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This is Lawrence Solum's legal theory weblog. Legal Theory Blog comments and reports on recent scholarship in jurisprudence, law and philosophy, law and economic theory, and theoretical work in substantive areas, such as constitutional law, cyberlaw, procedure, criminal law, intellectual property, torts, contracts, etc.

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Monday, February 28, 2005
 
Monday Calendar
    UCLA School of Law: Kurt Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment. Highly recommended! Here is a taste:
      A comprehensive look at the lost history of the Ninth Amendment is presented in two articles, Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 331 (2004), and Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 597 (2005). This short essay briefly summarizes some important aspects of that history. Those interested in the subject are encouraged to read the full articles. Given that the states had existed for more than a decade under the Articles as thirteen “free and independent states, it is no surprise that the degree to which the proposed Constitution would diminish (or eradicate) individual state autonomy was a major issue in the ratification debates. Despite Federalist assurances to the contrary, Anti-federalists warned of the potential consolidation of the states under a national government with unlimited power. Although a sufficient number of states eventually agreed to ratify the Constitution, a number of them did so with the understanding that the scope of federal power would be strictly limited. Several state conventions included statements of principle along with their notice of ratification declaring their understanding that all non-delegated powers, jurisdictions and rights were reserved to the states.
    Northwestern International Law: Larry Helfer, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, "Exit Treaties". Here is a taste:
      [B]uried at the back of most modern international agreements, and often overlooked by scholars, are provisions that call into question international law’s unequivocal command that states must either obey treaties or cooperate in abrogating or revising them. Such provisions, known as denunciation or withdrawal clauses, permit a state to “exit” from a treaty that the state had previously ratified and that is otherwise valid and in force. Distilled to their essence, exit clauses create a lawful, public mechanism for a state to terminate its treaty obligations or withdraw from membership in an intergovernmental organization.5 Denunciation and withdrawal are fundamentally unilateral acts. They do not require the consent or approval of other states, and may often be effectuated simply by providing notice to the other parties. Moreover, a state that invokes these clauses to quit a treaty occupies a very different position from a state that breaches its treaty commitments. An exiting state faces different burdens and benefits, different prospects of being sanctioned, different reputational consequences, and different responses by other parties than a state that breaches an international agreement.
    University of Texas School of Law: Richard Sander, University of California at Los Angeles, "A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools".
    Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar: Robert Sugden, East Anglia.
    Hofstra University School of Law: Myriam Gilles, Cardozo Law School, “Opting Out of Class Action Liability”.
    Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Douglas Berman, Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, "Booker: The Future of the U.S. Sentencing Guidlines".
    NYU Law: Liam Murphy, Concepts of Law. Vanderbilt Law & Economics: Jennifer Arlen, New York University, "Private Contractual Alternatives to Malpractice Liability".
    Vanderbilt Charney Distinguished Lecture Series: William Schabas, National University of Ireland, Galway, "Genocide and International Law: Darfur, Srebenica and Cambodia".


 
Conference Announcement: European Congress for Analytic Philosophy
    Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, ECAP 5 Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, 27-31 August 2005 http://www.centrofilosofia.org/ecap5 Workshop on Philosophy, Economics, and Public Policy Organised by Luc Bovens (LSE and editor, Economics & Philosophy), Geoffrey Brennan (ANU and editor, Economics & Philosophy), and Alex Voorhoeve (LSE). Description: The workshop focuses on techniques and ideas from moral and political philosophy and from economic theory that bear on the analysis of issues in public policy. Some of the topics that may be addressed in the workshop are environmental regulation, health policy, the welfare state, voting theory, … Invited Speakers: Sven Ove Hansson (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm) Julian Legrand (LSE, London and UK Prime Minister’s Health Policy Advisor) Jonathan Wolff (UCL, London) Submission of papers: Authors are invited to submit papers that they wish to present at the workshop electronically to ecap5@bovens.org. Submissions should be maximum 5000 words. All papers will be blind reviewed. The deadline for submission is April 15, 2005. Authors will be informed of the decision about the presentation of their paper by May 15, 2005. The workshop is supported by a grant by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government.


 
Conference Announcement: Self-Knowledge
    The Royal Institute of Philosophy University of Manchester 5 March 2005 'Self-Knowledge' A symposium on the nature and the limits of understanding oneself. Speakers:
      Paul Snowdon (UCL) Sven Bernecker (Manchester) David Owens (Sheffield) Naomi Eilan (Warwick)
    For further inquiries please visit: http://les.man.ac.uk/philosophy/rip/rip2005.html


