxation - as it has been for centuries - but rather over what kind of consumption tax to choose. Failure to address this question head-on has led tax policy to move, seemingly inexorably, towards the wrong choice, with the fate of progressive, redistributive taxation hanging in the balance.
Highly recommended! I am always impressed with McCaffery.


 
Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard on the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the PSLRA Stephen J. Choi , Jill E. Fisch and Adam C. Pritchard (New York University - School of Law , Fordham University School of Law and University of Michigan Law School) have posted Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, the Act's "lead plaintiff" provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel'’s compensation. Congress' stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors - pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, etc. - to come forward to serve as lead plaintiff. The theory was that an institutional investor with a substantial damages claim would have the incentive to bargain hard with class counsel on behalf of the class, reducing the percentage of the recovery awarded to class counsel. Congress also expected institutions to play an oversight role, monitoring to make sure that class counsel was vigorously pursuing claims on behalf of the class and not settling claims on the cheap. Our study offers evidence on the extent to which the lead plaintiff provision furthers these goals. We have collected two samples of securities class actions - one from 1991 to 1995 (pre-PSLRA), and one from 1996-2000 (post-PSLRA). We compare the class representatives from the two periods to determine if institutional investors are stepping forward in significantly greater numbers. We also sort the institutional investors - distinguishing public from private - to see what types of investors have stepped forward to serve as lead plaintiff. Consistent with other research, we find a significant difference only in the number of public institutions serving as lead plaintiff. Our sample also allows us to analyze the impact of the lead plaintiff provision. Does the presence of an institutional investor increase the likelihood of a high value settlement? Despite the visible participation of institutions in several high-profile cases, we find no systematic evidence that private institutional lead plaintiffs are associated with larger class recoveries. Public pension funds, on the other hand, are correlated with higher class recoveries as a fraction of the potential damage award in the post-PSLRA period. Our results are, however, consistent with the possibility that public pensions "cherry pick" the actions in which they seek to become lead plaintiff, selecting only the cases with the largest potential damages and the strongest evidence of fraud. Further analysis is necessary to evaluate this possibility. We also evaluate the effect of lead plaintiffs on the selection of attorneys and attorneys’ fees. We find that, for the time period of our study, institutional investors tended to avoid the Milberg Weiss plaintiffs’ attorney firm. On the more fundamental issue of whether the presence of an institutional investor as a lead plaintiff reduces the fees paid to the lawyers, after controlling for the size of the case, we find no systematic evidence that institutional involvement correlates with lower fee awards.


 
Rose on Commodification Carol M. Rose (Yale Law School) has posted Whither Commodification? (RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READING IN LAW AND CULTURE, Martha M. Ertman, Joan C. Williams, eds., New York University Press, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This chapter concludes a book on new theories of commondification. While early commodification theory constituted a sharp critique of economics approaches to law, the author finds a certain rapprochement in some of the newer commodification literature. Although many of the newer scholars remain critical, some in effect borrow the economic idea of the "second best," to argue that although gift relationships might be first-best solutions, particularly in intimate associations, market approaches could be second-best even in those contexts, where noncommercial approaches are not feasible. (That is to say, love might be best, but getting paid is second-best, e.g. in the case of prostitution, domestic relations or organ transfers.) Other scholars see commodification as a liberating release from nosy neighbors and intrusive regulators, e.g. in the case of reproductive materials. Still others note that markets themselves are social relationships, and market exchange may act as the opening step toward later relationships of friendship and trust, as in the burgeoning affection between paid caregivers and recipients. In all these and other ways, newer commodification theorists, while still frequently very resistant to law-and-economics, have offered a fresh look into the liberatory or socializing characteristics of market transactions.


Wednesday, April 20, 2005
 
Wednesday Calendar
    Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Inmaculada Marrero Rocha,* Professor of Law, University of Granada (Spain), The Constitution of the European Union.
    NYU Legal History: Serena Mayeri, Samuel I. Golieb Fellow, NYU School of Law.


 
Rose on Lucas Carol M. Rose (Yale Law School) has psoted The Story of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea (ENVIRONMENTAL STORIES, Richard J. Lazarus, Oliver A. Houck, eds., Foundation Press, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This background study of the Lucas case focuses on legislative efforts to protect the evocative and productive lands of coastal areas. A starting point is the failed effort in the early 1970s to enact a Federal Land Use Act that would encourage statewide land use planning. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) was in effect a remnant of this larger effort, successful because it isolated opposition by narrowing the regulatory ambit to the popular coastal area. State coastal programs often replicated the CZMA's pattern of isolating opposition by focusing on a relatively narrow coastal area. This strategy, however, ran two risks: first, the environmental risk that a truncated "coastal zone" would miss important coastal influences outside that zone; and second, the jurisprudential risk that narrowly-drawn coastal laws would be caught in an evolving "takings" jurisprudence, fueled by an increasingly vocal property rights movement. Both risks became clear in California's pioneering and aggressive coastal program, but the issues came to a head not in California but in South Carolina, as this state (following environmental theories developed in neighboring North Carolina) attempted to orchestrate a "retreat" from beachfront development. South Carolina's efforts ran into David Lucas' "takings" claim that the new regulations made his beachfront property lose all economic value. When the Supreme Court accepted this theory, the decision galvanized property rights proponents but also set off a wave of criticism. Subsequent events have initiated some reconsideration of traditional takings theories, since the decision does not fit well into standard political, economic or fairness theories of takings. The author concludes that takings jurisprudence is best understood as part of the management of regulatory transitions.


 
Sklansky & Yeazell on Comparing Civil and Criminal Procedure David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law and University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) have posted Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa (Georgetown Law Journal, 2006). Here is the abstract:
    Civil and criminal procedure have parted ways - to their mutual detriment. Although civil and criminal processes grow from the same roots, practitioners, academics, rule-makers, and judges who create, critique, and operate the two systems usually behave as if the two systems had little to teach each other. This article seeks to explain the divergence of the two systems and to imagine what a dialogue might sound like. We examine three situations in which systems resolve analogous problems in different ways - settlement and plea bargains, discovery, double jeopardy and former adjudication - and suggest some modest borrowings. We examine one area - remedies for basic procedural failures (i.e., legal malpractice, re-opened judgments, and habeas corpus) - in which the divergent approaches lay bare unexamined systemic preferences. Finally, we examine two areas - professional ethics and the law of evidence - in which the systems have remained largely unified, and explore the implications of that choice.


 
Christians on Tax Treaties and Development Allison Christians (Northwestern University - School of Law) has posted Tax Treaties For Investment And Aid To Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Tax treaties are believed to increase cross-border trade and investment by reducing international tax burdens. The pursuit of tax treaties is therefore advanced as an integral component of U.S. foreign aid policy, which increasingly favors indirect assistance in the form of fostering trade and investment over traditional direct assistance in the form of donor funding. The importance of tax treaties is especially advanced in the context of U.S. relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty-related conditions are extreme and foreign trade and investment minimal. Yet despite many years of consistent promotion there are currently no tax treaties between the United States and the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. This article explains the apparent contradiction by presenting as a test case a hypothetical tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana. The case study illustrates that in today’s global commercial climate, traditional tax treaties provide few tax benefits to and indeed may negatively impact private investors. Consequently, the continuing absence of tax treaties can be explained by the lack of incentives for private investors to pressure the U.S. government to conclude these agreements. This article concludes that means other than increasing the international network of tax treaties must be pursued if the goal to increase trade and investment to developing countries is to be achieved.


 
Broekman on a European Constitution Jan M. Broekman (University of Illinois College of Law) has posted Towards a Constitution for the European Union on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Debates on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe form a grat legal, political an socially inspiring event at an international level. Questions arise how non-European entities relate to the Union or whether this Constitution functions as a model for supranational institutions and an emerging legal system of 25 nations, each with their own Constitution. Those nations are pooling sovereignty and harmonizing their legal systems within the Union's Civil Law family. The unpredictability of referendums or parliamentary ratifications in Member States is not the result of precise knowledge of a text named Constitution, but of social and political beliefs based on ideological judgments in Member States. Inside and outside the Union exists the need for an informed opinion and correct information on the institutional framework embedding the text, which establishes the Treaty on a Constitution of the EU. First, the peculiar structure of the text is studied: this text is subject of a Treaty and named constituion by contract. A 'democtratic deficit' exists where Union citizens are supposed to be consumers of law and lawmakers - any contract about naming and treating a text as Constitution finds its legitimacy in the political competence of the Member State citizens. That throws, secondly, a new light on the 'demos-discussion' - since 1995 a debate about the quesiton whether a Constitution must have a people, a 'Volk' as its basis. There is no correspondence with any direct expressiveness of a people, so can one speak of 'democracy' or should the plural 'demicracy' be used as proposed by Nicolaides? Is the EU Constitution a first plural and poly-centered constitution? This challenges the sovereign nation state concept and the image of citizens participating in such a State. A third paragraph focuses education in the Union as a force to change attitude and mentality of EU citizens. To educate means to create a difference through a educated appreciation of others--a necessary condition for the multicultural life in supranational EU institutions, supported by citizens who themselves grew up with emphasis on national goals and values. It is important to observe how materials for virtual education program, for instance paralleling languages and Union data, remain out of use, so that an overwhelming education deficit must be mentioned. A final paragraph explains how many social and political problems in the Union result from a clash between nation-bound and supranational perspectives. Does the EU Constitution survive that clash?


 
Molot on Textualism Jonathan T. Molot (The George Washington University Law School) has posted The Rise and Fall of Textualism (Columbia Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The textualist revolution is over. Textualism's past accomplishments are quite impressive - indeed, much more impressive than either its adherents or detractors are willing to acknowledge. Textualists have been so successful discrediting strong purposivism and updating their new brand of modern textualism that they have forged a new consensus on the interpretive enterprise that dwarfs any remaining disagreements. Yet, by failing to acknowledge their successes to date, textualists are jeopardizing their project. Rather than celebrating the recent convergence and claiming victory, textualists keep waging their war against strong purposivism. In so doing, they misrepresent the moderate views of their opponents and so radicalize their own position as to strip it of its core value. If textualists continue on this course, their opponents will be able to claim credit for the moderate approach that prevails today and textualism will be destined for defeat. This Article offers a different path for textualism. Textualists should celebrate the moderate approach to statutory interpretation that prevails today, note the small differences that remain, and mark the dawn of the post-textualist era. Instead of substituting strong textualism for strong purposivism, scholars and judges should embrace a modest approach to statutory interpretation that heeds the lessons of textualism but avoids its pitfalls.


Tuesday, April 19, 2005
 
Tuesday Calendar
    Northwestern University, Constitutional Theory: Donald Kommers, Joseph and Elizabeth Robbie Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame, "Constitutional Interpretation in Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties".
      Germany’s constitution, adopted in 1949, is known as the Basic Law.1 Under the circumstances of a divided nation, the founders decided, pending Germany’s reunification, to write a “basic law” (Grundgesetz) rather than a “constitution” (Verfassung). Similarly, they chose to call the assembly charged with framing the Basic Law a parliamentary council (parlamentarische Rat) instead of a constitutional convention (verfassunggebende Versammlung). Symbolically, the terminology was important. A “constitution” in the German understanding is a framework for the permanent organization of a nation-state. By contrast, the Basic Law was adopted as a provisional charter for the governance of a “mere fragment of a state,” as one of the framers described the western half of Germany. But within the space of 40 years, the Basic Law had demonstrated its durability, resulting in a general acceptance of its legitimacy.2 During these years, it had also evolved into one of the world’s most admired constitutions, even rivaling the United States Constitution in influence and prestige around the world.3 So when the day of unity finally arrived in 1990, East and West Germany merged under the imprint of the Basic Law itself. Today, in both structure and substance, although frequently amended, it remains the constitution of reunited Germany. Accordingly, the terms “ basic law” and “constitution” are used interchangeably in this chapter.
    University of Texas School of Law: Reinier Kraakman, Harvard University, "CEO Job Tenure, Equity Ownership, and the Decision to Sell the Company".
    Georgetown University School of Law: Tim Westmoreland, "Federal Budget".
    Lewis & Clark Law School: Susan Mandiberg Regulatory Crimes.


 
Welcome to the Blogosphere . . . . . . to Religion Clause by University of Toledo law professor Howard Friedman.


 
Schanzenbach and Tiller on Strategic Juding Under the Sentencing Guidelines Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller (Northwestern University - School of Law and Northwestern University - School of Law) have posted Strategic Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Instrument Choice Theory and Evidence on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    We present an instrument choice theory of criminal sentencing and test it using data from the United States Sentencing Commission. The theory posits that, faced with appellate review, federal district court judges applying the Sentencing Guidelines strategically use "sentencing instruments" - fact-based and law-based determinations made during the sentencing phase - to maximize the judges' sentencing preferences subject to the Guideline's constraints. Specifically, district court judges are more likely to use law-based departures when they share the same party ideology with the overseeing circuit court than when there is no party alignment between the two courts. Fact-based adjustments, on the other hand, are routinely used to maximize sentencing preferences regardless of party alignment between the two courts. Our regression analyses suggest that the theory is largely supported. We find that: (1) Democrat appointees generally gave lower prison sentences relative to Republican appointees for crimes of violence, theft and drug-trafficking and (2) sentencing instruments were selectively used to raise or lower the prison sentence based on the political ideology of the judge, the type of crime, and whether there was political alignment between the district and circuit court.


 
Ribstein Goes Hollywood Larry E. Ribstein (University of Illinois College of Law) has posted Wall Street and Vine: Hollywood's View of Business on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    American films have long presented a negative view of business. This article is the first comprehensive and in-depth analysis of filmmakers' attitude toward business. It shows that it is not business that filmmakers dislike, but rather the control of firms by profit-maximizing capitalists. The article argues that this dislike stems from filmmakers' resentment of capitalists' constraints on their artistic vision. Filmmakers' portrayal of business is significant because films have persuasive power that tips the political balance toward business regulation.


 
Wright on Trial Distortion Ronald F. Wright (Wake Forest University - School of Law) has posted Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Law (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Fall 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article starts with a troubling and unnoticed development in federal criminal justice: acquittals have virtually disappeared from the system in the last 15 years, and for all the wrong reasons. It seems likely that prosecutors have increased the "trial penalty" so much that defendants with meaningful defenses feel compelled to plead guilty, undermining the truth-finding function of the criminal process. The article examines these federal developments in light of a proposed "trial distortion theory." The theory I develop here evaluates the quality of plea negotiation practices in a jurisdiction by asking whether the system produces outcomes (convictions, acquittals and dismissals) similar to the outcomes that would occur if all the cases had gone to trial. The trial distortion amounts to a "mid-level" theory of plea bargaining. It is more demanding than the toothless standards that operate at the individual case level, focusing on the "voluntariness" of the defendant. On the other hand, it is more practically useful than "social purpose" theories that evaluate the global costs and benefits of plea bargaining as an institution. Given the stability and universal nature of the practice, the live questions about plea bargaining do not involve the virtues of abolition. Instead, what we need is a method to sort the positive from the negative plea negotiation practices. Trial distortion theory offers a handy diagnostic tool for evaluating plea practices in a particular jurisdiction. The last half of the paper evaluates the federal system in light of trial distortion theory. Historical analysis of the federal system links the acquittal rates to prosecutor and judicial workload and the expanding role of defense counsel. The years since 1989 have produced the most troubling drop in acquittal rates, largely due to the federal sentencing guidelines and the power they give to prosecutors to make the trial penalty both larger and more certain. An empirical study of the 94 federal districts between 1994 and 2002 produces a regression analysis that identifies the prosecutorial practices with the strongest distorting effects on outcomes. These include heavy use of the "substantial assistance" departures and the enhanced "acceptance of responsibility" adjustments. This topic is especially timely in light of the Supreme Court's January 2005 decision in Booker v. United States, holding that the federal sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional. I offer both specific recommendations for revising the sentencing guidelines, and more general principles for Congress to follow as it restructures the federal sentencing statutes over the next few months and years. Those principles aim to achieve a "separation of powers" for sentencing, with a proper balance of authority between the prosecutor and the judge.


 
Leib on a Man's Right to Choose Ethan Leib (Hastings) has posted A Man's Right to Choose (an Abortion?) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article attempts to argue - contra Danforth and Casey - for a man's right to participate in the abortion decision and provides some legal mechanisms to implement such a right.
And for discussion check out this post and that one.


 
Program Announcement: Seminar on Slavery & the Constitution
    SUMMER 2005 SEMINAR ON SLAVERY AND THE CONSTITUTION Location: District of Columbia, United States Summer Program Begins: 2005-06-13 The Institute for Constitutional Studies at the George Washington University Law School, in cooperation with the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, the Association of American Law Schools, and the Organization of American Historians, is pleased to announce its sixth annual summer seminar for college teachers and advanced doctoral candidates. The topic for discussion this year is "Slavery and the Constitution," and Paul Finkelman, Chapman Distinguished Professor at the University of Tulsa College of Law, and Mark Tushnet, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown University Law Center, will lead the seminar. Professor Finkelman is an expert on American legal history, race and the law, and First Amendment issues, and his books include: Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson; Slavery in the Courtroom; and An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity. A past president of the Association of American Law Schools and an expert on Constitutional law and American legal history, Professor Tushnet has published The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860; The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education 1925-1950; Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961; and Making Constitutional Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1961-1991. The seminar will explore how the U.S. Constitution affected slavery and how slavery affected the writing and development of the Constitution. The seminar will begin with a discussion of the Constitutional Convention and then turn to various constitutional issues stemming from slavery, including: the ending of the African slave trade; the rendition of fugitive slaves; the status of slavery in the territories; the interstate transit of slaves, the status of free blacks in antebellum America, and the problem of emancipation. Major Supreme Court decisions, including Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), and Ableman v. Booth (1859) will be covered. The seminar will also consider the "constitutional politics" of slavery through discussions of the fugitive slave laws, the Amistad case, the Lincoln-Douglas debates, secession, and emancipation. Seminar leaders will guide discussion around the topics of the participants' interests, share their own research, and organize activities that will take advantage of the unique riches of the Washington area for research on these subjects. They will also advise the participants regarding archival research and use of other primary resources. The purpose of the program is to provide graduate students and younger scholars a chance to meet with senior scholars to do two things: discuss issues within the general topic of the seminar and present their early research for comment and refinement. Participants will be required to identify their topics or research interests in advance and provide a short bibliography of reading materials for seminar members to read. Each regular meeting will concentrate on these research topics. Time outside the scheduled meetings will be reserved for special events, as well as for individual consultation with the seminar leaders. The seminar will meet in Washington, DC for two weeks, June 13 - 24, 2005. Generous funding from the Park Foundation has allowed for the reimbursement of transportation costs up to $300 per participant, shared accommodation in nearby university residence halls (single accommodation can be obtained for a supplement of $35 per night), and a set per diem to cover food and any additional expenses. Enrollment will be limited to fifteen participants. Applicants for the seminar should send a copy of their c.v., a brief description (three to five pages) of the research project to be pursued in the seminar, and a short statement on how this seminar will be useful to them in their research, teaching, or professional development. Materials will be accepted until May 1, 2005, only by email at (the e-mail address provided below). Successful applicants will be notified soon thereafter. For further information, call Maeva Marcus or e-mail (telephone number and e-mail address follow). Maeva Marcus, Director Institute for Constitutional Studies The George Washington University Law School 2000 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20052 (202) 502-1040


 
Conference Announcement: Workplace Privacy: Here and Abroad
    58th Annual New York University Conference on Labor NYU School of Law May 19-20, 2005 "Workplace Privacy: Here and Abroad" All sessions will be held in Lipton Hall, D'Agostino Hall, NYU School of Law, 108 West Third Street. ***Please contact Ben Eisenman for conference information or to request a faxed copy of the program: (212) 998-6242, Fax: (212) 995-4036 or ben.eisenman@nyu.edu The 58th Annual New York University Conference on Labor is scheduled for May 19-20, 2005. Our theme this year is "Workplace Privacy: Here and Abroad". Conference attendees will receive 14 hours of CLE; including 2 hours of ethics/professionalism. Please see our web site for registration forms and additional conference information: http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/labor/conferences/2004_2005/annual/index.html Please contact Ben Eisenman for conference information or to request a faxed copy of the program: (212) 998-6242, Fax: (212) 995-4036 or ben.eisenman@nyu.edu In an era of fast-moving technological developments and global labor and product competition, workplace privacy has risen to the fore as one of the central concerns of policymakers and practitioners. This is the theme of New York University's 58th Annual Conference on Labor, May 19-20, 2005, the nation's premier forum for the consideration of employment studies. Bringing together leading practitioners, government officials and academics, the NYU Conference offers a rare opportunity for sustained, balanced dialogue with the experts on cutting-edge developments concerning privacy at work. The first day includes consideration of ground-breaking issues in global position monitoring, medical and personnel records maintenance systems, here and abroad, tracking of emails, background checks and physical surveillance of employees. Another segment takes up the claims of privacy advocates that employers should be limited in their ability to discipline employees for arguably nonworkplace behavior, such as use of drugs, consumption of lawful products, and social relations with coworkers and employees of competitors. The day closes with a focus on how these issues are hammered out in collective bargaining. The second day turns the spotlight on the securities industry, a major employer, and how global companies are addressing the terrorist threat to the security of facilities, communications systems and workers. Our special luncheon speaker is Hon. Robert J. Battista, chair of the National Labor Relations Board. CLE Credit CLE credit (14 hours of CLE credit including 2 hours of ethics/professionalism) under New York State is available; for those interested in pursuing CLE for states other than New York we will provide certificates of completion for submission to your respective state boards. This program is eligible for transitional CLE credit. Full or partial scholarships are available on a limited basis for cases of demonstrated financial hardship. Conference Fee includes all materials, breakfast and lunch both days, and refreshments. Conference Agenda All sessions will be held in Lipton Hall, D'Agostino Hall, NYU School of Law, 108 West Third Street. 14 hours of CLE credit including 2 hours of ethics/professionalism Thursday, May 19, 2005 8:00 a.m.-8:30 a.m. Registration; Breakfast Reception 8:30 a.m. Welcome Prof. Samuel Estreicher (Program Chair, Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Director of the Center for Labor and Employment Law at NYU School of Law; Of Counsel, Jones Day) 8:45 a.m.-10:15 a.m. Part One. GPS Monitoring: The New Frontier Moderator: Fred Braid, Esq. (Holland & Knight) Presenter: Lewis Maltby, Esq. (National Workrights Institute) Commentator: Bruce E. Boyden, Esq. (Proskauer Rose) 10:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m. Part Two. Information/Records Privacy Moderator: Ronald H. Shechtman, Esq. (Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn) 1. European Data Protection Directive Presenter: Eric Taussig, Esq. Commentator: Scott J. Wenner, Esq. (Schnader Harrison) 2. Personnel Records Presenters: Prof. David Sherwyn (Cornell University) and Paul Wagner, Esq. (Shea Stokes & Carter) 3. Medical Records Presenters: Frances Milberg, Esq. and Kaye Pestaina, Esq. (The Segal Company) 12:00 p.m.-1:15 p.m. Luncheon 1:15 p.m.-2:45 p.m. Part Three. Investigations Moderator: Mark Brossman, Esq. (Schulte Roth) 1. Email Monitoring Presenter: Alfred G. Feliu, Esq. (Vanderberg & Feliu) Commentator: Theodore O. Rogers, Jr., Esq. (Sullivan & Cromwell) 2. Background Checks Presenter: Timothy M. Singhel, Esq. (Holland & Knight) Commentator: David J. Reilly, Esq. (Medco Health Solutions) 3. Physical Surveillance Presenter: Daniel P. O'Gorman, Esq. (Ford & Harrison) 2:45 p.m.-4:00 p.m. Part Four. Nonworkplace Behavior Moderator: Jeffrey S. Klein, Esq. (Weil, Gotshal & Manges) 1. Drug Testing Presenter: Donna Malin, Esq. (Johnson & Johnson) Commentator: TBA 2. "Lawful Activity" Laws Presenter: Professor Matthew W. Finkin (University of Illinois College of Law) Commentator: Andrew Peterson, Esq. (Jackson Lewis) 3. Fraternization/No Dating Policies Presenter: Mindy Farber, Esq. (Farber Legal) Commentator: Kathleen Peratis, Esq. (Outten & Golden) 4:15-5:30 p.m. Part Five. Privacy Issues at the Bargaining Table Moderator: Hon. Celeste Mattina (Regional Director, Region 2, NLRB) Presenter: Ann Hodges, Esq. (University of Richmond School of Law) Commentators: Michael Bauman, Esq. (Friedman & Wolf) and G. Peter Clark, Esq. (Clifton Budd & DeMaria, LLP 5:30 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. Reception Location: 14th Floor Terrace, D'Agostino Hall, NYU School of Law, 108 West Third Street Friday, May 20, 2005 8:00 a.m.-8:30 a.m. Breakfast 8:45 a.m.-10:30 a.m. Part Six. Privacy Issues in the Securities Industry Moderator: Meryl Kaynard, Esq. (JP Morgan Chase) Presenters: Michael Curley, Esq. (Morgan Lewis) and Pearl Zuchlewski, Esq. (Kraus & Zuchlewski LLP) 10:45 a.m.-12:00 p.m. Part Seven. The Counterterrorism Challenge for Multinational Employers Moderator: Steve Catlett, Esq. (Jones Day) Presenters: Prof. Andew Morriss (Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Law & Regulation, Case Western University School of Law); Prof.Amos Guiora (Case Western University School of Law) and Jason Korosec, Esq. (Citishare & Eaglecheck, LLC) Commentator: Mike Belcher (Goldman Sachs) 12:00 p.m-1:15 p.m. Luncheon Speaker: Hon. Robert J. Battista (Chair, National Labor Relations Board) Introduction: Hon. John N. Raudabaugh (Butzel Long; former Member, NLRB) 1:30 p.m.-3:00 p.m. Part Eight. Ethical Issues for the Employment Litigator Presenter: Prof. Samuel Estreicher (NYU School of Law)


Monday, April 18, 2005
 
Weekend Update On Saturday, the Download of the Week was Initial Reflections on the Law and Economics of Blogging by Larry Ribstein and the Legal Theory Bookworm recommended Aristotle: Political Philosophy by Richard Kraut. On Sunday, the Legal Theory Lexicon entry was Overlapping Consensus & Incompletely Theorized Agreements and the Legal Theory Calendar previewed this week's talks and conferences.
Also on Sunday (now moved to Monday) you will find the latest version of the Entry Level Hiring Report. Can anyone help with information on Penn, UCLA, or Vanderbilt?


 
Monday Calendar
    The Center for Internet and Society and the Stanford Law and Technology Association: Elaine Newton, CIS Fellow, Privacy by Design (integrating privacy and/or anonymity into the design of technology).
    New York University School of Law; Barry Adler, Avarice-Based Forfeiture.
    Vanderbilt University Law School: Vikramaditya Khanna, University of Michigan, "Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure: An Economic Analysis".


