Legal Theory Blog |
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 All the theory that fits! Home This is Lawrence Solum's legal theory weblog. Legal Theory Blog comments and reports on recent scholarship in jurisprudence, law and philosophy, law and economic theory, and theoretical work in substantive areas, such as constitutional law, cyberlaw, procedure, criminal law, intellectual property, torts, contracts, etc. RSS Links for Legal Theory Blog --Lawrence B. 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Journals Specializing in Legal Philosophy --American Journal of Jurisprudence --The Journal of Philosophy, Science, and Law --Law and Philosophy --Law and Social Inquiry --Legal Theory --Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Legal Theory Resources on the Web Entries from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy +Austin, John +justice, distributive +justice, as a virtue +legal philosophy, economic analysis of law +legal reasoning, interpretation and coherence +legal rights +liberalism +libertarianism +naturalism in legal philosophy +nature of law +nature of law, legal positivism +nature of law, pure theory of law +republicanism From the Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence +Natural Law Theory: The Modern Tradition From the Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies +Law as an Autonomous Discipline From the Examined Life A Critical Introduction to Liberalism Papers & Articles +Virtue Jurisprudence Organizations +American Political Science Association(APSA) +American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (ASPLP) +Association of American Law Schools(AALS) +Internationale Vereinigung fur Rechts und Sozialphilosophie(IVR) +Law and Society Association +Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) My Postal Address Lawrence B. Solum University of Illinois College of Law 504 East Pennsylvania Ave Champaign, IL 61820 USA 
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Monday, January 31, 2005
Monday Calendar
NYU Law School: Rachel Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing. UCLA School of Law: Leti Volpp, UCLA School of Law, "Engendering Culture". New from Law & Politics Book Review
AMERICA'S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO, by Pedro A. Malavet. New York: New York University Press, 2004. 352pp. Cloth. $40.00. ISBN: 0814756808. Reviewed by Javier A. Couso. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY, by Rachel Kerr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 248pp. Hardback. £53.00 / $98.00. ISBN: 0-19-926305-1. Reviewed by Karol Soltan. NORDIC EQUALITY AT A CROSSROADS. FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES COPING WITH DIFFERENCE, by Eva-Maria Svensson, Anu Pylkkänen, Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen (eds). Burlington: Ashgate, 2004. 262pp. Hardback. $99.95 /£55.00. ISBN: 0754624080. Reviwed by Adelaide H. Villmoare. CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: CARL SCHMITT IN WEIMAR, by Ellen Kennedy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. 272pp. Paper. $22.95. ISBN: 0-8223-3243-4. Cloth. $79.95. ISBN: 0-8223-3230-2. Reviewed by John E. Finn. GAY MALE PORNOGRAPHY: AN ISSUE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION, by Christopher N. Kendall. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004. 296pp. Hardcover. $85.00. ISBN: 0-7748-1076-9. Paperback. $29.95. ISBN: 0-7748-1077-7. Reviewed by Claire Rasmussen. SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY B. RUTLEDGE, by John M. Ferren. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. 2004. 592pp. Cloth. $39.95. ISBN: 0-8078-2866-1. Reviewed by Artemus Ward. THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, by Terry H. Anderson. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 336pp. Cloth. $35.00 / £21.50. ISBN: 0-19-515764-8. Reviewed by Timothy J. O'Neill. Sunday, January 30, 2005
Legal Theory Calendar
NYU Law School: Rachel Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing. UCLA School of Law: Leti Volpp, UCLA School of Law, "Engendering Culture".
Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre: Dr. Alfredo Ilardi, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Origin and Development of International Protection of Intellectual Property. Lewis & Clark Law School: Geoffrey Manne, Hot Docs and Cold Economics.
Oxford Human Rights Discussion Group: Jens Scherpe, Recent Developments in European Family Law: Cohabitation and Gay Marriage. Trinity College, Oxford: Laurence Oatesm, Life, Death, and the Law Cardozo Law School, Jacob Burns Legal Theory Workshop: Robert Post, Yale Law School, The Structure of Academic Freedom. NYU Legal History: Samuel Issacharoff, Visiting Professor, NYU School of Law. Vanderbilt Law & Economics Workshop: Margaret Blair.