Sunday, February 27, 2005
 
Legal Theory Calendar
    Monday, February 28
      UCLA School of Law: Kurt Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment. Here is a taste:
        A comprehensive look at the lost history of the Ninth Amendment is presented in two articles, Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 331 (2004), and Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 597 (2005). This short essay briefly summarizes some important aspects of that history. Those interested in the subject are encouraged to read the full articles. Given that the states had existed for more than a decade under the Articles as thirteen “free and independent states, it is no surprise that the degree to which the proposed Constitution would diminish (or eradicate) individual state autonomy was a major issue in the ratification debates. Despite Federalist assurances to the contrary, Anti-federalists warned of the potential consolidation of the states under a national government with unlimited power. Although a sufficient number of states eventually agreed to ratify the Constitution, a number of them did so with the understanding that the scope of federal power would be strictly limited. Several state conventions included statements of principle along with their notice of ratification declaring their understanding that all non-delegated powers, jurisdictions and rights were reserved to the states.
      Northwestern International Law: Larry Helfer, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, "Exit Treaties". Here is a taste:
        [B]uried at the back of most modern international agreements, and often overlooked by scholars, are provisions that call into question international law’s unequivocal command that states must either obey treaties or cooperate in abrogating or revising them. Such provisions, known as denunciation or withdrawal clauses, permit a state to “exit” from a treaty that the state had previously ratified and that is otherwise valid and in force. Distilled to their essence, exit clauses create a lawful, public mechanism for a state to terminate its treaty obligations or withdraw from membership in an intergovernmental organization.5 Denunciation and withdrawal are fundamentally unilateral acts. They do not require the consent or approval of other states, and may often be effectuated simply by providing notice to the other parties. Moreover, a state that invokes these clauses to quit a treaty occupies a very different position from a state that breaches its treaty commitments. An exiting state faces different burdens and benefits, different prospects of being sanctioned, different reputational consequences, and different responses by other parties than a state that breaches an international agreement.
      University of Texas School of Law: Richard Sander, University of California at Los Angeles, "A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools".
      Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar: Robert Sugden, East Anglia.
      Hofstra University School of Law: Myriam Gilles, Cardozo Law School, “Opting Out of Class Action Liability”.
      Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School: Douglas Berman, Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, "Booker: The Future of the U.S. Sentencing Guidlines".
      NYU Law: Liam Murphy, Concepts of Law. Vanderbilt Law & Economics: Jennifer Arlen, New York University, "Private Contractual Alternatives to Malpractice Liability".
      Vanderbilt Charney Distinguished Lecture Series: William Schabas, National University of Ireland, Galway, "Genocide and International Law: Darfur, Srebenica and Cambodia".
    Tuesday, March 1
      Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Stephen Perry, Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law. Here is a taste:
        One of the strands woven into the complex fabric of Law’s Empire is an argument that there exists, under certain conditions, a general moral obligation to obey the law. Whether or not there can ever be such an obligation is an age-old problem in political philosophy, and Dworkin’s argument is offered, in part, as a contribution to that particular philosophical tradition. But it is more than that, because the argument also constitutes an integral part of Dworkin’s general theory of law. That is why I say it is one strand of a complex fabric; for Dworkin, political and legal philosophy are inextricably connected. For many of the philosophers who have addressed the question of political obligation, as I shall call it, there is no such inevitable connection. Notice, to begin, that no respectable theory of political obligation ever claimed that a person is obligated no matter what to obey the laws of a legal system to which he or she is subject. Every minimally plausible theory sets out certain conditions under which such an obligation is said to arise, and Dworkin’s is no exception. Many such theories have, however, regarded these conditions as ones that do not figure in any essential way in the concept of law itself. They assume that law constitutes a system of norms the existence and content of which can be established by, say, looking to certain kinds of social facts, and then asking whether or not a given legal system meets a set of independently specifiable conditions; if these conditions are met, then a general obligation to obey is said to exist. Arguments based on consent are often (although not necessarily) of that form; they look to an independently specifiable condition that asks whether or not everyone who is subject to a legal system has validly consented to obey its laws, whatever they are. The argument from fair play is also of this form; it looks to an independently specifiable set of conditions that asks, first, whether the content of the norms of the system show it to be a mutually beneficial scheme of cooperation, and, second, whether or not those subject to the system have “accepted” its benefits.2 There are, as Dworkin points out, well-known problems with both arguments if they are regarded as the basis of a general obligation to obey the law, since it is never the case that everyone subject to any given legal system has validly consented to obey it or has accepted, in the appropriate sense, certain benefits it happens to provide (LE at 192-95). My present point, however, is that these arguments treat the philosophical problem of political obligation as for the most part independent of the philosophical problem about the nature of law.
      Georgetown University School of Law: Abbe Smith.
      Northwestern Empirical Legal Studies: Margaret Brinig, William G. Hammond Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Iowa, "The Effect of Change in Child Custody Standards".
      Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Richard Whitecross, Legal Culture: Bringing the Theoretical and Empirical Closer Together: Citizenship and Belonging: Law and Identity in a Himalayan State.
      Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Dr Christine Greenhalgh & Dr Mark Rogers, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: The Use of Intellectual Property by the UK Financial Services Sector.
    Wednesday, March 2
      Notre Dame Law School: Lawrence Solum, University of San Diego, "Virtue Jurisprudence: An Aretaic Theory of Law." Scroll down to last Wednesday for an abstract.
      University College, London, Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy: Professor Seana Shiffrin (UCLA), 'What's wrong with compelled association?'. Here is a taste:
        Roberts v. United States Jaycees held that it was constitutionally permissible for Minnesota to require the Jaycees, as a public accommodation, to desegregate and to admit women. Sixteen years later, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale held that it was constitutionally impermissible for New Jersey to require the Boy Scouts, as a public accommodation, to remain partly desegregated and to retain an openly gay Scoutmaster. It is no surprise that Dale caused gnashing of teeth by those who applauded Roberts v. Jaycees: the Court’s commitment to integration seemed all too limited. Women counted; gays and lesbians did not. This analysis may be a partly accurate diagnosis of Dale’s resolution, but it does not fully capture what is troubling about Dale. From a First Amendment perspective, both Jaycees and Dale should have occasioned even greater dental damage. Those who support Roberts v. Jaycees, especially liberals, should have been disturbed by Dale, not entirely because of its outcome, but because the reasoning of Dale and the debate between the justices was foreshadowed by Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Jaycees. The opinions in Dale, and in particular the dissenting opinions of the liberal justices, follow the lead of Justice Brennan. In so doing, they reflect and forward a message-centered view of freedom of association that, while familiar, is importantly and unpalatably incomplete. In this Essay, I will argue that Jaycees was correctly decided but that Justice Brennan’s majority opinion reflects and has reinforced a messagecentered approach to freedom of association that denigrates its value and implicitly distorts and underplays its intimate connection to freedom of speech. A parallel mistake occurs in a common articulation of the objection to certain forms of compelled speech. Drawing upon a core, but underemphasized, aspect of liberalism, I will re-fashion the case against compelled speech in a way that concomitantly provides a stronger foundation for freedom of association. Specifically, the fundamental wrong of compelled speech in cases such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which found the compulsory recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional, does not depend on any external effect, in particular on outsiders possibly misunderstanding a person’s compelled speech as his own. It has more to do with the illicit influence compelled speech may have on the character and autonomous thinking process of the compelled speaker, and with illicit and disrespectful governmental efforts, however fruitless, to exert such influence.
      Northwestern University, Constitutional Theory Colloquium: Charles Lawrence, Georgetown, "Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy and Community". Here is a taste:
        This article considers the subject of my silence, the relationship between the constitutional injury of racial segregation and the privatization of education. When I speak of privatization here I do not only mean the flight to private schools, or the corporatization of school systems, or the politics of school vouchers,4 although these are all symptoms of the larger problem I wish to explore. The larger problem is something I will call the privatization of care and concern for and conversation about the education of our children. I believe that increasingly public policy makers and individual parents alike think and speak about children’s right to equal educational opportunity as if that project were primarily about giving parents the chance or “liberty” to be consumers in the education market on behalf of their own children. The decisions about how to educate our children (meaning the children in our nuclear family)—where we will school them, who their classmates will be, what curriculum they will be taught—are thought of as private, protected by our constitutionally protected liberty to raise our children as we see fit. When my colleague asks about a good school for his son he is not engaging me in a conversation about what school is best for his children and mine, much less for the poor black children who live in D.C. When parents search for a good school for their children, they do not see the project as collective, as about how we will engage the political process as a community to determine what is best for all our children and see to it that they get it.
      Fordham University School of Law: Grainne De Burca; European University Institute, Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law, "The European Constitution: In Search of Europe's International Identity?".
    Thursday, March 3
      University of Texas School of Law: Akhil Amar, America's Constitution: A Guided Tour. Here is a taste:
        This book has tried to offer a comprehensive account of America’s Constitution, introducing the reader both to the legal text (and its consequences) and to the political deeds that gave rise to that text. Surprisingly enough, virtually nothing else in print aims to do this. There is of course a vast outpouring of superb work on the Constitution. But within the legal literature, most books and articles focus on some specific aspect of constitutional law—executive power, judicial review, free speech, or what have you—and make no effort to encompass the constitutional system as a whole. Many law-trained authors concentrate on Supreme Court decisions, thereby privileging the United States Reports over the United States Constitution. Other law books are dense treatises aimed only at legal professionals. While political scientists routinely analyze Congress, the presidency, and the judiciary, they, too, rarely ponder the Constitution as a whole. True, historians have offered rich accounts of the Founding era and its colorful personalities. Yet these chroniclers have devoted less attention to the Constitution as a legal text, and what work they have done on the document often focuses only on the original version framed at Philadelphia. Rarely do they carry the story forward to include all the amendments over the next two centuries.* Finally, there are a few general classroom textbooks about the Constitution, most of which are distillations of conventional wisdom pitched at an average ninth grader. In the preceding pages I have aimed higher, targeting undergraduates, law students, graduate students, history buffs, civil libertarians, opinion leaders, politicians, judges, lawyers, teachers, professors, and general-interest readers.
      Yale Law, Economics, & Organization Workshop: Mark Roe, Harvard/Law, Delaware's Politics. Here is a taste:
        Delaware makes the corporate law governing most large American corporations. Since Washington can take any, or all, of that lawmaking away, a deep conception of American corporate law should show how, when, and where Washington leaves lawmaking authority in state hands, and how it affects what the states do. The interest groups and ideas in play in Delaware are narrow, those in Congress wide. Three key public choice results emanate from that observation. First, interest groups powerful enough to dominate Delaware lawmaking forgo a winner-take-all strategy because state-level losers can call for federal action and either ally there with new interest groups or appeal to ideas not in play in Delaware. Second, the major statelevel players usually want to confine federal authority in making corporate law, because a local deal cuts in fewer players; a federal deal splits the pie with outsiders. Third, we can delineate the space in which the states have room to maneuver and where they risk federal action. It’s when Delaware acts first—as it often can because the federal agenda is large and Delaware’s small—that it gains most of its discretion vis-à-vis the federal authorities. When it moves first, especially when its two main players¾managers and investors¾agree on what to do, those two players largely determine American corporate law’s initial content. Federal authorities might then change the state-made result, and players and ideologies absent in Delaware but big in Washington affect the federal result. Those new players and ideas give the original Delaware players reason to resist federal action. Doctrines that limit federal effort—corporate law’s principle that the incorporating state should govern its corporations’ internal affairs, for example—are public-regarding justifications for deferring to interests that prevail on the state level. But when Delaware cannot act first—either because media saliency puts the matter on the federal agenda or because its primary players disagree—then Delaware loses its dominance. I then analogize the relationship between Delaware and Congress to that between federal agencies and Congress. Federal agencies have discretion and first-mover advantages, but their independence even when wide is confined, ending when they provoke Congress. So it is with Delaware. The interstate race is overrated as the chief structural determinant of American corporate law. Without taking account of how Congress and Delaware interact, we cannot see core characteristics of American corporate law. And to understand that federal-state relationship, we must grapple with the how the interest groups and ideas in play in Delaware differ from those in Congress.
      Stanford Law & Economics: Alan Sykes (University of Chicago Law School), "Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law". Here is a taste:
        This paper develops a positive theory of the rules regarding standing and remedy in international trade and investment agreements. In the investment setting, the paper argues that a central objective of investment treaties is to reduce the risks confronting private investors and thereby to lower the cost of capital for capital importing nations. This objective requires a credible government-to-firm commitment (or signal) that the capital importer will not engage in expropriation or related practices. A private right of action for money damages is the best way to make such a commitment. In the trade setting, by contrast, importing nations have no direct interest in reducing the risks confronting exporters of goods and services, and will desire to make market access promises more secure only if such behavior facilitates reciprocal benefits for their own exporters. Consequently, commitments in trade agreements are best viewed as government-to-government rather than government-to firm. The parties to trade agreements can enhance their mutual political welfare by declining to enforce commitments that benefit politically inefficacious exporters, and can most cheaply do so by reserving to themselves the standing to initiate dispute proceedings – a right to act as a “political filter.” The paper also suggests why governments may prefer to utilize trade sanctions rather than money damages as the penalty for breach of a trade agreement.
      Boston University School of Law: Lewis Kornhauser (NYU), "Contingency and Control: A Theory of Contracts".
      Florida State University School of Law: Nancy Staudt, Washington University-St. Louis.
      George Mason University School of Law: Iliana Ilieva, GMU School of Law Levy Fellow, Law and Economics in Mutualfundland (with D. Bruce Johnsen).
      George Washington University IP Series: David Nimmer, "Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly".
      Georgetown Workshop on Transnational Legal Issues: Laurel Terry, Dickinson Law School "WTO, GATS, and the Regulation of Transnational Law Practice".
      Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Walter Benn Michaels, University of Illinois (English).
    Friday, March 4
      UCLA School of Law: Albert Yoon, Northwestern University Law School, "Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Insurance Litigation in the East"
      Oxford Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Group in conjunction with Centre for International Sustainable Development Law: Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Lectures, 2005 Hilary Term : Christopher Tung (Hong Kong), Climate Change Action and Sustainable Development in China.
      Georgetown International Legal Theory Colloquium: Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, U. of Virginia School of Law, "Failed States, or The State as Failure?".