 
Dripps on Exit Strategies from Overciminization Donald A. Dripps (University of San Diego - School of Law) has posted Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies (Penn State University Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In both the constitutional law of American criminal justice and the scholarly literature that law has generated, substance and procedure receive radically different treatment. The Supreme Court, even in this conservative political period, continues to require costly procedural safeguards that go beyond what elected legislatures have provided by statute. The Court, however, has shown great deference to the choices these same legislatures have made about what conduct may be made criminal and how severely it may be punished. The distinction between substance and procedure pervades academic thinking all the way down to its foundations. Substantive criminal law still holds its place in the sacred precincts of the first year curriculum. Criminal Law's cognate discipline is philosophy; the standard method of analysis is to measure general principles according to how well they track intuition's response to hypothetical cases. Criminal Procedure's cognate discipline is Constitutional Law; the standard method of analysis is to subject the operation of the criminal justice system to the same rhetoric of text, history, and precedent that frames the issues in separation of powers or freedom of speech cases. The philosophy mediated by doctrine is political, rather than moral theory. In trial level courthouses, however, the distinction fades, as the defendant trades his procedural rights for reductions in his substantive liability. The substantive law endows the prosecution with the ability to charge the same conduct at many different levels of potential punishment. The procedural law also endows the defense with its stock in trade - the rights to suppression motions, discovery, elaborate jury selection procedures, confrontation of the victim, and so on. These endowments are dynamic rather than static. A legislature that adopts a three-strikes law increases the prosecution's bargaining power. A court that reads the confrontation clause to bar excited utterances from the government's proof increases the defendant's bargaining power. In the trenches of criminal justice, these entitlements may well be traded off, erasing the distinction between substance and process. Admirable scholarship has exposed this basic dynamic. Debate continues about two great issues. First, is this state of affairs normatively defensible or not? Second, if the present relationship between substance and procedure is undesirable, what, if anything, can be done about it? In this paper I take up the second question, which seems to me to have drawn too little systematic attention (perhaps because it is so daunting). The literature has devoted considerable debate to alternatives to plea bargaining. But these discussions have been self-contained; they do not take account of the substance/procedure feedback loop already in place. The principal point against proposals to ban bargaining is not that we should not but that we cannot; self-interested, repeat-playing actors in the criminal justice process will find ways to bargain. The debate, naturally enough, has not gotten to the point of "what if we succeeded in banning plea bargaining?" As things stand, the prohibition of bargaining would leave prosecutors with unregulated discretion to select charges from overbroad and draconian criminal codes. Prohibiting bargaining would mean that defendants could not trade their constitutional procedural entitlements off against the state's substantive criminal law entitlements. The new model would be one in which defendants, facing decades in prison for relatively modest crimes, would stand trials they have little chance of winning. The discussions on plea bargaining have the same isolated quality as the discussions on individual bodies of criminal procedure doctrine. Of course they matter, in some cases; but the bigger picture is the relationship between substantive criminal law sentencing and the procedural rights of the defendant. So serious are the difficulties that I shall not - yet - defend any doctrinal reform on the ground that the relation between substance and procedure would be harmonized thereby. My task is one more modest, but I hope still useful. I aim to survey the possible strategies by which the system might escape the current impasse. The possible strategies fall into five basic categories. First, we might continue what we seem to be doing now: increasing constitutional procedural entitlements in the hope of mitigating the excesses of the substantive criminal law. Second, we might give up on the constitutional distinction between substance and process by deconstitutionalizing procedure altogether, or at least to a dramatic degree. Responsible then for both substance and process, legislatures might strike a better balance than is produced by the current division of labor. Third, we might achieve the same sort of unification by constitutionalizing substance. Robust judicial review of substantive criminal legislation might curb overcriminalization, which might in turn lead the courts to develop a more rational body of procedural rights. Fourth, we might look for more rigorous restrictions on prosecutorial discretion, building on administrative law and experience with sentencing guidelines. Fifth, we might look for more rigorous restrictions on the defendants' right to waive procedural rights for substantive advantage. What I hope to add to the scholarly conversation is a brief assessment of the promise and pitfalls that attend each of these strategies.


 
Fenster on Transparency Mark Fenster (University of Flordia) has posted The Opacity of Transparency on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The normative concept of transparency, along with the open government laws that purport to create a transparent public system of governance promise the world - a democratic and accountable state above all, and a peaceful, prosperous, and efficient one as well. But transparency, in its role as the theoretical justification for a set of legal commands, frustrates all parties affected by its ambiguities and abstractions. The public's engagement with transparency in practice yields denials of reasonable requests for essential government information, as well as government meetings that occur behind closed doors. Meanwhile, state officials bemoan the significantly impaired decision-making processes that result from complying with transparency's sweeping and powerful legal mandates, and complain about transparency's enormous compliance costs. This article argues that the frustrations with creating an open government originate in the concept of "transparency" itself, which fails to consider the tensions it conceals. The easy embrace of transparency as a basis for normative and utilitarian ends evades more difficult questions: When is transparency most important as an administrative norm? To what extent should an agency be held to that norm? Open government laws fall short in answering these questions because, relying on the assumptions of "transparency," they typically operate at exceptionally high levels of abstraction. As a result, they establish both broad mandates for disclosure and broad authority for the exercise of a state privilege of non-disclosure, and they ultimately fail to produce an effective, mutually acceptable level of administrative openness. Transparency theory's flaws result from a simplistic model of linear communication which assumes that information, once set free from the state that creates it, will produce an informed, engaged public that will hold officials accountable. To the extent that this model fails to describe accurately the state, government information, and the public, as well as the communications process of which they are component parts, it provides a flawed basis for open government laws. The article critiques the assumptions embedded in transparency theory and suggests an alternative approach to open government laws that would allow a more flexible, sensitive means to evaluate the costs and benefits of information disclosure. It also proposes institutional alternatives to the current default regime in open government laws, which relies on weak judicial enforcement of disclosure mandates, and offers substantive suggestions that would improve efforts to establish a more accountable state and informed public.
I read this very interesting paper yesterday. Fenster makes a number of very persuasive points about the inadequacies of an overly simplistic normative theory of the value of transparency. Recommended.


 
Stone on Rehnquist & the First Amendment Geoffrey R. Stone (University of Chicago Law School) has posted Justice Rehnquist and 'The Freedom of Speech, or of the Press' on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    After 33 years on the Supreme Court, what can we say about Justice Rehnquist's record on the freedom of speech, and of the press? This paper examines his voting pattern and finds not only that he was by far the justice least likely to support such claims, but also that his approach to these issues was largely unprincipled, result-oriented, and incompatible with any plausible theory of the First Amendment.


 
Raustiala on the Evolution of Territoriality Kal Raustiala (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) has posted The Evolution Of Territoriality: International Relations & American Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Territoriality is decreasingly important as a jurisdictional principle. Since the 1940s, federal statutes in a wide range of areas - antitrust, securities, criminal law, intellectual property, to name just some - have been frequently understood to have extraterritorial effect. Similarly, the protections of the Bill of Rights, once believed to apply only within US territory, now extend across the globe with regard to US citizens. In short, territoriality has been slowly unbundled from sovereignty. What explains the evolution of legal spatiality? The second-image reversed tradition in political science argues that international relations play an important causal role in domestic change. While doctrinal evolutions in discrete areas of the law are undoubtedly an important factor in this shift, I argue here that legal rules, like other domestic policies, are influenced by the constraints and opportunities presented by the international system. My primary claim is that the existing pattern of legal spatiality reflects the contingencies of history, but it chiefly reflects power and interest. As strict territoriality has relaxed, US courts, litigants, Congress, and the Executive have all engaged in instrumental assessments of the benefits and detriments of a reliance on territorial location as a legal principle in particular instances. As world politics has changed, these benefits and detriments have also changed. While globalization is often said to reduce the centrality of territory to states, I argue that globalization vel non cannot adequately explain the decline of territorial doctrines of jurisdiction. Globalization was highly significant during the 19th century - the height of jurisdictional congruence. Rather, it is the particular nature of postwar globalization, coupled to the rise of the modern regulatory state, has increased the incentives for states - in particular the US - to assert domestic law beyond their sovereign borders.


 
Joh on Abandoned DNA Elizabeth E. Joh (University of California, Davis - School of Law) has posted Reclaiming 'Abandoned' DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy (Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 100, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    We leave traces - skin, saliva, hair, and blood - of our genetic identity nearly everywhere we go. Should the police be permitted, without restriction, to target us and to collect the DNA that we leave behind? In a growing number of instances, the police, unburdened by criminal procedure rules, seek this "abandoned DNA" from criminal suspects in hopes of resolving otherwise unsolvable cases. Abandoned DNA is any amount of human tissue capable of DNA analysis and separated from an individual's person inadvertently or involuntarily, but not by police coercion. What are the consequences of allowing this investigative method to remain unregulated? In stark distinction to the growing body of commentary on the collection of DNA samples for state and federal DNA databases, little attention has been paid to this backdoor method of DNA collection. Deciding whether DNA might ever be "abandoned" is important, because abandoned DNA provides the means to collect genetic information from anyone, at any time. Criminal procedure law poses no restrictions on this kind of evidence collection by the police. Not only does the label of abandonment affect police behavior, it also raises basic questions about the changing nature of legal identity. How should we characterize the relationships between our physical bodies and our identities, now that nearly any "body particle" can reveal our genetic information? The final part of this Essay proposes first steps towards addressing the problem, but its primary task is to show the need to reframe the debate over covert involuntary DNA sampling and to make the case for "genetic exceptionalism."


 
Sandefur on Lochner Check out Why Lochner was rightly decided by Tim Sandefur on Freespace. Here is a taste:
    If you actually read Lochner, you’ll see it makes a lot of sense. The law in that case deprived bakers of the liberty to work overtime—something very important to poor people trying to make a living. Such a law only constitutes due process, therefore, if the reasons for that deprivation are legitimate public reasons—not just because the legislature decided so, or because depriving them of liberty would increase the wealth or pleasure of some politically powerful group. A law summarily depriving me of a portion of my paycheck merely for who I am—or a law summarily depriving bakers of the right to earn a living for no good reason—violates the Fourteenth Amendment. That is what Lochner says. And I think it’s right.


 
Conference Announcement: Norms, Reasoning and Knowledge in Technology
    Norms, Reasoning and Knowledge in Technology June 3-4, Boxmeer, the Netherlands -------------------------------------------- Norms in Knowledge NWO Project Section of Philosophy and Ethics of Technology Technical University of Eindhoven As part of our continuing investigation in the epistemological features of normative claims and their role in technological setting, we present a conference on Norms, Reasoning and Knowledge in Technology. Invited speakers will discuss the relationship between various facets of technological knowledge and reasoning and related norms, with special emphasis on the relationship between practical reasoning and functional ascriptions. The conference features a diverse and distinguished panel of speakers interested in the normative aspects of technological knowledge and the relationship between practical reasoning and artifactual knowledge. For registration, please visit the website below. Confirmed speakers ============================ Brown, Mark A., Syracuse University Hansson, Sven Ova, Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm Hennig, Boris, Saarland University Horty, John F., University of Maryland Hughes, Jesse, Technical University of Eindhoven Koen, Billy V., University of Texas Pollock, John, University of Arizona Vaesen, Krist, Technical University of Eindhoven Vermaas, Pieter, Technical University of Delft Walton, Douglas, University of Winnipeg For more information: <http://www.tm.tue.nl/capaciteitsgroep/aw/philosophy/NiK-conf.html>


 
Conference Announcement: Tort Law Symposium at the University of Western Ontario
    Tort Law Symposium University of Western Ontario June 9-11, 2006 Here is a brief description:
      "... a symposium on tort law to held at our Faculty on the weekend of June 9-11th, 2006. The theme of the event is "Emerging Issues in Tort Law" and the purpose of the symposium is to bring together leading academics to discuss undertheorized and/or underexplored areas of tort law that are likely to examined by appellate courts in the near future. Peter Benson, Vaughan Black, Peter Cane, Lewis Klar, Ken Oliphant, Denise Reaume, Robert Solomon, Jane Stapleton, Robert Stevens, Stephen Todd and Richard Wright have all tentatively agreed to present papers on the topics that include: Theories of Non-delegable Duty, The Defence of Justification for Economic Torts, Remoteness for Intentional Torts, Negligent Trespass, White v. Jones in Canada, NESS and Omissions, Decision Causation, Alcohol Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn, Intentional Infliction of Nervous Shock, Liability for Economic loss to Commercial Property, and The Structure of Intentional Torts."
    The speaker roster list is still open. Those interested in presenting papers on the symposium theme or as commentators on a proposed paper should contact the organizer Prof. Jason Neyers at jneyers@uwo.ca.


Sunday, April 17, 2005
 
Legal Theory Calendar
    Monday, April 18
      The Center for Internet and Society and the Stanford Law and Technology Association: Elaine Newton, CIS Fellow, Privacy by Design (integrating privacy and/or anonymity into the design of technology).
      New York University School of Law; Barry Adler, Avarice-Based Forfeiture.
      Vanderbilt University Law School: Vikramaditya Khanna, University of Michigan, "Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure: An Economic Analysis".
    Tuesday, April 19
      Northwestern University, Constitutional Theory: Donald Kommers, Joseph and Elizabeth Robbie Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame, "Constitutional Interpretation in Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties".
        Germany’s constitution, adopted in 1949, is known as the Basic Law.1 Under the circumstances of a divided nation, the founders decided, pending Germany’s reunification, to write a “basic law” (Grundgesetz) rather than a “constitution” (Verfassung). Similarly, they chose to call the assembly charged with framing the Basic Law a parliamentary council (parlamentarische Rat) instead of a constitutional convention (verfassunggebende Versammlung). Symbolically, the terminology was important. A “constitution” in the German understanding is a framework for the permanent organization of a nation-state. By contrast, the Basic Law was adopted as a provisional charter for the governance of a “mere fragment of a state,” as one of the framers described the western half of Germany. But within the space of 40 years, the Basic Law had demonstrated its durability, resulting in a general acceptance of its legitimacy.2 During these years, it had also evolved into one of the world’s most admired constitutions, even rivaling the United States Constitution in influence and prestige around the world.3 So when the day of unity finally arrived in 1990, East and West Germany merged under the imprint of the Basic Law itself. Today, in both structure and substance, although frequently amended, it remains the constitution of reunited Germany. Accordingly, the terms “ basic law” and “constitution” are used interchangeably in this chapter.
      University of Texas School of Law: Reinier Kraakman, Harvard University, "CEO Job Tenure, Equity Ownership, and the Decision to Sell the Company".
      Georgetown University School of Law: Tim Westmoreland, "Federal Budget".
      Lewis & Clark Law School: Susan Mandiberg Regulatory Crimes.
    Wednesday, April 20
      Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Inmaculada Marrero Rocha,* Professor of Law, University of Granada (Spain), The Constitution of the European Union.
      NYU Legal History: Serena Mayeri, Samuel I. Golieb Fellow, NYU School of Law.
    Thursday, April 21
      UC Berkeley, Kadish Center: Rogers Smith, Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, PROVIDENTIALISM, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE ETHICS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE:
        It is already clear that, like Ronald Reagan before him, President George W. Bush will be viewed as a far more historically significant figure than most observers anticipated when he first ran for the White House. For me he has a far less historic but nonetheless special significance. He came to power as I was writing Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (2003). Both his rhetoric and his policies have provided amazingly apt illustrations of that book’s empirical claims about how political leaders advance “stories of peoplehood” to win support for their vision of their political community’s proper identity and aims. But they also have provided profoundly disquieting challenges to the book’s normative argument, that we should welcome a democratic politics in which clashing “comprehensive views,” including religious views, are openly espoused. Since he ran for Governor of Texas and especially from his First Inaugural Address to the present, George W. Bush has advanced a religious understanding of American peoplehood quite explicitly, and since September 11, 2001 he has especially done so in the context of American foreign policy—in ways that I, like many observers, find deeply disturbing. The quandary this paper addresses, then, is this: if we recognize the importance of “stories of peoplehood” to the creation and maintenance of successful and morally defensible political societies, and if we acknowledge that religious stories can rightfully play a significant part in those processes, can we still find grounds to criticize the ways and means President Bush is deploying religious stories of peoplehood, especially in regard to U.S. foreign policy? This quandary is, I believe, a common one among Bush’s critics. Many who have been troubled by the President’s providentialist rhetoric have been reluctant to criticize it severely, fearing conservative charges that they are simply hostile to the expression of religious perspectives in public life. I argue that, despite their undoubted sincerity, President Bush’s religious statements can rightly be deemed ethically dubious contributions to political discourse. They are not dubious because they are religious, or because they are a type of “comprehensive view,” or even because they fail to provide reasons all can in principle accept. They fail on their own substantive terms, as religious arguments advanced in the service of democracy. Bush’s providentialist accounts claim theological certainty while remaining largely devoid of specific appeals to any identifiable religious authorities. They also repeatedly imply, though never quite claim, divine mandates for controversial specific policies, particularly in the periods when legitimation for those policies seems most crucial. And even as they profess to promote democracy, they are structured not only to discourage but to de-legitimate democratic criticism and dissent, all to a much greater degree than the discourses of Bush’s recent presidential predecessors, including Ronald Reagan. This kind of providentialist discourse bears the hallmarks of a “story of peoplehood” that is being used politically to gain an aura of ethical legitimacy for policies that are otherwise unlikely to be seen as in accord with the nation’s dominant moral traditions.
      Fordham University School of Law: Caroline M. Gentile, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham, "Investment Funds and Investment Fees".
        The purpose of this essay . . . is to begin to undertake this analysis and to identify the most promising methods of developing effective reform proposals. Part I provides a brief overview of mutual funds and hedge funds, describing first the similarities in the relationships between the investors in the funds and the investment advisers of the funds and then turning to the differences in organizational structures, regulatory restrictions, and investment strategies. Part II analyzes the fees charged to investors, noting first the types of fees and then describing the difficulties arising from each of the fees. Part III briefly outlines current reform proposals for addressing these problems and then sketches and alternative framework for developing reform proposals.
      Stanford Law & Economics: Bruce Hay (Harvard Law School) & Kathryn Spier (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University), "Manufacturer Liability for Harm Caused by Consumers to Others":
        Should the manufacturer of a product be held legally responsible when a consumer, while using the product, harms someone else? We show that if consumers have deep pockets then manufacturer liability is not desirable. If homogeneous consumers have limited assets, then the best rule is "residual-manufacturer liability" where the manufacturer pays the shortfall in damages not paid by the consumer. Residual manufacturer liability distorts the market quantity when consumers’ willingness to pay is correlated with their propensity to cause harm. It distorts product safety when consumers differ in their wealth levels. In both cases, consumer-only liability may be preferred.
      Yale Law Economics & Organizations Workshop: Professor K. Daron Acemoglu, MIT/Economics, Unbundling Institutions:
        This paper evaluates the importance of property rights institutions, which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and contracting institutions, which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history, and document strong first-stage relationships between property rights institutions and the determinants of European colonization strategy (settler mortality and population density before colonization), and between contracting institutions and the identity of the colonizing power. Using this instrumental variables approach, we ?nd that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic growth, investment, and ?nancial development. Contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of ?nancial intermediation. A possible explanation for this pattern is that individuals often ?nd ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse e¤ects of weak contracting institutions, but ?nd it harder to mitigate the risk of expropriation in this way.
      University of Texas Constitutional & Legal Theory Colloquium: Rick Hills, University of Michigan, "Two Concepts of ‘The Economic’ in Constitutional Law: The Underlying Unity of Due Process and Federalism Jurisprudence".
      Florida State University, College of Law: Lars Trägårdh, Columbia University, The Juridification of Politics in the United States and Europe: Historica Roots, Contemporary Debates and Future Prospects.
      Boston University School of Law: Allan Macurdy.
      Georgetown Workshop on Transnational Legal Issues: Lama Abu-Odeh, "The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Teaching Islamic Law in the United States".
      Vanderbilt University Legal Theory Workshop: Dan Farber, University of California - Berkeley Law School, "'Judgment Calls', Or, Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test?".
    Friday, April 22
      University of San Diego School of Law: Sai Prakash.
      University of Texas School of Law: Adrienne Davis, University of North Carolina (Visiting professor at UT Law), "Manumission, Miscegenation & Marriage: The Sexual Economy ofAmerican Slavery".


 
The Constitution in Exile In today's New York Times Magazine, Jeffrey Rosen has a piece entitled The Unregulated Offensive. Here is the teaser:
    Imagine that the interpretation of the Constitution was frozen in 1937. Imagine a country in which Social Security, job-safety laws and environmental protections were unconstitutional. Imagine judges longing for that. Imagine one of them as the next Supreme Court nominee.
And here is a taste from later in the article:
    But as Thomas's presence on the court suggests, it is perhaps just as likely that the next justice -- or chief justice -- will be sympathetic to the less well-known but increasingly active conservative judicial movement that Epstein represents. It is sometimes known as the Constitution in Exile movement, after a phrase introduced in 1995 by Douglas Ginsburg, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. (Ginsburg is probably best known as the Supreme Court nominee, put forward by Ronald Reagan, who withdrew after confessing to having smoked marijuana.) By ''Constitution in Exile,'' Ginsburg meant to identify legal doctrines that established firm limitations on state and federal power before the New Deal. Unlike many originalists, most adherents of the Constitution in Exile movement are not especially concerned about states' rights or judicial deference to legislatures; instead, they encourage judges to strike down laws on behalf of rights that don't appear explicitly in the Constitution. In addition to the scholars who articulate the movement's ideals and the judges who sympathize with them, the Constitution in Exile is defended by a litigation arm, consisting of dozens of self-styled ''freedom-based'' public-interest law firms that bring cases in state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court.
And here is another passage from near the end of the piece:
    Randy Barnett, a libertarian scholar at the Boston University School of Law and the Cato Institute, was the plaintiff's lawyer in Ashcroft v. Raich, another key Supreme Court showdown, which was argued before the court last fall. Raich is a challenge to the federal government's attempt to enforce drug laws that conflict with the effort by California (and 10 other states) to allow the use of medical marijuana. Barnett represented Angela Raich, a woman who suffered from cancer that often confined her to a wheelchair but who said she felt much better after being prescribed medical marijuana. The author of a provocative book, ''Restoring the Lost Constitution,'' Barnett argues that courts should evaluate economic regulations with a ''presumption of liberty'' rather than with a presumption of deference. His book identifies a series of regulations that he says the courts should consider constitutionally suspect, from environmental laws to laws forbidding the mere possession of ordinary firearms, therapeutic drugs or pornography. ''The court has not really limited Congress's power very much,'' Barnett says. ''But the fact that it was willing to limit it at all has been an important principle. If it now basically throws in the towel, it will be pretty demoralizing to this whole side.''
Fascinating read--although I must say that I found Rosen's version of the story very selective and indiosyncratic. Nonetheless, a fun read.


 
Legal Theory Lexicon: Overlapping Consensus & Incompletely Theorized Agreements
    Introduction As law students become more sophisticated, they begin to notice that certain debates seem to repeat themselves over and over again. Disagreements about disparate subjects--in procedure, criminal law, torts, property, and constitutional law--frequently seem to turn on the really big questions of ethics and political theory. On the one hand, the proponents of inviolate individual rights appeal to deontological premises in moral theory or liberal (or libertarian) ideas in political philosophy. On the other hand, the proponents of balancing argue from premises rooted in utilitarianism or welfarism (the economic version of utilitarian moral philosophy).
    For a short time, the ability to see this pattern may be exhilarating. You begin to see big patterns that transcend courses and doctrines. But after a while, exhilaration may give way to depression. If all the great debates in legal theory boil down to debates about the deepest questions of moral and political philosophy, then the question arises, "Can we make any progress?" Because it sure doesn't look like the debates between deontology and consequentialism or between libertarians and communitarians are going to be decisively resolved any time soon.
    And that is where today's Legal Theory Lexicon comes into the picture. Even if the deep debates of moral and political philosophy are irresolvable, there may be other ways to make progress in legal theory. In particular, we may be able to use the ideas of "incompletely theorized agreements" (associated with Cass Sunstein) or "overlapping consensus" (associated with John Rawls) to break the impasse on the deep questions.
    The basic idea is simple. We cannot agree on the deep questions, so go shallow. Find the level at which those who disagree on the deep can nonetheless find common ground. John Rawls calls the idea of common ground by the name "overlapping consensus." Cass Sunstein calls a similar idea, "incompletely theorized agreement." But both Sunstein and Rawls express a similar intuition. When you cannot reach agreement at the deep end of the pool of ideas, head for the shallow end!
    Deep and Shallow I suspect that you've already gotten it! But just to make sure, let's work through the ideas one by one. The first idea we need is the one that I have expressed by the metaphor of deep and shallow reasons. The metaphor is based on the idea that particular applications (e.g. particular questions of legal doctrine) are at the surface, they are in the shallow end of the pool of ideas. Beneath the surface of particular issues in legal doctrine and legislative policy are deeper disagreements. Disagreements about the a surface level question (e.g. the precise contours of the mailbox rule in contract law) lead to beneath-the-surface issues (e.g. the nature of offer and acceptance) and then to still-deeper issues (e.g. the basis for contractual obligation) and finally to the deepest questions (e.g. the nature of moral obligation). You might picture a chain of reasons, stretching from the surface of legal doctrine down to the depths of political and moral philosophy.
    Overlapping Consensus John Rawls developed the idea of an "overlapping consensus" as part of the work that led up to his book Political Liberalism. The idea emerged as part of Rawls's work on what he called the problem of stability. In a society governed by Rawls's theory (justice as fairness), the guarantee of basic liberties would mean that individual citizens would be free to adopt their own views about morality and religion. As a result, Rawls argued, it was likely that a variety of comprehensive religious and moral doctrines would emerge. Rawls believed that this fact of pluralism posed a problem for his theory. How could justice as fairness be stable (or reproduce itself) given the plurality of viewpoints that is bound to emerge and persist under conditions of freedom? Rawls's answer to this question was based on the idea that divergent moral and religious conceptions of the good could (despite their diversity) converge on some common ground. That is, citizens who held a plurality of religious and moral beliefs could nonetheless agree on the constitutional essentials--the basic constitutional principles necessary for a society to satisfy the demands of justice as fairness.
    This meant that different citizens would support justice as fairness for different reasons. Catholics might affirm justice as fairness for reasons found within the Catholic natural law tradition, while secular humanists might affirm the same (or similar) ideas about justice for different reasons. Although a deep consensus might on justice as fairness might be impossible, an "overlapping consensus," Rawls argued, is possible.
    Incompletely Theorized Agreements Cass Sunstein has a related but different idea. Here is a summary from his article in the Harvard Law Review:
      Incompletely theorized agreements play a pervasive role in law and society. It is rare for a person, and especially for a group, to theorize any subject completely -- that is, to accept both a highly abstract theory and a series of steps that relate the theory to a concrete conclusion. In fact, people often reach incompletely theorized agreements on a general principle. Such agreements are incompletely theorized in the sense that people who accept the principle need not agree on what it entails in particular cases. People know that murder is wrong, but they disagree about abortion. They favor racial equality, but they are divided on affirmative action. Hence there is a familiar phenomenon of a comfortable and even emphatic agreement on a general principle, accompanied by sharp disagreement about particular cases.
      This sort of agreement is incompletely theorized in the sense that it is incompletely specified -- a familiar phenomenon with constitutional provisions and regulatory standards in administrative law. Incompletely specified agreements have distinctive social uses. They may permit acceptance of a general aspiration when people are unclear about what the aspiration means, and in this sense, they can maintain a measure of both stability and flexibility over time. At the same time, they can conceal the fact of large- scale social disagreement about particular cases.
      There is a second and quite different kind of incompletely theorized agreement. People may agree on a mid-level principle but disagree both about the more general theory that accounts for it and about outcomes in particular cases. They may believe that government cannot discriminate on the basis of race, without settling on a large-scale theory of equality, and without agreeing whether government may enact affirmative action programs or segregate prisons when racial tensions are severe. The connections are left unclear, either in people's minds or in authoritative public documents, between the mid- level principle and general theory; the connection is equally unclear between the mid-level principle and concrete cases. So too, people may think that government may not regulate speech unless it can show a clear and present danger, but fail to settle whether this principle is founded in utilitarian or Kantian considerations, and disagree about whether the principle allows government to regulate a particular speech by members of the Ku Klux Klan.
      My special interest here is in a third kind of phenomenon -- incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by agreements on the low-level principles that account for them. These terms contain some ambiguities. There is no algorithm by which to distinguish between a high-level theory and one that operates at an intermediate or low level. We might consider Kantianism and utilitarianism as conspicuous examples of high-level theories and see legal illustrations in the many (academic) efforts to understand such areas as tort law, contract law, free speech, and the law of equality to be undergirded by highly abstract theories of the right or the good. By contrast, we might think of low-level principles as including most of the ordinary material of legal doctrine -- the general class of principles and justifications that are not said to derive from any particular large theories of the right or the good, that have ambiguous relations to large theories, and that are compatible with more than one such theory. [Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1739-40 (1995)]
    Applications How can you use the idea of an overlapping consensus or incompletely theorized agreement? These conceptual tools are useful when you believe that you have reached a theoretical impasse at some deep level. You've identified an issue, and you can see how the issue can be traced to a deep disagreement in moral or political theory. Now, you have some choices to make. On the one hand, you can try to resolve the deep disagreement. But there is a problem with this option. The deep debates in moral and political philosophy are both ancient and persistent. The world's great thinkers have worked on these problems. If Aristotle, Kant, and Bentham were unable to come up with a knock down argument in favor of their respective moral theories, then it does seem unlikely that you will be able to resolve these debates in an article or book that is mostly focused on another topic or idea. Moreover, the current state of the art in moral and political theory involves a complex field of interconnected arguments. If you need to master these debates before you can complete your work in legal theory, then the work may never be completed.
    The alternative is to see whether you can find a different level at which the dispute can be resolved. One possibility is that you can find convergence at the surface level. It seems as if deontologists and utilitarians disagree, but perhaps you can craft consequentialist arguments that converge with the arguments of fairness. Another possibility is that you will be able to find converged on what Sunstein calls "mid-level principles." For example, both consequentialists and deontologists might be able to agree that contract formation (normally) requires that both parties manifest and intention to be bound--although they would have different reasons for affirming this proposition.
    Conclusion The move to "overlapping consensus" or "incompletely theorized agreements" is one of the niftiest and most useful in contemporary legal theory. Add it your personal legal theory toolbox!