Florida State University, College of Law: Gregory Keating, University of Southern California, Abusing "Duty". Fordham University School of Law: Deborah W. Denno, Professor of Law, Fordham, "The Legal Link Between Genetics and Crime: Vile or Viable?". Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Dr Andrew Hurrell, International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art and the State of the World. Stanford Law & Economics: Michael L. Katz (School of Business, University of California, Berkeley) & Howard A. Shelanski (School of Law, University of California, Berkeley), "Moving Targets: Merger Policy in the Face of Technological Change" University of Michigan, Cyberlaw & Economics: Paul Resnick, Michigan School of Information, Calculating Error Rates for Filtering Software & Does Pornography-Blocking Software Block Access to Health Information on the Internet. University of Texas School of Law Constitutional & Legal Theory Colloquium: Larry Sager, UT, "Equal Liberty" Vanderbilt Legal Theory Workshop: Ann-Marie Slaughter, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.
UCLA School of Law: Adam Winkler, UCLA School of Law, "Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: Debunking the Myth of Strict Scrutiny". Oxford Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Group in conjunction with Centre for International Sustainable Development Law:
Prof. Irene Dankleman (The Netherlands), Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Lectures, 2005 Hilary Term : The Challenge of Gender: Towards a Common Future. Vanderbilty University School of Law, Charney Distinguished Lecture Series: Anne-Marie Slaughter, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, "Rethinking the War on Terror". Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards, and Principles
We can slice and dice legal norms in various ways. In this post, we will investigate the idea that legal norms can be sorted into three general classes: rules, standards, and principles. Let's stipulate to the following definitions to get the discussion off the ground: Rules Although the phrase "legal rule" can be used in a broad sense, to refer to all legal norms, whether they be case in the form of a bright-line rule, a standard that in the form of a balancing test, or even an abstract principle, there is also a narrower sense of "rule" that distinguishes rules from standards and principles. Rules themselves vary--let's use hard and soft to refer to the poles of a continuum. A rule is harder if both the conditions for its application and the consequences that follow are defined by bright-line distinctions that admit of easy application. The rule that disqualifies persons who are not 35 years of age is quite hard or rigid. Rules become softer as they criterion for the application and/or the consequences to which they lead become fuzzier. If the constitution had limited the presidency to "adults," then there could have been cases in which the question whether a particular candidate was unclear. Twelve year olds are clearly not adults but twenty-five year olds clearly are. In between, the necessity of drawing a somewhat arbitrary line makes the "adult" rule relatively softer than the "35-year old" rule. Standards Standards are less constraining than even "soft" rules. Whereas a rule defines a triggering condition and a consequence, a standard may define a set of relevant considerations and options. One familiar example of a standard is provided by the fairness component of the International Shoe test for personal jurisdiction. That test requires a court to find that a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause on the basis of a give factor balancing test, which refers to the defendant's interest, the plaintiff's interest, the interest of the forum, judicial efficiency and economy, and substantive policy concerns. Like rules, standards themselves vary in their capacity to guide and constrain the decision-making process. Some standards give the decision maker substantial guidance, by specifying relatively specific and concrete factors the decision maker should consider and the relative weight or importance of those factors. Other standards are much more open ended, requiring consideration of factors that are general and abstract. Standards that refer to "all the circumstances," "the interests of justice," or "equitable considerations" are particularly soft. Standards that require the evaluation of "cost to the defendant" or "serious invasions of privacy" are relatively harder, providing greater constraint and guidance. By way of illustration, consider eligibility for the presidency once again. A rule based approach might limit eligibility to persons of a certain age or to "adults." A standard might specify that the only persons who are "sufficiently mature" may occupy the office of President. This standard is relatively open-ended, and it might disqualify some sixty-year olds from the presidency but allow some 20 year olds to serve. Principles Principles are quite different from both rules and standards--at least on the basis of the definitions that we are using. Both rules and standards provide a framework that is, in theory, sufficient for resolving a particular issue in a legal dispute. But as we are using the term, a "principle" only provides guidance for the interpretation or application of a rule or standard. Principles by themselves do not resolve legal issues. This sense of principle