 
Legal Theory Lexicon: Textualism
    Introduction One of the most important topics in legal theory is “legal interpretation,” the theory of the derivation of meaning from legal texts. Of course, legal interpretation is a very large topic, with several different dimensions and approaches. This post will focus on “textualism,” and provide some introductory ideas about interpretive theory in general. As always, the Legal Theory Lexicon is designed for law students—especially first year law students—with an interest in legal theory.
    Three Levels of Interpretive Theory I find it helpful to separate out three different “levels” at which theories of legal interpretation can operate:
    • Level One: Meta Theories of Interpretation—One kind of theory examines questions like, “What does ‘interpretation’ mean?” and “How is ‘interpretation’ possible?”
    • Level Two: Normative Theories of Interpretation—A second kind of theory addresses the normative question, “What should legal interpretations aim at?” Among the answers to this question are: (a) the morally best reading of the legal text; (b) the intentions of the authors of the legal text, and (c) the plain meaning of the legal text.
    • Level Three: Methodological Theories of Interpretation—A third kind of theory aims to provide practical advice to legal actors (judges, lawyers, administrative officials, and citizens) about the techniques they can use to interpret various types of legal texts.
    Textualism, the subject of this post, can operate at any one of these three levels. That is, textualism could be the view that what legal texts really mean is their plain meaning. Or textualism could be the view that legal interpreters ought to interpret legal texts to have their plain meaning, even if that is not their true or deep meaning according to the best meta theory of interpretation. Or textualism could simply be a practical technique—a method that judges should employ. In this post, the primary focus will be on level two—textualism as a normative theory—with some discussion of level three. Level one, metatheory, gets us into a thorny set of issues that I hope to take up in a subsequent entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon series.
    The Plain Meaning of the Text Let’s begin with a basic question: what do we mean when we say “the plain meaning of the text.” A really good answer to that question would require us to develop a theory of meaning in general, but we must avoid that enterprise--at least for the purposes of this post. At one level, the idea of plain meaning is pretty simple. The plain meaning of a legal text is the meaning that would be understood by regular folks who knew that they were reading a statute (or court decision, etc.).
    But this preliminary formulation is too simple. Some laws are meant for all citizens (e.g., criminal statutes) and some are meant only for specialists (e.g., some sections of the tax code). A text that means one thing in a legal context, might mean something else if it were in a technical manual or a novel. So the plain meaning of a legal text is something like the meaning that would be understood by competent speakers of the natural language in which the text was written who are within the intended readership of the text and who understand that the text is a legal text of a certain type.
    An Excursion into Speakers Meaning and Sentence Meaning I may be making a mistake, but I think that textualism is illuminated by an excursion into what is sometimes called speech act theory, and in particular, by looking at the concepts of “speaker’s meaning” and “sentence meaning.” So here goes:
      Speaker’s Meaning and Sentence Meaning This idea of plain meaning assumes a distinction that can be formulated in terms of the difference between speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning. The speaker’s meaning of a given utterance (or author’s meaning of a given text) is the meaning that the speaker intended the audience to glean for the utterance (or text). This involves a reflexive set of expectations. What? When I write a text, I understand that the reader know certain things about my having authored the text. When I try to communicate, I take these expectations into account in deciding how to use language to communicate a certain meaning. For example, if I know that my readers know that I know that they know a particular convention, then I can use that convention to communicate to them. (By the way, there are no typos in the prior sentence, all those “knows” are in there for a reason.)
      So when I blog, I know that the readers of blogs assign a particular meaning to the word “post,” and I also know that my readers know that I know that they know this blogospheric convention. So I can use the term “post” to refer to blog entries with confidence that my readers will understand what I mean. On the other hand, if I were writing about blogging for an audience that had never encountered a blog, I would probably need to define the term “post,” before I used it, and if I used the term “post” without defining it, then my audience would likely believe I was referring to mail and not blog entries.
      In other words, when someone speaks or writes for a particular audience on a particular occasion, the speaker or author can take into account what she knows about the audience, what the audience knows about her, but only insofar as the speaker knows that the audience knows what the speaker knows about the audience.
      Speaker’s meaning can be distinguished from sentence meaning. Sentence meaning is the meaning that an utterance has when the audience is unaware of the speaker’s intentions. When we identify sentence meaning, it is as if we were imaging a sot of generic speaker, who uttered the sentence in a generic context. Or putting this a bit differently, sentence meaning is the meaning we would assign sentences when we know that the speaker can’t assume that we are aware of special conventions about meaning.
      Legal Texts, Sentence Meaning & Speaker’s Meaning Legal texts are sometimes intended for a timeless, generic readership. The authors of legislation, for example, know that many different actors (judges, lawyers, administrative officials, and ordinary citizens) will read the statute for an extended period of time in a variety of different conditions. Many of these readers will not be able to afford access to analysis of the legislative history of the statute; they will simply read the statute itself. Of course, they will know that the text they are reading is a statute, and they will therefore have a fair amount of knowledge about the likely intended meaning of various terms and phrases. Moreover, the legislature knows that the readers of statutes will have this knowledge. So it might make sense to assume that the speaker’s meaning that should be assigned to a legal text is a special version of the sentence meaning of the text, e.g. legal sentence meaning.
    The Case for Textualism If we view textualism as a normative theory of interpretation, we need to ask to ask why interpreters of legal texts should aim for interpretations that yield that “plain meaning of the text.” The usual answer to this question is that plain meaning best serves the rule of law values of publicity, predictability, certainty, and stability of the law. One of the important rule of law values is publicity: the law should be accessible to ordinary citizens. Ordinary citizens are likely to interpret statutes to have their plain meaning, because ordinary folks rarely have the training to understand legislative history and even if they did have such training, it would simply be too costly to analyze the legislative history of statutes to determine their meaning.
    Lawyers who counsel citizens and organizations do have the training to analyze legislative history, but can more easily and cheaply discern the plain meaning of a statute than some special meaning that only becomes clear once the legislative history is consulted. Moreover, analysis of legislative history can be quite complex, because some sources of legislative history (e.g. the statements of floor managers) are much more reliable than others (e.g. the statements of opponents of a bill or of the author of a bill). Because of the complexity of statutory interpretation, lawyers are likely to disagree about the meaning of legislative history and to err when predicting how a court will interpret legislative history.
    The same difficulties that afflict lawyers are plague judges. Moreover, most legal research done for federal judges is done by very young lawyers serving as law clerks. This group usually lacks experience in researching legislative history, and their performance is likely to be highly variable. Moreover, because legislative history will frequently contain many conflicting, ambiguous, and vague statements, it is possible that legislative history is easily subject to manipulation, giving judges the opportunity to support their own policy preferences with evidence of the “intentions of the legislature.”
    Textualism as a Practical Methodology Even if textualism does not provide the best ideal theory of legal interpretation, it might be the case that textualism does provide the best practical method of interpretation given the capacities of real world judges and officials. Suppose that we want to interpret statutes to achieve the purposes of the legislature. At first blush, it might seem that the best way to do this would be to have courts and officials employ an intentionalist methodology, combing the legislative record for evidence of legislative intent. But as a practical matter, it may turn out that judges aren’t very good at doing this. So it might be the case that real-world judges are more likely to implement legislative purposes by employing a fairly simple plain-meaning approach as methodology for statutory interpretation. And to the extent that legislators know that judges will employ this approach, legislators could draft with the expectation that judges will use a plain-meaning methodology, which presumably would lead to even closer fit between the plain meaning and the achievement of legislative purpose.
    Conclusion “Textualism” is just one of many approaches to the theory of legal interpretation, but it is an especially good place to begin thinking about issues of interpretation in law. One of the very best ways to become a sophisticated thinker about these issues is to take a really good course in statutory interpretation. Not so long ago, statutory interpretation was considered a dead field, but today there is a tremendous flowering of interesting and exciting scholarship about the interpretation of statutes. I hope that this post has whetted your appetite!


Saturday, February 26, 2005
 
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Agency And Answerability: Selected Essays by Gary Watson. Here is a description:
    Since the 1970s Gary Watson has published a series of brilliant and highly influential essays on human action, examining such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do? Moral philosophers and philosophers of action will welcome this collection, representing one of the most important bodies of work in the field.
Gary Watson's work is brilliant! If you are interested in agency and are not yet familiar with Watson, buy this book.