Saturday, April 16, 2005
 
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Aristotle: Political Philosophy by Richard Kraut. Here is a brief description:
    This book offers a systematic overview of Aristotle's conception of well-being, virtue and justice in the Nicomachean Ethics, and then explores the major themes of Politics: civic-mindedness, slavery, family, property, the common good, class conflict, the limited wisdom of the multitude, and the radically egalitarian institutions of the ideal society.
This is a marvelous book. I read a lot of the secondary literature on Aristotle, and Kraut's book has had an enormous influence on my understanding of Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics--the book on the virtue of justice. Highly recommended!


 
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Initial Reflections on the Law and Economics of Blogging by Larry Ribstein. Here is the abstract:
    Weblogs, or blogs, have proliferated and developed rapidly in recent years, and have attracted significant attention. Moreover, blogs have started to generate significant legal issues. Yet there is so far no coherent economic framework for addressing those issues. This article begins to develop such a framework. Building on blogs' technical features, it identifies the unique aspects of blogs that should have legal ramifications. It then briefly applies this framework to a variety of legal issues.
Download it while its hot!


Friday, April 15, 2005
 
Friday Calendar Updated & Moved to the Top of the Blog
    UCLA School of Law: Larry Helfer, Vanderbilt University Law School, "Exit in International Law and Politics"
    University of Texas Law School: Sovereignty Symposium:
      9:30-11:30 On the Meaning of “Dual Sovereignty” Within Federal Systems: Ernest Young (UT); Lynn Baker (UT); Neil MacCormick (Edinburgh) 12:15-1:15 Arthur Cockfield, Queens University, Ontario, Canada: "The Rise of the OECD as Informal 'World Tax Organization' through the Shaping of National Responses to E-commerce Taxation" 1:30-3:00 "The Privatization of Sovereignty" (Fabrizio Cafaggi, EUI); Jay Westbrook (UT) 3:15-4:45 "Negotiated Sovereignty over Common Spaces: The Case of Antarctica " (Patrizia Vigni)
    Indiana University, Bloomington: Symposium The Next Generation of Law School Rankings:
      8:30 - 8:35 a.m. Lauren Robel (Dean, Indiana), Welcome 8:35 - 8:45 a.m. Paul L. Caron (Cincinnati) & Rafael Gely (Cincinnati), Introduction Panel 1: Framing the Rankings Debate 8:45 - 9:05 a.m. Papers Richard A. Posner (Chicago; 7th Circuit): Evaluating Law School Rankings (paper only) Cass R. Sunstein (Chicago): Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (paper only) 9:05 - 9:20 a.m. Commentary Russell Korobkin (UCLA) Brian R. Leiter (Texas) (paper only) 9:20 - 9:35 a.m. Questions and Discussion Panel 2: Ranking Methodologies 9:35 - 10:20 a.m. Papers: Scott A. Baker (North Carolina), Stephen Choi (NYU) & Gaurang Mitu Gulati (Georgetown): The Rat Race as an Information Forcing Device Wendy Espeland (Northwestern) & Michael Sauder (Northwestern): The Benefits of Multiple Evaluations: A Comparison of Law and Business School Rankings William Henderson (Indiana) & Andrew P. Morriss (Case): Student Quality as measured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era 10:20 - 10:40 a.m. Commentary: Rafael Gely (Cincinnati) Michael E. Solimine (Cincinnati) 10:40 - 10:55 a.m. Questions and Discussion 10:55 - 11:10 a.m. Break Panel 3: Ranking Methodologies 11:10 - 11:55 a.m. Papers: Bernard S. Black (Texas) & Paul L. Caron (Cincinnati): Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN To Measure scholarly Performance Tracey E. George (Vanderbilt): Law Schools and the New Legal Science Jeffrey E. Stake (Indiana): The Interplay Netween Rankings Criteria and Effects: Toward Responsible Rankings 11:55 a.m. - 12:15 p.m. Commentary: Lawrence A. Cunningham (Boston College) Theodore Eisenberg (Cornell) 12:15 - 12:30 p.m. Questions and Discussion 12:30 - 1:45 p.m. Lunch Panel 4: Other Voices in the Rankings Debate 1:45 - 2:15 p.m. Papers: Alex M. Johnson, Jr. (Dean, Minnesota): Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicious Effect of Rankings Gene R. Nichol (Dean, North Carolina): Law Schools, Rankings, and Public Mission (paper only) Nancy B. Rapoport (Dean, Houston): Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real Change Is So Difficult in Law Schools 2:15 - 3:00 p.m. Commentary Sam Kamin (Denver) Rachel F. Moran (Boalt Hall) Patrick O'Day (LSSSE) Lauren Robel (Dean, Indiana) 3:00 - 3:30 p.m. Questions and Discussion 3:30 - 3:35 p.m. Jeffrey E. Stake (Indiana), Closing Comments


 
Lund on Federalism Nelson Lund (George Mason University School of Law) has posted Fig Leaf Federalism and Tenth Amendment Exceptionalism (Constitutional Commentary, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The Supreme Court's jurisprudence of federalism is at best undergoing an unfinished transformation, and is at worst just troubled and unsatisfying. In a little-noticed dissent in Tennessee v. Lane, Justice Scalia proposed an approach that could be generalized well beyond the specific position that he took in that case. Thus generalized, this approach may be understood as an elaboration of a proposal made by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion twenty years ago in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. If adopted by the Court, this synthesis of the O'Connor and Scalia suggestions could work a real transformation in its federalism jurisprudence, and without some of the potentially radical side-effects that have thus far made the Court timorous and inconsistent. This very short paper explains how the synthesis would work, and why the Court should adopt it.


 
Hoffman on the Duty To Be a Rational Stockholder David Hoffman (Temple) has posted The 'Duty' To Be a Rational Shareholder" (forthcoming Minn. L. Rev. 2005:3) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    How and when do courts determine that corporate disclosures are actionable under the federal securities laws? The applicable standard is materiality: would a (mythical) reasonable investor have considered a given disclosure important. As I establish through empirical and statistical testing of approximately 500 cases analyzing the materiality standard, judicial findings of immateriality are remarkably common, and have been stable over time. Materiality's scope results in the dismissal of a large number of claims, and creates a set of cases in which courts attempt to explain and defend their vision of who is, and is not, a reasonable investor. Thus, materiality provides an ideal lens through which to examine courts' understanding of behavioral psychology and how the insights of that discipline should inform legal decision making. Significantly, judges have shifted from standards-based to bright-line tests over time, increasingly imposing on investors a duty to behave in economically rational ways in response to corporate disclosures, or risk losing the benefit of legal protections from securities fraud. From this shift, I derive a duty to act as a rational shareholder, attaching to every investor in the public capital markets. Because experimental evidence suggests that women and minorities have different financial risk preferences than white men, courts' applications of this duty may result in privileging white, male investors at the expense of all others. Finally, the very existence of a duty attaching to mere share ownership has the potential to significantly change the way we evaluate those corporate governance models which assume shareholder passivity.
I just finished reading this very interesting paper. Highly recommended!


 
Entry Level Hiring I just added another report at 8:38 a.m. on Saturday, April 16. If I might be permitted to assume my role as appointments chair at USD for a moment, I'm proud to report that Orly Lobel will be joining Lesley McAllister as entry-level hires at San Diego, and that David McGowan and Miranda McGowan (both from Minnesota) had already accepted lateral offers from USD.
You can find the latest version of the preliminary report (96 law schools reporting on 140 hires) by scrolling up or following this link. I need additional information to complete reports for two hires by the University of Arkanasas at Little Rock and I have one outstanding rumour--about Syracuse (at the very end of the report). Also, can anyone report on entry-level hiring (or the lack thereof) at Yale and Stanford? Thanks for helping! Reports continue to come in on a regular basis--two so far this morning and around 8 in just the last two or three days--so I will continue to hold off on the final report for a bit longer.


 
Leiter Reports on Lateral Hiring by Berkeley Brian Leiter reports that U.C. Berkeley has acquired David Sklansky from UCLA & Leti Volpp from American University.


 
Tillers on the Role of History in the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause Peter Tillers (Cardozo Law School) has posted Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    I struggled quite a bit over what I should talk about today. I know a little bit about exploratory fact investigation and about related matters such as induction and what philosophers of science call the logic of discovery. I thought about discussing the worrisome implications of Crawford v. Washington for constitutional regulation of early phases of criminal investigation, about the possibility that Crawford might further weaken the already faint prospect that the Court might use the general due process guarantee to scrub criminal investigation of some pathologies that John Langbein complains about and other pathologies that do not seem to worry him nearly as much. But as alluring as this topic is, it has nothing to do with the topic under discussion by this panel, the role of history in the interpretation and elaboration of the Confrontation Clause. So I have decided to stick to the assigned topic, history.


 
Persily on Court-Drawn Redistricting Nathaniel Persily (University of Pennsylvania Law School) has posted When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans (George Washington University Law Review, Forthcoming). Here is the abstract:
    This essay presents guidelines for courts that undertake to draw their own redistricting plans. Although several dozen courts over the last four redistricting cycles have drawn their own plans, there is precious little in the case law or secondary sources to provide guidance. As a result, courts vary considerably in the procedures they follow and the substantive factors they take into account in their plans. This essay discusses the unique legal constraints on court-drawn plans and assesses the costs and benefits of following various procedures or substantive redistricting principles. The unique context of each case that spurs judicial involvement will often affect a plan more than will universal factors common to all such cases. However, each court that jumps into the political thicket of redistricting must make several critical decisions concerning how much deference it will give to the existing plan, whether to consider the political and incumbency-related effects of its plan, how much input the parties and the public will have in the process, and which, if any, "traditional districting principles" ought to apply.


 
Hillman on Private Ordering in Closely Held Firms Robert W. Hillman (University of California, Davis School of Law) has posted The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and Private Ordering within Closely-Held Business Associations (Illinois Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The law that dominates legal scholarship is the corporate law of the public entity. This corporate law struggles to define and protect the interests of a large, amorphous, and essentially passive group of shareholders who typically hold diversified portfolios and whose willingness and ability to focus attention on any single investment in that portfolio is limited. Aggrieved shareholders of publicly held firms normally have the exit option available through the liquidity provided by organized securities markets. Another corporate law addresses the closely held firms that at one time or another elected corporate status. Here, the problem lies in the exercise of control by one group of shareholders to the disadvantage of another group under circumstances in which disadvantaged shareholders, unlike their counterparts in publicly-held firms, typically do not have an easy exit option. This is the corporate under law under which private ordering through bargaining among shareholders has achieved slow but steady gains. It is also the corporate law largely ignored by contemporary legal scholars. The two corporate laws, and the concerns addressed by each, are quite distinct. Recognizing the distinction is critical in assessing the content as well as the evolution of "corporate law." It is also a premise underlying this article, which considers private ordering in closely-held firms and the degree to which partnership law and corporate law have influenced each other.


 
King on Juror Ethics Nancy J. King (Vanderbilt University School of Law) has posted Ethics for the Ex-Juror: Guiding Former Jurors After the Trial (JURY ETHICS, James Levine, John Kleinig, eds., Paradigm Publishers, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    When jurors complete their service, they often encounter situations in which they must decide whether to reveal or discuss what went on in the jury room during their jury service. In the United States a prohibition of such speech by former jurors would generally run afoul of the First Amendment and be unenforceable. Nevertheless, there are ethical principles that former jurors should consider before speaking about their deliberations. This essay addresses those ethical considerations and canvasses situations in which former jurors might have to choose whether to talk, to whom to speak, and what to say. It concludes with a sample jury instruction on the topic for judges to give to jurors at the end of their service.


 
Conference Announcement: One Click Over the Line
    One Click Over the Line: P2P Technology, Grokster, and What the Future Holds Monday, May 2, 2005 6-7:30 pm Bar Assn, NYC (42 W. 44th) Free (tell your NYC students) A panel discussion of copyright and technology law experts will discuss online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) services and recent legal developments, including: . The current U.S. Supreme Court "MGM v. Grokster" appeal, what this might mean with respect to the future of the "Sony-Betamax" standard . The shelved 2004 Induce Act and current P2P-related legislation . The competing legal interests of the entertainment industry, consumers and P2P service providers Moderator: SUSAN CRAWFORD Professor, Cardozo Law School Speakers: STEVE MARKS General Counsel, RIAA ADAM EISGRAU General Counsel, P2P United SARAH B. DEUTSCH Associate General Counsel, Verizon SONIA KATYAL Professor, Fordham Law School


 
Book Announcement: Religion and the Rise of Jim Crow in New Orleans
    Religion and the Rise of Jim Crow in New Orleans by James B. Bennett To read the entire book description or a sample chapter, please visit: http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7978.html Religion and the Rise of Jim Crow in New Orleans examines a difficult chapter in American religious history: the story of race prejudice in American Christianity. Focusing on the largest city in the late-nineteenth-century South, it explores the relationship between churches--black and white, Protestant and Catholic--and the emergence of the Jim Crow laws, statutes that created a racial caste system in the American South. Cloth | $39.50 / £26.95 | ISBN: 0-691-12148-6


 
Feminism & the Legal Academy Over at PrawfBlog, Ethan Lieb posts questions from Ariela Migdal on women in the legal academy. Here's a taste:
    How many of the young profs around here are men? How many are married or in long-term hetero relationships)? How many of the married men's ives followed them to places like Indiana or Georgia so that they could ursue their careers as hotshot profs? And, how many of the women profs ere are married and have found a (male) partner willing to shlep around he country to facilitate their careers as hotshot "prawfesses"? Are here prof couples? Whose career wins (unless you both got tenure-track obs at Columbia and Fordham at the same time)? Just curious....


 
Journal Announcement: Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy
    The University of Southern California is pleased to announce the new Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, an Online Peer-Reviewed Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy. Submissions of articles in these and related fields are welcome. For more information, please visit the journal at: www.jesp.org Editors:
      Andrei Marmor, (editor in chief), University of Southern California James Dreier, Brown University Julia Driver, Dartmouth College David Estlund, Brown University


 
Call for Papers: BSET 2006
    CALL FOR PAPERS The BRITISH SOCIETY for ETHICAL THEORY 2006 CONFERENCE University of Southampton, UK 10-12 July 2006 Invited Speakers:
      Roger Crisp (Oxford University) Mark Timmons (University of Arizona)
    Papers are invited for the annual conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, to be held at the University of Southampton. The subject area is open within metaethics and normative ethics. Papers on topics in applied ethics or the history of ethics may also be considered provided they are also of wider theoretical interest. Papers, which should be unpublished at the time of submission, should be in English, no longer than 6500 words, readable in at most 45 minutes and in a form suitable for blind review. Please send your submission electronically, and include an abstract, as well as your full name, address and academic affiliation. Those who submitted papers for our previous conferences - successfully or otherwise - are welcome to submit again (though not of course the same papers!). Please tell us if you are a postgraduate student: submissions from postgraduates are encouraged as our aim is that some such should be represented at the conference. Selected conference papers will be published in the journal "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice". Please make clear in any covering letter whether you want your paper considered for publication here as well as for the conference programme. The deadline for submissions is 6th December, 2005. Papers and accompanying particulars should be emailed to Dr. Elinor Mason: Elinor.Mason@ed.ac.uk Note that ONLY electronic submissions will be accepted. Further particulars regarding registration will be available in due course from: BSET homepage: www.bset.org For information on BSET 2005 visit http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Conferences/BSET.htm


Thursday, April 14, 2005
 
Conference Announcements: Ethics at Keele
    Virtue and Applied Ethics, 21st April 2005, Keele University This Society of Applied Philosophy research workshop will look at virtue theory generally and the prospects for its application. The second part will focus on arguably the leading recent work on this issue – Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles by Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking. Speakers: Dr. Justin Oakley (Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Australia) Dr. Nafsika Athanassoulis (Department of Philosophy, Leeds University) Dr. Mark Sheehan (Centre for Professional Ethics, Keele University) Further info at: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ep/peak/webdocuments/SAPflyer.pdf Children and the Concept of "Best Interests": Legal and Ethical Issues - 5th May, Keele University. This workshop focuses on the meaning and application of the concept of ‘best interests’ in legal discourse and ethical argument in relation to children. The idea of ‘best interests’ is central to discussions about policy making about children in the areas of medicine, family law and social care. What are ‘best interests’? Which factors should be taken into account? How should ‘best interests’ be formulated in situations of disagreement? What are the appropriate roles for parents and professionals in making such judgments? Why is the concept subject to critique? What alternative principles, if any, exist? This research workshop will explore these issues through a series of papers presented by a panel of philosophers and lawyers with research interests in this contested area. The full programme can be found at: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ep/peak/webdocuments/childrenleaflet.pdf Food, Ethics and the Public's Health - 2nd June, Keele University This workshop focuses on the relationship between food and health. Food ethics is a growing area of academic activity, as the production, marketing and consumption of food all raise ethical issues. This workshop has a special emphasis upon public health considerations in relation to food. For example, what obligations are there to ensure that the food we eat is produced safely and/or is nutritious? Should the government intervene to ensure that our diets are healthy, or is this an illegitimate form of state paternalism? What role should individual choice play in food policy? Should food be modified to improve our health? What ethical issues arise in relation to genetic modification of foodstuffs, and how should they be settled? This research workshop will explore these issues through a series of papers presented by a multi-disciplinary panel of philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists. The full programme is now available at: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ep/peak/webdocuments/foodethics.pdf


 
Does Blogging Help with Article Placement? Greg Goelzhauser (whom I finally met in person not long ago when I gave at talk at Florida State's faculty colloquium) has some interesting thoughts. Here's a taste:
    The key here seems to be name recognition. A lot of editors use a variety of heuristics to aid in sifting through the thousands of articles received each year. Examples may include school affiliation, publication history, and topic (i.e., sexy research areas like behavioral law and economics are likely to outperform topics like, say, tax). Another heuristic can be name recognition to the extent such a thing signals expertise--even if it's just perceived expertise--on a given topic.
Greg's post was triggered by these observations from Dan Markel and prompted some comments by Jon Click. I have some experience, perhaps atypical, that relates to Greg's question. One forthcoming piece--"The Future of Copyright"--originated as a series of blog posts (Legal Theory Bookclub: Lessig's Free Culture). There can be no doubt that blogging led directly to the placement: the Texas Law Review solicited the piece on the basis of the blog posts.


 
Conglomerate Reports on Teaching Loads Over at Conglomorate, Gordon Smith reports on teaching loads at the top twenty five U.S. law schools. Here is his data:
    Yale University ... 3 courses Harvard University ... 3 courses Stanford University ... 9 or 10 credits Columbia University ... 10 credits New York University ... 10 credits University of Chicago ... 11 credits* (quarter system) University of Pennsylvania ... 10 credits University of Michigan-Ann Arbor ... 10 credits University of Virginia ... 10 credits Northwestern University ... 3 courses Cornell University ... 3 courses Duke University ... 3 courses University of California-Berkeley ... 10 credits Georgetown University ... 10 credits University of California-Los Angeles ... 10 credits University of Texas-Austin ... 10 credits Vanderbilt University ... 10 credits University of Southern California ... 3 courses University of Minnesota-Twin Cities ... 10 credits Boston University ... 3 courses George Washington University ... 3 courses University of Iowa ... 12 credits Washington & Lee ... 10 credits University of Notre Dame ... 3 courses (30 credits over three years) Washington University in St. Louis ... 3 courses (no fewer than 9 credits)
If you are a legal academic or aspire to be one, you want to read Smith's post.


 
Welcome (Back) to the Blogosphere . . . . . . to A Taxing Blog by Vic Fleischer (UCLA).


 
Thursday Calendar
    Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Arthur Ripstein, University of Toronto (Law), "Beyond The Harm Principle":
      In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill introduces his “harm principle,” according to which "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with liberty of expression or action is to prevent harm to others." A few sentences later, Mill goes on to say "The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which is he is answerable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign." My aim is to argue that a commitment to individual sovereignty and a sphere of action in which you are answerable only to yourself requires that we abandon the harm principle.
    UC Berekely, Kadish Center: Debra Satz, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, INEQUALITIES IN SCHOOLING: THE CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC ADEQUACY:
      This paper examines two different kinds of arguments that have been made against our unequally funded and resourced K-12 education. One argument condemns inequalities in educational resources as a consequence of a commitment to an ideal of equality of opportunity applied to education. The ideal of equality of opportunity is comparative: what matters is how much opportunity a given person has with respect to others. The other argument presents its case primarily in terms of adequacy. The ideal of adequacy is non-comparative: what matters is that each person have enough opportunity. Equality of opportunity and adequacy are not the only two possible criticisms of educational inequalities, nor are they mutually exclusive. (They both, for example, give us reasons to condemn the status quo distribution of educational resources.) Nevertheless, the idea of educational adequacy–of establishing a threshold of cognitive skills and knowledge for all children—is in principle quite distinct from the idea of giving all children an equal opportunity to compete. Critics of current educational inequalities usually seem to have one type of criticism or the other primarily in mind.
    Florida State University School of Law: Lars Trägårdh, Columbia University, The Juridification of Politics in the United States and Europe: Historica Roots, Contemporary Debates and Future Prospects
      IN AN ARTICLE prominently published a few years ago in The New York Times, Roger Cohen (2000) sounded a by now familiar theme: the nation-state is losing ground in Europe. But what was interesting about Cohen’s article was not the general assertion, both commonplace and contested, that the European Union is characterised by the transgression of national sovereignties. Rather, its significance lay in his contention that a new European identity is in the process of being shaped that is based neither on the adoption of an elusive common ‘culture’, in the quasi ethnic sense of a common language, literature and history, nor on traditional nation-statist civic attributes such as mass political parties, the ritual of voting, the symbolism of flag, anthem, conscription, oath of allegiance, or passport. Rather, Cohen claimed, a new ‘sense of European citizenship’ is emerging, which is founded on the ‘pre-eminence of European law over national legislation’.
    UCLA Legal Theory Workshop: Anne M. Coughlin, O. M. Vicars Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
    Fordham University School of Law: William E. Forbath, Lloyd M. Bensten Endowed Chair in Law, Professor History, University of Texas, Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law (2004-2005), "Social Citizenship In England And America: A Comparative Constitutional History":
      In my view, social citizenship stands out as one of the great achievements of the 20th century. As a moral sensibility, it broke with millenia-old conventions of exclusion; instead, every member of society was deemed worthy of the same "social heritage" and dignifying standards of life. My question, then, is a variation on an old saw: Why no Social Citizenship in America? There are myriad familiar answers. By the early 20th century, the labor movements of Britain and other European nations embraced broad class-based political programs, and these nations saw the formation of labor or socialist parties. These latter, in turn, proved crucial in the creation of social citizenship rights, both as political agents in their own right, and, equally, as rivals for power with other political parties, whose programs were shaped by this rivalry. Not so the U.S., where, so standard accounts suggest, since Andrew Jackson's day, workers have been wedded to individualistic strategies for bettering their lot, and have largely resisted efforts to improve their condition as a class; where even trade unionists have always been "pragmatists," not "class conscious," but "job conscious"; and where, accordingly, class-based reform politics and "socialistic" ideas have been the province of intellectuals and agitators on the margins of political life. The potential for a broader class-based politics within the American working class was undone not only by the individualism engrained in the nation's culture. Class-based politics also foundered on profound racial and ethnic divisions among working people - the fruits of African slavery and waves of European immigration.
    Michigan Cyberlaw & Economics: Robert Hillman, Cornell, On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications:
      In a recent article, Jeffery Rachlinski and I analyzed whether contract law’s approach to the problem of paper standard forms can effectively govern electronic forms.1 Some analysts believe that contract law must evolve to police business’s new Internet strategies for taking advantage of consumers. Conversely, others assert that contract law must create a new framework to facilitate business’s use of the new technology. Relying on our assumptions about how e businesses use the Internet and how consumers treat their e-standard forms, we concluded that Internet contracting is not fundamentally different from the paper world. Accordingly, major changes in the approach of contract law are not imperative. This paper tests the assumptions we made about consumer behavior when agreeing to estandard forms by offering some empirical evidence of consumer practices. Part I revisits our assumptions about these practices. To test these assumptions, Part II reports on a survey of 92 contracts students’ e-standard form practices. The survey inquired about all aspects of their practices, including frequency of contracting, the place and time of such contracting, whether they read their eforms, the reasons for reading or failing to read, and the factors that would promote reading.
    Boston University School of Law:
      Tim Greaney
      Frank Michelman (Harvard) (DISTINGUISHED LECTURE)
    George Mason School of Law: Dean Lueck, University of Arizona Department of Economics, Conservation Easements: Economics, Law and Politics.
    Georgetown Colloquium on Intellectual Property & Technology Law: Arti K. Rai, Duke Law School, Open-Source Genomics and Biopharmaceutical Industry.
    Princeton Public Law Colloquium: Professor Gordon Silverstein of the University of California - Berkeley, "How Law Kills Politics."
    University of Texas Law School, Sovereignty Symposium:
      9:00-11:00 Conceptualizing Sovereignty: Michael Gillespie (Duke University); Michael Lind (Washington, D.C.); Philip Bobbitt (UT); David Law (University of San Diego Law School), Alex Alienikoff (Georgetown University Law Center) 11:15-12:30 Law and “The Emergency”: "Sovereignty: Use of Force and Human Rights" (Francesco Francioni, EUI); “Constitutional Norms in a Time of Permanent Emergency,” Sanford Levinson (UT), 1:45-3:45 On the Idea of Popular (or “Democratic” Sovereignty: I. The debate over looking to foreign materials in interpreting the United States Constitution On the meaning of “Democratic Sovereignty”: Ken Anderson (American University); Jed Rubenfeld (Yale); Sarah Cleveland (UT); Judith Resnik (Yale) 4:00-5:30 II. “Popular Constitutionalism”: Scot Powe (UT), Gary Jacobsohn (UT)


 
Jacobi on Judicial Signaling & Docket Shaping Tonja Jacobi (Northwestern University - School of Law) has posted The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape their Dockets on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Contrary to traditional wisdom, judges are not passive receivers of their agendas. Instead, many judges attempt to shape their dockets by encouraging potential litigants to bring particular cases. This encouragement takes the form of judges signaling their own positions on an issue as well as their colleagues' expected support. This process is modeled as a signaling game, with both separating and pooling equilibria resulting. The existence of pooling equilibria is of particular interest, as it indicates some judges misrepresent the chances of success of a case in order to induce desired legislation.


 
Langbein on the Duty of Loyalty John H. Langbein (Yale Law School) has posted Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest? (Yale Law Journal, Vol. 114, p. 929, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The duty of loyalty requires a trustee to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. Any transaction in which the trustee has an actual or potential interest violates the sole interest rule, no matter how beneficial the transaction to the beneficiaries. This Article develops the view that a transaction should not give rise to liability merely because the trustee also benefits. Sometimes beneficiaries are better off when a transaction also benefits the trustee. Corporation law has wholly abandoned the sole interest rule, preferring a rule that permits a conflicted transaction that satisfies disclosure and fairness standards. Important changes have been undermining the trust law sole interest rule. The grievous procedural inadequacies of the equity courts that gave rise to the rule have now been overcome. The rise of professional trusteeship has required that the sole interest rule be abridged to permit trustee compensation. As trusteeship has increasingly become a branch of the financial services industry, major exceptions to the sole interest rule have been recognized to facilitate trustee-provided financial services. The rationale for these exceptions is that they benefit trust beneficiaries by promoting integration of functions and economies of scale. This Article contends that the exceptions are wiser than the rule they modify. The duty of loyalty should be reformulated to prefer the best interest rather than the sole interest of the beneficiary. A conflicted transaction should continue to be presumed to violate the duty of loyalty, but rebuttably, not conclusively. The trustee should be allowed the defense that the transaction was in the best interest of the beneficiaries.