is illustrated by Ronald Dworkin's example of the principle that no one should be allowed to profit from their own wrong, drawn from the case of Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). In that case, the statute of wills would have allowed a murderer to inherit from his victim, but the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the statute should be given an equitable interpretation in light of the common law principle against wrong doers profiting from their wrongs. This principle is not a rule: the law does permit wrong doers to profit from their wrongs in a variety of circumstances. Rather, this general and abstract principle provided guidance in the interpretation and construction of a rule--in Riggs, the rule provided by the statute of wills. (This example is drawn from Ronald Dworkin's famous essay Hard Cases.) The Pros and Cons of Rules, Standards, and Principles What are the pros and cons of rules, standards, and principles? When you have identified a candidate legal norm, when should you argue that the norm should be formulated as a rule, a standard, or a principle? In his famous 1985 article, Pierre Schlag provided this example:
References
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases in Taking Rights Seriously (1977). Henry Hart & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process (unpublished manuscript tent. ed. 1958). Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harvard Law Review 1685 (1976). Saturday, January 29, 2005
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Can We Be Legal Positivists Without Being Constitutional Positivists? by Abner Greene. Here is the abstract:
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Natural Law and Practical Rationality by Mark Murphy. Here is a description:
Friday, January 28, 2005
Lipkin on Federalism Robert Justin Lipkin has posted Federalism as Balance on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Friday Calendar
Oxford, Said Business School (in conjunction with EU Research and Training Network and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy): Corporate Governance Conference. Oxford Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Group: Speaker: H.E. Judge C. G. Weeramantry (Sri Lanka), Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Lectures, 2005 Hilary Term : Sustainable Justice: The Role of International Law. UCLA Law: Rethinking Redistribution: Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality.
Zeiler on Tort Reform Kathryn Zeiler (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: A New Approach to Tort Reform (Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 1, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Ku and Yoo on Functionalism and the Alien Tort Statute Julian Ku and John C. Yoo (Hofstra University - School of Law and University of California at Berkeley School of Law) have posted Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute (Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Bernstein on the Enterprise of Liability Anita Bernstein (Emory University School of Law) has posted The Enterprise of Liability (Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 69, p. 27, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Kaczorowski on Supreme Court Enforcement of Constitutional Rights Robert J Kaczorowski (Fordham University - School of Law) has posted A Synopsis of The Supreme Court and Congress's Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly (Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 154, 2004) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Thursday, January 27, 2005
Thursday Calendar
U.C. Berkeley, Workshop in Law, Philosophy, & Political Theory: Jeff McMahan, Philosophy, Rutgers University, THE BASIS OF MORAL LIABILITY TO DEFENSIVE KILLING. Here's a taste:
Stanford Law & Economics: Christine Jolls (Harvard Law School), "Debiasing Through Law (with Special Reference to Employment Discrimination Law)" Fordham University College of Law: Joel Reidenberg, Professor of Law, Fordham, "Internet Jurisdiction". Boston University, School of Law: Hillary Sale (Iowa), "Banks, The Forgotten (?) Partners in Fraud". George Washington University IP Series: F. Scott Kieff, Washington University - St. Louis School of Law, "Introducing a Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Intellectual Property Regimes" Northwestern Tax Series: Howard Abrams, Professor of Law, Emory University, "The Section 734(b) Basis Adjustment Needs Repair". Oxford Financial Law Discussion Group: Andrew Whittaker, Current Issues in Financial Regulation. Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Penelope Simons, Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights: The Adequacy and Effectiveness of Voluntary Self-Regulation Regimes. University of Michigan, Cyberlaw & Economics: Peter Swire, Ohio State, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security? Greene on Sager Abner Greene (Fordham University - School of Law) has posted Can We Be Legal Positivists Without Being Constitutional Positivists? (Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Call for Papers: Development
Wednesday, January 26, 2005
Welcome to the Blogosphere . . . . . . to The Conservative Philosopher, a group blog that includes Keith Burgess-Jackson, Michael C. Sudduth, Jim Ryan, Max Goss, William F. Vallicella, Stephan L. Burton, Robert C. Koons, John Kekes, and Edward C. Feser. Wednesday Calendar
