Legal Theory Blog
All the theory that fits!
This is Lawrence Solum's legal theory weblog. Legal Theory Blog comments and reports on recent scholarship in jurisprudence, law and philosophy, law and economic theory, and theoretical work in substantive areas, such as constitutional law, cyberlaw, procedure, criminal law, intellectual property, torts, contracts, etc.
Wednesday, May 31, 2006
Gillman at Empirical Legal Studies Blog Howard Gillman, about whom I cannot say enough good things, is guest blogging at Empirical Legal Studies blog. Check him out here, here, and here. Don't miss this.
Welcome to the blogosphere . . . . . . to The Fire of Genius (Academic commentary about patent law, i.p. law, creativity, and more) by Joseph Miller of Lewis & Clark Law School.
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
Hasen on Renewal of the Voting Rights Act Check out What Congress Should Consider Before Renewing the Voting Rights Act: A Chance to Preempt Supreme Court Invalidation, and Better Protect Minority Voting Rights by Rick Hasen on Findlaw. Here's a taste:
Welcome to the Blogosphere . . . . . . to Carrollogos by Michael Carroll of Villanova University School of Law (and the Board of Creative Commons.
Seminar on Benkler at Crooked Timber Check out The Wealth of Networks seminar over at Crooked Timber! Here's a snippet:
Green on Rutledge & Executive Detention Craig Green (Temple University) has posted Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Monday, May 29, 2006
Leiter on Toleration of Religion Brian Leiter (University of Texas at Austin - School of Law & Department of Philosophy) has posted Why Tolerate Religion? on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Van Alstine on Executive Foreign Affairs Lawmaking Michael P. Van Alstine (University of Maryland - School of Law) has posted Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking (UCLA Law Review, Vol. 54, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Kyriacou, Bacaria & Congleton on Menu Federalism Andreas P. Kyriacou , Jordi Bacaria and Roger Congleton (University of Girona - Department of Economics , Department d'Economia Aplicada and Center for Study of Public Choice) have posted A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement (Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 14, pp. 167-190, 2003) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Symeonides on Territoriality and Personality in Tort Conflicts Symeon C. Symeonides (Willamette University - College of Law) has posted Territoriality and Personality in Tort Conflicts (INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER NYGH, T. Einhorn, K. Siehr, eds., pp. 401-433, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Sunday, May 28, 2006
Legal Theory Calendar
Oxford EC Law Discussion Group: Ulf Bernitz, The Duty to Refer Cases to the ECJ under Art 234 EC
Oxford Law Faculty, Invited Seminars in Constitutional Theory 2006: Professor John Bell, 'Managing the Judiciary and Judicial Independence'
Florida State University Law: Benjamin J. Priester, Florida State University College of Law
Legal Theory Lexicon: Metaethics
"Metaethics" may sound rather esoteric, but, in fact, metaethical argumentation is very common, both in ordinary life and in legal theory. Perhaps the most familiar example is the use of moral relativism (or similar positions) in normative argumentation. When one party in an argument asserts something like, "Homosexuality is morally wrong," the reply might be, "No, it isn't. You are mistaken," but another common (perhaps more common) reply is, "That's just a value judgment." The implication is that moral judgments are relative or subjective or just an expression of emotional reactions.
Metaethics is a very big topic, and even a cursory introduction is the subject of a whole course or monograph, but some very basic ideas and terminology can be introduced in a blog post. As always, the Legal Theory Lexicon is aimed at law students (especially first year law students) with an interest in legal theory.
Metaethical Questions Metaethics includes a variety of topics, and one good way to get a basic grasp on the field is to simply list some of the questions that are encompassed by (legal)metaethics:
Cognitivism and Noncognitivism One of the most important debates in metaethics (from the point of view of normative legal theory) is the debate between cognitivism and noncognitivism. Very roughly, cognitivism is the position that moral statements (such as "There ought to be a constitutional right to privacy.") express beliefs that can be true or false. (Beliefs are "cognitive" states, hence the name "cognitivism.") Noncognitivism denies this and asserts that moral statements express noncognitive states, such as emotions or desires. Noncognitive states (emotions, desires) cannot be true or false.