 
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Legal Positivism Since H.L.A. Hart by Jules Coleman, . Here is a taste:
    Dworkin is inclined to trivialize what it is about law that is of interest to positivists. He often associates positivism with a social science project that we are ill suited for. The only philosophical projects he allows that we might be interested are not interesting: either an account of the meaning of ‘law,’ or the individuation of norms. Now frankly I am interested in the first of these projects, but not for the reasons Dworkin thinks, and every positivist is interested in the latter project but not as a vapid or empty exercise. Rather, it is an interesting feature of our social lives that we participate at any one time in a wide range of normative social practices. They are similar to one another in certain ways, and different from one another in other ways. Our participation is different, our reasons for doing so differ; the claims these practices make on us our different. We want to explore the distinguishing features of the practices because we want to know how they differ from one another and how they are similar to one another, and we want to know how and why the claims they make on us differ. In other words we want to understand important aspects of ourselves in the social world. At the end of the day, jurisprudence is important to the human project of self-understanding. I don’t think that is any less worthy or suspect that understanding the law from the point of view of central concerns in political philosophy. I doubt that one has to be a positivist either to appreciate the importance of jurisprudence to understanding ourselves from the first person perspective in the social world.
Highly recommended, of course!



Friday, February 25, 2005
 
Friday Calendar
    University of San Diego School of Law: Orin Kerr, George Washington University.
    UCLA School of Law: Mark Lemley, Stanford University School of Law, "Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding".
    University of Texas, School of Law: Ronald J. Mann, UT Law, & Seth Belzley, UT Law student, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability.
    University of Texas, School of Law: Thomas Kohler, Visiting Professor at UT from Boston College, "The Notion of Solidarity and the Secret History of American Labor Law".
    Oxford Centre for Competition Law & Policy: Sir John Vickers (Chairman, OFT), The abuse of market power.
    Oxford Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Group in conjunction with Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Lectures, 2005 Hilary Term: Mr. Kent Nnadozie (Nigeria), An International Regime on Access to Biodiversity and Sharing of its Benefits.


 
Bridgeman on Corrective Justice Accounts of Contract Curtis Bridgeman (Florida State University - College of Law) has posted Strict Liability and the Fault Standard in Corrective Justice Accounts of Contract on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Corrective-justice theorists have enjoyed a certain amount of success explaining tort law. Some of these theorists have begun to apply corrective-justice theory to the law of contract, but they have not yet explained how corrective justice, which normally argues that private law is concerned with the correction of wrongdoing done to victims by injurers, can explain a body of law like contract that seems indifferent to wrongdoing. In this paper, I argue that void is a problem for corrective-justice theories of contract, since although contract compensates for breach it does not do so as a way of responding to breach as a form of moral wrongdoing. Corrective justice can still explain contract law, however, because there is a way of understanding corrective justice as the view that private law compensates for losses that are wrongful even though they may or may not be the result of wrongdoing. Moreover, I argue that by understanding corrective justice in this way we achieve a general theory of contract that is more acceptable from the point of view of political liberalism than the current non-corrective accounts of contract.
Highly recommended!


 
Wendel on Professionalism as Interpretation W. Bradley Wendel (Cornell Law School) has posted Professionalism as Interpretation (Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 3, p. 99, Spring 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In this Article, I defend the interpretive attitude of professionalism. Professionalism is a stance toward the law which accepts that a lawyer is not merely an agent of her client. Rather, in carrying out her client's lawful instructions, a lawyer has an obligation to apply the law to her client's situation with due regard to the meaning of legal norms, not merely their formal expression. Professionalism requires a lawyer acting in a representative capacity to respect the achievement represented by law, namely the final settlement of contested issues (both factual and normative) with a view toward enabling coordinated action in our highly complex, pluralistic society. This social function of law gives it legitimacy, in the sense that the law becomes worthy of being taken seriously, interpreted in good faith with due regard to its meaning, and not simply seen as an obstacle standing in the way of the client's goals. The grounds for the authority of law entail a conception of lawyers as custodians of the law, which in turn entails principles of legal interpretation that constrain the manipulation of legal norms to serve the ends of clients. The jurisprudential argument in the Article relies on the nature of language and its inability to capture the full range of meaning that a text must bear. In other words, there is no such thing as a self-interpreting legal text that regulates the actions of lawyers or clients apart from the exercise of interpretive judgment by a community of professionals. As a consequence, the law cannot operate as a device to settle normative conflict and coordinate activity without a commitment on the part of law-interpreters to respect the substantive meaning standing behind the formal expression of legal norms. This theory of interpretation stands in contrast to the prevailing belief of many scholars and practicing lawyers, which can be labeled legal realism, law-as-price, or the Holmesian bad man view of law. This view regards the law as functioning in practical reasoning as only one cost among many, and not as the expression of a view that individuals should, or should not do something. Professionalism, by contrast, requires lawyers to treat the law as having normative significance as such. After first considering a simple hypothetical case, the Article takes up three recent controversies - tax shelters, the Enron transactions, and the torture memos prepared by Justice Department lawyers - that show clearly the distinction between professionalism in interpretation and the Holmesian bad man stance toward the law. In my view, if the lawyers involved in those cases deserve moral criticism, it is not due to the moral wrongfulness of the clients' ends, but for failing in their responsibilities to treat the law as legitimate. This paper is an updated version of a work-in-progress previously published on SSRN under the title The Jurisprudence of Enron: Professionalism as Interpretation.


 
Fletcher on Tribal Employment Separation Matthew L.M. Fletcher (University of North Dakota - School of Law) has posted Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law Enigma, Tribal Government Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum (University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 38, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This Article discusses the difficulty of employment separations in Indian Country. The central premise of this Article is that Euro-American law and jurisprudence is uniquely unsuited to Indian Tribes and Tribal Courts. The result of the implementation of employment separation law and jurisprudence by Tribes and Tribal Courts is unnecessary litigation and emotional suffering. Part I of this Article describes the characteristics of employment with Indian Tribes and Tribal organizations. Tribes are usually close-knit communities that generally employ a significant percentage of Tribal Members. Part II describes the legal structures required by the Euro-American legal system as imposed on Indian Tribes and considers how these structures create significant legal problems for the Tribes and social problems for the Indian communities. Part III analyzes the Tribal law of sovereign immunity as it applies to lawsuits by discharged employees in Tribal Courts. Part IV proposes the reduction of harms associated with employment separations. Since most Tribes have adopted significant portions of Euro-American law and jurisprudence, a blanket restructuring of Tribal legal systems would be extremely difficult. This proposal cuts through much of problems associated with adjudicating Tribal employment separation disputes.


Thursday, February 24, 2005
 
Welcome to the Blogosphere . . . to Opinio Juris, a weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship in the fields of international law and politics, with Chris Borgen, Julian Ku, and Peggy McGuinness.


 
Bridgeman on Cardozo & Formalism Curtis Bridgeman (Florida State University - College of Law) has posted Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and Formalism in Context on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Allegheny College is a bit of an oddity. It deals with a narrow issue (the enforceability of promises to make donations to charities), and Cardozo's majority opinion is almost universally derided as at best confusing and at worst outright devious. Yet it is still included in most contracts casebooks and taught by most contracts professors, usually as an introduction to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In this paper, I defend the opinion - something almost no one has done without severe qualification - and argue that most of the criticisms are the result of a misguided emphasis on promissory estoppel. Although most scholars now agree that the case is decided on consideration grounds, the invocation of promissory estoppel is usually explained away as some sort of rhetorical flourish or deceit, probably designed ultimately to undermine the doctrine of consideration. I take on some of this scholarship, and then argue by contrast that the reference to promissory estoppel is not meant even to suggest that promissory estoppel controls in this case, but rather to show that whether bargaining has taken place (and therefore whether a promise is supported by consideration) depends very much on context. The key move in Cardozo's opinion is not only finding the return implied promise by the college, but also claiming that Ms. Johnston made her promise in order to induce Allegheny College to obligate itself, a point that has gone almost unnoticed in the scholarship. Perhaps more importantly, I argue that there is a larger lesson for us here about contracts jurisprudence. Finding bargaining in such an instance would likely be an unwarranted stretch in a normal business setting, but it makes perfect sense in the context of charitable subscriptions. I argue that this sensitivity to context is of a piece with two of Cardozo's other famous opinions, Wood v. Lucy and DeCicco v. Schweizer. There is room between the caricature of formalism as completely blind to particular facts and the caricature of realism as completely unbound by legal rules. Cardozo displays a jurisprudence that shows respect for the formalities of contract law, but insists on applying those rules in a way that understands transactions the way the parties themselves did.
Just read this last week, highly recommended!