Oxford Centre for Criminology: Mike Hough, Public Attitudes to Punishment and Penal Populism. University College, London, Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy: Professor Niki Lacey (LSE), Analytical jurisprudence versus descriptive sociology revisited. Here is a taste:
UCLA Legal History: Mark Graber, Maryland, Dred Scott as a Centrist Decision. Tuesday, January 25, 2005
Blume & Voigt on the Economic Effects of Human Rights Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt (University of Kassel - Economics and University of Kassel - Department of Economics) have posted The Economic Effects of Human Rights on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Goldman on Warez Trading Eric Goldman (Marquette University - Law School) has posted The Challenges of Regulating Warez Trading (Social Science Computer Review, Vol. 23, No. 24, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Hyman & Silver on Malpractice Liability & Health Care Quality David A. Hyman and Charles Silver (University of Illinois College of Law and University of Texas Law School) have posted The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Bainbridge on Executive Compensation Stephen M. Bainbridge (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) has posted Executive Compensation: Who Decides? (Texas Law Review, 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Tuesday Calendar
University of Chicago Olin Series: Max Schanzenbach, Northwestern University School of Law, Strategic Judging under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Instrument Choice Theory and Evidence. Hofstra University School of Law: Eugene Volokh, UCLA School of Law, "Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions" Loyola Marymount University, School of Law: Georgene M. Vairo, Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, "The Role of Private Individuals in Complex Claims Resolution” Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information: The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding". Lewis & Clark Law School: Dan Rohlf, The Scientific Limits of Democracy. Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Dr David Brennan, What is Equitable Remuneration for Intellectual Property Use? Monday, January 24, 2005
Monday Calendar
University of Texas, Law, Business & Economics: David Dana, Northwestern, "Using The Veil of Ignorance To Ensure Fairness in Class Action Settlements: A Rawlsian/Experimental Economics Approach to of Adequacy of Representation after Stephenson". Conference Announcement: Meeting the Challenge of Grutter
Sunday, January 23, 2005
Legal Theory Calendar
University of Texas, Law, Business & Economics: David Dana, Northwestern, "Using The Veil of Ignorance To Ensure Fairness in Class Action Settlements: A Rawlsian/Experimental Economics Approach to of Adequacy of Representation after Stephenson".
University of Chicago Olin Series: Max Schanzenbach, Northwestern University School of Law, Strategic Judging under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Instrument Choice Theory and Evidence. Hofstra University School of Law: Eugene Volokh, UCLA School of Law, "Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions" Loyola Marymount University, School of Law: Georgene M. Vairo, Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, "The Role of Private Individuals in Complex Claims Resolution” Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information: The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding". Lewis & Clark Law School: Dan Rohlf, The Scientific Limits of Democracy. Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre, Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Dr David Brennan, What is Equitable Remuneration for Intellectual Property Use?
Oxford Centre for Criminology: Mike Hough, Public Attitudes to Punishment and Penal Populism. University College, London, Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy: Professor Niki Lacey (LSE), Analytical jurisprudence versus descriptive sociology revisited. NYU Legal History: James Jacobs, NYU School of Law. UCLA Legal History: Mark Graber, Maryland, Dred Scott as a Centrist Decision.
U.C. Berkeley, Workshop in Law, Philosophy, & Political Theory: Jeff McMahan, Philosophy, Rutgers University, THE BASIS OF MORAL LIABILITY TO DEFENSIVE KILLING. Here's a taste:
Stanford Law & Economics: Christine Jolls (Harvard Law School), "Debiasing Through Law (with Special Reference to Employment Discrimination Law)" Fordham University College of Law: Joel Reidenberg, Professor of Law, Fordham, "Internet Jurisdiction". Boston University, School of Law: Hillary Sale (Iowa), "Banks, The Forgotten (?) Partners in Fraud". George Washington University IP Series: F. Scott Kieff, Washington University - St. Louis School of Law, "Introducing a Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Intellectual Property Regimes" Northwestern Tax Series: Howard Abrams, Professor of Law, Emory University, "The Section 734(b) Basis Adjustment Needs Repair". Oxford Financial Law Discussion Group: Andrew Whittaker, Current Issues in Financial Regulation. Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group: Penelope Simons, Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights: The Adequacy and Effectiveness of Voluntary Self-Regulation Regimes. University of Michigan, Cyberlaw & Economics: Peter Swire, Ohio State, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security?