I think the best way to get a handle on this debate is to take a brief look at a very simple version of noncognitivism. A noncognitivist might assert that when some says that X is morally wrong, they are simply expressing an attitude of disapproval towards X. That is, "X is wrong" means "Boo X." When someone says "X is morally good," they are expressing an attitude of moral approval towards X. The Boo-Hooray theory is a crude version of emotivism--the theory that moral statements express emotions, associated with A.J. Ayer. As I'm sure you've already guessed, contemporary noncognitivists have theories that are more sophisticated than Ayer's; examples of such contemporary noncognitivist theories include Allan Gibbard's norm expressivism and Simon Blackburn's quasi realism.
Cognitivsts assert that moral propositions express beliefs that have cognitive content and hence can be true or false (or at least correct or incorrect). The cognitivist landscape is complex. Some cognitivist theories hold that our moral beliefs track natural properties in the world; others cognitivist theories hold that our moral beliefs are about nonnatural properties: G.E. Moore had a theory like this. Still other cognitivists believe that moral statements can be true or false, but deny that they are about any states of affairs (natural or nonnatural).
A simple example of a naturalist cognitivist theory might be the following: a utilitarian might believe that statements about the rightness or wrongness of actions are about natural states of the world, e.g. the natural properties of pleasure and pain: when I say, action X is right, I mean, X will produce the greatest balance of pleasure over pain as compared the alternative courses of action. In Legal Theory Lexicon 014: Fact and Value, we explored G.E. Moore's "open question" argument against naturalist forms of cognitivism.
It goes without saying that debates over cognitivism and noncognitivism are much richer and complex than the simplified ideas that we've just explored, but the core idea--the distinction between cognitivism and noncognitivism--is accessible and hugely important.
Moral Psychology Another important set of questions in metaethics concerns the relationship between moral judgments and motivation. Suppose one makes a moral judgment that X is morally obligatory. Does it follow that one is motivated to do X? Or can one believe that X is morally required with no motivation to do X? Lot's of folks find it very plausible to think that if one affirms "X is morally obligatory," then one has got to have a motive to do X. "Internalism" is the view that there is some internal or conceptual connection between moral judgments and motivation. "Externalism" is the view that the connection between moral judgment and motivation is external or contingent.
For some forms of noncognitivism, the question whether there is an internal connection between moral judgment and motivation isn't much of a question. If moral statements simply express motivations (to take the easiest case), then it follows that the sentence X is morally obligatory would turn out just to mean, "I am motivated to do X." It will get more complicated for other forms of noncognitivism, but in general and vastly oversimplified terms, if morality is about desire or emotion and if desires or emotions motivate, then moral judgments are closely connected with motivations.
But for cognitivists, things are not so easy. Let's take our utilitarian naturalist cognitivist as an example. I know that if I stop working on my blog and start working for Oxfam, I can produce better consequences. If internalism were true, this would give me a motive to stop working on the blog. Assuming that Hume was right and motives are desires plus beliefs, at the very least, I ought to feel some sort of tug (or other motivating state) pulling in the direction of working for Oxfam. But I don't, in fact, feel such a tug. One way to square these facts (assuming they were true) with cognitivism is to deny that there is an internal connection between moral judgments and motivations. Thus, I might think that some external sanction or internalized norm must be added to the moral judgment in order to produce motivating force.