 
Thursday Calendar
    Florida State University School of Law: Lawrence Solum, University of San Diego School of Law Virture Jurisprudence: An Aretaic Theory of Law. (See Wednesday for an excerpt.).
    UCLA Legal Theory Seminar: Jules Coleman, Legal Positivism Since H.L.A. Hart. Here is a taste:
      Dworkin is inclined to trivialize what it is about law that is of interest to positivists. He often associates positivism with a social science project that we are ill suited for. The only philosophical projects he allows that we might be interested are not interesting: either an account of the meaning of ‘law,’ or the individuation of norms. Now frankly I am interested in the first of these projects, but not for the reasons Dworkin thinks, and every positivist is interested in the latter project but not as a vapid or empty exercise. Rather, it is an interesting feature of our social lives that we participate at any one time in a wide range of normative social practices. They are similar to one another in certain ways, and different from one another in other ways. Our participation is different, our reasons for doing so differ; the claims these practices make on us our different. We want to explore the distinguishing features of the practices because we want to know how they differ from one another and how they are similar to one another, and we want to know how and why the claims they make on us differ. In other words we want to understand important aspects of ourselves in the social world. At the end of the day, jurisprudence is important to the human project of self-understanding. I don’t think that is any less worthy or suspect that understanding the law from the point of view of central concerns in political philosophy. I doubt that one has to be a positivist either to appreciate the importance of jurisprudence to understanding ourselves from the first person perspective in the social world.
    Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Michele Landis-Dauber, Stanford (Law), "The Sympathetic State" & Book Proposal. Here is the abstract from "The Sympathetic State":
      Despite nearly universal scholarly agreement on the absence of federal redistribution during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (except for Civil War pensions), the frequency and generosity of federal disaster relief appropriations actually escalated during this period. These appropriations, which included such measures as the Freedmen’s Bureau and other Southern war relief, and relief of floods, fires, and earthquakes, were seen as constitutionally unproblematic and indeed mandated by precedent. Not surprisingly, members of Congress and other advocates for the poor pointed to disaster appropriations, albeit unsuccessfully, as a precedent for spending policy innovations. For example, Congressional Populists argued during the Depression of 1893 that unemployment relief was analogous to disaster relief. Proponents of Henry Blair’s bill for federal aid to common schools in the 1880s made a similar case, also fruitlessly. Similarly, disaster relief precedents figured prominently in Supreme Court litigation, including the Sugar Bounty cases in the 1890s. The efforts by claimants in all of these instances to expand the definition of what could legitimately count as a “disaster” that could be relieved with federal funds foreshadowed the similar, though more successful, efforts by New Dealers during the 1930s on behalf of the unemployed, tenant farmers, and the elderly.
    UC Berkeley, Workshop in Law, Philosophy, & Political Theory: Samuel Freeman, Steven F. Goldstone Term Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Pennsylvania, Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples. Here's a taste from the conclusion:
      I have argued that the main reasons for Rawls’s social grounding of distributive justice are political and institutional–they concern the social conditions of the possibility of the creation, distribution, and enjoyment of income and wealth, particularly in a democratic society. That is to say, distributive justice is not a simple question of allocating a fix sum of wealth according to some division principle and without regard to how it is created. Nor is it a problem of alleviating poverty, handicaps, or brute bad luck. These are surely problems of justice, and must be addressed by any society, democratic or otherwise, and in some cases addressed internationally by the Society of Peoples. But they are not problems of distributive justice, as Rawls conceives it.
    Lior Strahilevitz, Chicago, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy.
    Northwestern Tax Series: Karen Burke, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego, "Black & Decker's Contingent Liability Shelter: 'A Thing of Grace and Beauty'?".
    Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Robert McCorquodale, The international community and international law-making: towards an inclusive international legal system.
    Georgetown, Transnational Legal Issues: Bill Bratton, Comparative Corporate Governance.
    Boston University School of Law: Geoff Miller, NYU, TBA.
    George Mason University School of Law: Charles Keckler, GMU School of Law Visiting Assistant Professor, Life v. Death: Why Capital Punishment Should Marginally Deter.


 
Conference Announcement: The Constitution in 2020 at Yale
    THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 April 8 - 10, 2005 Yale Law School Progressives need to set a constitutional agenda for the 21st Century. In the early 1980s a coalition of conservative groups produced a white paper known as "The Constitution in 2000," which has importantly shaped the Constitution under which we now live. To reclaim the Constitution for progressive values, we must now begin to articulate constitutional ideals capable of inspiring the next generation of judges, lawyers, scholars, policymakers and activists. In this spirit, we now invite you to a conference at the Yale Law School on "The Constitution in 2020." The Conference will be held April 8 - 10, 2005. The conference will bring together influential members of the legal academy, leaders of progressive organizations, experienced practitioners, and significant policy-makers. In break-out groups and in networking sessions, in panels and over meals, we shall discuss a broad range of progressive issues. These issues will range from the challenges of terrorism and globalization to the reconceptualization and protection of equality, from politics in the 21st Century to contemporary criminal justice, from securing individual liberties to constituting group identities. For a conference schedule and speakers, see http://www.law.yale.edu/acs/conference/schedule/ The conversation has already begun on the conference weblog, available at http://constitutionin2020.blogspot.com/ And to register, please visit http://www.law.yale.edu/acs/conference/registration/ We hope you will be able to join us for this exciting project. http://www.law.yale.edu/acs/conference/brochure.pdf


Wednesday, February 23, 2005
 
Wednesday Calendar
    Saint Louis University, School of Law: Lawrence Solum, University of San Diego School of Law Virture Jurisprudence: An Aretaic Theory of Law. Here is a taste:
      Contemporary legal theory in the United States has been dominated by the realist paradigm. The extreme version of realism is captured by the slogan of the critical legal studies movement: “Law is politics!” Other heirs to the realist tradition (including normative law and economics, the legal process school, legal pragmatism, and so forth) coalesce around what we might call the instrumentalist thesis—the point of legal institutions (especially courts) is to use the law as an instrument to achieve the goals of some normative theory (such as welfarism or deontology ) or a political ideology (of the left, right, or center). There are, of course, opposing tendencies in contemporary legal theory. Some neoformalists emphasize the duty of adjudicators to follow the law and give the parties what they are due; in a rough and ready sort of way, these neoformalists adopt a deontological perspective on legal theory that competes with the consequentialism of contemporary neorealists. In this paper, I sketch an alternative direction for contemporary legal theory, an approach that I call “virtue jurisprudence.” My core idea is quite simple. In moral theory, virtue ethics offers a third way—an alternative to the deontological and consequentialist approaches that dominated modern moral philosophy until very recently. What would happen if we transplanted virtue ethics into normative legal theory? This paper offers the sketch of an answer to that question.
    University College, London-Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy: Professor Simon Blackburn (Cambridge), 'Hume, Justice and Sentiment'. Here is a taste:
      The popularity of rationalism, and the general feeling that there ‘must be something to’ the kinds of argument I have been discussing, are very deep-rooted. Partly, they represent a noble dream. They answer a wish that the knaves of the world can be not only confined and confounded, but refuted – refuted as well by standards that they have to acknowledge. Ideally, the will be shown to be in a state akin to self contradiction. Kerstein acknowledges that Kant and neo-Kantians have not achieved anything like this result. But it is still, tantalizingly there as a goal or ideal, the Holy Grail of moral philosophy, and many suppose that all right-thinking people must join the pilgrimage to find it. We sentimentalists do not like our good behaviour to be hostage to such a search. We don’t altogether approve of Holy Grails. We do not see the need for them. We are not quite on all fours with those who do. And we do not quite see why, even if by some secret alchemy a philosopher managed to glimpse one, it should ameliorate his behaviour, let alone that of other people. We think instead that human beings are ruled by passions, and the best we can do it to educate people so that the best passions are also the most forceful. We say of rationalistic moral philosophy what Hume says of abstract reasonings in general, that when we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, its conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning.
    Hofstra University School of Law: Monroe Freedman, Hofstra Law School, “The Public Defender and Triage—Gideon’s Trumpet Becomes Gideon’s Strumpet”.
    NYU Legal History: Deborah Malamud, An-Bryce Professor of Law, NYU School of Law.
    Nuffield College, Oxford: Antanas Mockus, Culture and Law Enforcement.
    UCLA Legal History: Ariela Dubler, Columbia, Immoral Purposes: The Genus of Illicit Sex and the Marriage Cure.


 
Conference Announcement: Robert Merrihew Adams
    Metaphysics, History, Ethics: A conference in honor of Robert Merrihew Adams April 8-10, 2005 at Yale University The Philosophy Department at Yale University will host a conference in honor of Robert Adams. In recognition of the breadth of Robert Adams' own philosophical work, speakers will cover topics in metaphysics, ethics, and the history of philosophy. Speakers: Shelly Kagan David Kaplan Derk Pereboom Robert Sleigh Jeffrey Stout Susan Wolf Allen Wood Dean Zimmerman Commentators: Keith DeRose William FitzPatrick Calvin Normore Marleen Rozemond Jerry Schneewind Houston Smit Nicholas Wolterstorff For more information about the conference or to register for the conference, view the website at http://www.yale.edu/philos/events/Bobfest.htm or contact Larry Jorgensen (larry.jorgensen@yale.edu).
Adams was one my favorite teachers at UCLA. This is a well-deserved honor!


 
Schauer on the Practical Dimension of Choosing Our Concept of Law Frederick Schauer (Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government) has posted The Social Constructioon of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 25, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In Evaluation and Legal Theory, Julie Dickson argues, against me and against Hart, that the beneficial moral consequences attaching to accepting one or another concept of law should have no place in deciding which concept of law is true. In response, I argue that a concept of law, as both Dickson and I acknowledge, is subject to change over time, and may vary across cultures. Yet once we recognize that the concept of law is contingent and variable, we can recognize that prescribing what the concept of law ought to be is no less plausible an enterprise than describing what our concept of law now is. And for the prescriptive enterprise, although plainly not for the descriptive one, the beneficial moral consequences flowing from accepting a particular concept of law are an unavoidable component of the task.
Schauer's point is an important one--highly recommended!