 
Dodge on Tax Justice Joseph M. Dodge (Florida State University College of Law) has posted Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles (Tax Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This essay considers the benefit, partnership, and ability to pay principles of tax justice with respect to their foundations and how they bear (if at all) on such issues as the role and size of government, the choice of the tax base, and the structure of rates and exemptions. The method of examination is primarily by way of critique of what I call the new benefit principle, or NBP, which has recently been invoked by some commentators. The broad thesis of this essay is that the NBP - as well as its sibling, the partnership theory of (income) taxation - is little more than a rhetorical counter to street Libertarian talk that assumes one's entitlement to market outcomes. The NBP and the partnership theory do not withstand analysis at the level of entitlement theory, and they do not prescribe a politically liberal taxing and spending role for government. Specifically, the NBP and, to a lesser extent, the partnership theory, tell us very little about what the tax system should look like, and they certainly do not favor a Schanz-Haig-Simons income tax base, or, for that matter, any personal tax base with progressive features. Neither can be implemented as a substantive tax fairness principle. In contrast, an objective ability-to-pay principle is compatible with leading social justice theories and clearly favors a realization income tax base. I also argue, contrary to Murphy & Nagel and Kaplow & Shavell, that the ability-to-pay principle, as a norm of tax fairness, has a legitimate (if not pre-emptive) role in tax theory.


 
Barkow on the Politics of Sentencing Rachel Barkow (New York University - School of Law) has posted Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing (Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105, May 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The politics of sentencing over the past three decades have been one-sided. Voices in favor of tougher sentences dominate the legislative debate at the state and federal levels. Those advocating on behalf of sentencing reform or alternatives to incarceration garner little attention. Although there are various options for improving deliberation in light of this political imbalance, one mechanism appears to be having an impact in many jurisdictions: a focus on the direct costs of incarceration. There is evidence from the states that tight budgets and a corresponding concern with the rising costs of existing incarceration policies have prompted greater deliberation, a consideration of alternatives to incarceration, and a rethinking of sanctions for some crimes. This focus on costs has served in some sense as a surrogate for typically ignored voices, such as prisoners and their families. When legislators take incarceration costs into account, they necessarily consider more than one side of the sentencing issue, and they begin to see that longer terms of incarceration involve at least some tradeoffs. I explain that looking at costs in this context therefore serves some of the same deliberation-enhancing values that proponents of risk tradeoff and cost-benefit analyses have identified in other regulatory contexts. Firm conclusions must await empirical research, but a preliminary analysis suggests that, because the states seem institutionally predisposed to place greater weight on these costs than the federal government, the state decisionmaking process on sentencing is susceptible to greater balance and is therefore likely to be more informed.


 
Solove & Hoofnagle on a Model Regime of Privacy Protection Daniel J. Solove and Chris Jay Hoofnagle (George Washington University Law School and Electronic Privacy Information Center West Coast Office) have posted A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 2.0) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This version incorporates and responds to the many comments that we received to Version 1.1, which we released on March 10, 2005. Privacy protection in the United States has often been criticized, but critics have too infrequently suggested specific proposals for reform. Recently, there has been significant legislative interest at both the federal and state levels in addressing the privacy of personal information. This was sparked when ChoicePoint, one of the largest data brokers in the United States with records on almost every adult American citizen, sold data on about 145,000 people to fraudulent businesses set up by identity thieves. Other companies announced security breaches, including LexisNexis, from which personal information about 32,000 people was improperly accessed. Senator Schumer criticized Westlaw for making available to certain subscribers personal information including Social Security Numbers (SSNs). In the aftermath of the ChoicePoint debacle and other major information security breaches, both of us have been asked by Congressional legislative staffers, state legislative policymakers, journalists, academics, and others about what specifically should be done to better regulate information privacy. In response to these questions, we believe that it is imperative to have a discussion of concrete legislative solutions to privacy problems. What appears below is our attempt at such an endeavor. Privacy experts have long suggested that information collection be consistent with Fair Information Practices. This Model Regime incorporates many of those practices and applies them specifically to the context of commercial data brokers such as ChoicePoint. We hope that this will provide useful guidance to legislators and policymakers in crafting laws and regulations. We also intend this to be a work-in-progress in which we collaborate with others. We have welcomed input from other academics, policymakers, journalists, and experts as well as from the industries and businesses that will be subject to the regulations we propose. We have incorporated criticisms and constructive suggestions, and we will continue to update this Model Regime to include the comments we find most helpful and illuminating. Notice, Consent, Control, and Access 1. Universal Notice 2. Meaningful Informed Consent 3. One-Step Exercise of Rights 4. Individual Credit Management 5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information Security of Personal Information 6. Secure Identification 7. Disclosure of Security Breaches Business Access to and Use of Personal Information 8. Social Security Number Use Limitation 9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records 10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks 11. Private Investigators Government Access to and Use of Personal Data 12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial Records 13. Government Data Mining 14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal Information Privacy Innovation and Enforcement 15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States 16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights


 
Abramowicz on Predictive Decisionmaking Michael Abramowicz has posted Predictive Decisionmaking Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, 2006 Michael Abramowicz (George Washington University - Law School) here is the abstract:
    In this Article, Professor Abramowicz identifies a regulatory strategy that he calls "predictive decisionmaking" and provides a framework for assessing it. In a predictive decisionmaking regime, public or private decisionmakers make predictions, often of future legal decisions, rather than engage in normative analysis. Several scholars, particularly in recent years, have offered proposals that fit within the predictive decisionmaking paradigm, but have not noted the connection among these proposals. The Article highlights five different mechanisms on which predictive decisionmaking regimes may rely, including predictive standards, enterprise liability, accuracy incentives, partial insurance requirements, and information markets. After identifying several advantages that predictive decisionmaking strategies may have over nonpredictive alternatives, the Article identifies several potential problems with predictive decisionmaking, and develops a simple analytical framework for assessing predictive decisionmaking proposals. The Article concludes by illustrating variants on the mechanisms for accomplishing predictive decisionmaking in conjunction with new predictive decisionmaking proposals.


 
Rayburn on the Burden of Performance in Sexual Assault Trials Corey Rayburn has posted To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual Assault Trials on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Despite decades of efforts to reform American rape law, prosecution and conviction rates remain astoundingly low. While activists led legislatures to adopt important statutory changes for rape and sexual assault, only modest effects in the levels of sexual violence have been observed. Nonetheless, reform-minded scholars continue to focus on statutory and rule tinkering as a means to quell rape. This article argues against the commonly held belief that the crucial factors in determining the outcome of rape trials are substantive and procedural in nature. Rather, the issues of performance, representation, and language often pre-determine the outcomes of rape trials. When a complainant testifies on the stand, she is forced into one of several roles by jury attitudes and defense narratives. These roles fit defense scripts and create a heavy burden of performance on the accusers. This burden of performance operates to put a complainant's gender identity on trial and results in the incorporation of dangerous societal myths into the fact-finding process. The way by which this process works is analogous to that of disaster pornography. Academics have observed that compassion fatigue has resulted because of overexposure to disaster imagery. Similarly, as society has become saturated with rape narratives, it has become desensitized and dissociated from complainants' stories of rape. Because of this phenomenon, there needs to be a fundamental rethinking concerning rape law reform. Otherwise, success in the fight against rape will be as rare as it has been for the last thirty years.


 
Journal Announcement: Unbound
    Harvard Law Journal Unbound Announces New Mission, New Issue http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/unbound/ CAMBRIDGE, MA – On Wednesday, April 20, students at Harvard Law School will publish a new issue of Unbound: Harvard Journal of the Legal Left, featuring articles by leading scholars critical of contemporary legal discourse. This will be the first issue of Unbound following a broad reworking of the journal’s mission and website earlier this year. Founded in 2001, Unbound is now dedicated to renewing the legal left by building a site where lawyers and legal scholars can critique liberal shibboleths and radically rethink their political and intellectual commitments. In Unbound’s revised mission statement, the editors clarify their rationale for this new orientation: Like many on the legal left, we feel a bit homeless. Others have built substantial “progressive” organizations and law reviews that support, channel, and house their political and intellectual endeavors. While we often sympathize with and participate in activist projects that advance economic redistribution, human rights, and racial, gender, and sexual equality, we are unsatisfied with the constraining language of liberalism within which such projects tend to operate. We’d like something spicier and more satisfying, a place where we can refine our ideas without having to justify our existence to unsympathetic critics. Unbound’s Spring 2005 issue features articles by such luminaries as Libby Adler (Northeastern), Christine Desan (Harvard), Richard Ford (Stanford), Thomas Franck (NYU), Janet Halley (Harvard), and Duncan Kennedy (Harvard), as well as several essays by current law students dissatisfied with the law school experience. The content will be available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/unbound/ “Two decades after the birth of Critical Legal Studies,” the editors observe in the new mission statement, “there is an urgent need for new politics based upon and interacting with new theory. Discussion must include systemic critique and productive self-interrogation, both of which we plan to promote in Unbound."


 
Conference Announcement: The Unity of Reason
    CONFERENCE: THE UNITY OF REASON 18th - 20the June 2005 Departments of Philosophy, University of St. Andrews (Conference theme detailed below.) SPEAKERS: Michael Bratman (Stanford), John Broome (Oxford), Jonathan Dancy (Reading), Stephen Darwall (Michigan), Pascal Engel (Paris), Alan Millar (Stirling), John Skorupski (St Andrews), Jens Timmermann (St Andrews), Theo von Willigenburg (Rotterdam) Details about the conference, including full program, attendance packages, costs, application form, can now be found via the conference website at: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/philosophy/unity.html POSTGRADUATES: There are postgraduate slots for which students are invited to submit papers on any topic falling under the conference theme. Papers should be up to 4,500 words in length and are to be presented in up to 30 minutes, with the remainder of each (1 hour) postgraduate session open for discussion. Bursaries for postgraduate speakers are available. Deadline for all submissions: FRIDAY MAY 6th 2005 Papers can be submitted to: sjr5@st-andrews.ac.uk or by hard copy (please supply 2 copies) to Simon Robertson: Unity of Reason Conference Departments of Philosophy University of St. Andrews Edgecliffe, The Scores St. Andrews Fife KY16 9AL Scotland, U.K. CONFERENCE THEME Reasons and rationality are philosophically fundamental concepts. Work done over the last few decades in a variety of areas of philosophy - including epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, rational choice theory and ethics - has made it timely to re-examine the philosophical questions that cluster around them and easier to do so in a rigorous and comprehensive way. The conference will revolve around the following questions: 1. Can a uniform account of reasons (or reasoning) in the (prima facie) three spheres of action, belief, and feeling/evaluation be given? Or are they in important ways diverse? 2. What role if any does 'reason' play (or: do reasons play) in the domain of feeling, as against action and belief? 3. Is one of the spheres dominant? For example: reasoning in all spheres is finally governed by practical reason, so that what there is reason to believe or feel is finally a practical question. Or: reasoning in all spheres is finally governed by theoretical reason, so that the result of reasoning is always a belief concerning fact or value, duty etc. 4. Is 'reason' in some sense one basic faculty, capacity, or competence, or is it a multiform, not very integrated set of competences? If you have any questions, don't hesitate to contact us at sjr5@st-andrews.ac.uk Conference website: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/philosophy/unity.html


Wednesday, April 13, 2005
 
Wednesday Calendar
    Northwestern Constitutional Theory: Adrian Vermeule, Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago, "Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs":
      Recent evidence suggests that capital punishment may have a significant deterrent effect, preventing as many eighteen or more murders for each execution. This evidence greatly unsettles moral objections to the death penalty, because it suggests that a refusal to impose that penalty condemns numerous innocent people to death. Capital punishment thus presents a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context, because government is a special kind of moral agent. The familiar problems with capital punishment - potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew - do not argue in favor of abolition, because the world of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs involved in capital punishment may depend on cognitive processes that fail to treat "statistical lives" with the seriousness that they deserve.
    Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Richard McAdams, Guy Raymond Jones Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, "The Uneasy Case for Regulating Undercover Operations: Institutional and Economic Perspectives on the Entrapment Defense"
    NYU Legal History: Harold Forsythe, Samuel I. Golieb Fellow, NYU School of Law.
    University of Texas School of Law: Sovereignty Symposium: Neil MacCormick University of Edinburgh, "Is European Democracy Possible? Reflections on the Proposed European Constitution".
    Vanderbilty Law School Law & Economics Workshop: Jason Johnston, University of Pennsylvania.


 
Barnett Replies to Morrison Randy E. Barnett (Boston University School of Law) has posted Why You Should Read My Book Anyhow: A Reply to Trevor Morrison (Cornell Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 101, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In his review of my book, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Tevor Morrison takes issue with (1) the relationship I describe between constitutional legitimacy and constitutional method, (2) my particular defense of originalism, (3) the operation of my proposed construction of the Constitution - The Presumption of Liberty - and (4) my interpretation of Lawrence v. Texas. In this reply I defend the fact that I hold a conception of constitutional liberty at partial variance from that of the Founders, the reasonableness and limits of originalist interpretation, the conception of the police power identified in Restoring the Lost Constitution, and my reading of Lawrence v. Texas. Because Professor Morrison's objections are not atypical of those I have heard from others, I hope that reading my reply will induce skeptics of my approach to read my book anyway.


 
Kaplan on Social Security Reform Richard L. Kaplan (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College) has posted The Security of Social Security Benefits and the President's Proposal (The ElderLaw Report, Vol. 16, Np. 9, pp. 1-5, April 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This article considers the Social Security program and President George W. Bush's proposal for individual accounts. The article begins by addressing the nature of the Social Security program's trust fund and explains how the federal government's ability to pay benefits is a function of political will more than the pecuniary intricacies of governmental trust fund accounting. The article then critically examines the components of the long-term financial situation of Social Security, including the use of economic growth rate assumption's that are extremely low by historical standards. It the analyzes several different possible responses, including reallocating governmental expenditures, changing the formula for calculating initial retirement benefits, increasing the cap on Social Security's payroll tax, and raising the retirement age, among others. Finally, the article notes that folks who would prefer to depend on their own individually managed retirement assets have a mechanism already available in the form of the Individual Retirement Account, a mechanism that is superior to President Bush's proposal for individual Social Security accounts in several dimensions.


 
Schroeder on H.L.A. Hart Jeanne L. Schroeder (Cardozo Law School) has posted His Master's Voice: H.L.A. Hart and Lacanian Discourse Theory on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart might seem completely antithetical to the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. Hart works within the analytic school that dominates Anglo-American philosophy departments. Lacan works within an alternate tradition variously called speculative philosophy or critical theory more likely in this country to be banished to comparative literature departments. In this Article, Prof. Schroeder shows why this apparent conflict between Hart and Lacan is an over-simplification. Hart's account of positive law has surprising similarities to Lacan's account of law as the "discourse of the Master." Accordingly, anyone seeking to develop a psychoanalytically sophisticated critical theory of law should return to Hart. Moreover, legal positivists should not lightly dismiss psychoanalysis. From a speculative position, Hart's concept of law is too narrow. He describes only one aspect of legal experience: obedience to the law, and perhaps, only obedience by those "officials" who apply and enforce the law. He omits from the concept of law most of what legal actors actually do - the creation of law by legislators, the analysis of law by policy oriented scholars, and the critique of law by those subjected to its power. Perhaps, most importantly, Hart's concept of law does not include the practice of law by lawyers. Lacan, in contrast, thought that law could not be reduced to the single master’s discourse but includes at least three other "discourses" which I argue correspond to legislation, some aspects of judging, legal scholarship, legal counseling, and the representation of clients. Lacan's analysis, therefore, supplements and complements Hart's.
I find the claim that Hart "omits from the concept of law most of what legal actors actually do - the creation of law by legislators . . ." puzzling to say the least. Hart is famous for the distinction between primary and secondary rules, including in the latter category--power-conferring rules. The paper acknowledges Hart's distinction, but my superficial reading of the paper didn't turn up any discussion of the relationship of Hart's discussion of power-conferring rules to the "creation of law by legislators." Interesting paper.


 
Sargent on a Catholic Critique of Law and Economics Mark Sargent (Villanova University School of Law) has posted Utility, The Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of Law and Economics (Journal of Catholic Legal Studies, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This paper contrasts the value maximization norm of welfare economics that is central to law and economics in its prescriptive mode to the Aristotelian/Aquinian principles of Catholic social thought. The reluctance (or inability) of welfare economics and law and economics to make judgments about about utilities (or preferences) differs profoundly from the Catholic tradition (rooted in Aristotle as well as religious faith) of contemplation of the nature of the good. This paper also critiques the interesting argument by Stephen Bainbridge that homo economicus bears a certain affinity to fallen man, and that law and economics thus provides appropriate rules for a fallen world. From a Catholic perspective, the social vision of neo-classical economics and its progeny (welfare economics and law and economics) rests on a concept of human autonomy and a utilitarian concept of pleasure inconsistent with the Aristotelian and Aquinean concept of virtue and the conception of civic happiness articulated by Antonio Genovesi and other Catholic economists.


 
Bagenstos on the Limits of Antidsicrimination Law Samuel R. Bagenstos (Washington University School of Law) has been posted The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law (California Law Review, Vol. 94, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    . Here is the abstract:
      The notion of "institutional" racism or sexism has been around a long time. Many of the original drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sought to address more than just discrete acts of discrimination. They sought as well to respond to what Senator Humphrey called the "many impersonal institutional processes which nonetheless determine the availability of jobs for nonwhite workers," but the statute Congress ultimately enacted fell short of their hopes on that score. Hints of a structural approach to discrimination persist in the doctrine of disparate impact. But that doctrine can no longer be said to have much practical significance. In the past decade, however, a number of academics have sought to revive the structural focus urged by Senator Humphrey and the exponents of institutional racism and sexism theory. Their efforts have been fueled by three significant developments: changes in the workplace that have made traditional tools of antidiscrimination law less effective in attacking problems of job bias; important empirical and experimental findings of social psychologists that demonstrate the persistence of (frequently unconscious or subtle) bias; and developments in regulatory theory that seem to offer a way effectively to address structural discrimination. In this paper, I examine these recent proposals for a structural employment discrimination law. But unlike much of the existing literature, my story is not an optimistic one. To the contrary, I believe that the structural turn in employment discrimination scholarship is best understood as highlighting the limits of antidiscrimination law. Perhaps paradoxically, that is in part because I find the case for a structural approach to employment discrimination law so compelling. Unconscious bias, interacting with a changing workplace, creates equality problems that our current antidiscrimination law is poorly suited to solving. A structural approach seems to be the best hope for addressing these problems. But there are very significant obstacles to the success of a structural approach to employment discrimination law. In the areas of the law that already seem to impose on courts the obligation to police workplace structures that might facilitate discrimination, judges have proven unwilling or unable to discharge that responsibility with rigor. The new proposals seek to sidestep that history, but they do so largely by urging deference to professional communities that are as likely to subvert as to promote norms of workplace equality. And these difficulties are mere symptoms of a deeper problem: To address structural employment discrimination issues effectively will require going beyond the generally accepted normative underpinnings of employment discrimination law. Because courts (and legislatures) are unwilling to take that step, structural discrimination advocates must proceed by indirection and seek to empower workplace constituencies that (those advocates hope) will serve the cause of equality. But unless courts have some normative idea of what workplace equality should mean, they will be unable to assure that those workplace constituencies will serve the purposes of antidiscrimination law. Employment discrimination law thus faces a challenge: The individualistic remedies provided by existing law are no match for the problems that the new structural-discrimination literature identifies. Those problems - unconscious bias interacting with flexible workplace structures - are likely to become more and more significant as time goes on, and other structural equality problems are likely to become more significant as well. But employment discrimination law is an insufficient tool for addressing these problems.


     
    Tillman on the Orders Resolutions, and Votes Clause New versions of Seth Tillman's two pieces on Article I, Section 7, Clause 3, are up on SSRN:Here is a synposis:
      U.S. Constitution: art. I, § 7, cl. 3 reads:
        Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
      Madison, in his Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention (Aug. 15 & 16, 1787), said it meant the following:
        Every [bill by whatever name Congress calls it] to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary [because it has legislative effect] (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of [other] Bill[s] [properly stylized when enacted per Art. I, § 7, cl. 2].
      Thus, this clause is usually called the residual presentment clause or, the second presentment clause: it ensures presentment in spite of feared Madisonian legislative legerdemain attempting to manipulatively bypass the president’s veto.
      I have good reason to believe Madison wrong. Here is the view put forward by a Commonwealth parliamentarian, who is very well informed with regard to eighteenth century British and colonial parliamentary and administrative (treasury) practices. Indeed, my research relied extensively on contacts with foreign and domestic parliamentary officers, legislative clerks and secretaries.
      Every [final] Order, Resolution, or Vote [of a single house of Congress] to which the [prior or subsequent] Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary [as statutory authorization or ratification] (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect [as a regulation per the prior organic act], shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill [which is a different case].
      This new meaning stands our separation of powers jurisprudence on its head. It means the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Chadha -- broadly speaking was fundamentally misconceived. Presentment is necessary, but not bicameralism, where single house orders (subject to presentment) are authorized (or ratified) by a prior (or subsequent) statute. At a deeper level it means that our interpretive community, judges, legal academics, academics in related fields (government, political science, and history), lawyers and the American public generally, have forgotten what a clause of the Constitution meant, and that recovery of lost meaning required going to a foreigner! (A pity this was nof discussed at the Breyer-Scalia debates.)
      Although this trilogy of papers is about the recovery of lost public meaning, in the process of doing so, many of the sainted proponents of legal craftsmanship espousing traditional methods and materials take it on the chin. A few that are heavily criticized include: Justice Story, Stanley Corwin, Charles L. Black, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Solicitor General Olson. Many of the modern academic proponents of originalism and textualism are, also, somewhat bloodied in the process. Because the names are legion, I will not single out anyone (except Justice Scalia) for special consideration here. (I am confident he will not mind.) But it is a long, long list. And I sincerely hope that, at some point, he or they might reply.
      Additionally, this paper represents what I think legal scholarship should be -- at least some of the time. It should be fun. I continue the tradition of Lon L. Fuller’s The Case of the Speluncean Explorers by writing the Supreme Court’s missing 1798 opinion in Hollingsworth v. Virginia. And my findings regarding the original public meaning of the ORV Clause are presented in a form not unlike that of a deposition colloquy.
      I pull no punches. For those who want a taste:
        Compare Email from Laurence B. Marquet, Clerk of the Legislative Council and Clerk of the Parliaments, Parliament of Western Australia, to Seth Barrett Tillman (Apr. 9, 2003) (“If you now read [the ORV Clause], you will see [] that it contains a condition precedent, viz, the vote etc must be one that requires the concurrence of both the Senate and HR.”) (emphasis added), with Symposium, Agency Decisionmaking, supra note 117, at 690 (Antonin Scalia) (“[Justice White’s] contrived and hypertechnical response . . . [would make] the validity or invalidity of the one-house veto or the concurrent resolution depend upon whether the requirement for congressional approval is phrased in the [prior authorizing] statute as a condition precedent . . . . You remember conditions precedent . . . from 15th century property law.”) (emphasis added); cf. The Quotations Page, Sir Winston Churchill, at http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/407.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) (“Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing ever happened.”); Email from M.J.C. Vile, Professor Emeritus, University of Kent, to Seth Barrett Tillman (June 23, 2004) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (“I accept your argument about the origins of the ORV Clause in the parliamentary practice regarding financial matters in Britain.”). (the above is slightly rewritten for the purposes of presentation here)
        ... [U]nder these conditions, when the very words of the Constitution are alien to its interpreters, we cannot but take for granted that such a court [the Chadha Court] would adopt the Madisonian position with regard to the ORV Clause:
          The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the Framers. Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a “resolution” or “vote” rather than a “bill.” 2 Farrand [The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1911)] 301–302. As a consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3 . . . was added. 2 Farrand 304–305.
        The Chadha Court assumed that Madison’s rationale for his own motion [which failed] equally applied to Randolph’s rationale for his motion [which passed and became the ORV Clause]. Moreover, the fact that Madison’s motion failed seems to have escaped the Court’s notice. Is it not a pathetic commentary on our jurisprudence that the only democratic component of the Convention record—the actual votes of the States—is unworthy of the Court’s commentary or analysis? This sad state of affairs afflicts the Chadha majority, Justice Powell’s concurrence, and Justice White’s dissent. (And the Supreme Court is not our only federal court struck with this peculiar malady.) It is worth noting that not every earlier commentator on the Convention record was quite as confident as Chief Justice Burger and his majority. (footnotes omitted, and slightly rewritten for presentation here)
        ... [W]e will have to come to terms with the fact that the proposed paradigm for constitutional interpretation—an interpretive position founded on a parliamentary culture celebrating elections, representative government, and the ability of ordinary people to participate in lawmaking—stands in direct opposition to the deeply held religious convictions of the (long-standing and still) dominant Madisonian cult, espousing antimajoritarianism rationalized through fears of rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior by overbearing majorities composed along factional lines. The many provisions of the Constitution of 1787 contain elements supporting both views. The overwhelming dominance of the latter worldview within modern American legal culture is not a reflection of some obvious transcendental historical or legal truth arising from an uncontested past but rather is a reflection of their Lord and Ladyships being in basic agreement with Madison’s fears and constitutional vision.
        And that is why some might be afraid, very afraid. After two hundred years, they may come to realize that they backed the wrong horse. (footnote omitted)


     
    Singer on Same Sex Marriage & Full Faith & Credit Joseph Singer (Harvard) has posted Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation (Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Vol. 1, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Now that same sex marriages have been occurring in Massachusetts for almost a year, the issue of interstate recognition is no longer merely a theoretical issue. Most scholars have either argued that the full faith and credit clause does not mandate recognition of same sex marriages or that it does so for limited purposes or for marriages of Massachusetts residents but not nonresidents seeking to evade their restrictive home state marriage laws. This article argues that the full faith and credit clause should be interpreted to require interstate recognition of same sex marriages validly celebrated in Massachusetts and that Congress does not have the power to deny such recognition under the effects thereof language of the full faith and credit clause. Rather than focusing on the rights of same sex couples to have their valid Massachusetts marriages recognized elsewhere, we should focus on the obligations inherent in the marriage relationship. Both Congress and the majority of states have passed so-called Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs). If these laws are constitutional, they effectively authorize partners in same sex marriages to relocate to other states and evade their obligations as spouses and parents under Massachusetts law. Those states have made themselves havens for fleeing debtors. Using traditional and modern choice-of-law analysis, as well as analogies to the law of divorce and corporate governance, this article argues that the full faith and credit clause should be interpreted to require recognition of marriages that are valid where celebrated to avoid inconsistent obligations, to allow free interstate travel and commerce, and to prevent the states from authorizing married partners to walk away from their concededly valid and persisting obligations under Massachusetts law.


     
    Conference Announcement: Joint Session
      The annual Joint Session conference of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society will be held at the University of Manchester (England) from 8th-10th July 2005. INVITED SPEAKERS Inaugural Address - Simon Blackburn Symposia: Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel Derek Matravers and Jerrold Levinson Samuel Scheffler and Véronique Munoz-Dardé Stewart Shapiro and Patrick Greenough Jennifer Hornsby and Jason Stanley Marilyn Adams and Richard Cross Programme details are available at: http://www.sas.ac.uk/aristotelian_society/docs/programme.html The programmes for the graduate papers and the submitted paper sessions are still being finalised, but it is expected that there will be eight papers by graduates and seventy further submitted papers. Please note that the closing date for submissions has now passed. Papers by invited speakers are published in advance and can be ordered at: http://www.sas.ac.uk/aristotelian_society/docs/supplementary_volumes.html For details of how to register for the conference, see: http://www.sas.ac.uk/aristotelian_society/docs/registration.html


    Tuesday, April 12, 2005
     
    Petit on the Indeterminacy Debate Over at Scrivener's Error, C.E. Petit has an interesting post on the indeterminacy debate in legal theory--the subject of Sunday's Lexicon.


     
    Ribstein on the Law & Economics of Blogging Larry Ribstein (Illinois) has posted Initial Reflections on the Law and Economics of Blogging on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Weblogs, or blogs, have proliferated and developed rapidly in recent years, and have attracted significant attention. Moreover, blogs have started to generate significant legal issues. Yet there is so far no coherent economic framework for addressing those issues. This article begins to develop such a framework. Building on blogs' technical features, it identifies the unique aspects of blogs that should have legal ramifications. It then briefly applies this framework to a variety of legal issues.
    I read this paper last week, before it went up on SSRN. Very, very interesting. A must read for bloggers.Here is a sample from the body of the paper:
      At a deeper level, blogging is enabled by three technologies: the Internet, the Worldwide Web, and Google and other sophisticated search engines. Google’s technology is particularly important. Consider how easy it would be without search engines for a blog post to be lost in the near infinity of the Web. Google not only finds the post but, more importantly, gives top ranking in searches to the more “important” posts. Google and other search engines provide a kind of spontaneous filtering mechanism.4 Google ranks search results by popularity determined by the number of sites that link to the result and the importance of each linking site as measured by its links. Links are “votes” by the linking web pages for the quality and accuracy of the blog. Blogs have an incentive to link only to high-quality blogs because their own readers judge them by, among other things, the quality of their links. The votes themselves are weighted according to the importance of the voters as measured their own popularity, which is in turn at least partly a function of their quality and accuracy. Google also provides a way of distinguishing professionals from amateurs. The more frequently a blog updates, the more Google visits the site, and the more the blog will tend to come up in searches. This gives an edge to those who are willing to spend more time on blogging.
    Download it while its hot!
    Update: Posts on this from Howard Bashman and Glenn Reynolds. Plus there is a nice post over at PrawfsBlawg. Here's a taste:
      Which schools, if any, are underwriting any of the costs associated with blogging (whether in terms of research assistance, which would be valuable for a blog like Larry Solum's, which performs incredibly valuable service to the profession, but also is highly administrative in nature, or fees for webhosting, or more generally, the time of the profs)? If none, why aren't they? Is it possible that the blogs have already generated sufficient rewards to the bloggers in terms of name recognition (among law review editors and other profs, if not others)?
    Personally, I think of the Blog as more or less the equivalent of "service to the profession," although I note that several of my more substantive posts have actually been cited in law review articles.