Conclusion Normative legal theory necessarily implicates metaethics. Most normative legal theorists explicitly or implicitly assert that their positions are true (or at least correct) and that inconsistent positions are false (or incorrect). That means that most normative legal theories rest on metaethical assumptions. That doesn't mean that you need to be an expert in metaethics to be a good normative legal theorist, but it sure helps to know the very general outlines of the terrain! Bibliography
Saturday, May 27, 2006
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Behavioral Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform by Ed McCaffery. Here is the abstract:
Legal Theory Bookworm I've been thinking recently about "introductions" to normative theory--the kind of books you would recommend as a jumping off point for someone who is interested in acquiring a basic skill set in normative legal theory, but has never studied moral or political philosophy. I'm still not sure about my final list, but here are some preliminary thoughts:
Friday, May 26, 2006
Perry on Charitable Contributions & an Ideal Estate Tax Miranda Perry (University of Colorado) has posted Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Esty on Globalizing Administrative Law Daniel C. Esty (Yale Law School) has posted Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law (Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, pp. 1490-1562, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Smythe on Shareholder Democracy Donald J. Smythe (Washington and Lee University) has posted Shareholder Democracy and the Economic Purpose of the Corporation (Washington and Lee Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Rossi on Restructuring Electric Utilities Jim Rossi (Florida State University College of Law) has posted Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry (Wisconsin Law Review, pp. 763-837, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Glicksman on Environmental Federalism Robert L. Glicksman (University of Kansas - School of Law) has posted From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy (Wake Forest Law Review, 2006) on SSRN. Here's the abstract:
Hunt & Laszlo on Bribery Jennifer Hunt and Sonia Laszlo (McGill University - Department of Economics and McGill University - Department of Economics) have posted Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are The Payoffs? on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Kaplan in Lisbon
Thursday, May 25, 2006
Garrett & Tetlow on Katrina & the Constitution Brandon L. Garrett (University of Virginia - School of Law) & Tania Tetlow (Tulane University - School of Law) have posted Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution after Hurricane Katrina on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Conference Announcement: Law & Technology at MIT
Conference Announcement: The Future of Democracy at William & Mary
Wednesday, May 24, 2006
Leib & Ponet on Citizen Representation on the Jury Ethan J. Leib (University of California, Hastings College of the Law) & David L Ponet (Columbia University) have posted Citizen Representation and the American Jury on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Most Cited Cases Check out What Is the Most Heavily-Cited Tax Case? over at TaxProf Blog, which actually discusses all of the most cited United States Supreme Court cases.
Conference Announcement: Colloquium on Labor and Employment Law at Marquette
New from Law & Politics Book Review
COMMUNITY RESOURCES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, by Johanna Gibson. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. 396pp. Cloth. $114.95/£60.00. ISBN: 0-7546-4436-7. Reviewed by Robert G. Brookshire.
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, by Roger C. Cramton and Paul D. Carrington (eds). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2006. 516pp. Paper. $45.00. ISBN: 1-59460-213-1. Reviewed by Chris W. Bonneau.
MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS, by Anita Bernstein (ed). New York: New York University Press, 2006. 255pp. Cloth. $40 ISBN: 0814799299. Reviewed by Elizabeth Ellen Gordon.
Tuesday, May 23, 2006
Bell and Parchomovsky on Public Use Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky (Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law and University of Pennsylvania - School of Law) have posted The Uselessness of Public Use on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Saban on Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies Ilan Saban (University of Haifa - Faculty of Law) has posted Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analysis and the Case of the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Vermont on Independent Invention Samson Vermont (George Mason University School of Law) has posted Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement (Michigan Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Forell on Provocation & Gender Equality Caroline Anne Forell (University of Oregon - School of Law) has posted Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United States, Canada and Australia (Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law, Vol. 14, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Monday, May 22, 2006
International Political Theory: The IPT Beacon Check out the website the "International Political Theory Beacon." Here's a description:
Nagel’s Atlas, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34.2 (2006) by A. J. Julius
and Extra Rempublicam, Nulla Justicia, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34.2 (2006) by Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel
McCaffery on Behavioral Economics & Tax Reform Ed McCaffery (University of Southern California) has posted Behavioral Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Sunday, May 21, 2006
Legal Theory Calendar
Legal Theory Lexicon: Functional Explanation in Legal Theory
Why do legal rules have the form and content that they do, in fact, have? One answer to this question is based on the idea that the function of a rule can be part of a causal explanation of the content of the rule. Why does corporations law limit the liability of stockholders? One kind of answer to that question might begin: "That rule is the way it is, because it serves the interest of the capitalist class." Or, "The rule is that way, because that is the efficient rule, and common law adjudication selects for efficient rules." In other words, the content of the rule is explained (causally) by the function the rule serves.