Tuesday, February 22, 2005
 
Tuesday Calendar
    Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, A Detached Viewpoint in Legal Theory. Here is a taste:
      I have attempted to show that it is plausible to describe or explain normative concepts from a ‘detached’ viewpoint. Contra Dworkin, I have argued the theorist need not to be ‘morally engaged’ to explain the moral or practical viewpoint of our evaluative practices. The use of Nagel’s inside-outside approach has been enriched with Raz’s notion of ‘relative independence of interlinked concepts’ and has enabled us to show that any inquiry into normative concepts might begin from an inside perspective that aims at an expansion towards an objective or ‘detached’ viewpoint . There are different degrees of objectivity and an important overlapping of detached or objective reasons.
    University of Chicago, Law & Economics: Thomas Hubbard, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry.
    Georgetown Law: Gowri Ramachandran, "Intersectionals and Assimilation: Blurring the Line Between 'Reasonable' Identity Performance Demands and Irrational Discrimination".
    Lewis & Clark Law: Lydia Loren The Fallacy of the Extra Element.
    Oxford Taxation Law: Ian Menzies-Conacher, Group Taxation Director, Barclays plc and James Bullock, tax litigation partner, McGrigors, Implications of the judgments of the House of Lords in the Barclays Mercantile and Scottish Provident cases.
    Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Rainer Moufang, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Recent Developments in the Case Law of the European Patent Office Boards of Appeal.
    Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Roger Cotterrell, Legal Culture: Bringing the Theoretical and Empirical Closer Together: Should "Culture" Become a Legal Concept?
    University of Texas School of Law: John Dzienkowski, Personal Conflicts of Interest.
    Widener Law School (Delaware campus): Seth Barrett Tillman, Original Understanding of the Orders, Resolutions and Votes Clause -- What James Madison Failed to Learn from the Westminster Parliamentary Tradition--based on A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned & The Domain of Constitutional Delegations under the Orders, Resolutions and Votes Clause: A Reply to Professor Gary S. Lawson.


 
Rossi on a Political Process Bargaining Approach to Antitrust Federalism Jim Rossi (Florida State University - College of Law) has posted Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose of deterring the adoption of regulations with adverse spillover effects for those who do not participate in the relevant lawmaking process. The Article illustrates how a political process bargaining approach to these doctrines differs in its recommendations from traditional formulations, with implications for the degree of deference courts afford state and local laws.


 
Charles on Hasen Guy-Uriel E. Charles (University of Minnesota School of Law) has posted Judging the Law of Politics (Michigan Law Review, March 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    In this Review Essay I explore the rights-structure debate that has captivated the attention of election law scholars. The Essay juxtaposes the recent work of a leading individualist Professor Richard Hasen's new book, The Supreme Court and Election Law, against the recent work of a leading structuralist, Professor Richard Pildes' recent foreword to the Harvard Law Review. I argue that even though the rights-structure debate produces much heat, it does not significantly advance the goal of understanding and evaluating the role of the Court in democratic politics. I aim to return election law to a dualistic understanding of the relationship between rights and structure; an understanding that prevailed in the early articulation of structuralism's relevance to judicial review of democratic politics. I shall argue that election law cases cannot be divided into neat categories along the individual rights and structuralism divide. Election law cases raise both issues of individual and structural rights. Therefore, the label attached to election law claims is immaterial. The fundamental questions are what are the values that judicial review ought to vindicate and how best to vindicate those values. These are questions that transcend the rights-structure divide.


 
Lipshaw on a Theory of Promise & Contract Jeffrey M. Lipshaw (Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis) has posted Duty and Consequence: A Non-Conflating Theory of Promise and Contract on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    This is a short introductory essay laying out a thesis for a more involved project. The thesis is that the general debate between deontologists and consequentialists of law, played out in the microcosm of promise and contract, is a reprise of the conflation of reason and knowledge. Present-day legal consequentialists see reason (pure or practical) as unhelpful or worse. Pragmatism, if anything, rules the day. But the present-day rationalists fare no better, seeking to make constitutive claims of knowledge on the basis of reason. Hence the concept of contract as promise has been subject to the criticism that it fails as an explanation of the law (versus an exposition of how our relationships ought to be ordered). There is irony in the overwhelming interest of the consequentialist legal academy in trying to find a scientific answer to our most fundamental questions of duty and deontologists to defend morality consequentially. I argue that there are limits to each and that we operate consequentially and deontologically in the ordering of our private affairs, often simultaneously. The mistakes (typical of reason's drive to a single maximand) are assuming, on one hand, that contractual consequentialism defines our commercial relationships, or, on the other, that contracts are capable of containing our moral obligations. Put another way, there is nothing sanctified about the contract (versus the underlying promise), and the conflation of the two is the source of the confusion over the limits of the law of contract. The transcendental aspect of the contract is the underlying promise - its soul, so to speak - but the law can only doctor its body, what shows in the contract.


 
Berman on the Historical Foundation of Law Harold Berman (Emory University - School of Law) has posted The Historical Foundation of Law (Emory Law Journal, Vol. 54, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The historical school of jurisprudence needs to be revived in order to reconcile the two other major schools - positivism and natural-law theory - and thus to create an integrative jurisprudence that will respond to the historical challenges that confront the Western legal tradition in the twenty-first century. Prior to the so-called Enlightenment of the 18th century, the three schools were not sharply separated. It was almost universally presupposed among Western legal philosophers that the tri-une God is the ultimate source of order, of justice, and of human destiny - all three. Thus it was possible to integrate in theological terms - despite differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant jurisprudence - the political, the moral, and the historical dimensions of law. Today the positivist interprets legal rules according to their plain meaning or, in case of ambiguity, according to the policies they represent, while the naturalist considers also the implicit moral purposes of the rules in the light of the system of justice of which they are a part. Missing in the debate between them is a recognition of the normative significance of the historical dimension of law, which may permit or even compel an accommodation between politics and morality. The historical school emerged as a separate school of legal philosophy in the early 19th century, after the positivist school had broken off from the natural law school. In arguing that Germany was not historically ready for the adoption of a civil code, Savigny wrote that "law is developed first by custom and belief of the people, then by legal science - everywhere, therefore, by internal, silently operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of the legislator." In the late 20th century the historical school, which had predominated for almost a century, came under attack in Europe and America partly for exalting the spirit of the nation as the ultimate source of the development of law and partly for demeaning the positive role of the will of the lawmaker. In the twenty-first century fundamental issues that now confront lawmakers require, for their proper solution, a broad historical perspective. The Western legal tradition is now in crisis partly because of the weakening of the belief system on which it was originally based and partly because it now confronts other legal traditions in the gradual construction of a body of transnational and transcultural world law.


Monday, February 21, 2005
 
Conference Announcement: Action and Values
    ACTION and VALUES: A Conference in Honor of the Publication of Gary Watson's book, Agency and Answerability, at UC Riverside. Since the 1970s Gary Watson has published a series of influential essays on human action, examining such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do? Moral philosophers and philosophers of action will welcome this collection, representing one of the most important bodies of work in the field. Keynote speakers: Michael Bratman, Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, paper to be presented: "Three Theories of Self-Governance" (updated 02/07/05); with comments by Daniel Speak, Asst. Professor, Azusa Pacific University Stephen Darwall, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, paper to be presented: "Moral Obligation and Accountability"; with comments by Andrew Eshleman, Assoc. Professor, University of Arkansas, Little Rock Other Participants include: Harry Frankfurt, Princeton University (emeritus); Barbara Herman, UCLA; Alfred Mele, Florida State University; Dana Nelkin, UC San Diego Conference Schedule: Saturday, February 26, 2005, HMNSS 1500, UC Riverside. 11 am Coffee, Registration Noon-12:15 Welcome: John Fischer, Philosophy; Emory Elliott, University Professor (English) and Director, Center for Ideas and Society 12:15-2:15 Michael Bratman, "Three Theories of Self-Governance"; with comments by Daniel Speak (Chair for session: William Bracken) 2:15-2:30 Break; sandwiches 2:30-4:30 Stephen Darwall, "Moral Obligation and Accountability"; with comments by Andrew Eshleman (Chair for session: Andrews Reath) 4:30-4:45 Break 4:45-approx. 7 Panel Discussion (Chair, Moderator: Manuel Vargas) Participants: Barbara Herman, Alfred Mele, Dana Nelkin, Harry Frankfurt [if he wishes--up to him] 7-approx. 8:45 Drinks, Reception, Dinner HMNSS 1500 For questions or more information on this event, please contact the conference organizer, John Martin Fischer (John.Fischer@ucr.edu) or Janet Mauren (Janet.Mauren@urc.edu) in the Philosophy Department. In order to facilitate the planning of this event, please RSVP to Janet Mauren by e-mail or by phone @ 951-827-5209 by February 22, 2005.