     
    Law on the Paradox of Omnipotence David S. Law (University of San Diego School of Law) has posted The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and Commitments on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Sovereigns, like individuals, must sometimes make commitments that limit their own freedom of action in order to accomplish their goals. Social scientists have observed that constitutional arrangements can, by restricting a sovereign's power, enable the sovereign to make such commitments. This paper advances several claims about the commitment problems that sovereigns face. First, constitutions do not necessarily solve such problems but can instead aggravate them, by entrenching inalienable governmental powers and immunities. Second, sovereigns and other actors face two distinct varieties of commitment problems - undercommitment and overcommitment - between which they must steer: an actor that can bind itself has surmounted the problem of undercommitment but must then face the risk of hobbling itself to an unforeseen or undesirable extent, or overcommitting itself. Third, courts are well positioned to navigate a course between these matching perils and to optimize the extent of the sovereign's commitments, even in the face of constitutional barriers to commitment by the sovereign. In performing these functions, however, courts risk damage to the basis of their own power - namely, their reputation for rendering fair and efficacious judgments.
    And here is a bit more from the middle of the paper:
      Imagine a family law regime under which divorce is illegal under any circumstances and adultery is a felony that carries a mandatory sentence of imprisonment. A successful marriage requires substantial investment, and neither partner may be willing to make the necessary investment if each fears that the other will break the commitment and leave for a more attractive opportunity.96 That is, undercommitment is a potential impediment to a successful marriage. Draconian divorce and adultery laws may alleviate this problem by rendering marital commitments highly credible. At the same time, however, such laws may discourage people from making marital commitments in the first place, precisely because they so thoroughly exclude all other future possibilities – including, for example, the possibility of making a new marital commitment to a different person after a previous marriage has irretrievably failed for unforeseen reasons beyond one’s own control. Commitments that cannot be broken or modified for any reason are risky because they can limit one’s freedom of action in ways that prove unexpectedly onerous or costly in light of unforeseen circumstances. In other words, actors may experience a fear of overcommitment – of becoming unexpectedly or unacceptably constrained if they choose to commit. This fear may discourage rational actors from committing in the first place.
    I'm having dinner with David tonight, and I look forward to discussing this very interesting paper. Download it while its hot!


     
    Wednesday Calendar
      University of Illinois College of Law: Oren Gazel, Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School, "Plea Bargaining Only for the Guilty?".
      University of Chicago, Law & Economics: Alan Auerbach, Robert D. Burch Professor of Economics and Law, University of California, Berkeley, and NBER, Budget Windows, Sunsets, and Fiscal Control:
        In recent years, the United States has evaluated policy changes using a multi-year budget window. A budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window’s endpoint, while a window that is too long includes years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and allows the shifting of fiscal burdens to those whom budget rules are supposed to protect. This paper characterizes the “optimal” budget window. An appropriately designed budget window eliminates the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions. The analysis also has implications for how to account for long-term term budget commitments.
      Northwestern Empirical Legal Studies: James Heckman, Henry Schultz Distinguished Service Professor in Economics, University of Chicago, "Labor Market Discrimination and Racial Differences in Pre-Market Factors"


     
    Kerr on Search & Seizure in a Digital World Orin S. Kerr (The George Washington University Law School) has posted Searches and Seizures in a Digital World (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 119, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The new frontier of the Fourth Amendment is the search and seizure of computer data. Created to regulate entering homes and seizing physical evidence, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is now called on to regulate a very different process: retrieval of digital evidence from electronic storage devices. While obvious analogies exist between searching computers and searching physical spaces, important differences between them will force courts to rethink the basic meaning of the Fourth Amendment's key concepts. What does it mean to search computer data? When is computer data seized? When is a computer search or seizure reasonable? This article offers a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer data. It begins by exploring the basic differences between physical searches of physical property and electronic searches of digital evidence. It then proposes an exposure theory of Fourth Amendment searches: any exposure of data to an output device such as a monitor should be a search of that data, and only that data. The exposure approach is then matched with a rule for computer seizures: while copying data should not be deemed a seizure of that data, searches of copies should be treated the same as searches of the original. In the final section, the article proposes a rethinking of the plain view exception in computer searches to reflect the new dynamic of digital evidence investigations. The plain view exception should be narrowed or even eliminated in digital evidence cases to ensure that digital warrants that are narrow in theory do not devolve into general warrants in practice. Tailoring the doctrine in light of the new realities of computer investigations will protect the function of existing Fourth Amendment rules in the new world of digital evidence.


     
    Two by Solove Daniel J. Solove has posted two papers on SSRN:
      The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights (Iowa Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 941, 1999):
        Deference presents one of the greatest threats to liberalism in the modern age, undermining judicial review for fundamental constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and due process. In contrast to existing critiques which dismiss deference as an ideological tool wielded by conservative judges, this article explores deference more systematically and rigorously, addressing it at its conceptual underpinnings. Deference has a strong conceptual backbone rooted in the long-accepted principle that the judiciary must avoid doing what was done in Lochner - the substitution of judicial judgment for that of the policymaker or legislature. The article argues that deference is a misguided attempt to carry out this principle in practice, an attempt based on an impoverished conception of how the judiciary and government institutions evaluate factual and empirical evidence.
      Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism (Yale Law Journal, Vol. 113, pp. 687-741, December 2003, coauthored with Michael Sullivan, Emory University - Emory College):
        Richard Posner's Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003) is the most comprehensive account to date of his pragmatic vision of the law and democracy. For the most part, Posner's theory of pragmatism has been attacked externally, mainly by theorists unsympathetic to pragmatism. In contrast, in this Review, we contest Posner's account of pragmatism from within the pragmatic tradition. We contend that Posner's views are problematic not because they are pragmatic, but because they are often not pragmatic enough. We put Posner's account of pragmatism to the pragmatic test by examining its implications. Posner views ideals as useless and philosophical theorizing as empty. Lacking any meaningful approach for scrutinizing social goals, however, pragmatism devolves into an efficiency exercise - finding the appropriate means to achieve our given ends. Posner's account has little to say about the selection of ends. Accordingly, his attack on abstract ideals becomes, in effect, an endorsement of such ideals, since it leaves unreconstructed the dominant moral ideals of present society. In contrast, we return to the thought of the classical pragmatists (primarily John Dewey) to offer an alternative vision of pragmatism. This account better integrates theory and practice and provides more meaningful guidance about the choice of ends. Although Posner adopts many of the ideas of the classical pragmatists, he diverges in crucial ways that lead to internal inconsistencies with his own pragmatic commitments and to end up employing unpragmatic forms of reasoning. Posner finds himself in this position because the pragmatic ideas upon which he founds his theory have far more potent and revolutionary implications than Posner is willing to entertain. After setting forth his account of pragmatism, Posner attacks theories of deliberative democracy as unpragmatic. According to Posner, the pragmatist recognizes that it is too unrealistic and idealistic to expect most Americans to engage in meaningful political dialogue. Instead, Posner advances a concept of democracy based on the ideas of Joseph Schumpeter: Democracy should consist of a set of elite managers whose goal is to find the most efficient means to achieve our inherited ends. We argue that Posner's account of democracy is not pragmatic at all - even on his own terms. Under Posner's account, since people are not encouraged to make any effort to form a community on the basis of shared ideals, the dominant normative ideals of society are left to drift haphazardly. Posner views the equilibrium that emerges from individuals who pursue their own private interests as sufficient to generate the larger social ethos. We contend that this conclusion is deeply flawed. Additionally, we demonstrate that certain central features of deliberative democracy, far from being unpragmatic, are, in fact, deeply connected to pragmatic inquiry.


     
    Shepherd on Permanent Vegetative States Lois Shepherd (Florida State University - College of Law) has posted In Respect of People Living in a Permanent Vegetative State - And Allowing Them to Die on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      This article considers the controversy surrounding the removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube and argues for a new approach in determining treatment decisions for people in a permanent vegetative state. Examination of the duty to respect living people as persons rather than as objects reveals that people in a permanent vegetative state are particularly vulnerable under our current statutory and case law to being kept alive only in service to the interests of others. The article proposes that we replace the current legal presumption in favor of continued life support with a presumption to discontinue it for those in a permanent vegetative state and that judicial or quasi-judicial review be brought to bear on decisions in favor of continued life support, particularly tube feeding.


     
    Macklem on the Paradox of Self-Determination Patrick Macklem (University of Toronto - Faculty of Law) has posted Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-Determination on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The international legality of militant democracy - when and how a constitutional democracy can legally act in an antidemocratic manner to combat threats to its democratic existence - is far from clear. The legality of legal pluralism - the extent to which international law authorizes transformative political agendas that seek to implement forms of religious, cultural or national autonomy - is also unclear. The elusive legality of these political developments creates conditions for the abuse of power both by states acting in defense of democracy, and by religious, cultural and national communities seeking a measure of legal autonomy. Marked by a shared normative commitment to the paradoxical principle of self-determination, the relationship between legal pluralism and militant democracy provides insight into the legality of both developments in ways that might be overlooked by viewing each in isolation. That this is the case is revealed dramatically by the recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Refah v. Turkey, in which the Court upheld the banning of a political party that advocated a form of legal pluralism which would introduce elements of Islamic law into the Turkish legal order. Refah v. Turkey establishes a legal site in which contestations over the boundaries of legal pluralism and militant democracy will take place in the future, and reveals how European human rights law seeks to realize the democratic potential of self-determination.


     
    Swaine on Treaty Reservations Edward T. Swaine (University of Pennsylvania - Legal Studies Department) has posted Reserving on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The law of treaty reservations - which enables states to ask that their multilateral obligations be tailored to their individual preferences - has been controversial for over fifty years, and is at present subject to pitched battles within (and between) the International Law Commission and numerous other international institutions. There is broad agreement that existing scheme under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties involves a sharp tradeoff between honoring the unalloyed consent of non-reserving states (that is, those agreeing to the treaty as originally negotiated, which may object to proposed reservations) and respecting the conditioned consent of reserving states; moreover, it is thought to decisively favor the latter, leading to a surplus of treaty reservations and a paucity of objections to them. The ambiguities that pervade the Convention are said to play a supporting role. Whatever their cause, it is thought, such ambiguities tend to disadvantage non-reserving states; the straightforward solution is to resolve those ambiguities, preferably by making reservations harder to pull off. This approach is seriously flawed. In fact, the law of treaty reservations - understood as reflecting, rather than surmounting, its frustrating ambiguities - plausibly serves the interests of its supposed victims, the non-reserving states, perhaps even to a greater degree than for inveterate reservers. Treaty reservations not only increase the breadth of treaty participation, but permit agreement on broader commitments than would otherwise be possible. These effects inure to the benefit of reserving and non-reserving states alike. But deeper commitments, coupled with reservations, also establish a reliable, low-cost mechanism for providing information on reserving states, something facilitated by the existing scheme's eccentricities. Those same eccentricities also enable non-reserving states to "reserve" their own judgment regarding the acceptability of reservations, and thus shift risk control back (somewhat) in their favor.


     
    Mamill on Business's Fair Share of the Tax Burden Susan Pace Hamill (University of Alabama School of Law) has posted A Moral Perspective on "Big Business" Fair Share of America's Tax Burden (University of St. Thomas Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 857, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      This article applies the ethical frameworks of utilitarian ethics, egoism and virtue ethics to the questions of whether progressive versus flat tax structures are more fair. This article also examines the economic theory of supply side economics, often cited by proponents of flat and consumption tax structures, as well as the theory of marginal utility, often cited by proponents of progressive tax structures. The article concludes that neither theory offers any reliable scientific information backing up either structure.


     
    Mann on Credit Cards & Bankruptcy Ronald Mann (Texas) has posted Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, and Bankruptcy on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      This paper analyzes the effects of credit card use on broader economic indicators, specifically consumer credit, savings, and consumer bankruptcy filings. Using aggregate nation-level data from Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, I find that credit card spending, lagged by 1-2 years, has a strong positive effect on consumer credit. I find no significant relation between credit card use and savings. Finally, I find a strong relation between credit card debt, lagged by 1-2 years, and bankruptcy, and a weaker relation between consumer credit, lagged by 1-2 years, and bankruptcy. The relations are robust across a variety of different lags and models that include variables to control for the effects of economic cycles on bankruptcy.


     
    Journal Announcement: Review of Law and Economics


    Monday, April 11, 2005
     
    Monday Calendar
      Vanderbilt Law School: Sims Lecture: Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court, "Constitutional Interpretation".
      Columbia Law & Economics, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cornell Law School, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,(Authored with Andrew J. Wistrich and FChris Guthrie):
        Procedural fairness and due process requires that courts assess evidence before them without regard to information outside of the record. Skepticism about the ability of jurors to ignore inadmissible information is widespread. Empirical research confirms that this skepticism is well-founded. Many courts and commentators, however, assume that judges can accomplish what jurors cannot. This article reports the results of studies we have conducted to determine whether judges can disregard inadmissible evidence. We found that the judges who participated in our studies struggled to perform this challenging mental task. The judges had difficulty disregarding demands disclosed during settlement talks, conversations protected by attorney-client privilege, the prior sexual history of an alleged rape victim, prior criminal convictions of a party in a civil case, and extrinsic evidence in a criminal sentencing decision . This information influenced judges' decisions even when they had ruled the evidence inadmissible. In contrast, judges were able to ignore inadmissible, constitutionally infirm evidence in two criminal cases. We conclude that like jurors, judges are not reliably able to avoid being influenced by relevant but inadmissible information of which they are aware. Nevertheless, judges displayed a surprising ability to do so in some situations.
      Northwestern International Law: Edward Swaine, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Law, University of Pennsylvania, "Reservations":
        The law of treaty reservations – which enables states to ask that their multilateral obligations be tailored to their individual preferences – has been controversial for over fifty years, and is at present subject to pitched battles within (and between) the International Law Commission and numerous other international institutions. There is broad agreement that existing scheme under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties involves a sharp tradeoff between honoring the unalloyed consent of nonreserving states (that is, those agreeing to the treaty as originally negotiated, which may object to proposed reservations) and respecting the conditioned consent of reserving states; moreover, it is thought to decisively favor the latter, leading to a surplus of treaty reservations and a paucity of objections to them. The ambiguities that pervade the Convention are said to play a supporting role. Whatever their cause, it is thought, such ambiguities tend to disadvantage non-reserving states; the straightforward solution is to resolve those ambiguities, preferably by making reservations harder to pull off. This approach is seriously flawed. In fact, the law of treaty reservations – understood as reflecting, rather than surmounting, its frustrating ambiguities – plausibly serves the interests of its supposed victims, the non-reserving states, perhaps even to a greater degree than for inveterate reservers. Treaty reservations not only increase the breadth of treaty participation, but permit agreement on broader commitments than would otherwise be possible. These effects inure to the benefit of reserving and non-reserving states alike. But deeper commitments, coupled with reservations, also establish a reliable, low-cost mechanism for providing information on reserving states, something facilitated by the existing scheme’s eccentricities. Those same eccentricities also enable non-reserving states to “reserve” their own judgment regarding the acceptability of reservations, and thus shift risk control back (somewhat) in their favor.
      Doron Teichman, UT School of Law, "Sex,Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Law":
        The legal system does not function in a vacuum. Some acts that are governed by legal rules are also governed by social norms. In many cases, these social norms are enforced by a set of non-legal sanctions, which include internal sanctions such as guilt and external sanctions such as refusal to interact with the offender. This Article focuses on the general question of how policymakers aiming to minimize the cost of sanctioning should utilize legal and non-legal sanctions when designing a system of criminal sanctions. Specifically, this Article examines the current trend in various jurisdictions in the United States to enact a version of Megan’s Law requiring the publication of the names of convicted sex offenders. Law and economics scholars have studied social norms and non-legal sanctions for many years. This inquiry initially focused on the characteristics of non-legal systems within closely-knit societies and then broadened to include issues related to public law. Recently, these researchers have turned to developing more general theories as to the origin of social norms and the relationship between social norms and the law. The wealth of research that has been done demonstrates the importance law and economics scholars attribute to this area of study. One of the current debates regarding non-legal sanctions concerns the extent to which legally-induced non-legal sanctions such as shaming should be used to punish criminals. At one end of this debate stand scholars such as Toni Massaro and James Whitman, who argue that non-legal sanctions are either ineffective or morally repugnant and therefore should not be used. At the other end stand scholars such as Dan Kahan and Eric Posner, who argue that non-legal sanctions may be an efficient and politically viable sanctioning tool. This Article sides with the latter stance and incorporates further economic insights into the debate. It demonstrates that policymakers cannot substitute legal sanctions with non-legal ones and still hold the level of non-legal sanctions constant, since the level of one type affects that of the other. For example, a reduced legal sanction might cause the public to perceive a certain crime as less severe, which in turn might reduce the non-legal sanctions it imposes as a result. Thus, tailoring an efficient system that combines legal and non-legal sanctions might be more difficult than previously perceived.
      UCLA School of Law: Robert Pushaw, Pepperdine Law School.
      Hofstra University School of Law: Neal Devins, William & Mary Law School, “Reflections on the Rehnquist Court”
      NYU Law School: Mattias Kumm.


     
    Huigens on Williams v. New York Kyron Huigens has posted Solving the Williams Puzzle (Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105, No.4, May 2005). Here is the abstract:
      In the 1949 case of Williams v. New York, the United State Supreme Court approved of judicial factfinding as a feature of discretionary sentencing. The Court's more recent ban on judicial factfinding in determinate sentencing systems would seem to apply to discretionary sentencing systems as well, implying that Williams is no longer good law. If a sentencing judge may find facts in the exercise of discretionary sentencing as a matter of due process, then a legislature's attempt to introduce rule of law values into sentencing by creating a determinate sentencing regime hardly seems to call for constitutional limitations on judicial factfinding. And yet, the Court has not only left Williams intact, but embraced it in Booker v. United States as a remedy for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ inconsistency with Blakely. This Essay offers a rationale for the continued viability of Williams and the continued practice of unconstrained judicial factfinding in discretionary sentencing systems. Professor Huigens describes and compares the normative architecture of offense definition and adjudication to that of sentencing in terms of two fundamental and competing values in criminal law: legality and fine-grainedness. He argues that if a legislature chooses to impose the normative architecture of offense definition and adjudication onto sentencing, then the constitutional regulation appropriate to offense definition and adjudication is made relevant to sentencing. This is a normative argument, but one that is compelling in light of an increased conceptual clarity about the fundamental values and normative architecture of criminal law.


     
    Oman on the Theory of Contract Nathan Oman (Sidley Austin) has posted Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      One of the central problems of contracts jurisprudence is the conflict between autonomy theories of contract and efficiency theories of contract. One approach to solving this conflict is to argue that in the realm of contracts between corporations, autonomy theories have nothing to say because corporations are not real people with whose autonomy we need to be concerned. While apparently powerful, this argument ultimately fails because it implicitly assumes theories of the corporation at odds with economic theories of law. Economics, in turn, offers a vision of the firm that is quite hospitable to autonomy theories of contract. The failure of this argument suggests that a more fruitful avenue for reconciling these competing approaches is to find a principled way of integrating them into a single theory.
    As a law student, Nate was one of the best serious bloggers. I take special pleasure in recommending this very interesting paper.


     
    Two By Eisikovits Nir Eisikovits has posted two articles to SSRN:
      Moral Luck and the Criminal Law (forthcoming in J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, D. Shier, Eds. Law and Social Justice, MIT Press):
        The problem of moral luck springs from a discrepancy between our notion of responsibility and the actual manner in which we make moral judgments. We tend to think people are only responsible for what they can control, but we are also inclined to judge them on the basis of what they cannot. The problem was introduced by two seminal articles written by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel and has generated a good deal of interest since. Scholars concerned with the criminal law have found it especially rich. Most lawyers have focused on Nagel's account of moral luck, perhaps because it is more concerned with external judgments of an agent's action (which are the kind of judgments the law makes), while Williams focuses on self-evaluation. As a matter of fact legal scholars have focused especially on one aspect of Nagel's account, namely luck in the outcomes of our actions, or outcome luck. This paper begins with a short example aimed at bringing out some of the questions involved in the notion of 'moral luck'. It then proceeds to give a critical account of the debate concerning the role of fortuity in the moral assessment of criminal actions and in their punishment. I preface the final part of the essay with a cautionary note about taking sides in this debate. The problem of moral luck represents a paradox in the heart of our moral practices; it needs to be described rather than 'solved', since paradoxes cannot be argued away. I then go on to describe aspects of the relationship between law and luck that have been largely neglected by the literature.
      Forget Forgiveness: On the Benefits of Sympathy for Political Reconciliation (recently appeared in a special issue of Theoria):
        The work of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission has generated a great deal of interest in the role of forgiveness in politics. More specifically, it has raised the question of whether forgiveness should be a constitutive part of reconciliation processes between groups. In this paper, I argue that it should not, and that it might be both more useful and more realistic to consider something like Adam Smith's notion of 'sympathy' instead. Part 1 examines the arguments for and against policies promoting political forgiveness. Part 2 suggests sympathy as an alternative. Part 3 considers and rejects some objections to the employment of sympathy in this context.


     
    Prescott & Star on Improving Jury Decision Making After Blakeley J. J. Prescott (MIT Department of Economics; Michigan Law School) & Sonja B. Starr (Goldstein & Howe, P.C.) have posted Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely Revolution on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The shift in sentencing fact-finding responsibility triggered by Blakely v. Washington will dramatically change the complexity and type of questions that many juries will have to answer. Among the most important challenges confronting legislatures now debating the future of their sentencing regimes is whether juries are prepared to handle these new tasks effectively - and, if not, what can be done about it. The literature addressing Blakely and jury reform advocates have essentially ignored these questions - yet absent reform, a number of limitations on juror decision making seriously threaten the accuracy of verdicts and the fairness, effectiveness, and credibility of the criminal justice system. In this essay, we assess juries' capacity to handle their new post-Blakely responsibilities, considering problems of cognitive overload, frustration and loss of motivation due to complex structures, difficulties evaluating certain kinds of evidence juries do not ordinarily consider, distortions due to the framing of non-binary questions, and deliberation-related biases, among others. We then propose a model for sentencing-stage jury proceedings that would minimize these problems. Its components include bifurcation of proceedings, partial application of the rules of evidence, formulation of special verdict forms in certain specific ways that will minimize framing effects, structural simplification of sentencing tasks, a more active jury, and guidance for jurors on bias-reducing deliberation structures.