Oxford, Said Business School (in conjunction with EU Research and Training Network and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy): Corporate Governance Conference. Oxford Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Group: Speaker: H.E. Judge C. G. Weeramantry (Sri Lanka), Globalisation & Sustainable Development Law Lectures, 2005 Hilary Term : Sustainable Justice: The Role of International Law. UCLA Law: Rethinking Redistribution: Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality.
Legal Theory Lexicon: Social Welfare Functions
Background
Cardinal and Ordinal Interpretations of Utility One key divide is between cardinal and ordinal interpretations of utility. An ordinal utility function for an individual consists of a rank ordering of possible states of affairs for that individual. An ordinal function tells us that individual i prefers possible world X to possible world Y, but it doesn't tell us whether X is much better than Y or only a little better. A cardinal utility function yields a real-number value for each possible state of affairs. If we assume that utility functions yield values expressed in units of utility or utiles, then individual's utility function might score possible world P at 80 utiles and possible world Q at 120 utiles. We might represent the utility function U of individual i for P and Q as follows:
Measurement Problems Both cardinality and interpersonal comparability pose measurement problems for economists. Even in the case of a single individual, it is difficult to reliability measure cardinal utilities. Measurements that support interpersonal comparisons are even more difficult to justify, and cardinal interpersonal comparisons seem to require the analyst (the person making the comparison) to make a variety of controversial value judgments. Market prices won't do as a proxy for utility, for a variety of reasons including wealth effects. The challenge for welfare economics was to develop a methodology that yields robust evaluations but does not require the cardinal interpersonally comparable utilities. Pareto This is the point at which Pareto arrives on the scene. Suppose that all the information we have about individual utilities is ordinal and non-interpersonally comparable. In other words, each individual can rank order states of affairs, but we (the analysts) cannot compare the rank orderings across persons. The weak Pareto principle suggests that possible world (state of affairs) P is socially preferable to possible world (state of affairs) Q, if everyone's ordinal ranking of P is higher than their ranking of Q. Weak Pareto doesn't get us very far, because such unanimity of preferences among all persons is rare. The strong Pareto principle suggests that possible world (state of affairs) P is socially preferable to possible world (state of affairs) Q, if at least one person ranks P higher than Q and no one ranks Q higher than P. Unlike weak Pareto, strong Pareto does permit some relatively robust conclusions. The New Welfare Economics The so-called new welfare economics was based on the insight that market transactions without externalities satisfy strong Pareto. If the only difference between state P and state Q is that in P, individuals i1 and i2 engage in an exchange (money for widgets, chickens for shoes) where both prefer the result of the exchange, then the exchange is Pareto efficient. A state of affairs where no further Pareto efficient moves (or trades) are possible is called Pareto optimal. The assumption about externalities is, of course, crucial. If there are negative externalities of any sort, then the trade is not Pareto efficient. Weak Pareto and the Arrow Impossibility Theorem Weak Pareto plus ordinal utility information allows some social states (or possible worlds) to be ranked on the basis of everyone's preferences. A method for transforming individual utility information into such a social ranking is called a social utility function. Kenneth Arrow's famous impossibility theorem demonstrates that it is impossible to construct a social utility function that can transform individual ordinal rankings into a social ranking in cases not covered by weak Pareto, if certain plausible assumptions are made. Arrow's theorem has spurred two lines of development in welfare economics. One line of development relaxes various assumptions that Arrow made; for example, we might relax Arrow's assumption that the social ranking must be transitive (if X is preferred to Y and Y is preferred to Z, then X must be preferred to Z). The other line of development considers the possibility of allowing information other than individual, noncomparable ordinal utilities. It is this second line of development that is relevant to the use of social welfare functions in contemporary law and economics.