 
Monday Calendar
    Columbia Law & Economics: Anup Malani, University of Virginia, School of Law and Albert Choi, University of Virginia, "Are Non-Profit Firms Simply For-Profits in Disguise? Evidence from Executive Compensation in the Nursing Home Industry". Here is the abstract:
      It is well-established that non-profit hospitals employperformance bonuses with much lower frequency than for-profit hospitals. Weisbrod (1999, 2003a, 2003b) suggest that this implies that principals of non-profit and for-profit firms have different objectives or purposes. Brickley and Van Horn (2002) dispute the different-objectives hypothesis. They present evidence that the salaries and turnover of executives at non-profit hospitals reward financial performance but not altruistic tivities. Employing a unique data set of executive compensation at 2,700 nursing homes in 2001 and 2002, this paper improves on Brickley and Van Horn's analysis in three important ways. First, we provide an explanation for how non-profit firms and for-profit firms may both seek to reward financial performance but write different executive compensation contracts. This explanation relies upon tax penalties on the use of financial rewards for executives by non-profit firms. Second, we introduce direct comparisons of wages at non-profit and for-profit facilities as well as superior controls for quality of patient care and the risk profile of patients. Third, we consider the implications of observed patterns in executive compensation for alternative theories of non-profit behavior, such as quality/quantity maximization. We conclude that executive compensation at non-profit firms supports that the hypothesis that principals at non-profit firms either care about profits just like principals at for-profit firms (the strong version of the for-profit-in-disguise model) or behave as if they do (the weak version).
    Georgetown International Legal Theory Colloquium: Paul Stephan, University of Virginia School of Law, "The New Leviathan - Enforcing International Law in the Twenty-First Century"
    Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar: Folke Tersman, Stockholm.
    Stanford The Center for Internet and Society and the Stanford Law and Technology Association: Elizabeth Townsend, CIS Non-residential Fellow, Assessing the Arrival of the Unpublished Public Domain in the Internet Age.
    Oxford Environmental Law Discussion Group: Dr Liz Fisher & Dr Lucia Zedner, Risk Assessment: Perspectives From Environmental Law and Criminology.
    University of Texas Law and Economics Workshop: Kate Litvak, UT, "Governance Through Exit: Default Penalties and Walkaway Options in Venture Capital Partnership Agreeements".
    Vanderbilt University School of Law: Richard Brooks, Yale.
    Washington & Lee University, School of Law: Michele Goodwin, DePaul University.


 
Three by Arneson Richard Arneson (UCSD Philosophy & USD Law) has posted three new papers:
    Justice after Rawls:
      In the mid-twentieth century John Rawls single-handedly revived Anglo-American political philosophy, which had not seen significant progress since the development and elaboration of utilitarianism in the nineteenth century. Rawls re-invented the discipline by revising the social contract tradition of Locke Rousseau, and Kant. A series of essays starting with “Justice as Fairness” culminated in a monumental treatise, A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999a). That theory of justice was in turn qualified and set in a new framework by an account of legitimate political authority to which Rawls gave a definitive formulation in his second book, Political Liberalism (Rawls 1996). Rawls also produced an important monograph on justice in international relations, The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999c) . Rawls’s achievements continue to set the contemporary terms of debate on theories of social justice. This essay comments on the present state of play in the political philosophy discussions that Rawls initiated and stimulated.
    Distributive Justice and Basic Capability Equality: 'Good Enough' Is Not Good Enough:
      “Sen’s proposal is that distributive justice entails equalizing midfare levels across persons,” writes John Roemer. “Other things being equal,” one has to add by way of correction to Roemer’s formulation. Sen holds that we should be concerned with the extent of people’s capability or freedom to attain midfare as well as the midfare level actually reached. Sen holds that distributive values including equality must be balanced against and should sometimes be sacrificed to aggregative values. We should care about how much of the good things of life people get as well as how evenly they are distributed. Also, what Roemer is calling “midfare” according to Sen is not one thing but itself a plurality: the many functionings (doings and beings) that people have reason to value so far as they are seeking their own well-being. Sen does not affirm that there is a single canonical measure of these functionings, so the ideal of equality of midfare is in an important sense indeterminate. Besides well-being as midfare functionings and freedom to get well-being the just society also properly promotes and distributes agency achievement, the attainment of goals one has reason to value, and freedom to attain agency goals.
    Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections
      The popularity of rule-consequentialism among philosophers has waxed and waned. Waned, mostly; at least lately. The idea that the morality that ought to claim allegiance is the ideal code of rules whose acceptance by everybody would bring about best consequences became the object of careful analysis about half a century ago, in the writings of J. J. C. Smart, John Rawls, David Lyons, Richard Brandt, Richard Hare, and others.1 They considered utilitarian versions of rule consequentialism but discovered flaws in the view that attach to the wider consequentialist doctrine. In the eyes of many, the flaws were decisive. Brad Hooker has produced brilliant work that unsettles this complacent consensus. Over a period of several years he has produced a sustained and powerful defense of a version of rule consequentialism that does not obviously succumb to the criticisms that have been thought to render this doctrine a nonstarter. He acknowledges intellectual debts to Richard Brandt. But Hooker avoid certain excrescences in Brandt’s efforts to conceive of morality as an ideal code of rules. Most notably, Hooker eschews Brandt’s misguided attempt to derive some version of rule utilitarianism from an underlying commitment to some form of contractualism. Moreover, Hooker has worked to articulate a version of rule consequentialism in sufficient detail that one can see how the different parts of the doctrine hang together and how the best version of the doctrine must confront many discrete choices of formulation and make the best choice at each of these many decision nodes.
Arneson is one of the best. All three are highly recommended!


 
Garvey on the Heat of Passion Stephen P. Garvey (Cornell Law School) has posted Passion's Puzzle (Iowa Law Review, Vol. 90, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
    The puzzle of the provocation defense, otherwise known as the "heat of passion" defense, is to figure out how, if at all, each of the basic elements of the doctrine can be explained in a coherent and normatively attractive fashion. None of the prevailing theories of provocation succeeds in solving this puzzle. These theories either fail to explain one or more of the basic elements of the doctrine, or else end up committing the state to a decidedly illiberal course of action: punishing citizens not only for what they do (for their actions), but for who they are (for their characters). I offer an alternative theory, called provocation as akrasia, which I suggest can solve the puzzle. According to this theory, the basic elements of the defense work in concert to achieve the normatively attractive goal of sorting actors who kill in defiance of the law (and who should therefore be convicted of murder) from those who kill in a moment of culpable ignorance of law or weakness of will (and who should therefore be convicted of the lesser crime of manslaughter). Insofar as this theory justifies and so defends the basic contours of existing provocation doctrine, it challenges those who view the doctrine, in some or all of its formulations, as a pernicious presence in the criminal law.