    Sunday, April 10, 2005
     
    Legal Theory Calendar
      Monday, April 11
        Vanderbilt Law School: Sims Lecture: Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court, "Constitutional Interpretation".
        Columbia Law & Economics, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cornell Law School, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,(Authored with Andrew J. Wistrich and FChris Guthrie):
          Procedural fairness and due process requires that courts assess evidence before them without regard to information outside of the record. Skepticism about the ability of jurors to ignore inadmissible information is widespread. Empirical research confirms that this skepticism is well-founded. Many courts and commentators, however, assume that judges can accomplish what jurors cannot. This article reports the results of studies we have conducted to determine whether judges can disregard inadmissible evidence. We found that the judges who participated in our studies struggled to perform this challenging mental task. The judges had difficulty disregarding demands disclosed during settlement talks, conversations protected by attorney-client privilege, the prior sexual history of an alleged rape victim, prior criminal convictions of a party in a civil case, and extrinsic evidence in a criminal sentencing decision . This information influenced judges' decisions even when they had ruled the evidence inadmissible. In contrast, judges were able to ignore inadmissible, constitutionally infirm evidence in two criminal cases. We conclude that like jurors, judges are not reliably able to avoid being influenced by relevant but inadmissible information of which they are aware. Nevertheless, judges displayed a surprising ability to do so in some situations.
        Northwestern International Law: Edward Swaine, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Law, University of Pennsylvania, "Reservations":
          The law of treaty reservations – which enables states to ask that their multilateral obligations be tailored to their individual preferences – has been controversial for over fifty years, and is at present subject to pitched battles within (and between) the International Law Commission and numerous other international institutions. There is broad agreement that existing scheme under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties involves a sharp tradeoff between honoring the unalloyed consent of nonreserving states (that is, those agreeing to the treaty as originally negotiated, which may object to proposed reservations) and respecting the conditioned consent of reserving states; moreover, it is thought to decisively favor the latter, leading to a surplus of treaty reservations and a paucity of objections to them. The ambiguities that pervade the Convention are said to play a supporting role. Whatever their cause, it is thought, such ambiguities tend to disadvantage non-reserving states; the straightforward solution is to resolve those ambiguities, preferably by making reservations harder to pull off. This approach is seriously flawed. In fact, the law of treaty reservations – understood as reflecting, rather than surmounting, its frustrating ambiguities – plausibly serves the interests of its supposed victims, the non-reserving states, perhaps even to a greater degree than for inveterate reservers. Treaty reservations not only increase the breadth of treaty participation, but permit agreement on broader commitments than would otherwise be possible. These effects inure to the benefit of reserving and non-reserving states alike. But deeper commitments, coupled with reservations, also establish a reliable, low-cost mechanism for providing information on reserving states, something facilitated by the existing scheme’s eccentricities. Those same eccentricities also enable non-reserving states to “reserve” their own judgment regarding the acceptability of reservations, and thus shift risk control back (somewhat) in their favor.
        Doron Teichman, UT School of Law, "Sex,Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Law":
          The legal system does not function in a vacuum. Some acts that are governed by legal rules are also governed by social norms. In many cases, these social norms are enforced by a set of non-legal sanctions, which include internal sanctions such as guilt and external sanctions such as refusal to interact with the offender. This Article focuses on the general question of how policymakers aiming to minimize the cost of sanctioning should utilize legal and non-legal sanctions when designing a system of criminal sanctions. Specifically, this Article examines the current trend in various jurisdictions in the United States to enact a version of Megan’s Law requiring the publication of the names of convicted sex offenders. Law and economics scholars have studied social norms and non-legal sanctions for many years. This inquiry initially focused on the characteristics of non-legal systems within closely-knit societies and then broadened to include issues related to public law. Recently, these researchers have turned to developing more general theories as to the origin of social norms and the relationship between social norms and the law. The wealth of research that has been done demonstrates the importance law and economics scholars attribute to this area of study. One of the current debates regarding non-legal sanctions concerns the extent to which legally-induced non-legal sanctions such as shaming should be used to punish criminals. At one end of this debate stand scholars such as Toni Massaro and James Whitman, who argue that non-legal sanctions are either ineffective or morally repugnant and therefore should not be used. At the other end stand scholars such as Dan Kahan and Eric Posner, who argue that non-legal sanctions may be an efficient and politically viable sanctioning tool. This Article sides with the latter stance and incorporates further economic insights into the debate. It demonstrates that policymakers cannot substitute legal sanctions with non-legal ones and still hold the level of non-legal sanctions constant, since the level of one type affects that of the other. For example, a reduced legal sanction might cause the public to perceive a certain crime as less severe, which in turn might reduce the non-legal sanctions it imposes as a result. Thus, tailoring an efficient system that combines legal and non-legal sanctions might be more difficult than previously perceived.
        UCLA School of Law: Robert Pushaw, Pepperdine Law School.
        Hofstra University School of Law: Neal Devins, William & Mary Law School, “Reflections on the Rehnquist Court”
        NYU Law School: Mattias Kumm.
      Tuesday, April 12
        University of Illinois College of Law: Oren Gazel, Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School, "Plea Bargaining Only for the Guilty?".
        University of Chicago, Law & Economics: Alan Auerbach, Robert D. Burch Professor of Economics and Law, University of California, Berkeley, and NBER, Budget Windows, Sunsets, and Fiscal Control:
          In recent years, the United States has evaluated policy changes using a multi-year budget window. A budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window’s endpoint, while a window that is too long includes years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and allows the shifting of fiscal burdens to those whom budget rules are supposed to protect. This paper characterizes the “optimal” budget window. An appropriately designed budget window eliminates the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions. The analysis also has implications for how to account for long-term term budget commitments.
        Northwestern Empirical Legal Studies: James Heckman, Henry Schultz Distinguished Service Professor in Economics, University of Chicago, "Labor Market Discrimination and Racial Differences in Pre-Market Factors"
      Wednesday, April 13
        Northwestern Constitutional Theory: Adrian Vermeule, Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago, "Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs":
          Recent evidence suggests that capital punishment may have a significant deterrent effect, preventing as many eighteen or more murders for each execution. This evidence greatly unsettles moral objections to the death penalty, because it suggests that a refusal to impose that penalty condemns numerous innocent people to death. Capital punishment thus presents a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context, because government is a special kind of moral agent. The familiar problems with capital punishment - potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew - do not argue in favor of abolition, because the world of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs involved in capital punishment may depend on cognitive processes that fail to treat "statistical lives" with the seriousness that they deserve.
        Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Richard McAdams, Guy Raymond Jones Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, "The Uneasy Case for Regulating Undercover Operations: Institutional and Economic Perspectives on the Entrapment Defense"
        NYU Legal History: Harold Forsythe, Samuel I. Golieb Fellow, NYU School of Law.
        University of Texas School of Law: Sovereignty Symposium: Neil MacCormick University of Edinburgh, "Is European Democracy Possible? Reflections on the Proposed European Constitution".
        Vanderbilty Law School Law & Economics Workshop: Jason Johnston, University of Pennsylvania.
      Thursday, April 14
        Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Arthur Ripstein, University of Toronto (Law), "Beyond The Harm Principle":
          In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill introduces his “harm principle,” according to which "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with liberty of expression or action is to prevent harm to others." A few sentences later, Mill goes on to say "The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which is he is answerable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign." My aim is to argue that a commitment to individual sovereignty and a sphere of action in which you are answerable only to yourself requires that we abandon the harm principle.
        UC Berekely, Kadish Center: Debra Satz, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, INEQUALITIES IN SCHOOLING: THE CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC ADEQUACY:
          This paper examines two different kinds of arguments that have been made against our unequally funded and resourced K-12 education. One argument condemns inequalities in educational resources as a consequence of a commitment to an ideal of equality of opportunity applied to education. The ideal of equality of opportunity is comparative: what matters is how much opportunity a given person has with respect to others. The other argument presents its case primarily in terms of adequacy. The ideal of adequacy is non-comparative: what matters is that each person have enough opportunity. Equality of opportunity and adequacy are not the only two possible criticisms of educational inequalities, nor are they mutually exclusive. (They both, for example, give us reasons to condemn the status quo distribution of educational resources.) Nevertheless, the idea of educational adequacy–of establishing a threshold of cognitive skills and knowledge for all children—is in principle quite distinct from the idea of giving all children an equal opportunity to compete. Critics of current educational inequalities usually seem to have one type of criticism or the other primarily in mind.
        Florida State University School of Law: Lars Trägårdh, Columbia University, The Juridification of Politics in the United States and Europe: Historica Roots, Contemporary Debates and Future Prospects
          IN AN ARTICLE prominently published a few years ago in The New York Times, Roger Cohen (2000) sounded a by now familiar theme: the nation-state is losing ground in Europe. But what was interesting about Cohen’s article was not the general assertion, both commonplace and contested, that the European Union is characterised by the transgression of national sovereignties. Rather, its significance lay in his contention that a new European identity is in the process of being shaped that is based neither on the adoption of an elusive common ‘culture’, in the quasi ethnic sense of a common language, literature and history, nor on traditional nation-statist civic attributes such as mass political parties, the ritual of voting, the symbolism of flag, anthem, conscription, oath of allegiance, or passport. Rather, Cohen claimed, a new ‘sense of European citizenship’ is emerging, which is founded on the ‘pre-eminence of European law over national legislation’.
        UCLA Legal Theory Workshop: Anne M. Coughlin, O. M. Vicars Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
        Fordham University School of Law: William E. Forbath, Lloyd M. Bensten Endowed Chair in Law, Professor History, University of Texas, Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law (2004-2005), "Social Citizenship In England And America: A Comparative Constitutional History":
          In my view, social citizenship stands out as one of the great achievements of the 20th century. As a moral sensibility, it broke with millenia-old conventions of exclusion; instead, every member of society was deemed worthy of the same "social heritage" and dignifying standards of life. My question, then, is a variation on an old saw: Why no Social Citizenship in America? There are myriad familiar answers. By the early 20th century, the labor movements of Britain and other European nations embraced broad class-based political programs, and these nations saw the formation of labor or socialist parties. These latter, in turn, proved crucial in the creation of social citizenship rights, both as political agents in their own right, and, equally, as rivals for power with other political parties, whose programs were shaped by this rivalry. Not so the U.S., where, so standard accounts suggest, since Andrew Jackson's day, workers have been wedded to individualistic strategies for bettering their lot, and have largely resisted efforts to improve their condition as a class; where even trade unionists have always been "pragmatists," not "class conscious," but "job conscious"; and where, accordingly, class-based reform politics and "socialistic" ideas have been the province of intellectuals and agitators on the margins of political life. The potential for a broader class-based politics within the American working class was undone not only by the individualism engrained in the nation's culture. Class-based politics also foundered on profound racial and ethnic divisions among working people - the fruits of African slavery and waves of European immigration.
        Michigan Cyberlaw & Economics: Robert Hillman, Cornell, On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications:
          In a recent article, Jeffery Rachlinski and I analyzed whether contract law’s approach to the problem of paper standard forms can effectively govern electronic forms.1 Some analysts believe that contract law must evolve to police business’s new Internet strategies for taking advantage of consumers. Conversely, others assert that contract law must create a new framework to facilitate business’s use of the new technology. Relying on our assumptions about how e businesses use the Internet and how consumers treat their e-standard forms, we concluded that Internet contracting is not fundamentally different from the paper world. Accordingly, major changes in the approach of contract law are not imperative. This paper tests the assumptions we made about consumer behavior when agreeing to estandard forms by offering some empirical evidence of consumer practices. Part I revisits our assumptions about these practices. To test these assumptions, Part II reports on a survey of 92 contracts students’ e-standard form practices. The survey inquired about all aspects of their practices, including frequency of contracting, the place and time of such contracting, whether they read their eforms, the reasons for reading or failing to read, and the factors that would promote reading.
        Boston University School of Law:
          Tim Greaney
          Frank Michelman (Harvard) (DISTINGUISHED LECTURE)
        George Mason School of Law: Dean Lueck, University of Arizona Department of Economics, Conservation Easements: Economics, Law and Politics.
        Georgetown Colloquium on Intellectual Property & Technology Law: Arti K. Rai, Duke Law School, Open-Source Genomics and Biopharmaceutical Industry.
        Princeton Public Law Colloquium: Professor Gordon Silverstein of the University of California - Berkeley, "How Law Kills Politics."
        University of Texas Law School, Sovereignty Symposium:
          9:00-11:00 Conceptualizing Sovereignty: Michael Gillespie (Duke University); Michael Lind (Washington, D.C.); Philip Bobbitt (UT); David Law (University of San Diego Law School), Alex Alienikoff (Georgetown University Law Center) 11:15-12:30 Law and “The Emergency”: "Sovereignty: Use of Force and Human Rights" (Francesco Francioni, EUI); “Constitutional Norms in a Time of Permanent Emergency,” Sanford Levinson (UT), 1:45-3:45 On the Idea of Popular (or “Democratic” Sovereignty: I. The debate over looking to foreign materials in interpreting the United States Constitution On the meaning of “Democratic Sovereignty”: Ken Anderson (American University); Jed Rubenfeld (Yale); Sarah Cleveland (UT); Judith Resnik (Yale) 4:00-5:30 II. “Popular Constitutionalism”: Scot Powe (UT), Gary Jacobsohn (UT)
      Friday, April 15
        UCLA School of Law: Larry Helfer, Vanderbilt University Law School, "Exit in International Law and Politics"
        University of Texas Law School: Sovereignty Symposium:
          9:30-11:30 On the Meaning of “Dual Sovereignty” Within Federal Systems: Ernest Young (UT); Lynn Baker (UT); Neil MacCormick (Edinburgh) 12:15-1:15 Arthur Cockfield, Queens University, Ontario, Canada: "The Rise of the OECD as Informal 'World Tax Organization' through the Shaping of National Responses to E-commerce Taxation" 1:30-3:00 "The Privatization of Sovereignty" (Fabrizio Cafaggi, EUI); Jay Westbrook (UT) 3:15-4:45 "Negotiated Sovereignty over Common Spaces: The Case of Antarctica " (Patrizia Vigni)


     
    Legal Theory Lexicon: Indeterminacy
      Introduction It all depends on your first year section, but many law students begin to get a sinking feeling about the law early in their first year. Does the law actually make any difference to the way cases are decided? Before law school, most of us would answer "Yes, of course." And many law students start law school with the assumption that they will "learn the rules." But in contemporary American legal education, many students encounter a thesis that goes something like this:
        The laws have nothing to do with how cases come out. They are just window dressing that skillful lawyers and judges can manipulate to justify any decision they reach on grounds of policy, ideology, or personal preference.
      This counterintuitive position is a version of the claim that law is indeterminate, or what we might call the indeterminacy thesis.
      The Indeterminacy Debate The indeterminacy thesis is associated with legal realism, but in its most strident form, it is most strongly identified with the Critical Legal Studies movement--a loose and multifaceted cluster of legal scholars that became very prominent in the 1980s.
      The indeterminacy debate is about the claim that the law does not constrain judicial decisions. Put differently, the claim is that all cases are hard cases and that there are no easy cases. The strongest version of the claim is the notion that any result in any legal dispute can be justified as the legally correct outcome, but the thesis can be modified or weakened in various ways.
      What does the indeterminacy thesis mean? Let's call the claim that the laws (broadly defined to include cases, regulations, statutes, constitutional provisions, and other legal materials) do not determine legal outcomes the indeterminacy thesis. Because there are many different versions of the indeterminacy thesis, our approach will be to identify clearly the distinct versions of the indeterminacy thesis and then to consider each version of the thesis on its own merits.
      Indeterminacy versus Underdeterminacy The next step in clarifying the indeterminacy debate is to distinguish between "indeterminacy" and "underdeterminacy" of law. Thus far, we have accepted the implicit assumption that indeterminacy and determinacy are exhaustive categories, i.e. that the decision of a case is either determined by the law or it is indeterminate. This assumption is not correct. A legal dispute may be constrained by the law, but not determined by it.
      Roughly, an case is underdetermined by the law if the outcome (including the formal mandate and the content of the opinion) can vary within limits that are defined by the legal materials. This approximation can be made more precise by considering the relationship between two sets of outcomes of a given case. The first set consists of all possible results — all the imaginable variations in the mandate (affirmance, reversal, remand, etc.) and in the reasoning of the opinion. The second set consists of the outcomes that can be squared with the law — the set or legally acceptable outcomes. The distinctions between indeterminacy, underdeterminacy and determinacy of the law with respect to a given case may be marked with the following definitions:
      • The law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of legally acceptable outcomes contains one and only one member.
      • The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of legally acceptable outcomes is a nonidentical subset of the set of all possible results.
      • The law is indeterminate with respect to a given case if the set of legally acceptable outcomes is identical with the set of all possible results.
      Hard Cases The notion of a "hard case" can now be explicated with reference to the idea of underdeterminacy. A case is a "hard case" if the outcome is underdetermined by the law in a manner such that the judge must choose among legally acceptable outcomes in a way that changes who will be perceived as the "winner" and who the "loser." The point is that the outcomes of an case need not be completely indeterminate in order for it to be a hard case; a case in which the results are underdetermined by the law will be "hard" if the legally acceptable variation makes the difference between loss or victory for the litigants. The distinction between indeterminacy and underdeterminacy is rarely observed in the indeterminacy debate, but it is nonetheless important to assessing the debate. Claims that the law is radically indeterminate are implausible, but more modest claims about underdeterminacy may both be defensible and play a role in a radical critique of liberal legal theory.
      Is the law radically indeterminate? The strongest (the most ambitious) claim about the indeterminacy of law is the claim that in every possible case, any possible outcome is legally correct. In other words, the strong indeterminacy thesis is the claim that the law is radically indeterminate:
        The Strong Indeterminacy Thesis: In any set of facts about actions and events that could be processed as a legal case, any possible outcome — consisting of a decision, order, and opinion — will be legally correct.
      To falsify the strong indeterminacy thesis one needs to establish that there is at least one possible case in which at least one possible outcome is legally incorrect. This refutation would disprove the strong indeterminacy thesis only in the sense stipulated here; it would not establish that the law is always, usually, or even frequently determinate.
      The Argument from Easy Cases One way to establish that there is at least one possible case in which at least one outcome is legally incorrect has been called "the argument from easy cases" by Fred Schauer. In its simplest form, the argument from easy cases points to a hypothetical case in which at least one outcome is legally incorrect. The following discussion attempts to formulate one such easy case:
        Consider the following case, consisting of facts, a legal rule, and a legal event. First, postulate the following set of events and actions: Ben visited Point Magu State Beach in Ventura County, California between the hours of 12:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, February 14, 2004. Second, consider the following legal rule: Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states, "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . ." (26 Stat. 209 (1890)). Third, consider the following claim about a possible case: Ben's visit to the beach on the date and time specified would not constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In order fully to convince you of this, I would need to tell you more about what went on at the beach on that day. The details will include Ben's looking at the ocean, speaking with friends about politics, reading a book, and so forth. Children flew kites; a friend grilled chicken and hot dogs. You might want to know whether Ben discussed any business dealings at the beach: he did not. But no matter how many questions you asked, no matter how hard you tried, you would not be able to make out a legally valid case that the Sherman Act was violated. If a prosecution were filed against Ben based only on the events specified, a verdict of guilty would be legally incorrect. This is not to deny that it is possible that things would go wrong in some way. Perjury might be committed; the judge assigned to the case might be deranged. Our system of justice is hardly foolproof, but that does not entail the further conclusion that any result is legally correct.
      The upshot of this example of an easy case is this: there is at least one possible case in which at least one possible outcome is legally incorrect. Therefore, the strong indeterminacy thesis (as I have defined it) is false. Notice my argument is not that the outcome of an antitrust prosecution based on the facts I outline is predictable. Rather, my claim is that one possible outcome, i.e. conviction, would be legally incorrect. If the law is correctly applied and the witnesses testify truthfully, the prosecution should fail.
      Changing the Hypothetical Of course, we can easily change the hypothetical so that the legally correct outcome would change. Just add a conspiratorial conversation at the beach that does violate the Sherman Act. But the fact that the hypothetical can be changed so as to change the legally correct outcome is not responsive to the argument from easy cases. Let us stipulate for the sake of argument that it is always be possible to add facts to an easy case such that the addition of the new facts will change the legally correct outcome of the case. This does not demonstrate that there are no easy cases. Quite the contrary, the fact that the advocate of the strong indeterminacy thesis needed to add facts to the easy case in order to change the legally correct outcome shows that as originally stated the easy case was not indeterminate. If the strong indeterminacy thesis were true, then a reasonable legal argument should be available on the facts as originally stated in the hypothetical. The additional facts should not be necessary. That facts must be added to transform an easy case into a hard one demonstrates that the law does constrain the set of legally correct outcomes.
      Is a modest version of the indeterminacy thesis defensible? If the strong indeterminacy thesis cannot be supported, is there a more modest claim about indeterminacy that is defensible and has critical bite? One modest version of the indeterminacy thesis might be the following: in most (or almost all) of the cases that are actually litigated, the outcome is underdetermined by the law. This claim about indeterminacy is not refuted by the argument from hypothetical easy cases. Confirmation of the actually-litigated underdeterminacy thesis would require empirical investigation, but there are some good reasons to believe that cases which actually proceed to filing, trial, or appeal will frequently be underdetermined by the law. Litigants will rarely have an incentive to settle easy cases. For example, in a civil dispute where the law gives a determinate answer to the question of who will win and what the amount of their judgment will be, the parties to litigation will usually prefer to settle, rather than incur the expenses of litigation. Uncertainty about the law is one of the factors that selects which cases will be filed, go to trial, and be appealed. This point should not be exaggerated, however: litigation may proceed for any number of reasons, including an irrational overconfidence in a hopeless case, uncertainty about facts in a case in which the law is clear, and so forth.
      Important Cases Another modest version of the indeterminacy thesis claims that while many ordinary cases are roughly determinate, all the really important cases are indeterminate. Put more precisely, the claim might be that the important issues in important cases are underdetermined by the law. If true, this claim might preserve almost all of the critical force of the strong indeterminacy thesis. Yes, there are easy cases, but those cases are unimportant.
      One difficulty with the important case version of the indeterminacy thesis is its potential circularity. Our concept of what counts as an important case may have indeterminacy as a component. Part of what makes a case important is that the result is not certain or predictable; if we all knew how the case would come out, we would not be interested. Likewise, the Supreme Court may select cases in part on the basis of their legal indeterminacy.
      Conclusion I have just begun to scratch the surface of the indeterminacy debate, but I hope that I've provided enough perspective so that you can begin to think about this important question on your own. As I'm sure you know by now, I am not a fan of the radical indeterminacy thesis, but I also think it is important to recognize that the law is underdeterminate in important ways.
      For more on the indeterminacy debate, see Lawrence Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 University of Chicago Law Review 462 (1987). (online here)
    For a complete collection of the Legal Theory Lexicon posts with a table of contents, click here.


    Saturday, April 09, 2005
     
    Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends a contemporary classic The Right to Private Property by Jeremy Waldron. This is a marvelous book, and essential reading for anyone interested in the theory of property law. Highly recommended!


     
    Download of the Week The Download of the Week is The Political Psychology of Redistribution by Ed McCaffery and Jonathan Baron (University of Southern California - Law School and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Psychology). Here is the abstract:
      Welfare economics suggests that the tax system is the appropriate place to effect redistribution from those with more command over material resources to those with less - that is, in short, to serve equity. Society should set other mechanisms of private and public law, including public finance systems, to maximize welfare - that is, in short, to serve efficiency. The populace, however, may not always accept first-best policies. Perspectives from cognitive psychology suggest that ordinary citizens can react to the purely formal means by which social policies are implemented, and thus may reject welfare-improving reforms. This Article sets out the general background of the problem. We present the results of original experiments that confirm that the means of implementing redistribution affect its acceptability. Effects range from such seemingly trivial matters as whether or not tax burdens are discussed in dollars or in percent terms, to more substantial matters such as how many different individual taxes there are, whether the burden of taxes is transparent or not, and the nature and level of the public provision of goods and services. The findings suggest a deep and problematic tension between the goals of equity and efficiency in public finance.
    Download it while its hot!


    Friday, April 08, 2005
     
    Spooner Award to Barnett Randy Barnett's Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty is the 2005 winner of the Lysander Spooner Award for Advancing the Literature of Liberty for books published in 2004.


     
    Huigens on Duress Kyron Huigens has posted Duress Is Not A Justification on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      In this response to Peter Westen's and James Mangiafico's article, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not An Excuse - And Why It Matters, Professor Huigens argues that Westen and Mangiafico (W&M)do not demonstrate that duress is a justification in the sense that they apparently mean: that duress is in all instances a justification and never an excuse. W&M argue that duress is a justification because, seen in context, a human threat is more grave than a natural threat, so that avoiding such a threat is a lesser evil. But there is nothing remarkable in this, because the facts that will support a duress defense often will also support a justification argument. In the framing of a justification argument, we always contextualize by allowing the defendant to argue both that he was justified and that he was reasonable even if he was mistaken about being justified. This does not preclude the defendant from making a third argument that, even if he was not actually justified, and even if he was at fault in mistakenly believing that he was justified, he still ought to be acquitted. The conditions of responsibility are not met where he makes a wrong choice under circumstances of hard choice, and he is not a fair candidate for punishment when most of those who would presume to punish him lack the moral right to do so, because they would have made the same wrong choice that he did in those circumstances.


     
    Burk on Law as a Network Standard Dan L. Burk (University of Minnesota Law School) has posted Law as a Network Standard (International Journal of Communications Law Policy, Forthcoming). Here is the absract:
      The problem of global information flows via computer networks can be conceived and understood as raising issues of competition, interoperability, and standard-setting parallel to those in analysis of technical standards. Uniform standards, whether technical or legal, give rise to a constellation of positive and negative network effects. As a global network based upon the "end to end" principle of interoperability, the Internet mediates between different, otherwise incompatible computing platforms. But to the extent that law and technological "code" may act as substitutes in shaping human behavior, the Internet similarly mediates between different, otherwise incompatible legal platforms. Much of the legal and social controversy surrounding the Internet stems from the interconnection of such incompatible legal systems. As with technical systems, problems of incompatibility may be addressed by the adoption of uniform legal standards. This, however, raises legal standard-setting problems similar to those seen in technical standard-setting, where the standard may be "tipped" in favor of dominant producers. In particular, if law is considered a social product, the benefits of interjurisdictional competition and diversity may be lost as a single uniform legal standard dominates the market for law.


     
    Stake on Law School Rankings Jeffrey Evans Stake (Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington) The Interplay between Ranking Criteria and Effects: Toward Responsible Rankings on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The law school rankings published by US News and World Report have changed and continue to change the law school world. Are the rankings accurate? Are they changing schools for the better? As measures of educational quality, the US News rankings are seriously flawed. They overweight criteria that matter little, such as bar pass rate. They exclude criteria that matter greatly, such as job satisfaction. Two of the seemingly valid criteria incorporated into the US News rankings are illusory. The reputation surveys done by US News do not tap into independent professional opinion but instead measure opinions which are influenced by US News and, thus, add little reliability to the results that would be reached on other criteria. A more serious problem is the effect of US News rankings on the operation of law schools and students who desire admission. The rankings have created incentives for students who want to be lawyers to go to schools that have grade inflation and take easy courses at those schools. The US News rankings have created incentives for schools to teach to the bar exam, spend money on glossy publications, raise tuition, increase the number of transfer students accepted, and admit students according to their ability to bubble in multiple-choice answer sheets rather than their prospects for contributing to the learning environment at the law school or their prospects for becoming effective and responsible lawyers.


     
    Suggs on Law & Economics and Racial Inequality Robert E. Suggs (University of Maryland - School of Law) has posted Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial Inequality on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The standard Law & Economics analysis of racial discrimination has stunted our thinking about race. Its early conclusion, that laws prohibiting racial discrimination were unnecessary and wasteful, discredited economic analysis of racial phenomena within the civil rights community. As a consequence we know little about the impact of racial discrimination on commercial transactions between business firms. Laws do not prohibit racial discrimination in transactions between business firms, and the disparity in business revenues between racial minorities and the white mainstream dwarf disparities in income by orders of magnitude. This disparity in business revenues is a major factor in the persistence of racial inequality. Since discrimination in business activity cannot be prohibited and equal protection doctrine severely limits race conscious programs, policies intended to erode racial barriers to business firms must satisfy the demands of the marketplace. And we currently lack the nuanced understanding needed to design relevant programs. Law & Economics built its flawed analysis of discrimination on the concept of "psychic" income. Critical to its conclusion about civil rights laws being unnecessary was the implicit assumption that only white workers, but not black workers, could experience psychic gains and losses from satisfying their preferences. Once flawed assumptions, such as this one, are replaced by more appropriate ones, economic analysis can increase our understanding of how race affects market activity and aid the creation of policies that increase minority business activity and reduce racial inequality.
    I would think that this critique is not properly aimed at "Law and Economics" per se, but rather at particular work.


     
    Ku on Grokster Raymond Shih Ray Ku (Case Western Reserve University - School of Law) has posted Grokking Grokster on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Much more is at stake in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster than the standard for secondary liability under copyright. Ultimately, the Supreme Court must decide whether judges should interpret intellectual property in defense of the existing market structure and to prevent the current paradigm from shifting. This becomes clear when one recognizes that the competing positions in Grokster are representative of a debate between what the author describes as property pragmatists and property idealists. In resolving this intellectual property debate, the author argues that the Supreme Court should be guided by history and the precedent the Court established for real property in the Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge decision. In both cases, the property pragmatist's position was and is appropriate because the decision to expand legislatively granted rights requires the evaluation of complex facts and choices between competing interests and values for which the Supreme Court is not well suited, and a judicial decision expanding those rights would insulate a particular set of economic interests and values for generations. According to the author, the pragmatic position is consistent with the Supreme Court's historic approach towards copyright, and the property idealist's claim that Congress cannot be relied upon to deliver a legislative solution is inconsistent with this same history. Lastly, the pragmatic position is justified because it recognizes the non-linear nature of progress as illuminated by the study of economics and science.


    Thursday, April 07, 2005
     
    McAdams on Conformism Richard H. McAdams (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - College of Law) has posted Conformity to Inegalitarian Conventions and Norms: The Contribution of Coordination and Esteem (The Monist, Vol. 88, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      In this contribution to a symposium on Conformism, I comment on two of the many mechanisms producing conformity: coordination and esteem. First, I set forth one point about conformity coordination settings - that there can be a strong stability to conventions in which the required behavior varies by the observable physical differences among human beings, such as sex and those that come to be associated with race. In a certain class of important games, observable personal differences work to break symmetry, which significantly changes the possible outcomes to the game. Second, I explain the claim that human beings desire the esteem of others and then discuss how this simple preference can produce significant conformity. As with coordination, one implication is that esteem-seeking among strangers is likely to make behaviorally relevant the distinctions among individuals that even a stranger will know, i.e., observable physical traits, including sex and race. In both cases - coordination and esteem - I emphasize some inegalitarian (and illiberal) types of conformity.
    Highly recommended!


     
    Hadfield on Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation Gillian Hadfield (The Law School, University of Southern California) has posted Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases (Stanford Law Review, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Recent efforts to assess whether or not the trial is vanishing from the civil justice system, have thus far not drawn distinctions between cases in which the market efficiency function of the legal system is in play and those in which democratic and political functions are in play. As Marc Galanter famously set out thirty years ago in his seminal work on why the haves come out ahead and as current studies of the legal profession confirm, however, we should expect that there are significant differences in how corporations, organizations, governments and private individuals fare in our legal system: these different entities bring different resources to bear and they face different repeat versus one-shot incentives. Normatively, the issues at stake in our understanding of what is happening to civil cases and the efforts to craft alternatives to traditional civil litigation require that we differentiate between litigants, between legal functions, and between the different goals of our legal system. It may be that the disappearance of public civil trials to resolve commercial contract disputes is of no consequence; indeed it may be an efficient response to the increasing cost of the public system. The same cannot be said of the disappearance - if it is a real phenomenon - of public adjudication of civil rights or the claims of individuals about the misconduct of public or corporate actors. Private and confidential dispute resolution may be perfectly appropriate and something to be promoted in the resolution of family disputes, whereas it may be inappropriate in the resolution of patent disputes in which two corporations may bargain over the division of monopoly rents or in the resolution of disputes between the state and citizens about how electoral districts are determined. If judicial resources are strained by caseloads, which litigants are flooding in - corporate or individual? And if rationing is required, if an attempt to reduce the number of cases to which judges and courts devote their efforts is required, which cases should be diverted into private dispute resolution and which should be retained for public adjudication? In this paper I present preliminary data on the differences between individual and organizational litigants in the disposition of federal civil cases. This paper follows on an earlier paper in which I developed a methodology for increasing the value of the database created by the Administrative Office of the US Courts. Here I endeavor to show the differences between individual and organizational litigants in the rate at which cases are abandoned, defaulted, adjudicated without a trial, adjudicated with a trial, or settled. The results show substantial differences in cases based, primarily, on plaintiff rather than defendant type. I find individual plaintiff cases are substantially more likely to be determined by an adjudication - especially a non-trial adjudication - than are organizational plaintiff cases. I also find evidence that organizational plaintiffs - against either individual or organizational defendants - are substantially more likely to settle their cases rather than to have them decided either by trial or non-trial adjudication.
    This work is very valuable to anyone (me, for instance) with a deep interest in procedure.