F is some increasing function that yields a real number, U1(x) is a cardinal, interpersonally comparable utility value yielded by some procedure for individual 1 for state of affairs X, and N is the total number of individuals. What Are the Plausible Social Welfare Functions? There are a variety of different possible functions that can be substituted for F. Here are some of the most important possibilities:
Bernoulli-Nash SWF--In the alternative, we could substitute the product function (¡Ç) and multiply individual utilities. This is sometimes called a Bernoulli-Nash social welfare function, which can be represented as follows:
One of the interesting theoretical questons about SWFs concerns the problem of interpersonal comparison. How do we get the values to plug into U1(x), U2(x), and so forth. That is, how do we compare up with a way of putting my utility and your utility on the same scale. As I understand the state of play, this is not a topic on which economists agree. Some economists believe that there is no objective way of producing interpersonally comparable cardinal utility values. But some economists believe that a third-party (the legal analyst or the economist) can do the job of assigning values to individual utilities. Conclusion We've barely begun to scratch the surface of the many interesting theoretical issues that attend the use of social welfare functions in legal theory. Some of those issues were explored in a prior Legal Theory Lexicon entry on Balancing Tests. Even if you have absolutely no background in economics, there is no reason to shy away from the debates about social welfare functions. The notation, although at first intimidating, is actually very simple. The foundational ideas, although sometimes articulated in the jargon of economic theory, really go to fundamental questions in moral theory. I hope this post has given you the tools to begin to discuss these ideas! Saturday, January 22, 2005
Legal Theory Bookworm The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends On Bullshit by Harry G. Frankfurt. Here is a description:
Download of the Week The Download of the Week is Objectivity in ethics: two difficulties, two responses by David Wiggins. Wiggins is one of the deepest and most interesting moral philosophers. Here is a taste from the paper:
Saturday Calendar
Friday, January 21, 2005
Haque on Dan-Cohen Adil Ahmad Haque (Yale University - Law School) has posted The Harmless Thoughts of Meir Dan-Cohen on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Friday Calendar
University of San Diego, School of Law & University of California at San Diego, Department of Political Science and Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies: "Administrative Law and Process in the U.S. and Abroad: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives" (today & tomorrow):
Hathaway Debates Posner at Legal Affairs Alice Dong emails:
Thursday, January 20, 2005
Thursday Calendar
Northwestern University, School of Law, Constitutional Theory Colloqium: Stanley Fish, University of Illinois at Chicago, English, "There Is No Textualist Position". UCLA Legal Theory Workshop: Mark G. Kelman, The Interdependence of Irreconcilable Foundational Beliefs. University Pennsylvania, Legal Theory Workshop: Professor Henry Richardson, eorgetown University Philosophy Department, Nussbaum's critique of Rawls. University College, London, Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy: Professor David Wiggins (Oxford), Objectivity in ethics: two difficulties, two responses. Boston University, School of Law: Jenny Wiggins (Maine) "The Color of Injury: Race, Gender, and Torts in the First Half of the Twentieth Century". Fordham University, School of Law: Elizabeth Cooper, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham, "Choosing Parenthood in the AIDS Epidemic: Can Law Catch Up to Science?" University of Michigan, Cyberlaw & Economics: John Rothchild, Wayne State, Economic Analysis of Technological Protection Measure. The Internet is P2P Read Ed Felten's My Morning Pick-Me-Up about California Senate Bill 96, which is targeted at P2P filesharing software. Here is the key language from the bill:
Strauss on the Story of Overton Park Peter L. Strauss (Columbia Law School) has posted Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Confirmation Wars Department Over at law.com, T.R. Goldman has a piece entitled Handicapping Bush's Judicial Nominations. Here's a taste:
Wednesday, January 19, 2005
Conference Announcement: Some Modest Proposals 2.0
Strauss on Statutes that are not Static Peter L. Strauss (Columbia Law School) has posted Statutes that are not Static - The Case of the APA (Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, Vol. 14, No. 2, February 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Stark on Objections to Endowment Taxation Kirk J. Stark (University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law) has posted Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to Endowment Taxation (Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, January 2005) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Book Announcement: Morton White's From a Philosophical Point of View
Tuesday, January 18, 2005
Tuesday Calendar
Vanderbilt University Law School: Burch Lecture, Professor Erik Jayme, Institute for Foreign, International, Private & Economic Law, Heidelberg. |