The Idea of a Functionalist Explanation Functionalist explanations are familiar to almost everyone, because of the important role they play in evolutionary biology. When we try to explain why an organism has a particular trait--why male peacock's have their feathers or why the elephants have trunks--we appeal to the function that the trait serves. Male peacock's have colorful feathers because that trait serves to attract female peacock's and hence the genes produce this trait are favored by evolution. Elephants have trunks, because they enable elephants to eat and drink more efficiently.
In biology, functionalist explanations are scientifically valid, because we understand the causal mechanism whereby function plays a causal role. That causal mechanism is evolution, of course, and we have a very good explanation for how evolution works in the form of genetics. DNA (plus a lot of other stuff) provides the precise causal mechanism by which evolution operates.
Functionalist Explanation in the Social Sciences Functionalist explanations are not limited to biology. Sociologists frequently explain social behavior on the basis of the social function that the behavior serves. Why does this group do a "rain dance"? Because the rain dance ritual serves to create social cohesion in times of stress. There is, however, a significance difference between functionalist explanation in biology and functionalist explanation in the social sciences. In biology, functionalist explanations are underwritten by a well-confirmed theory of the causal mechanism by which evolution functions. In social science, the causal mechanisms are murkier. What causal law explains how the social cohesion function of rain dances leads to their perpetuation across generations? Without an answer to questions like this, we have at least prima facie reason to be suspicious of functionalist explanations in the social sciences. This suspicion is enhanced because functionalist explanations can easily become nonfalsifiabile. In the case of biology, because evolutionary theory is well confirmed, we more or less know in advance that some functionalist explanation has got to be right--the question is which functionalist explanation is correct. In the case of social science, there is no well-confirmed general theory of social evolution, so it isn't necessarily the case that there is always a true functionalist explanation for any given social behavior.
Functionalist Explanations in Legal Theory And that brings us to law. Functionalist explanations are frequently invoked in positive legal theory. That is, when we ask the question, "Why does the law have such and such content?", the answer frequently is, "Because such and such a rule functions in thus and so way." Here are some examples:
Legal Evolution Functionalist explanations are also implicit in any claim that the law evolves (where "evolves" is meant in a technical sense and is not a mere synonym for "changes"). The idea that legal systems evolve is very common, but there is not general theory of legal evolution that has the well-confirmed status of the corresponding theory of biological evolution. Be on the watch for claims about legal evolution; such claims frequently are not well thought out and almost always lack empirical support.
Efficiency Another example of functionalist explanation in legal theory is the claim that the common law rules are efficient. "Why did the common law adopt the Learned Hand formula as the standard for negligence?" "Because that is the efficient standard." Sometimes these claims are accompanied by an account of the mechanism by which a common law system moves towards efficient legal rules. For example, it might be argued that inefficient legal rules will be subject to continuous litigation pressure; whereas efficient legal rules, once adopted, tend to facilitate settlement of disputes.
For a very lucid explanation of the role of microfoundations in social science, I highly recommend Jon Elster's brilliant book Making Sense of Marx. And for an equally brilliant defense of functionalist explanations, consult G.A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History. (The debate between Cohen and Elster is one of the most interesting and important debates in contemporary philosophy of the social science.)
Conclusion Let me conclude with a very short diatribe. Legal theorists need a basic understanding of positive legal theory. (I hope this is obvious to everyone!) That means that legal academics should, at a minimum, have a working familiarity with the general concepts of the methodology and theory of the social sciences, including basic ideas about the role of functionalist explanations. But almost no law schools (even the elite ones that train most academics) offer courses in the methodology of positive legal theory! That's bad. Real bad.