     
    Posner on the Nonexistence of Default Penalty Rules in Contract Law Eric A. Posner (University of Chicago Law School) has posted There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      In an influential article, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner introduced the concept of the "penalty default rule," a rule that fills a gap in an incomplete contract with a term that would not be chosen by a majority of parties similarly situated to the parties to the contract in question. Ayres and Gertner argued that such a rule might be efficient in a model in which contracting parties have asymmetric information. However, Ayres and Gertner did not provide any persuasive examples of penalty default rules; their best example is the Hadley rule, but this rule is probably not a penalty default rule. It turns out that there are no plausible examples of penalty default rules that solve the information asymmetry problem identified by Ayres and Gertner. The penalty default rule is a theoretical curiosity that has no existence in contract doctrine.


     
    Call for Papers: Thinking in/after Utopia
      Thinking in/after Utopia. East-European and Russian Philosophy before and after the Collapse of Communism CALL FOR PAPERS 27-30 October, 2005 Organizer: The Havighurst Center for Russian & Post-Soviet Studies, Miami University of Ohio Plenary speakers: * Vladimir Tismaneanu (University of Maryland): "The End of Leninism and the Future of Liberal Values" * Mikhail Epstein (Emory University): “The Platonic Drama of Russian Thought: Ideas against Ideocracy” * Catharine Nepomnyashchy (Columbia University): TBA The 2005 annual Havighurst young researchers’ conference is dedicated to exploring * The state of East-European and Russian philosophy today * How philosophical ideas contributed (or didn’t contribute) to the process of dismantling of the Communist system * The effects that the collapse and Communism had on shaping new configurations/movements of philosophical ideas in Eastern Europe and Russia The conference is conceived of as a forum where young researchers in the field of East-European and Russian studies/philosophy come, from all over the world, and share their views and the outcomes of their research, interact with senior researchers in the field, and with Miami University faculty and students. We are interested in bringing together papers that deal not necessarily with philosophical problems/topics taken in themselves, but especially with the sophisticated, ever-changing interplay that took place in the Communist countries between philosophy and politics, philosophy and ideology, philosophy and social life, philosophy and the other humanities, philosophy and the arts. What role (if any) did various philosophical practices (teaching, research, philosophically-informed cultural journalism or philosophically-inspired civic movements, etc) play in undermining the Marxist ideology in East-Europe and Russia? On the other hand, how precisely did philosophy (Marxism included) permeate the (societal, intellectual, cultural) life in the Communist regimes? What happened with philosophy – and with the net of relationships that it had established with politics, ideology, social life, etc. – when the system collapsed? What happens with the life of the mind when one school of thought (Marxism) becomes the only accepted school of though? What happens with that school of thought itself under such conditions? What happened with all the Marxist philosophers of Eastern Europe and Russia in the 90’? What have become of them? What are, in general, the sources of the post-communist Russian and East-European philosophy? To what extent the “dissident philosophers” (Patocka, Havel, and others) can be seen as practitioners of the ancient conception of “philosophy as a way of life”? These are only some of the issues to be addressed in the course of the conference. Call for papers: Young scholars (ABDs, Post-docs, Assistant-Professors, etc.) working in the field of East-European and Russian thought are hereby cordially invited to submit abstracts on these or any other issues related to the conference’s topic. Funding: Those selected to present papers will be provided with accommodation for the duration of the conference, ground transportation from/to the airport, and partial travel funding (up to $250 for domestic travel and up to $500 for international travel). Publication: We plan to publish the conference papers in an edited volume with a major US academic press. Deadline for abstracts: 10 April, 2005. Email submissions are strongly encouraged. Please send abstracts (no longer than 300 words) and a copy of your CV to: Dr. Costica Bradatan, Havighurst Fellow and Conference Coordinator Department of Philosophy, 221 Hall Auditorium, Miami University, Oxford, OH-45056 USA Email: bradatc@muohio.edu


     
    Call for Papers: Philosophy, Economics, and Public Policy
      CALL FOR PAPERS: ECAP 5 workshop on Philosophy, Economics, and Public Policy. August 27-28, 2005, University of Lisbon. Organised by Luc Bovens (LSE and editor, Economics & Philosophy), Geoffrey Brennan (ANU and editor, Economics & Philosophy), and Alex Voorhoeve (LSE). Description: The workshop focuses on techniques and ideas from moral and political philosophy and from economic theory that bear on the analysis of issues in public policy. Some of the topics that may be addressed in the workshop are environmental regulation, health policy, the welfare state, voting theory, etc. Invited Speakers: Sven Ove Hansson (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm) Julian Le Grand (LSE, London and UK Prime Minister’s Health Policy Advisor) Jonathan Wolff (UCL, London). Submission of papers: Authors are invited to submit papers that they wish to present at the workshop electronically to ecap5@bovens.org. Submissions should be maximum 5000 words. All papers will be blind reviewed. The deadline for submission is April 15, 2005. Authors will be informed of the decision about the presentation of their paper by May 15, 2005. The workshop is supported by a grant by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government. The workshop is part of the Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, ECAP 5 University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters, 27-31 August 2005 http://www.centrofilosofia.org/ecap5/


    Wednesday, April 06, 2005
     
    Welcome to the blogosphere . . . . . . to Dan Markel & Ethan Leib (two newly minted lawprofs) on PrawfsBlog.


     
    Kalt on Levy Brian C. Kalt (Michigan State University College of Law) has posted The People's Forest and Levy's Trees: Popular Sovereignty and the Origins of the Bill of Rights (Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 119, 2000) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      This is a 2000 book review of Leonard Levy's Origins of the Bill of Rights. Levy presents a stirring account of the history and tradition of specific rights in pre-Bill-of-Rights America, but he gives no sense of how deeply important popular sovereignty is to the Bill of Rights as a whole, both at its origins and in the present day. This review argues that Levy's view of rights is anachronistic, and that the Bill of Rights is better understood as a declaration of rights intended to be protected by political processes (and to preserve those processes), not just by courts.


     
    Entry Level Hiring There are two more additions to the entry level hiring report this morning--Tulane & Whittier. Scroll down or click on this link for the most recent version of the 2005 report.


     
    Lindgren on the the Bellesiles Scandal James Lindgren (Northwestern University Law School) has posted Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal (Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, p. 2195, 2002). Here is the abstract:
      Before there was a scandal, there was a book - Michael A. Bellesiles's Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture. Arming America is a well-written and compelling story of how early Americans were largely unfamiliar with guns until the approach of the Civil War. It tells a wide-ranging, detailed, but relatively unnuanced story of gunlessness in early America. Bellesiles writes: "The vast majority of those living in British North American colonies had no use for firearms, which were costly, difficult to locate and maintain, and expensive to use." His primary evidence was low counts of guns in probate records, gun censuses, militia muster records, and homicide accounts. According to Bellesiles, in early America there were very few guns. Privately owned guns were mostly in poor working condition. By law, guns were not kept in the home but rather stored in central armories, and guns were too expensive for widespread private ownership. He even claims that men generally were unfamiliar with guns and that they did not want guns - preferring axes and knives instead, in part because guns were so inaccurate that they were of little use. He argues that axes made very good weapons in hunting, and in battle, people considered "the ax the equal of a gun." Bellesiles claims that states enacted laws that restricted gun ownership to white Protestants who owned property. White-on-white homicide was rare in colonial America, according to Bellesiles, and guns were rarely the weapon used in homicides. Guns were not culturally important, either: Travel narratives do not show that guns were part of everyday life, even on the frontier. At least in probate records, women did not own guns. He further claims that the background of the Second Amendment shows that the Anti-Federalists had no problem with restricting militia membership to those above the lower social classes. Last, with a few exceptions, the militia were extremely ineffective. Unfortunately, except for the last claim of militia ineffectiveness, all 15 of these major contentions of Arming America turn out to be false. Two meta-arguments by Bellesiles might have direct public policy applications (though, as a work of history, Arming America does not directly advocate any gun policies). One is that guns and violence go together. In early America, he claims, we had very low gun ownership and low homicide rates; after the Civil War, we had lots of guns and high homicide rates. The second is that if guns were not widely owned, then it is unlikely that gun owning was understood as an individual right in the Second Amendment. In this review article, I examine the following questions: How Common Was Gun Ownership? Was Homicide Rare? Were Privately Owned Guns Mostly in Poor Working Condition? How Expensive Were Guns? How Effective Were Guns, Bladed Weapons, and the Militia? Were Guns Kept in the Home? Were Guns Common in Travel Accounts? How Central Are the Errors to the Thesis of Arming America? Since the book's publication, scholars who have checked the book's claims against its sources have uncovered an almost unprecedented number of discrepancies, errors, and omissions. Indeed, the review ends with an appendix documenting over 200 specific errors in Arming America. When these are taken into account, a markedly different picture of colonial America emerges: Household gun ownership in early America was more widespread than today - in a much poorer world. Arming America claims that we did not have a gun culture before the Civil War, but that we have had one since then. There is an obvious conceptual problem with this thesis: What would it mean to have - or not have - a gun culture? It is hard to judge the truth of this claim without deciding on what a gun culture is. Bellesiles gives us some hints of what he means, but he never clearly states his criteria. This is an unfortunate way to frame the inquiry. Cultural analysis is not an all-or-nothing proposition. America had one form of gun culture in the late eighteenth century, it had another form of gun culture in the late nineteenth century, and it has another form today. Although Bellesiles never defines what he means by having a gun culture, he puts great store in owning guns, familiarity with guns, and the prevalence of guns in popular culture - such as in magazines, television, and movies. If having a gun culture requires gun-lover magazines and violent film and television crime stories (or the contemporary equivalent), then we have a gun culture today, but did not two centuries ago. If, instead, having a gun culture means growing up in households with guns, learning how to shoot them, widespread participation in military training where guns are used, and using guns as a tool (such as for vermin control), then we definitely had more of a gun culture in the eighteenth century than we do today. Arming America is an impressive book, especially to those not versed in the materials that Bellesiles wrote about. It is extremely well-written for a book that covers so many apparent specifics of gun ownership and use. Superb historians praised it on its release. Yet even from the beginning, there were those who found disturbing differences between Arming America and its sources. As time has passed and other scholars have entered the debate, these errors - which once looked like such serious defects that they could not be true - have been confirmed. The book and the scandal it generated are hard to understand. How could Bellesiles count guns in about a hundred Providence wills that never existed, count guns in San Francisco County inventories that were apparently destroyed in 1906, report national means that are mathematically impossible, change the condition of most guns in a way that fits his thesis, misreport the counts of guns in censuses or militia reports, have over a 60% error rate in finding guns in Vermont estates, and have a 100% error rate in finding homicide cases in the Plymouth records he cites? We may never know the truth of why or how Arming America made such basic errors, but make them it did. As scholars, we must content ourselves with correcting errors and searching for the realities of gun ownership, use, and social meaning.
    This is a contemporary classic!


     
    Ackerman & Fontana on Jefferson & the Electoral College Bruce Ackerman and David Fontana (Yale Law School and Yale Law School/Oxford University) have posted Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself Into the Presidency (Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 551, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The Constitution instructs the President of the Senate to open the ballots submitted by members of the Electoral College, but it provides little guidance when a ballot turns out to be defective. This article provides the first in-depth consideration of two early precedents. Both Vice-President John Adams and Vice-President Thomas Jefferson confronted problems when counting the electoral votes in 1797 and 1801, respectively. Both men were placed in the awkward position of ruling on matters involving an election in which they were leading presidential candidates, but Jefferson's problem was more serious. In 1801, Georgia's electors cast their votes for Jefferson and Burr, but their ballots were in plain violation of the Constitution's explicit formal requirements. If Jefferson had ruled these votes invalid in his capacity as Senate President, one of the Federalist candidates, Adams or Pinckney, might well have emerged victorious from the House runoff required under the Constitution. But Jefferson used his authority as Senate President to exclude his Federalist competitors, restricting the runoff to a two-man race between himself and Aaron Burr. This allowed him to emerge victorious on the thirty-sixth ballot. Rumors of this episode occasionally surfaced during the nineteenth century, but this article presents indisputable documentary evidence demonstrating the irregularity of the Georgia ballot. After telling the story, we appraise its significance both as an act of constitutional statesmanship and as an enduring legal precedent that may guide future Senate Presidents as they confront the electoral college crises of the twenty-first century.


     
    McCaffery & Baron on the Psychology of Redistribution Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron (University of Southern California - Law School and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Psychology) have posted The Political Psychology of Redistribution on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Welfare economics suggests that the tax system is the appropriate place to effect redistribution from those with more command over material resources to those with less - that is, in short, to serve equity. Society should set other mechanisms of private and public law, including public finance systems, to maximize welfare - that is, in short, to serve efficiency. The populace, however, may not always accept first-best policies. Perspectives from cognitive psychology suggest that ordinary citizens can react to the purely formal means by which social policies are implemented, and thus may reject welfare-improving reforms. This Article sets out the general background of the problem. We present the results of original experiments that confirm that the means of implementing redistribution affect its acceptability. Effects range from such seemingly trivial matters as whether or not tax burdens are discussed in dollars or in percent terms, to more substantial matters such as how many different individual taxes there are, whether the burden of taxes is transparent or not, and the nature and level of the public provision of goods and services. The findings suggest a deep and problematic tension between the goals of equity and efficiency in public finance.


    Tuesday, April 05, 2005
     
    Hasen on FEC Regulation of Blogging Check out The Ripple Effects of the FEC's Rules on Political Blogging by Rick Hasen on Findlaw.


     
    Cunningham on SSRN Lawrence A. Cunningham (Boston College (Law School)) has posted Scholarly Profit Margins and the Legal Scholarship Network: Reflections on the Web on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Controversy surrounding scholastic rankings arises, in part, because of complexities associated with measuring academic contributions. Legal researchers use various methodologies to assess scholarly production and impact but all suffer from inherent limitations and none provides data useful to scholarly self-reflection. The 10-year old Legal Scholarship Network (LSN) offers potential to improve considerably on both scores of public and personal assessment. This Essay critically evaluates approaches to conceptualizing scholarly profit margins, explores how LSN can enhance these conceptions, and opens new frontiers for this innovative Web-based repository of legal writing.


     
    Hasen on Avoiding Election Meltdown Rick Hasen (Loyola Law School (Los Angeles)) has posted Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      In the 2004 presidential election, the United States came much closer to electoral meltdown, violence in the streets, and constitutional crisis than most people realize. Less than a 2% swing among Ohio voters toward Democratic candidate for President John Kerry and away from incumbent Republican President George W. Bush would have placed the Ohio - and national - election for president well within the "margin of litigation," and it would have gotten ugly very quickly. Allegations of voter fraud and voter suppression were rampant on both sides, and even though Kerry conceded the election on the day after Election Day, public confidence in the U.S. system of American administration is now quite low. Previously unpublished data demonstrate that there is a growing partisan divide over views of the fairness of the election process. The bad news from the story of Election 2004 is that things likely won't get better in 2008. As Part I details, the extreme partisanship and close division of the American electorate, coupled with the Electoral College system, make the possibility of another razor-close presidential election in one or more battleground states fairly likely. Add to that mix election administration incompetence and a widely decentralized system of election administration with a patchwork of inconsistent rules. What's worse, since Bush v. Gore, losing candidates have become more willing to resort to election law as part of a political strategy: the number of election-law related cases in the lower courts has risen dramatically compared to the period before the case. It all adds up to a recipe for electoral meltdown. In Part II of this Article, I argue for three reforms that could significantly lower the risk of electoral meltdown. First, I advocate registration reform, in particular universal voter registration conducted by the government coupled with a voter identification program. There has been a wide partisan divide in the election administration debate between Democrats who have expressed concern about voter suppression and Republicans who have expressed concern about voter fraud. The registration reform I advocate can alleviate both of those concerns, minimize the potential for and political rhetoric regarding voter fraud, and eliminate a great majority of potential litigation surrounding presidential election administration Second, I advocate a transition to nonpartisan election administration. The nonpartisan solution aims to create both the actuality and appearance of neutrality in election administration, thereby bolstering the public's faith in the process. Australia and Canada serve as good models for reform in this regard, though not necessarily their nationalization of election administration. I consider how to assure that U.S. election administrators are truly nonpartisan, and contrast arguments for nonpartisan election administration with calls for nonpartisan redistricting commissions and campaign finance enforcement. Third, I discuss the role of the courts in minimizing electoral meltdown. The key here is to encourage courts to be more willing to entertain pre-election litigation and much more chary of entertaining post-election litigation. To the extent election administration problems can be recognized in advance, pre-election judicial review prevents future harm from occurring, rather than putting courts in the position of trying to undo the bad effects of a past harm. The costs of post-election review are large: the pressure put on courts to decide arcane election law questions when the outcome of an election - especially a presidential election - is huge, and the appearance of partisan decisionmaking is inevitable.
    I am always impressed by Hasen's work!


     
    Mann & Belzley on Internet Intermediate Liability Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley have psoted The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability (forthcoming Wm. and Mary L. Rev., October 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      The internet has transformed the economics of communication, creating a spirited debate as to the proper role of federal, state, and international governments in regulating conduct that relates to or involves the internet. Many have argued that internet communications should be entirely self-regulated - either because they cannot or should not be the subject of government regulation. The advocates of that approach would prefer a no-regulation zone around internet communications, based for the most part on the unexamined view that internet activity is fundamentally different in a way that justifies broad regulatory exemption. At the same time, it is undisputed that some kinds of activity that the internet facilitates violate widely shared norms and legal rules. State legislatures motivated by those concerns have begun to respond with internet-specific laws directed at particular contexts, giving little or no credence to the claims that the internet needs special treatment. This Essay starts from the realist assumption that government regulation of the internet is inevitable. Thus, instead of focusing on the naïve question of whether the internet should be regulated, it discusses how to regulate internet-related activity in a way that is consistent with approaches to analogous offline conduct. The Essay also assumes that the most salient characteristic of the internet is that it inserts intermediaries into relationships that could be, and previously would have been, conducted directly in an offline environment. Existing liability schemes generally join traditional fault-based liability rules to broad internet-specific liability exemptions. Those exemptions are supported by the premise that in many cases the conduct of the intermediaries is so wholly passive as to make liability inappropriate. We argue that the pervasive role of intermediaries calls not for a broad scheme of exoneration, premised on passivity, but rather for a more thoughtful development of principles for determining when and how it makes economic sense to allocate responsibility for wrongful conduct to the least cost avoider. Accordingly, in cases in which it is feasible for intermediaries to control the conduct, we recommend serious attention to the possibility of one of a series of three different schemes of intermediary liability. The final Part of the Essay uses that framework to analyze the propriety of intermediary liability for several kinds of internet-related misconduct.


     
    Conference Announcement: Naturalized Epistemology
      KAZIMIERZ NATURALISED EPISTEMOLOGY WORKSHOP 2nd-6th September 2005 Kazimierz Dolny, Poland http://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont/KNEW The second half of the 20th Century has witnessed the rapid growth of an approach to epistemology that gives up on the idea of a first philosophy and argues for a close partnership with sciences such as biology, psychology, cognitive science and information theory. As a result of the cross-pollination of ideas, naturalised epistemology has come to include a great richness of methodologies and approaches. The workshop will bring together a number of leading experts with post-graduates and researchers. Over the five days, the speakers will lead workshop groups that will focus on issues arising out of their work; in particular, issues of naturalised normativity. KNEW'05 is supported by the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, UMCS; the Department of Theory of Knowledge, KUL; and by the Philosophy Students Society, KUL. KNEW'05 is being organised by Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (UMCS) and Arkadiusz Gut (KUL). CALL FOR PAPERS We invite submissions (by abstract) of papers in the area of naturalised epistemology by all summer school participants. Papers dealing with work related to the work presented by the invited speakers will be given preference. Contributed papers will have a total of half an hour presentation plus discussion time. Submission (in PDF, DOC or RTF) dead-line: May 30th, 2005 Notification of acceptance: June 15th, 2005 APPLICATION The workshop is mostly aimed at postgraduate students and junior researchers. Applications should include an application form (DOC | PDF) and a CV and should either be sent by e-mail (entitled 'KNEW Application') to or posted to: KNEW'05 Konrad Talmont-Kaminski Philosophy and Sociology Faculty Marie Curie-Sklodowska University Plac MCS 4 20-031 Lublin POLAND Application dead-line: May 30th, 2005 (but early applications will be given preference if there is a shortage of available places) Notification of acceptance: June 15th, 2005 Registration fee: 180 EURO, to be paid on-site (cash only). If this cost is prohibitive please include in the application a request for a partial reduction in the fee. The registration fee includes: * all workshop sessions * conference materials * accommodation at the KUL centre * meals at the KUL centre (breakfast, lunch, dinner) * minibus from Warsaw to Kazimierz and back * tours of Kazimierz and Janowiec The fee does not include: * the conference dinner Tourist visas are required for those coming from outside of the European Union. Dr Konrad Talmont-Kaminski Philosophy and Sociology Faculty Foreign Relations Co-ordinator Marie Curie-Sklodowska University, Lublin, Poland konrad AT talmont.com or ktalmont AT yahoo.com http://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont Cogita Tute!


     
    Call for Papers: The Legacy of John Courtney Murray for Law & Politics
      CALL FOR PAPERS An Interdisciplinary Conference THE LEGACY OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY FOR LAW AND POLITICS Sponsored by the Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Villanova University School of Law Friday, September 16, 2005 Villanova University The 2004 presidential election showed that the perpetual question of the nature of the relationship between the Catholic Church and American politics and law remains unresolved, and that interest in the question is as great as ever. This question has always had many dimensions. It is at once a problem in the political theory of liberal democracy, in the law of Church and State and in the relationship of law and morality. It is also a problem of conscience for both ordinary Catholics and Catholic politicians. In the 1950's and 1960's John Courtney Murray, S.J., created a major synthesis that seemed to ease what were very sharp tensions between the triumphal Church of mid century and the claims of liberal democracy. To what extent is Father Murray's resolution of the tensions of that era useful for us today, after the culture wars of the last forty years (particularly over abortion), the rise of the religious right as a political force, the split between "right" and "left" in the Church, the trend toward privatization of religion in American life, and the increased difficulty of claiming, as did Murray, that "We Hold These Truths"? These and related questions will be explored in an interdisciplinary conference including legal academics, political theorists, philosophers, theologians and others. Papers presented at the conference will be considered for publication in the Journal of Catholic Social Though in a special symposium issue. Please send paper proposals to Mark A. Sargent at sargent@law.villanova.edu, or Villanova University School of Law, 299 North Spring Mill Road, Villanova, Pennsylvania 19085, by May 15, 2005.


    Monday, April 04, 2005
     
    Hasen on the Nuclear Option in the Conclave of Cardinals Rick Hasen has an op/ed on New Republic Online (registration required) concerning the election of the next Pope. Here is a taste:
      In the upcoming papal election, as in all elections, the rules of the game help determine the winner. And recent changes in those rules instituted by Pope John Paul II make it more likely that the next Pope will not be a consensus candidate who could bridge chasms among the world's Catholics. That's because the new rules provide for a "nuclear option" much like the one being considered in the U.S. Senate to break Democratic resistance to President Bush's judicial nominees.


     
    Ginsburg on International Judicial Lawmaking Tom Ginsburg (University of Illinois College of Law) has posted International Judicial Lawmaking (Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, Spring 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Judges at the international level make law in the course of resolving disputes. The scope of this lawmaking power depends on the ability of states to constrain judicial actors. While formal mechanisms to over-rule international judges are relatively difficult to exercise, states have at their disposal various informal mechanisms to communicate their views to judges. This paper utilizes a framework of exit, voice and loyalty to consider these powers, as well as the features conducive to international judicial lawmaking.


     
    Etienne on the Ethics of Cause Lawyering Margareth Etienne (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - College of Law) has posted The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Criminal defense attorneys are often motivated by an intricate set of moral and ideological principles that belie their reputations as amoral (if not immoral) "hired guns" who, for the right price, would do anything to get their guilty clients off. Using empirical data from interviews with forty criminal defense attorneys I consider the motivations that inform their decisions to enter the field of criminal defense and the values that influence the manner in which they do their jobs. I conclude that many criminal defense attorneys are in fact cause lawyers who are committed to individual clients but also the "cause" of legal reform in criminal law. These dual commitment - essentially to individual clients versus the collective group of criminal defendants - occasionally raise ethical conflicts that have largely gone under-examined and that the rules of ethics and professionalism are not well-equipped to resolve. Although examined here through the lens of criminal defending, the ethical dilemma of cause lawyering is a noteworthy problem generally for activist lawyers because they continue to play an important role in socio-legal movements in this country.
    Etienne is workshoping this paper at Notre Dame today.


     
    Call for Papers: Bayt Al-Hikma
      Bayt Al-Hikma (House of Wisdom), Baghdad, Iraq, is dedicating a special issue of its peer refereed journal "Al-Hikma" (Wisdom) to English language papers in Social and Political Philosophy. Papers are invited in any area within social and political philosophy relevant to the current situation in Iraq. Areas/issues include those relating to liberalism, democracy, just war, the ethics of occupation, and many others. Bayt Al-Hikma hopes that this special issue of the journal would bring international focus of a scholarly nature on the many social and political issues confronting Iraq today. About Bayt Al-Hikma: Bayt Al-Hikma is an independent, non-profit, research institute originally founded in the ninth century during the Abbasid period. Its current mandate is similar to that associated with traditional research institutes and think-tanks. It is guided by a Board of Trustees and has an advisory council consisting of 30 prominent Iraqi and international experts. It maintains 88 resident scholars and fellows, representing major research areas and major geographical regions and universities in Iraq. It publishes books, periodicals, newsletters, and various reports,and organizes conferences, seminars, debates, and workshops. Submission Deadline for complete papers: 31 August 2005 (Authors may wish to submit a brief abstract for consideration before that deadline) Submission Guidelines: 1. 5000 words maximum, double spaced, 1 inch margins, and minimal endnotes. 2.Manuscripts should be anonymized for blind refereeing, and contributors are asked to number all pages. 3. Please include on a separate cover page: Title of the Paper. The Author's name, qualifications and affiliations (if any). The Author's full postal and email addresses. An Abstract of 250-500 words. 4. Articles should be submitted in Word or WordPerfect format by email ONLY and sent to BOTH of the guest editors: Professor Fatina Hamdi Chair, Department of Philosophy Bayt Al-Hikma, Baghdad, Iraq Email: fihi20@yahoo.co.uk Dr. Hakam Al-Shawi Research Fellow (Non-Resident) Department of Philosophy Bayt Al-Hikma,Baghdad, Iraq Email: hhalshawi@yahoo.com Please note that some or all of the papers may be translated into Arabic with the author's permission.


     
    Conference Announcement: Environmental Ethics, Science, and Policy
      The Philosophy Department at the University of Utah will be holding its annual colloquium on the topic of Environmental Ethics, Science, and Policy. The Colloquium will take place from Friday, April 8 through Sunday, April 10 on the University of Utah campus in Salt Lake City. The keynote speaker will be Bryan Norton, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology. His talk is entitled "Conserving Biodiversity". It will be held on Thursday, April 8 at 5:30 pm in the Gould Auditorium, Marriott Library on the Utah Campus. Other speakers include Marc Ereshefsky, Philosophy, University of Calgary; Matt Haber, Philosophy University of California, Davis; Jim Collins, Biology, Arizona State University; Sandy Andelman, Ecology, University of California, Santa Barbara; Catherine Willott, Biology, University of Arizona; Sahotra Sarkar, Philosophy & Biology, University of Texas, Austin; Gregory Cooper, Ethics & Public Policy, Washington & Lee University; Sharon Kingsland, History of Science, Johns Hopkins University; Jay Odenbaugh, Philosophy, Lewis & Clark University; Amy Wildermuth, Law, University of Utah; and Dinah Davidson, Biology, University of Utah. Their talks will be held in the Tanner Library in the Philosophy Department, 334 Orson Spencer Hall. Attendance is free and open to all. Please contact Anya Plutynski (plutynski@philosophy.utah.edu) if you have any questions about the conference or about housing for those coming from out of state. The conference web page can be found at http://www.ebusinessbasics.com/confpage/mainpage.htm


     
    Clermont on Jurisdictional Facts Kevin M. Clermont (Cornell University - School of Law) has posted Jurisdictional Fact on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      What kind of factual showing must the plaintiff make in order to establish, say, personal jurisdiction? While that may seem simple enough, real difficulties in regard to the standard of proof arise when there is a similarity of the facts entailed in the jurisdictional determination and on the merits. Surely the plaintiff has to do more than allege that the defendant is the author of state-directed acts or omissions. Yet just as surely the plaintiff should not have to prove the cause of action in order to establish jurisdiction. The plaintiff thus must have to show something between allegation and proof. From a morass of confused cases on this procedural point of significance, this Article draws a startlingly clear rule that covers jurisdictional fact, and more. On any factual or legal issue of forum-authority, whenever challenged, the proponent of forum-authority must make a showing of more likely than not, subject to this one exception: if that issue overlaps the merits of the claim, the proponent need provide only prima facie proof to establish the forum's authority. Depending on the particular threshold issue's importance, prima facie might mean any of the standards below the more-likely-than-not standard, namely, slightest possibility, reasonable possibility, substantial possibility, or equipoise. That lower standard will allow the judge to decide appropriately whether the forum has authority to decide the merits, without foreclosing the decision on the merits that will invoke the higher standard.