Sunday, February 20, 2005
 
Legal Theory Calendar
    Monday, February 21
      Columbia Law & Economics: Anup Malani, University of Virginia, School of Law and Albert Choi, University of Virginia, "Are Non-Profit Firms Simply For-Profits in Disguise? Evidence from Executive Compensation in the Nursing Home Industry". Here is the abstract:
        It is well-established that non-profit hospitals employperformance bonuses with much lower frequency than for-profit hospitals. Weisbrod (1999, 2003a, 2003b) suggest that this implies that principals of non-profit and for-profit firms have different objectives or purposes. Brickley and Van Horn (2002) dispute the different-objectives hypothesis. They present evidence that the salaries and turnover of executives at non-profit hospitals reward financial performance but not altruistic tivities. Employing a unique data set of executive compensation at 2,700 nursing homes in 2001 and 2002, this paper improves on Brickley and Van Horn's analysis in three important ways. First, we provide an explanation for how non-profit firms and for-profit firms may both seek to reward financial performance but write different executive compensation contracts. This explanation relies upon tax penalties on the use of financial rewards for executives by non-profit firms. Second, we introduce direct comparisons of wages at non-profit and for-profit facilities as well as superior controls for quality of patient care and the risk profile of patients. Third, we consider the implications of observed patterns in executive compensation for alternative theories of non-profit behavior, such as quality/quantity maximization. We conclude that executive compensation at non-profit firms supports that the hypothesis that principals at non-profit firms either care about profits just like principals at for-profit firms (the strong version of the for-profit-in-disguise model) or behave as if they do (the weak version).
      Georgetown International Legal Theory Colloquium: Paul Stephan, University of Virginia School of Law, "The New Leviathan - Enforcing International Law in the Twenty-First Century"
      Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar: Folke Tersman, Stockholm.
      Stanford The Center for Internet and Society and the Stanford Law and Technology Association: Elizabeth Townsend, CIS Non-residential Fellow, Assessing the Arrival of the Unpublished Public Domain in the Internet Age.
      Oxford Environmental Law Discussion Group: Dr Liz Fisher & Dr Lucia Zedner, Risk Assessment: Perspectives From Environmental Law and Criminology.
      University of Texas Law and Economics Workshop: Kate Litvak, UT, "Governance Through Exit: Default Penalties and Walkaway Options in Venture Capital Partnership Agreeements".
      Vanderbilt University School of Law: Richard Brooks, Yale.
      Washington & Lee University, School of Law: Michele Goodwin, DePaul University.
    Tuesday, February 22
      Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group: Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, A Detached Viewpoint in Legal Theory. Here is a taste:
        I have attempted to show that it is plausible to describe or explain normative concepts from a ‘detached’ viewpoint. Contra Dworkin, I have argued the theorist need not to be ‘morally engaged’ to explain the moral or practical viewpoint of our evaluative practices. The use of Nagel’s inside-outside approach has been enriched with Raz’s notion of ‘relative independence of interlinked concepts’ and has enabled us to show that any inquiry into normative concepts might begin from an inside perspective that aims at an expansion towards an objective or ‘detached’ viewpoint . There are different degrees of objectivity and an important overlapping of detached or objective reasons.
      University of Chicago, Law & Economics: Thomas Hubbard, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry.
      Georgetown Law: Gowri Ramachandran, "Intersectionals and Assimilation: Blurring the Line Between 'Reasonable' Identity Performance Demands and Irrational Discrimination".
      Lewis & Clark Law: Lydia Loren The Fallacy of the Extra Element.
      Oxford Taxation Law: Ian Menzies-Conacher, Group Taxation Director, Barclays plc and James Bullock, tax litigation partner, McGrigors, Implications of the judgments of the House of Lords in the Barclays Mercantile and Scottish Provident cases.
      Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Rainer Moufang, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Recent Developments in the Case Law of the European Patent Office Boards of Appeal.
      Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies: Roger Cotterrell, Legal Culture: Bringing the Theoretical and Empirical Closer Together: Should "Culture" Become a Legal Concept?
      University of Texas School of Law: John Dzienkowski, Personal Conflicts of Interest.
      Widener Law School (Delaware campus): Seth Barrett Tillman, Original Understanding of the Orders, Resolutions and Votes Clause -- What James Madison Failed to Learn from the Westminster Parliamentary Tradition--based on A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned & The Domain of Constitutional Delegations under the Orders, Resolutions and Votes Clause: A Reply to Professor Gary S. Lawson.
    Wednesday, February 23
      Saint Louis University, School of Law: Lawrence Solum, University of San Diego School of Law Virture Jurisprudence: An Aretaic Theory of Law. Here is a taste:
        Contemporary legal theory in the United States has been dominated by the realist paradigm. The extreme version of realism is captured by the slogan of the critical legal studies movement: “Law is politics!” Other heirs to the realist tradition (including normative law and economics, the legal process school, legal pragmatism, and so forth) coalesce around what we might call the instrumentalist thesis—the point of legal institutions (especially courts) is to use the law as an instrument to achieve the goals of some normative theory (such as welfarism or deontology ) or a political ideology (of the left, right, or center). There are, of course, opposing tendencies in contemporary legal theory. Some neoformalists emphasize the duty of adjudicators to follow the law and give the parties what they are due; in a rough and ready sort of way, these neoformalists adopt a deontological perspective on legal theory that competes with the consequentialism of contemporary neorealists. In this paper, I sketch an alternative direction for contemporary legal theory, an approach that I call “virtue jurisprudence.” My core idea is quite simple. In moral theory, virtue ethics offers a third way—an alternative to the deontological and consequentialist approaches that dominated modern moral philosophy until very recently. What would happen if we transplanted virtue ethics into normative legal theory? This paper offers the sketch of an answer to that question.
      University College, London-Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy: Professor Simon Blackburn (Cambridge), 'Hume, Justice and Sentiment'. Here is a taste:
        The popularity of rationalism, and the general feeling that there ‘must be something to’ the kinds of argument I have been discussing, are very deep-rooted. Partly, they represent a noble dream. They answer a wish that the knaves of the world can be not only confined and confounded, but refuted – refuted as well by standards that they have to acknowledge. Ideally, the will be shown to be in a state akin to self contradiction. Kerstein acknowledges that Kant and neo-Kantians have not achieved anything like this result. But it is still, tantalizingly there as a goal or ideal, the Holy Grail of moral philosophy, and many suppose that all right-thinking people must join the pilgrimage to find it. We sentimentalists do not like our good behaviour to be hostage to such a search. We don’t altogether approve of Holy Grails. We do not see the need for them. We are not quite on all fours with those who do. And we do not quite see why, even if by some secret alchemy a philosopher managed to glimpse one, it should ameliorate his behaviour, let alone that of other people. We think instead that human beings are ruled by passions, and the best we can do it to educate people so that the best passions are also the most forceful. We say of rationalistic moral philosophy what Hume says of abstract reasonings in general, that when we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, its conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning.
      Hofstra University School of Law: Monroe Freedman, Hofstra Law School, “The Public Defender and Triage—Gideon’s Trumpet Becomes Gideon’s Strumpet”.
      NYU Legal History: Deborah Malamud, An-Bryce Professor of Law, NYU School of Law.
      Nuffield College, Oxford: Antanas Mockus, Culture and Law Enforcement.
      UCLA Legal History: Ariela Dubler, Columbia, Immoral Purposes: The Genus of Illicit Sex and the Marriage Cure.
    Thursday, February 24
      Florida State University School of Law: Lawrence Solum, University of San Diego School of Law Virture Jurisprudence: An Aretaic Theory of Law. (See Wednesday for an excerpt.).
      UCLA Legal Theory Seminar: Jules Coleman, Legal Positivism Since H.L.A. Hart. Here is a taste:
        Dworkin is inclined to trivialize what it is about law that is of interest to positivists. He often associates positivism with a social science project that we are ill suited for. The only philosophical projects he allows that we might be interested are not interesting: either an account of the meaning of ‘law,’ or the individuation of norms. Now frankly I am interested in the first of these projects, but not for the reasons Dworkin thinks, and every positivist is interested in the latter project but not as a vapid or empty exercise. Rather, it is an interesting feature of our social lives that we participate at any one time in a wide range of normative social practices. They are similar to one another in certain ways, and different from one another in other ways. Our participation is different, our reasons for doing so differ; the claims these practices make on us our different. We want to explore the distinguishing features of the practices because we want to know how they differ from one another and how they are similar to one another, and we want to know how and why the claims they make on us differ. In other words we want to understand important aspects of ourselves in the social world. At the end of the day, jurisprudence is important to the human project of self-understanding. I don’t think that is any less worthy or suspect that understanding the law from the point of view of central concerns in political philosophy. I doubt that one has to be a positivist either to appreciate the importance of jurisprudence to understanding ourselves from the first person perspective in the social world.
      Yale Legal Theory Workshop: Michele Landis-Dauber, Stanford (Law), "The Sympathetic State" & Book Proposal. Here is the abstract from "The Sympathetic State":
        Despite nearly universal scholarly agreement on the absence of federal redistribution during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (except for Civil War pensions), the frequency and generosity of federal disaster relief appropriations actually escalated during this period. These appropriations, which included such measures as the Freedmen’s Bureau and other Southern war relief, and relief of floods, fires, and earthquakes, were seen as constitutionally unproblematic and indeed mandated by precedent. Not surprisingly, members of Congress and other advocates for the poor pointed to disaster appropriations, albeit unsuccessfully, as a precedent for spending policy innovations. For example, Congressional Populists argued during the Depression of 1893 that unemployment relief was analogous to disaster relief. Proponents of Henry Blair’s bill for federal aid to common schools in the 1880s made a similar case, also fruitlessly. Similarly, disaster relief precedents figured prominently in Supreme Court litigation, including the Sugar Bounty cases in the 1890s. The efforts by claimants in all of these instances to expand the definition of what could legitimately count as a “disaster” that could be relieved with federal funds foreshadowed the similar, though more successful, efforts by New Dealers during the 1930s on behalf of the unemployed, tenant farmers, and the elderly.
      UC Berkeley, Workshop in Law, Philosophy, & Political Theory: Samuel Freeman, Steven F. Goldstone Term Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Pennsylvania, Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples. Here's a taste from the conclusion:
        I have argued that the main reasons for Rawls’s social grounding of distributive justice are political and institutional–they concern the social conditions of the possibility of the creation, distribution, and enjoyment of income and wealth, particularly in a democratic society. That is to say, distributive justice is not a simple question of allocating a fix sum of wealth according to some division principle and without regard to how it is created. Nor is it a problem of alleviating poverty, handicaps, or brute bad luck. These are surely problems of justice, and must be addressed by any society, democratic or otherwise, and in some cases addressed internationally by the Society of Peoples. But they are not problems of distributive justice, as Rawls conceives it.
      Lior Strahilevitz, Chicago, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy.
      Northwestern Tax Series: Karen Burke, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego, "Black & Decker's Contingent Liability Shelter: 'A Thing of Grace and Beauty'?".
      Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Robert McCorquodale, The international community and international law-making: towards an inclusive international legal system.
      Georgetown, Transnational Legal Issues: Bill Bratton, Comparative Corporate Governance.
      Boston University School of Law: Geoff Miller, NYU, TBA.
      George Mason University School of Law: Charles Keckler, GMU School of Law Visiting Assistant Professor, Life v. Death: Why Capital Punishment Should Marginally Deter.
    Friday, February 25
      University of San Diego School of Law: Orin Kerr, George Washington University.
      UCLA School of Law: Mark Lemley, Stanford University School of Law, "Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding".
      University of Texas, School of Law: Ronald J. Mann, UT Law, & Seth Belzley, UT Law student, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability.
      University of Texas, School of Law: Thomas Kohler, Visiting Professor at UT from Boston College, "The Notion of Solidarity and the Secret History of American Labor Law".
      Oxford Centre for Competition Law & Policy: Sir John Vickers (Chairman, OFT), The abuse of market power.
      Oxford Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Group in conjunction with Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Lectures, 2005 Hilary Term: Mr. Kent Nnadozie (Nigeria), An International Regime on Access to Biodiversity and Sharing of its Benefits.
    Saturday, February 26