Saturday, May 20, 2006
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Why People Obey the Law by Tom Tyler. Here's a blurb:
Download of the Week The Download of the Week uis Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq by Kim Ferzan. Here is the abstract:
Friday, May 19, 2006
Scalia on Foreign Law & Constitutional Interpretation Check out Scalia to Congress: Butt Out of Court's Use of Foreign Law by David Savage. Here's a snippet:
Perry on the Value of American Law Reviews Ronen Perry (University of Haifa) has posted The Relative Value of American Law Reviews: Refinement and Implementation on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Thursday, May 18, 2006
Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Dr Edward Kwakwa, The Role of the International Lawyer in an International Organization
Oxford Law Faculty Invited Seminars in Constitutional Theory 2006: Martin Loughlin, speaking on The Idea of Public Law, with comments from Paul Craig, Richard Ekins, Nick Barber
Florida State Law: Jonathan Klick, Florida State University College of Law, "Incomplete Contracts and Opportunism in Franchising Arrangements" (joint w/ Larry Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi)
University of Arizona Law: Jack Chin, The Tyranny of the Minority
Entry Level Hiring Report--Last Call Until the End of Summer Tomorrow, I will do the final version of the entry-level report until the end of the summer. If you have a new report, a correction, or a report about a school that has not made any entry level hires, please forward it to me by Thursday, May 18. I will do a final version of the report, probably sometime in August, to include late hires and some additional analysis of the data.
This post will move to the top of the blog until the 18th.
And thanks to everyone who has contributed reports!
The most recent revisions can be found here or scroll down. The most recent version is immediately below this post.
Barros on Kelo Benjamin Barros (Widener University School of Law) has posted Nothing "Errant" About It: The Berman and Midkiff Conference Notes and How the Supreme Court Got to Kelo With Its Eyes Wide Open on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Book Announcement: Why People Obey the Law by Tyler
Zwolinksi on Exploitation Matt Zwolinski (University of San Diego, Philosophy) has posted Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
New from Law & Politics Book Review
DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA, by David A. Skeel, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001 (2nd Printing and Paperback edition, 2004). 296pp. Cloth. $67.50/£43.95. ISBN: 0-691-08810-1. Paper. $19.95/£12.95. ISBN: 0-691-11637-7. Reviewed by Thomas G.W. Telfer.
BORROWING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN WEIMAR GERMANY AND THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC, by Cindy Skach. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 192pp. Cloth. $29.95/£18.95. ISBN: 0-691-12345-4. Reviewed by Amalia D. Kessler.
BREACH OF TRUST: HOW THE WARREN COMMISSION FAILED THE NATION AND WHY, by Gerald D. McKnight. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 512pp. Cloth. $29.95. ISBN: 0-7006-1390-0. Reviewed by David A. Yalof.
CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE, by Anna-Maria Marshall. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co, 2005. 200pp. Hardback. $89.95/£55.00. ISBN: 0754625206. Reviewed by Susan M. Behuniak.
POLITICAL DEMOCRACY, TRUST, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW, by Charles F. Andrain and James T. Smith. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2005. 231pp. Cloth. $65.00. ISBN: 1-55553-645-X. Paper. $26.00. ISBN: 1-55553-646-8. Reviewed by Helen J. Knowles.
LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT, by Oscar G. Chase. New York: New York University Press, 2005. 224pp. Cloth. $45.00. ISBN: 0814716512. Reviewed by: Gad Barzilai.
Wednesday, May 17, 2006
Law School Entry Level Hiring Report (2005-06 Hiring Season): Version 4.18 (last modified on 18 May 2006)
The report covers hirings to entry-level tenure-track positions at American law schools. It does not cover lateral hiring, hiring by law schools located outside of the United States, or hiring by non-law school legal studies programs.
As in part years, I will continue to move the report to the top of the blog, adding new data as it comes in. After the data set begins to become "complete," I will begin to add various reports and graphic material.