    Sunday, April 03, 2005
     
    Reaction to Today's Lexicon Over at Ex Post, "T" has posted a reaction to today's Legal Theory Lexicon entry. Here is a taste:
      I find that I have conversations with a variety intellectually honest professors at Columbia who support these decisions because they believe that judges are by and large a healthy counterbalance to the popular will. Whether they will think the same of the role of judges as more "conservative" activism arises remains to be seen. But I do not think that many law professors (I know that Tribe and Dworkin claim to be exceptions) seriously imagine that there is any legal skill that could be taught that would be sufficient to produce the likes of Roe or Roper. As I understand Dworkin's claims that what these judges are doing really is the act of "getting the right legal answer," they require judges to be trained in moral reasoning as much as if not more than they are trained in legal reasoning. This most judges are not, and this in any event would mean that judges were using lots of extra-legal reasoning to reach the "right" result. This would constitute activism, I think, given most classical notions of the rule of law. And I think we can all envision ways we would like the law to be that it actually is not; if as judges we announced that it were so, then we would be being activist.


     
    Sunday Calendar
      University of Cincinatti: Conference on Virtue Ethics versus Kantian Ethics ends today:
        Paul Guyer, University of Pennsylvania, Kantian Perfectionism:
          In Kant's own time, the successor to classical virtue ethics was the perfectionism of Wolff, Baumgarten, and Mendelssohn. Kant famously criticized this perfectionism as empty or question-begging, that is, as presupposing rather than defining a conception of the good. But Kant himself often used perfectionist language to characterize his own position, with the crucial difference that his fundamental moral conception of the good is the perfection of the human will rather than of the human condition. This in turn suggests that his real criticism of Wolffian perfectionism is not that it is formal or empty, but that it is ultimately empirical, indeed ultimately not much different than the empiricist utilitarianism on offer from Hutcheson and Hume. Basing his own theory on the perfection of the will allows Kant to introduce an a priori element into moral philosophy without in fact severing it completely from traditional conceptions of human goods and virtues.
        Rosalind Hursthouse, The University of Auckland, New Zealand, Moral Knowledge in Aristotelian Virtue Ethics:
          Phronesis/practical wisdom is that form of moral knowledge which enables its possessor to make correct decisions about what to do. Generalists think that this would be knowledge of a code of general principles, which moral philosophers rightly seek. Particularists typically deny this and assert an anti-codifiability claim. But anti-codifiability is not the substantial point at issue, which is, rather, the question of what normative ethical theorising can achieve. There are, undeniably, some general principles to be found in Aristotle such as the ‘absolutist’ rejection of murder (1107a11) and the rules concerning repaying loans and returning benefits (1164b30 ff). And what about the v-rules (‘Do what is courageous, do not do what is cowardly’) themselves? Don’t these supply an action-guiding code? Yes, but none of these are principles that philosophers need to seek, nor are they appropriate candidates for phronesis. They are all ‘mother’s knee’ rules and the phronimos has special knowledge that goes well beyond what everyone well brought up knows. What is special about his knowledge is the special understanding he brings to them, which is inseparable from the possession of virtue itself. He has an (intellectual) capacity, acquired through training – the same training that produced his virtue – and can see things the non-virtuous cannot see. There is no substitute for this training (such as a set of definitions) that would enable someone untrained in virtuous action to see, reliably, that this was generous rather than prodigal, or not disgraceful, or more important than that. We moral philosophers are, qua philosophers, no better equipped than any other adult with moral knowledge. We can claim to be better equipped only by claiming virtue. There may still be something important –albeit unexpected - for normative ethical theorists to do in finding ways to make it easier to acquire phronesis, such as inventing ‘informed consent’, but those of us who lack virtue may make it more difficult (by e.g. elevating ‘person’).
    I've had a marvelous time at this conference, with excellent papers all around. It was a special pleasure to hear Tom Hill's excellent paper on Kant & Virtue Ethics yesterday. I had my very first ethics course from Tom at UCLA--probably in the late 70s--and his very thorough introduction (using the famous Frankena book) is still with me. Nancy Sherman's paper (also yesterday, scroll down) was very helpful to me as well--as I am currently reworking my own treatment of the virtue of judicial temperment. And of course, I am looking forward to Rosalind Hursthouse's paper today--Hursthouse is simply amazing. I would also like to thank Adam Feibelman (University of North Carolina, visiting at Cincinnati) for his help and Ingrid Brunk Wuerth (Cincinnati law) and Julian Wuerth (Cincinnati philosophy) for their very generous hospitality.
    Finally, if you would like to learn more about the connections between virtue ethics and normative legal theory, you might check out Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging. You can also take a look at the Legal Theory Lexicon entry on Virtue Jurisprudence.


     
    Legal Theory Lexicon: Strict Construction & Judicial Activism
      Introduction This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon is a bit unusual. Rather than explicating concepts that are important to legal theory, the point of this post is to debunk two concepts that are unimportant (or even meaningless), strict construction and judicial activism.
      Strict Construction Strict construction is short hand for the idea that the United States Constitution should be strictly construed. The phrase appears to have become popular as a campaign slogan used by Richard Nixon when he ran for President in 1968. Nixon promised that he would appoint judges who were "strict constructionists" as opposed to the "judicial activism" that characterized the Warren Court.
      The question is: what does strict construction mean? Is there really a method of constitutional interpretation described by the phrase "strict construction" or is this a mere political slogan? The confusion engendered by the term is illustrated by the following definition (offered on law.com):
        strict construction (narrow construction) n. interpreting the Constitution based on a literal and narrow definition of the language without reference to the differences in conditions when the Constitution was written and modern conditions, inventions and societal changes. By contrast "broad construction" looks to what someone thinks was the "intent" of the framers' language and expands and interprets the language extensively to meet current standards of human conduct and complexity of society.
      This definition borders on incoherence, opposing "strict construction" to both originalism and to the notion of a living constitution--ideas that might be thought antithetical to one another. So can we offer a better definition of strict construction? One way to approach this question is via the method of separation of cases. What are the possible meanings of strict construction?
      • Strict Construction as "Textualism". One possibility is that strict construction refers to textualism--the idea that all constitutional interpretations must be grounded in the text of the Constitution. There are two difficulties with this suggestion. First, almost all of the Warren Court jurisprudence to which strict constructionism was opposed was rooted in the text of the Constitution in some way. Even the "unenumerated rights" jurisprudence (e.g. the right to privacy at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade) was grounded in the text of the 14th amendment. Second, this definition provides no content to the idea that constructions must be "strict."
      • Strict Construction as "Literalism". Another possibility is that strict construction involves literal rather than purposive interpretations of the constitutional text. Perhaps, a strict construction is one that reads each clause of the Constitution to mean what the plain language says and nothing more. This idea is more promising than textualism, because it gives some real bite to the idea of "strictness" in construction. The difficulty is that the proponents of "strict construction" (and others) have rarely advocated a thorough-going literalism. That approach would, for example, mean that the First Amendment to the Constitution applies only to Congress (and not to the states, the executive, or to common-law doctrines). Other provisions of the Constitution don't seem to have any determinate literal meaning--the due process clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and the republican form of government clause come to mind.
      • Strict Construction as "Originalism". Yet another possibility is that strict construction refers to some form of originalism, either original-intention originalism or original-meaning originalism. (The former looks to the intentions of the framers, whereas the latter looks to the way the text would have been understood by citizens when it was adopted.) Original-intentions originalism does not fit well with the label "strict constructionism" as it would allow courts to take into account intentions of the framers that are not "strictly speaking" in the constitutional text. The latter is a much better fit with the idea of strict construction, but the label "strict construction" is simply not very descriptive of the idea that the constitutional text should be read today in a way that fits the way it would have been read at the time it was adopted.
      • Strict Construction as a "Presumption of Constitutionality". Yet another possibility is that the constitution should be construed against challenges to the constitutionality of legislation or executive action. The idea of a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of challenged action is certainly a coherent idea, but it is not clear why such a presumption should be called "strict construction." One might naturally assume that a strict construction of the constitution would invalidate government action that contravened the meaning of the constitutional text.
      We could go on, but I think you will now see the point. It simply isn't clear what "strict construction" means. Once you actually give content to the idea of strict construction, then the label isn't particularly description and better names can be given to the view that strict construction could name. For this reason, most serious constitutional theorists avoid using the phrase "strict construction." If you think you have a good reason to continue using this phrase, you might give serious consideration to offering a very careful definition when you first introduce the term.
      Judicial Activism In conservative political discourse in the United States, "strict construction" is good and "judicial activism" is bad. But what is judicial activism? Once again, it is not clear that this phrase has any real meaning. The standard argument against the use of the term "judicial activism" is that it translates best as "judicial decision making with which I disagree." To see why this is so, once again let us consider the possible interpretations of the phrase:
      • Judicial Activism as Nonabstention. One idea would be that activist judges decide cases, whereas passive judges abstain. This would make sense of "judicial activism," but it is completely unattractive as a normative ideal. Judges need to decide cases; they need to be active in the sense that they resolve controversies.
      • Judicial Activism as Exercise of the Power of Judicial Review. A second possibility is that judicial activism means striking down statutes or invalidating executive action. A passive judge approves the conduct of the other branches of government; an active judge strikes such conduct down. Once again, this interpretation is coherent, but hardly anyone thinks that it is per se wrong for judges to invalidate unconstitutional governmental action. Very few critics of "judicial activism" would criticize a court that struck down a federal statute requiring every American to attend the services of a particular denomination. Nor would many critics of judicial activism endorse a judicial decision that upheld a law reestablishing slavery. So activism is not meant to be equated with "deciding to strike down a statute or executive action."
      • Judicial Activism as Incorrect Exercise of the Power of Judicial Review. What is usually meant by judicial activism is not simply judicial activity or judicial activity invalidating action by the political branches. Rather, judicial activism means judicial activity that wrongfully invalidates action by the political branches. This naturally leads to the question, "What makes an exercise of the power of judicial review wrongful?" The answer to that question is a theory of constitutional interpretation. Different theories authorize different sets of invalidations. So, adherents of different constitutional theories would apply the label "judicial activism" to different sets of decisions.
      And that's the problem with the phrase "judicial activism." One can define judicial activism in a way that doesn't boil down to "wrong," but those definitions make the phrase useless as a term of criticism. Or one can define judicial activism in such a way that it has real critical bite, but then the phrase ends up as a synonym for incorrect. Either way, "judicial activism" is not a useful term for constitutional theorists.
      Conclusion This post has had two goals. The first is to convince you that "strict construction" and "judicial activism" are simply not very useful as theory terms for academic constitutional lawyers. The second is to illustrate the importance of clear explication of constitutional concepts. Constitutional theory is a value-laden activity. Debates about positions in constitutional theory are frequently extensions of debates in moral and political theory generally. For that reason, it is very important for constitutional theorists to be very careful about their use of language.


    Saturday, April 02, 2005
     
    SSRN Tournament of Law Schools--Update SSRN has an updated ranking of law schools by downloads in the last twelve months. You need to register to view the full list. Here are the top twenty:
      1 Harvard University - Harvard Law School 2 University of Chicago 3 Stanford Law School 4 Columbia University - Columbia Law School 5 University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law 6 University of Texas at Austin 7 Georgetown University Law Center 8 University of Southern California - Law School 9 George Mason University 10 University of California, Berkeley 11 George Washington University - Law School 12 Yale University - Law School 13 University of Virginia - School of Law 14 New York University - School of Law 15 Vanderbilt University - School of Law 16 University of San Diego - School of Law 17 University of Pennsylvania - School of Law 18 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - College of Law 19 Boston University - School of Law 20 University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Law School
    And the list of individual law professors has also been update--here (registration required).


     
    Saturday Calendar
      University of Cincinatti: Conference on Virtue Ethics versus Kantian Ethics continues today:
        Anselm Mueller, Trier, Practical Teleology: What Aristotle Should Have Said:
          Aristotle does not consistently keep apart intentional from natural teleology. This misleads him into conceiving of the teleology of praxis as the intention of a practical telos. This telos is then identified with either virtue or the good life. Hence the idea of a “practical syllogism” that is structurally on all fours with a piece of technical reasoning. In reality, however, the virtuous character of the way one acts is not in general constituted by an intention to practise virtue or to live well. Nor is it, as a rule, any other kind of purpose that renders virtuous what one does.To act, e.g., justly one must be motivated not by some purpose but by respect for others’ rights, or by considerations of equal need or merit, or the like. Aristotle should have distinguished this type of motivation constitutive of good praxis from both the inherent, or natural, teleology of praxis (its being finalized by eupraxia), and from the intentional teleology of the production (poiesis) that good praxis will often consist in. This would have had serious repercussions on many points of his conception. Indeed, it would have led him to a different, and more plausible, account of acting well and of practical reason.
        Nancy Sherman, Georgetown University, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant on Emotions:
          In this paper I take up the question of anger and its place in the moral life. In particular, how do Aristotle, Seneca, and Kant, each within their respective accounts, answer the question? And within the context of what sort of descriptive accounts of emotion do they give their answer? I lead off with Aristotle and his descriptive and normative conception of anger. Here we find a fairly straightforward view of the positive role anger can play within the life of virtue. Aristotle insists that on certain occasions we may even be required to express excessive anger in order to hit the mean; to fail to show such anger may be a sign of servility. When we move to the Stoics, and in particular Seneca, all forms of anger are viewed as irrational and resting on false beliefs about what is of real value in the world. Thus, not only unbridled wrath becomes an irrational response, but so too, moral resentment and indignation. Such emotions have no place among the “good emotions,” or eupatheiai, characteristic of the sage. Moral protest, Seneca argues, will be adequately recorded through seeking acts of punishment and justice. Does Kant maintain the Stoic position on this? Or is there a place for emotions of moral outrage among the so-called “practical emotions”? Put differently, does moral anger play a morally expressive role in Kant’s theory, above and beyond moral disapproval for wrongdoing expressed in punishment? In all this, I also assess the restorative role of moral anger for one who is the victim of wrongdoing.
        Richard Kraut, Northwestern University, Flourishing and Moral Rightness:
          The Kantian tradition, in its struggle against utilitarianism, has often sought to downgrade the practical significance of such notions as happiness, the satisfaction of desire, and self-interest. One way in which this program has been carried forward is through the elevation of a different family of ideas – duty, obligation, moral rightness, respect for the moral law. Rawls’s doctrine of the priority of the right over the good is a particularly clear exposition of this program; it is given even fuller expression in the work of Scanlon, who assigns a small role in practical thinking to the concept of well-being, and a far larger role to moral rightness. Another approach, under the banner of “virtue ethics”, offers fresh resistance to this Kantian program, but in two radically opposed ways. One form of virtue ethics insists that the duality of the right and the good is too simple: our basic moral concepts, it holds, are far more varied. An opposite tack is to elevate virtue above both the right and the good, and to make it the master-concept of practical life. The theory I propose follows neither of these two paths, without reverting to utilitarianism. I reject the maximizing of good, but adopt the utilitarian thesis that all practical thinking should be good-centered. To make that idea viable, we need a picture of what it is for a human being to flourish. What is good for us is not the satisfaction of rational desire, or any other form of successful conation; rather, it is the development and exercise of our cognitive, affective, sensory, social, and physical powers. Social rules can be shown to be worth observing only through their relationship to some aspect of human flourishing. The wrongness of slavery provides a test case of how this approach works.
        Thomas Hill, Jr., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Kant on Virtue as Strength of Moral Will:
          A virtuous person, in Kant’s view, has a strong will to do what is right. Virtue, then, apparently requires more than a good will, but how is strength of will to be understood? The analogy with physical strength can be misleading. Can we will to act on a good maxim but be unable to do so because we lack the necessary strength of will? If so, how could we be responsible for the failure? Are we only indirectly responsible for the strength or weakness of our moral will? If we are responsible for doing a particular wrong, then it seems that we must will to act on a bad maxim despite the ability to do otherwise. If we do the wrong through weakness, or deficiency of virtue, despite the ability to do otherwise, do we then also will weakly to act on a morally better maxim? Given that the will is not a desire or physical force, how can we think of willing weakly or strongly? More briefly, how does Kant’s conception of the role of virtue in a moral life contrast with conceptions often associated with “virtue ethics”? For example, how do these contrast with respect to whether moral rules are needed, what more a good character requires in addition to a good will, and how virtue and right action related?


     
    Legal Theory Bookworm I'm attending the Conference on Virtue Ethics vs Kantian Ethics at the University of Cincinatti, so I thought I would recommend three books on virtue ethics by conference participants:
      On Virtue Ethics by Rosalind Hursthouse. Here is a description:
        Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, here presents a full exposition and defense of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions.
      Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View by Christine Swanton. Here is a blurb:
        Christine Swanton offers a new, comprehensive theory of virtue ethics which addresses the major concerns of modern ethical theory from a character-based perspective. The book departs in significant ways from classical virtue ethics and neo-Aristotelianism, employing insights from Nietzsche and other sources, resulting in a highly distinctive and original brand of virtue ethics.
      Morals from Motives by Michael Slote. Here is the description:
        We are in the midst of a tremendous revival of interest in virtue ethics, but till quite recently almost everything that has appeared in this vein has been of Aristotelian inspiration. The present book attempts to take virtue ethics in a somewhat different direction, one both more theoretical and at the same time more radical and "pure" than most familiar virtue ethics. It offers a systematic agent based account of virtue ethics.


     
    Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts by Dennis Patterson. Here is the abstract:
      In a recent comment on H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts may be understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like tiger, gold and water. This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin's claims by challenging the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political concepts. Additionally, even if there are natural kinds, Dworkin's arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic and unpersuasive. One problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds undermines the "fit" side of his fit/justification model of adjudication. Finally, because in matters of value there is no methodological equivalent to the scientific method, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to explain the meaning of legal and political concepts.
    Download it while its hot! Also recomended this week:


    Friday, April 01, 2005
     
    Friday Calendar
      University of Cincinnati Philosophy & Law: Virtue Ethics vs. Kantian Ethics:
        This conference examines virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, their past and present, their differences, and their respective strengths and weaknesses.
      University of Cincinnati School of Law: Lawrence Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: An Aretaic Theory of Law.
      UCLA School of Law: Gideon Parchomovsky, University of Pennsylvania Law School, "Patent Portfolios"


     
    Lindgren & Heather on Counting Guns James Lindgren and Justin Lee Heather (Northwestern University Law School and Northwestern University Law School) have posted Counting Guns in Early America (William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 5, p. 1777, 2002) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      Probate inventories, though perhaps the best prevailing source for determining ownership patterns in early America, are incomplete and fallible. In this Article, the authors suggest that inferences about who owned guns can be improved by using multivariate techniques and control variables of other common objects. To determine gun ownership from probate inventories, the authors examine three databases in detail-Alice Hanson Jones's national sample of 919 inventories (1774), 149 inventories from Providence, Rhode Island (1679-1726), and Gunston Hall Plantation's sample of 325 inventories from Maryland and Virginia (1740-1810). Also discussed are a sample of 59 probate inventories from Essex County, Massachusetts (1636-1650), Gloria L. Main's study of 604 Maryland estates (1657-1719), Anna Hawley's study of 221 Surry County, Virginia estates (1690-1715), a sample of 289 male inventories from Vermont (1773-1790), and Judith A. McGaw's study of 250 estates in New Jersey and Pennsylvania (1714-1789). Guns are found in 50-73% of the male estates in each of the eight databases and in 6-38% of the female estates in each of the first four databases. Gun ownership is particularly high compared to other common items. For example, in 813 itemized male inventories from the 1774 Jones national database, guns are listed in 54% of estates, compared to only 30% of estates listing any cash, 14% listing swords or edged weapons, 25% listing Bibles, 62% listing any book, and 79% listing any clothes. Using hierarchical loglinear modeling, the authors show that guns are more common in early American inventories where the decedent was male, Southern, rural, slave-owning, or above the lowest social class - or where the inventories were more detailed. The picture of gun ownership that emerges from these analyses substantially contradicts the assertions of Michael Bellesiles in Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture (Arming America). Contrary to Arming America's claims about probate inventories in seventeenth and eighteenth-century America, there were high numbers of guns, guns were much more common than swords or other edged weapons, women in 1774 owned guns at rates (18%) higher than Bellesiles claimed men did in 1765-1790 (14.7%), and 87-91% of gun-owning estates listed at least one gun that was not old or broken. The authors replicated portions of Bellesiles's published study in which he both counted guns in probate inventories and cited sources containing inventories. They conclude that Bellesiles appears to have substantially misrecorded the seventeenth and eighteenth century probate data he presents. For the Providence probate data (1679-1726), Bellesiles has misclassified over 60% of the inventories he examined. He repeatedly counted women as men, counted about a hundred wills that never existed, and claimed that the inventories evaluated more than half of the guns as old or broken when fewer than 10% were so listed. Nationally, for the 1765-1790 period, the average percentage of estates listing guns that Bellesiles reports (14.7%) is not mathematically possible, given the regional averages he reports and known minimum sample sizes. Last, an archive of probate inventories from San Francisco in which Bellesiles claims to have counted guns apparently does not exist. By all accounts, the entire archive before 1860 was destroyed in the San Francisco earthquake and subsequent fire of 1906. Neither part of his study of seventeenth and eighteenth-century probate data is replicable, nor is his study of probate data from the 1840s and 1850s.


     
    Picker on Sony Randal C. Picker (University of Chicago Law School) has posted two new papers on SSRN:
      Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home and the Duty of Ongoing Design:
        The emergence of distributed storage, machine intelligence and cheap communications has give rise to the networked product. These are products that can evolve even after versions of the product have been put into the hands of consumers. The most interesting consumer products of the day are networked products. This includes the natural successor to the VCR-whether the plain digital video recorder or the TiVo favored by the digerati-and the ubiquitous iPod and its less chic cousin MP3 players. This category also includes peer-to-peer software in its various forms, whether as Napster, Aimster or Grokster. More than twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court confronted the VCR in the Sony case. The substantial noninfringing use test has both virtues and vices. It has provided a safe harbor for product innovation. It makes it possible for a creator to toss a product onto the waters to see what hap-pens, having only a vague sense of what will happen next. But Sony also provides no reason for a creator to design products to eliminate infringing uses. The core fight over Sony turns precisely on the uncertainty of what happens next: what is the next use of the product not seen today? But Sony is framed in the context of episodic design with an installed-base constraint and no real possibility of feedback between actual use of the product and design. We are at a very different point now. Networked products evolve and we are now going to frame what ongoing design obligations should exist with regard to these networked products. Once we combine software with communication to create networked products we then have products that can evolve in real-time (and do). Smart products phone home and update themselves. Phoning home - and the control that results from that - is a choice and one that designers of networked products make every day. Design ceases to be a one-time event and in-stead becomes a continuous process. And that is true not only for the next product sold, but also for the entire installed base. The dead hand of the past and the constraints of backwards compatibility are lifted. We need to update the Sony test to reflect these possibilities. If the producer chooses to let go of a networked product so that the producer cannot exercise control going forward and therefore cannot evolve the product in response to actual use, the producer should face a hard use test, perhaps one tied to whether the primary use of the product is noninfringing. If instead the producer ensures that the product can phone home so that updates can be promulgated throughout the system for the networked product, the producer should face a substantial non-infringing use test, coupled with the duty to evolve the product to eliminate infringing uses.
      Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts (ANTITRUST, PATENTS & COPYRIGHt, Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski, eds., Edward Elgar, Autumn 2005):
        Copyright has emerged as a pliable tool, to be bent and shaped by firms and frequently with an eye towards disadvantaging competitors through the erection of entry barriers. The easy manner in which copyright arises makes it possible for firms to get copyrights and threaten competitors with costly infringement actions. This is the use of copyright as more than just defining property rights, the use of copyright in creating market locks. But we would paint with too broad a brush were we to condemn all of these market locks. Market locks facilitate product differentiation and that may expand the range of ways that fixed costs can be recovered in a competitive industry. This can be useful and can improve outcomes for consumers. We should think this pattern to arise most plausibly in industries with foremarkets and aftermarkets. These would include original equipment markets and repair parts, printers and toner cartridges and garage door openers and would encompass a series of important cases, including Chamberlain, Kodak, Lexmark and Toro. Market locks in these settings may appropriately limit partial entry, as when an entrant wants only to supply replacement parts. In these settings, contractual product degradation - typically a license limiting permitted uses of the product -will make it possible to offer different products to different consumers. We should not routinely condemn market locks in these situations and should be troubled if we shape copyright law in a way that prevents these market locks from operating. At the same time, we should be troubled by market locks that create entry barriers for an entrant willing to enter on the same scale as the incumbent, for an entrant willing to undertake full rather than partial entry. These will frequently be situations characterized by high switching costs, where the incumbent's advantage may arise from the simple fact of being first. In these cases, copyright law can make entry barriers concrete and we should be concerned if copyright law works to disadvantage full entry. This pattern matches well with cases such as IMS, Lotus and Southco, though courts have done reasonably well in making possible entry, even if the courts have only glimpsed the full competitive issues at stake. Finally, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act has emerged to play a central role in these cases. Firms looking to limit use naturally move from weakly-enforceable paper contracts to self-enforcing technological contracts in the form of lock-out chips and the like. But the heart of the DMCA is technological controls for copyrighted works and the DMCA does not implement a pure regime of technological contracts. It is hardly surprising that firms in cases such as Chamberlain and Lexmark have tried to squeeze within the DMCA and no less expected that the courts have refused to expand its scope. That reluctance, though, tells us little about the real merits of technological contracting or about the true copyright protection scheme erected by the DMCA.


     
    Nadler on Flouting the Law Janice Nadler (Northwestern University School of Law) has posted Flouting the Law (Texas Law Review, Vol. 83, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      What happens when a person's common-sense view of justice diverges from the sense of justice he or she sees enshrined in particular laws? In particular, does the perception of one particular law as unjust make an individual less likely to comply with unrelated laws? This Article advances the Flouting Thesis - the idea that the perceived legitimacy of one law or legal outcome can influence one’s willingness to comply with unrelated laws - and provides original experimental evidence to support this thesis. The results suggest that willingness to disobey the law can extend far beyond the particular unjust law in question, to willingness to flout unrelated laws commonly encountered in everyday life (such as traffic violations, petty theft, and copyright restrictions), as well as willingness of mock jurors to engage in juror nullification. Finally, this Article explores the relationship between perceived injustice and flouting and offers several possible explanations, including the role of law in American popular culture and the expressive function of the law in producing compliance.


     
    Kingsbury on the International Legal Order Benedict Kingsbury (New York University - School of Law) has posted The International Legal Order on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
      This paper reviews major directions in the recent scholarship of international law. Commissioned for the Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet eds., Oxford University Press, 2003), it is highly synoptic, being limited to 10,000 words and 30 references. It argues that the Anglo-French scholar-practitioner focus on disputes and on third-party settlement, with its associated positivist theory, has dovetailed with broader US-led problem-solving approaches in encouraging the development of several useful legal concepts: sustainable development; international criminal responsibility; transnational civil responsibility; a renewed exclusivity of domestic jurisdiction, and an expanding but precarious concept of a unified international legal system. But the dominant positivist theoretical structure that has held international legal practice together now encounters internal critiques of some of its core concepts such as statism, national interest, and instrumental rationality, as well as external challenges from critical, neo-Marxist, and constructivist perspectives. Its viability is seriously in question, unless it can be deepened and renovated through current efforts to address such issues as legitimacy and democracy in international governance; the roles and approaches of major states such as the US; and the more general functions of normativity in international order. A proposal for rethinking the concept of international law is outlined. It is argued that the Grotian integration of theory and practice is a valuable and distinctive feature of international law, that there are ethical arguments for the predominant positivist positions which this problem-solving engagement with practice has fostered, that problems such as moral injustice and lack of legitimacy now require a richer approach to international law rules and process in an era of deepening international governance, and that a Grotian conception of international law which integrates sources-based and content-based criteria provides a promising way forward.


     
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