161 reports have been received as of version 4.18. Of these, 40 candidates had a JD without either an advanced degree of a post-doc/pre-tenure position such as a VAP or fellowship. 43 candidates had an advanced doctorate such as a PhD, SJD, or DPhil, and 43 candidates had some other advanced degree, usually a masters. 88 candidates have done some kind of post-doc/pre-tenure program. 23 candidates had the “hat trick” of a JD plus an advanced doctorate plus a post-doc/pre-tenure position; 53 candidates had the JD plus some advanced degree and a post-doc/pre-tenure position.
The mean JD graduation date as of version 4.18 was 1999. The median graduation date was 2000. The mode was 19, shared by 2000 and 2001. As of version 4.18, 1 new hire had a first law degree awarded in 2006, 5 new hires graduated in 2005; 9 in 2004; 11 in 2003; and 15 in 2002. 1 new hire graduated in 1975; 1 in 1984; and 1 in 1985. Only 7 pre-1990 graduates recieved entry-level offers.
Adding to the Report To report a new hire not yet listed or to correct a current listing, email me at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Incomplete reports are welcome!
This time around, I am trying to collect the following data elements:
Fernanda Nicola, Laurea in Legge Turin 2000, SJD Harvard 2006, PhD Law, Trento 2006
Ezra Rosser, JD Harvard 2003, MPhil Land Economy Cambridge 2004, Westerfield Fellow Loyola University New Orleans
Dennis Ventry, JD NYU 2004, PHD History (Economic & Legal) University of California at Santa Barbera 2001, Visiting Scholar in Taxation UCLA
Robert D. Sloane, JD Yale 2000, Associate-in-Law Columbia 2005-2006, Visiting Lecturer-in-Law & Research Fellow Yale 2004-2005
Charles Whitehead, JD Columbia 1986, Research Fellow and Director, Transactional Studies, Columbia
Max Minzner, JD Yale 1999
New: Bobby Dexter, JD Harvard 1992, Fellowship Loyola New Orleans
New: Olatunde Johnson, JD Stanford 1995, Kellis Parker Research Fellow, Columbia
David Cohen, JD Columbia, 1997
Dana Irwin, JD Yale, 2002>
Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, J.D. Columbia 1996
Lesley Wexler, J.D. University of Chicago 2002, Bigelow Fellow at Chicago
Samson Vermont, JD Georgia __, LLM U. Va. 2005, Humphrey Law and Economics Fellow, University of Michigan
David Fontana, JD Yale 2005, D.Phil Socio-Legal Studies Oxford (expected 2006)
William Gallagher, JD UCLA 1994, PhD Law/Jurisprudence & Social Policy, University of California at Berkeley 1993
Angelique A. EagleWoman, JD University of North Dakota 1998, LL.M. American Indian and Indigenous Law University of Tulsa College of Law 2004
Stacey A. Tovino, JD University of Houston Law Center 1997, Ph.D. Health Care Ethics University of Texas 2006,Visiting Assistant Professor University of Houston Law Center
Elizabeth M. Glazer, JD Chicago 2004, MA Philosophy University of Pennsylvania 2001
H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, JD University of Southern California 1997, LLM (European IP) University of Oslo 2004, Visiting Researcher and Lecturer University of Oslo
New: Cesare Romano, PhD International Law Geneva (date?), Visiting Professor, Amsterdam
Margaret Satterthwaite, JD NYU 1999, MA English U.C. Santa Cruz 1995, Clinical Instructor NYU
New: Laurel Haskell, JD Minnesota 1997
Annecoos Wiersema, LLB London School of Economics 1998, SJD Harvard 2004, Visiting Assistant Professor University of Denver
Michael O'Shea, JD Harvard 2001, MA Philosophy Pittsburgh 1998
Emily Gold Waldman, JD Harvard 2002
Rose Cuison Villazor, JD American University Washington College of Law 2000, LLM Columbia Law School 2006, Human Rights Fellow, Columbia Law School
Y.S. (Steve) Lee, BA (Law) Cambridge 1993, PhD (Law) Cambridge 2004, Visiting Research Fellow, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law
New: Molly Walker Wilson, JD University of Virginia 2004, PhD Psychology University of Virginia 2004
Colin Marks, JD University of Houston 2001
C.A. Harwell Wells, JD Vanderbilt 2001, PhD Modern American History University of Virginia 1998
Bill Jeffery, JD Stanford 1975
Glenn Roque-Jackson, JD Harvard 1992
Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, JD University of Chicago 2002, Bigelow University of Chicago
Brent White, JD NYU 1998, VAP NYU
New: Sharon E. Foster, JD Loyola Law School Los Angeles 1987, PhD Law University of Edinburgh anticipated 2006, Clinical Associate Professor (Legal Research and Writing) University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
New: Ned Snow, JD Harvard 2003
Melissa Murray, JD Yale 2002, Associate in Law, Columbia
Jacob Katz Cogan, JD Yale 1999, PhD History Princeton 2002, VAP University of Chicago
Sonja West, J.D. Chicago 1998, BA Journalism University of Iowa 1993, Hugo Black Faculty Fellow University of Alabama
New: Melynda Price, JD Texas 2002, PhD Political Science Michigan 2006
Ben Depoorter, Bachelor and Master in Law Ghent 1998, M.A. Hamburg 1999, LL.M. Yale 2003, PhD Economics Ghent 2003, SJD Yale expected, VAP George Mason
Scott Hershovitz, JD Yale 2004, D.Phil. Law University of Oxford 2001
David Mitchell, JD University of Pennsylvania 2002, PhD Sociology University of Pennsylvania (date?)
Anthony Schutz, JD Nebraska 2003, Lecturer Cornell
Michelle Harner, JD Ohio State University 1995
Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, JD Temple University 2000, LLM Legal Education Temple University 2006, Abraham L. Freedman Fellow & Lecturer in Law Temple University
Serena Mayeri, JD Yale 2001, PhD History Yale 2006, Golieb Fellow NYU
Noah Sachs, JD Stanford (date?), MPP Princeton (date?), Climenko Fellowship Harvard
New: Schmuel Leshem, LLB Hebrew 1997, SJD NYU 2005
Toby Heytens, JD University of Virginia 2000, Visiting Assistant Professor Cornell
New: Sylvia Kang'ara, LLB University of Nairobi 1996, SJD Harvard 2003, VAP Oklahoma City
Dongsheng Zang, LLB Beijing Colege of Economics, SJD Harvard, VAP University of Washington
Stephanie Tai, JD Georgetown 2000, PhD Chemistry Tufts 1997, Visiting Associate Professor Washington & Lee
Nita Farahany, JD Duke 2004, PhD* Philosophy Duke 2006 (*expected), Fellow and Instructor in Law Vanderbilt
New: Terry Maroney, JD NYU 1998, NYU Furman Fellow, USC Law Fellow
New: Joy Mullane, J.D. Florida 1999, LL.M. Florida in Tax 2003, Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Florida Levin College of Law
New: Teressa Ravenell, J.D. Columbia 2002, Visiting Assistant Professor at the College of William and Mary Marshall Wythe School of Law
Chaim Saiman, JD Columbia 2001, Olin Fellow, Harvard, Golieb Fellow, NYU
Omari Simmons, JD University of Pennsylvania 1999
Emily Hughes, JD Michigan 1997, MA International Relations Yale 1992, Associate Director Death Penalty Clinic DePaul
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, JD Harvard 1996, PhD Candidate Psychology NYU, Research Fellow NYU
Susan Evans Cancelosi, JD Cornell 1992, LLM University of Houston, Research Professor Houston
Steven Davidoff, JD Columbia 1995, M.Finance London Business School 2005
Lance Gable, J.D. Georgetown 2001, M.P.H. from Johns Hopkins University (2001), Professorial Lecturer Georgetown
New: Dana Roach, JD Michigan 1999
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, JD Stanford 2002
Jeffrey Dobbins, JD Duke 1994
Judith Wise, JD University of Chicago 1997, M.A. Sociology University of Chicago 1994, Visiting Assistant Professor Florida State